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# **“Friendship without Reciprocation? Aristotle, Nietzsche and Blanchot”**

## **Introduction**

What role does reciprocation play in friendship and how can this help us with contemporary understandings of the political bond? For a number of decades a body of work has been developing which attempts to re-conceptualize civic and political relations using the concept of friendship.<sup>1</sup> This body of work either argues for an explicit form of political friendship, or it uses friendship as a model or ideal for civic relations such as citizenship. It is suggested that political or civic friendship can form the basis of a new social bond, a bond which variously invokes care, joint projects, and affection to overcome the perceived individualization, alienation, and fragmentation of contemporary (Western) societies. In response, friendship has been proposed as a corrective for, or alternative to, existing political relations. Some theorists have been content to point to the structuring potential of friendship, often pointing out how it provides pockets of resistance and solidarity for otherwise marginalized groups. In the thought of these theorists such as King and Friedman, friendship contributes towards the basic social and civic fabric.<sup>2</sup> Others explore the possibilities of friendship for civic relations and especially citizenship. In this vein whilst Digeser is skeptical that friendship can be a part of a model of citizenship, nevertheless it can be a part of a civic ideal for some citizens.<sup>3</sup> Scorza views friendship as having the potential ‘to enrich the contemporary practice of citizenship’. This is because Scorza argues that there are direct similarities between being a good friend and being a good citizen.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Edyvane has argued that ‘the bond of friendship provides the most promising source of solidarity of a liberal political community in conditions of pounced moral conflict’.<sup>5</sup> Others take a more radical view.

For example, Schwarzenbach argues for a form of civic friendship modelled on the experience and labour of women. Such a civic friendship would entail a praxis of care.<sup>6</sup> In addition, Graham M. Smith has argued that friendship is a central term in conceptualising the political as it brings us back to the basic encounter of self and other in relation to order and value.<sup>7</sup> More recently, Smith and Nordin have offered a ‘manifesto of sorts’ which argues that friendship can form the basis of a new politics understood as ‘the open-ended and ongoing encounter with the other’ which holds open ‘a shared space open for the potentialities that that encounter brings’.<sup>8</sup> In this vision the unity of the self of both the person and politics is brought into question via friendship. In the thought of each of these theorists friendship is not reduced to one of its varieties, but is considered to take a specifically socio-political form. Indeed, both Digeser and Smith are keen to underline this point.<sup>9</sup>

In thinking about social and political relations friendship can be said to be addressing one of the most pressing questions of our time: what can form the basis of political relations and action in a condition when established ethical, social, and political frameworks are coming under increasing stress and strain? As will be shown, friendship has something to say to this condition which situates people as both being capable of greater and more diverse forms of connection and yet fearing isolation and fragmentation. Given the deep social and political questions of our time, such an attempt to theorize relations beyond the established tropes of individualism and community is worth exploring.<sup>10</sup> In order to contribute to this discussion this article focuses on one common assumption about friendship: that it is a reciprocal relationship. It does so by exploring a ‘minor strand’ in thinking about reciprocation and friendship. In contrast to the dominant strand which stresses closeness and reciprocity, this minor strand reconfigures friendship displacing and even by dispensing with reciprocation. In addition, by relating reciprocity to togetherness, a tension can also be made visible in friendship. This tension concerns seeing the friend as another but separate self which might lead to an exclusionary or

hostile attitude to difference and otherness; and what some have seen as a dangers of merging the self and the reproduction of sameness.<sup>11</sup> This minor strand of friendship suggests that abandoning the connection between friendship and reciprocation allows a reformulation of friendship which is modeled on the space between self and other, rather than the closeness and identity of self and self. Such a reformulated understanding of friendship has implications for how we model and understand civic relations. Whereas previous models have focused on what is shared and what is held in common, this model would emphasize difference, diversity, and even separation. In so doing this model maps onto the very relations that have caused contemporary theorists so much concern.

Before outlining how the article will proceed, it is worth pausing at this point to say something about the notion of ‘reciprocity’ itself. Reciprocity is clearly a common notion both in ordinary parlance and theoretical discourse. Whilst it finds a home in political and economic discourse (states might have reciprocal agreements for example), it is also a term which is especially associated with friendship. When attempting to summarize what ‘reciprocity’ is there is broad general agreement in theoretical circles. For example, Blackburn defines ‘reciprocity’ as ‘the practice of making an appropriate return for a benefit or harm received from another’<sup>12</sup> and Becker agrees writing that ‘reciprocity is the practice of making a fitting and proportional return of like for like: of good for good, and evil for evil’.<sup>13</sup> In short, and at its most basic level, reciprocity indicates a relationship of *quid pro quo*. Benefits are given with the expectation of receiving benefits; and if one does harm one can expect harm in return. In this way this view of reciprocity can be found to underpin the Ancient Greek dictum ‘help friends and harm enemies’. Perhaps as a result of the general agreement as to what ‘reciprocity’ means, most philosophical attention to the notion has been around the status of reciprocity as a moral principle (especially in relation to other principles), whether reciprocity is

required in all exchanges or only those that are voluntary or invited, and how a person can measure the proportionality of reciprocation.<sup>14</sup> However, although this view is fairly standard it is worth investigating ‘reciprocity’ as it is more complex and context bound notion than it might first appear. When thinking about ‘reciprocity’ and ‘reciprocation’ a set of inter-related meanings and usages begin to emerge. Whilst ‘reciprocal’ can mean having ‘an alternate backward and forward motion’<sup>15</sup>, there are two other meanings that are pertinent to the task in hand (and which form the basis of a distinction that we develop in our own account of reciprocation as a feature of friendship). First, ‘reciprocation’ can mean ‘pertaining to a return made for something’.<sup>16</sup> This is the meaning which chimes most closely with the standard understanding. Second, ‘reciprocation’ can also mean ‘corresponding or answering to each other, as being similar or complementary’.<sup>17</sup> In the analysis that follows these two meanings are drawn-out and form the basis of a distinction between two forms of reciprocation found in friendship: reciprocation as: ‘exchange and dependence’, and ‘correspondence’.

The article is divided into three main parts and a conclusion. Each part develops the idea of friendship with an alternative form reciprocation to that of the dominant model. Three theorists are used to help explore the idea that it is possible to conceive of friendships which do not involve reciprocation. The first section draws on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. From this starting-point the article develops two forms of reciprocation that are central to its argument: ‘reciprocation and exchange and dependence’ and ‘reciprocation as correspondence’. It is reciprocation as correspondence that opens a path to thinking about friendship without reciprocation. Such a form of friendship has implications for thinking about personal, social and political relations as it moves away from thinking about these relationships in terms of both closeness and exchange.

Using our notion of ‘reciprocity as correspondence’ as a foundation, the second part focuses on the thought of Nietzsche. Nietzsche predominantly casts friends as akin only insofar as they are capable of individuation and engaging on a philosophical quest. Here ‘correspondence’ is continued, but in a slightly unexpected way as the what is reciprocated between the friends is their ability to maintain their difference. Nietzsche therefore eschews reciprocation as exchange. Intriguingly, Nietzsche also raises the possibility of “friends to come”, where friendship stretches between generations unknown to each other. This stretches reciprocity as correspondence almost to its limit: mutual admiration is removed from spatial and temporal proximity. This leads to the final part of the article which is focused on the thought of Blanchot. Here the separateness of friends becomes absolute. His ideal friendship is beyond reciprocation. Indeed, reciprocation undermines friendship. The article concludes that whilst reciprocation and togetherness represent the dominant strand of thinking about friendship, there remains a minor strand which moves away from these themes. This has important implications for thinking about friendship as it suggests that friendship is a relationship not just of similarity but also difference and radical otherness. In such friendships the other is not reduced to the same, but otherness is a necessary component of friendship. If this is read politically, then contemporary polities face a radical reorientation from the search and promotion of sameness and commonality, to the preservation of difference and diversity.

### ***1.1 Reciprocity bifurcated: Aristotle and friendship***

It is a central claim of this article that whilst reciprocation is present in some friendships it is not essential to all. Ultimately it is possible to conceive of friendship without reciprocation. Furthermore, it is also claimed that there are several different forms

of reciprocation in friendship. In order to begin to explore this claim this section consider the seminal account of friendship in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>18</sup> In that account three species of friendship are motivated by a love of virtue, pleasure, and utility (usefulness).<sup>19</sup> Although different the friendships all appear to share minimal generic features, which helps to explain how the three species of friendship can all be considered forms of friendship despite their obvious differences.<sup>20</sup> Aristotle first discusses his three species of friendship against a backdrop of equality, but he goes on to consider unequal friendships (such as those between superior and inferior men, and family relations).<sup>21</sup> As might be expected, in all these accounts there seems to be some role for reciprocation – but what does Aristotle have in mind, and how does it relate to friendship? In order to make the most sense of Aristotle's account it is necessary to entertain the idea that he relies on two senses of reciprocation: reciprocation as 'correspondence', and reciprocation as 'exchange'. It is this first sense which is primary to Aristotle's most complete form of friendship; and it is also this sense of reciprocation which opens the possibility of the minor strand of friendship illustrated in Nietzsche and Blanchot which displaces reciprocation as a feature of friendship.

Reciprocation enters Aristotle's account of friendship in an explicit way when he uses it to differentiate friendship from mere goodwill which is necessary but not sufficient for friendship. After this, reciprocation remains a background assumption. Aristotle writes that:

(...) in the case of a friend they say that one ought to wish him good for his own sake. Those who wish for the well-being of others in this way are called well-disposed if the same feeling is not evoked from the other party, because

goodwill, they say, is friendship only when it is reciprocated. Perhaps we should add ‘and recognized’; because people are often well-disposed towards persons whom they have never seen, but believe to be good or helpful, and one of the latter might feel the same towards the former: then clearly these people are well-disposed towards each other, but how could we call them friends when their feelings for one another are not known? So friends must be well-disposed towards each other, and recognized as wishing each other’s good, for one of the three reasons stated above [i.e. virtue, pleasure or utility].<sup>22</sup>

Whilst reciprocation is said to be one of the defining features of friendship, Aristotle does not elaborate on what this reciprocation entails. In other words, it is clear that A can hold goodwill towards B, and for B not to hold goodwill towards A. It is also clear that A can hold goodwill towards B, and for B to be aware of this; and for B to hold goodwill towards A, and for A to be aware of this. Is this all that Aristotle means by reciprocation? In friendship, is reciprocation the mutual recognition of goodwill, or is it something more? The standard assumption is that it is something more: reciprocation is an economy of benefits and duties.

To open this up consider how Aristotle might be using the idea of reciprocation. As indicated, two senses suggest themselves: ‘correspondence’ and ‘exchange and dependence’. Although related and not mutually exclusive, these two senses of reciprocation may be thought of independently. The first sense considers reciprocity to be a form of correspondence: a simple pairing or matching. In terms of Aristotle’s passage above, this would mean that the acknowledgement of goodwill is reciprocated insofar as



A's goodwill towards B is recognized by B; and B's goodwill towards A is recognized by A. Notice here that the acknowledgement of goodwill is reciprocated in the sense that they are paired or correspond, but there is no exchange as such, and they are not dependent on each other. Both A and B recognize each other's goodwill, but this recognition is not a condition for them offering their own. This ties in with what Aristotle says elsewhere. Returning to his distinction between mere goodwill and friendship in Book IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle stresses that goodwill is not focused on the intention of gain to the individual, but provoked by the features or qualities of another. He writes: "In general, goodwill is aroused by some merit and goodness, when it seems to one that somebody is handsome or brave or something of that kind (...)"<sup>23</sup> Thus, here is a case of reciprocation as correspondence: the existence and recognition of goodwill is matched, but the existence of that recognition and goodwill is not dependent on the return of goodwill from the other.

The second sense of reciprocation introduces exchange and dependence. Exchange is thicker than correspondence; and dependence a further thickening of exchange. Whilst exchange and dependence work together, the tightness of the connection varies. Consider exchange first. Here exchange without dependence is illustrated in gift-giving. If A gives a gift to B it might be that B is said to reciprocate through offering A a gift at some later point, or even by simply offering gratitude. Here although there is an exchange which can be characterized as a form of reciprocation the exchange is not dependent. A and B do not give in order to receive, even though they occasion the other to give because they have received. As May points out "the gratitude one feels in receiving a friend's gift need not to be the payment of a debt. It can, instead, be the joy in inhabiting a relationship that is not reducible to an economy of debts".<sup>24</sup> The thicker sense of reciprocation as exchange connects it to dependence. In this understanding of reciprocation A's giving B a good is

dependent on at least some form of expected and acknowledged return that A thinks is appropriate, and A ceases to supply B with the good if the appropriate return is not forthcoming. If this view were to be applied to the passage under consideration then it would mean that the goodwill that A and B acknowledge is reciprocated insofar as A and B not only show goodwill to each other, but do so as a response to or return for the other showing goodwill. This, then, is reciprocation as ‘exchange and dependence’. As we shall see, this might be the basis for friendships of utility and pleasure, but it is not the basis for friendships of virtue.

### ***1.2 Reciprocation, justice, and virtue***

As discussed, the issue for Aristotle is to separate full friendship from mere goodwill, but there is a question about the role that reciprocation plays here. However, Aristotle does not first raise reciprocation in relation to friendship. Reciprocation is first raised in relation to justice<sup>25</sup> where Aristotle himself considers two kinds of reciprocation. The first is the idea of a simple reciprocity purportedly supported by the Pythagoreans as “having done to one what one had done to another”.<sup>26</sup> Aristotle rejects this as a form of either distributive or rectificatory justice by pointing-out the intuitive deficiencies of this account. He notes that whilst it might be just for an official to strike another during the course of the official’s duties, if the strike were returned then that would not be just. Furthermore, if an official were to be struck, simply returning the strike would not be considered justice; punishment for the striker would be expected. Nevertheless, Aristotle claims that “It is true that in associations for exchange justice in this form –i.e. reciprocity –is the bond; but it is reciprocity based on proportion, not on equality”.<sup>27</sup> What Aristotle seems to have in mind when talking of “reciprocity based on proportion” is a form of proportionate exchange between parties who desire goods and services from each other. Aristotle notes that such associations are formed by people desiring and supplying

different goods and services, but who facilitate exchange by calculating the proportionate worth of their respective goods and services. ‘Proportionate reciprocation’ is, then, a form of justice in some circumstances; it relates to exchanges based on supply and demand. This kind of reciprocity would be the thickest of those described in the analysis offered by this article (i.e. exchange and dependence).

How, then, does this earlier account of reciprocity relate back to Aristotle’s account of friendship? That ‘proportional reciprocation’ of the kind explained in Aristotle’s account of justice plays a role in friendship for utility can be seen from Aristotle’s attention to disputes in friendships. Utilitarian friendships are based on the hope of benefits and so seem connected to reciprocation as exchange<sup>28</sup>. Indeed, they appear dependent on returns.<sup>29</sup> It is notable that Aristotle describes both gifts and kindnesses as being a possible part of these utilitarian friendships.<sup>30</sup> Clearly he is not thinking of purely ‘mercenary’ friendships. Cooperating with others might primarily aim at bringing benefits, but it also shows concern for another, and exchange is not objectionable in itself.<sup>31</sup> However, the prudent friend will consider kindness shown in these relationships as part of the exchange of the friendship. To avoid dispute kindnesses should be repaid.<sup>32</sup> In friendship for utility, then, appropriate and dependent exchange is the key to understanding reciprocation.

This leaves the question of what form of reciprocation can be identified in the other two forms of friendship. In the case of the friendship for pleasure it seems that the friends remain together for as long as they appear pleasurable to each other and things will dissolve when this ceases to be the case.<sup>33</sup> This sounds a bit like exchange. Yet it is difficult to see how there could be reproach if one of the friends stopped being the source of pleasure. This provides the clue as to what separates this more limited friendship from virtue friendship. Virtuous people perform beneficial actions to each other not because

they expect some return, but simply because they are right and good.<sup>34</sup> It might be that virtue leads to pleasure –but this is not expected or demanded of others. Indeed, it appears to be the expectation of return which leads Aristotle to comment that friendships based on utility or pleasure “never in fact arouse goodwill”.<sup>35</sup> The ‘goodwill’ aroused in such friendships is really goodwill towards ourselves; others are valued insofar as they provide access to what is good.<sup>36</sup> The good at play in such friendships is limited and relative. In contrast, virtue friendships are based around mutual attraction to the good *as such* and desire to see good done,<sup>37</sup> they are not necessarily based on the *exchange* of good acts between the friends. If this is the case, it seems that the thinner form of reciprocation is what Aristotle has in mind for virtue friendships. This does not mean friends are not also useful and pleasant. However, that is secondary to a friendship based on admiration of virtue in self and others, and the desire to see virtue’s work done. In virtue friendships friends recognize goodness in their own character and see that replicated in the character of their friend.<sup>38</sup> In choosing a virtuous friend the virtuous choose what is good absolutely.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, in virtue friendships there is a thinner sense of reciprocation in play: reciprocation as correspondence. In these friendships mutual acknowledgement of praiseworthy qualities and goodwill is a sufficient basis for activity. Aristotle says that although friendship might involve activities (such as spending time together) it is correctly understood to be a state.<sup>40</sup> Friendship is not based on the parties conferring mutual benefits on each other, but on their disposition to do so.<sup>41</sup> Their disposition to do so is motivated not by the desire for a relative good, but the good absolutely. Thus, friendship can endure when the friends are separated (albeit not for too long). The friends might not be presently interacting, but they retain the correct disposition towards each other, and so remain friends. This is also the case when friendships dissolve. Here

Aristotle advises that “one ought to keep a memory of the former intimacy” and show some favor “for old acquaintance sake”.<sup>42</sup> Crucially, for Aristotle, the reciprocity involves acknowledgement or recognition of goodwill.

In summary, reciprocity forms part of Aristotle’s account of friendship, but this is far from a simple matter. In fact, it is the claim of this article that two accounts of reciprocity can be identified: the thickest is ‘exchange and dependence’ and is limited to friendships for utility and pleasure. ‘Correspondence’ is thinner, but underpins virtue friendship. Although virtue friends are useful and pleasant to each other, they are primarily friends because of their appreciation of the good means that they appreciate the good in both themselves and others.<sup>43</sup> Thus the reciprocation in such friendship is one of pairing or ‘correspondence’. Reciprocation is thus central to Aristotle’s thought on friendship, but it is also indicative of reciprocation’s two pathways. It is the direction of one of these pathways, reciprocation as correspondence, opens the possibility of distance between the friends. As will now be seen, Nietzsche develops this both spatially and temporally; Blanchot develops it as an ontological fact of the encounter between self and other. This development of reciprocation and its abandonment produces a different form of friendship to that which is considered standard.

### ***2.1 Reciprocity at the limits: Nietzsche and difference***

In the previous section Aristotle’s thought was used to start to develop a response to two questions: (1) What is reciprocation?; and (2) What role does reciprocation play in friendship? Aristotle’s thought suggests two kinds of reciprocation: this article has termed these forms of reciprocation as ‘exchange’ and ‘correspondence’. If reciprocation can be found in Nietzsche’s account of friendship it is as ‘correspondence’. However,

Nietzsche's view of friendship differs from Aristotle's in two very significant ways. First, whilst Aristotle stresses similarity in the aims and characters of the friends, Nietzsche stresses difference. Second, in Nietzsche's account of friendship there is the possibility that friendships can exist *without* the recognition of mutual goodwill. Nevertheless, as with Aristotle's virtue friends, Nietzsche focuses friendship around the character of the friends, rather than connecting friendship to utility or pleasure. However, as Berkowitz observes, Nietzschean friendship takes up a problem also identified in Aristotle: whether the achievement of virtue makes friendship superfluous.<sup>44</sup> In other words, can there be reciprocation at all?

Generally Nietzsche links friendship to both self-overcoming and self-knowledge, but the right kinds of friends are crucial. This is illustrated in the images of "the ladder" and "the circle" in *Human, All Too Human* and discussed in depth by Abbey.<sup>45</sup> The ladder ascends by choosing a friend appropriate to each step that they take, but the aim of the friendship is to move beyond that friend. The circle has a variety of contrasting friends held together in the person of the circle. The link between friendship and self-knowledge is also made in *Human*.<sup>46</sup> Stressing the obliqueness and defenses of the self, Nietzsche writes that in order for man to know himself then "friends and enemies [must] turn traitor and lead him there by a secret path".<sup>47</sup> Later in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche sees a role for the right kind of friendship, but is aware of the dangers of the wrong kind – especially where it is indulgent and stymies the development and independence of the individual. Nietzsche advises that the individual must 'test' himself. This involves accepting his own judgement and independence; the individual must not "cleave to another person, though he be the one you love most– every person is a prison, also a nook and corner".<sup>48</sup> The right kind of others, then, offer the possibility of self-knowledge and self-development, but closeness can also pose a significant danger.<sup>49</sup>

Some of these concerns play out in Nietzsche's own friendships which are illustrative of his philosophical concerns. Whilst the common view of Nietzsche would assume him to be a friendless misanthrope, the facts paint a very different picture. In fact, Nietzsche maintained a number of important friendships throughout his life and nearly all of them either contributed to, or supported, his life as a philosopher. Of these friendships two are especially illustrative: the friendship with Richard Wagner and then Paul Rée. In both of these friendships we can see the image of 'the ladder' realised. Indeed, the connection is complete because as Nietzsche grew dissatisfied with Wagner, Rée offered 'a change of direction' and 'a sharply defined alternative'.<sup>50</sup> Thus, Wagner and Rée were 'steps' on Nietzsche's own philosophical ladder. In both of these friendships there was a genuine attempt at a personal relationship which was also a spur to independence and greatness. In both friendships what became the Nietzschean themes of friendship were played-out: the philosophical quest, the correct response to hardship and pain, the agonism that slips into antagonism, and the eventual (perhaps inevitable) estrangement, distance and alienation. Once a source of attraction, Nietzsche broke with both men as disappointment, resentment and a sense of betrayal crept into the relationships. Nevertheless, the friendships with both men represent the central paradox of friendship for Nietzsche: that it is both a spur and a snare.

This worry about becoming snared by others sees Nietzsche make a connection between friendship and separateness. Ideally, friendship should be a way of being with others whilst navigating the snares of others. In Aristotle's account of virtue friendships, friends have similarities of character whilst their separateness is preserved. Yet the similarities of character make the friendship one of self-self: the friend recognizes his friend as another self, rather than an *other*. Nietzsche is much more concerned about the possibility of the merging of friends which he views as a danger of friendship. In

Nietzsche's thought there is a complex balancing-act which shows how the friends can be together but apart. For Nietzsche the person is not transparent to their self; the person is already 'in relation' to their self. Thus the structure of friendship is not simply self-self, the otherness of the self of both friends is also factored in.

From the current perspective concerning reciprocity, what is interesting about Nietzsche's discussions of friendship is that if something is reciprocated in his models of friendship, it is neither a simple *quid pro quo* nor a system of mutual exchange. In terms of the two models developed in the section on Aristotle, if reciprocity is present in Nietzsche's account of friendship it is a reciprocity of correspondence rather than exchange. In this sense, Nietzsche would view friendship based around exchange and dependence as undesirable. Such friendship mirrors the view of "justice" developed in the morality of the herd. It is a relationship where friends only do things expecting a return, and do not give freely from a position of strength.<sup>51</sup> There is for Nietzsche a "noble" sense of friendship, but this is based on the completeness and strength of the individual, rather than the demands of morality feelings of sympathy and pity.<sup>52</sup> It is perhaps because of the dangers of pity that Nietzsche stresses the separateness of friends, and this weakens the role of reciprocity. Thus, in exploring Nietzsche's writings another way of understanding friendship begins to emerge. This friendship goes beyond reciprocation as exchange and dependence, and is more akin to reciprocation as correspondence. However, there is a question mark over Nietzsche's thinking here as he entertains the possibility of friendship which stretches even this thinner form of reciprocation to its limits. In doing so, Nietzsche moves beyond the account of Aristotle. To explore this the connection between friendship, enmity and solitude is treated; then the possibilities of spatial and temporal distance in friendship is considered.

## ***2.2 Enmity and solitude***



One of the repeated motifs Nietzsche uses in connection with friendship is enmity.<sup>53</sup> However, the enemy is not the opposite of the friend. In Nietzsche's scheme the capacity for friendship and the capacity for enmity are often (although not always) connected.<sup>54</sup> For Nietzsche friendship is not about togetherness, agreement, and cooperation, but separateness, opposition, and agonism. Nietzsche stresses that friends 'help' each other not by sharing feelings or exchanging favors, nor by collapsing into each other, but by maintaining their distinctiveness and encouraging each other to strive for self-knowledge and self-overcoming. Thus, the friend as the enemy denotes a conception of friendship in which reciprocation would have another meaning to that which is commonly understood. What is reciprocated in this friendship is a mutual toughness and a focus on keeping the right distance.<sup>55</sup> It is a friendship that requires a deliberate separation for the good of the friends and a common strangeness.

One striking passage where Nietzsche makes the connection between friend and enemy concerns the relationship between those who are engaged on his (or Zarathustra's) philosophical quest.<sup>56</sup> Nietzsche portrays such philosophers as anchorites that require solitude to think. However, such solitude is already compromised as the thinker is in dialogue with himself. In other words, for Nietzsche there is already a relationship of difference, and even *otherness*, within the person. The solitary is already divided, and the division means that the person is not necessarily a 'good' friend to their own self. In fact, the person has the potential to lead their own self astray. What is needed, to avoid the solipsistic fate of the thinker, is the friend: "I and Me are always too earnestly in conversation with one another: how could it be endured, if there were not a friend?"<sup>57</sup> It is the friend who saves the philosopher from sinking into his solitary thoughts: "Alas, for all hermits there are too many depths. That is why they long so much for a friend and for his heights."<sup>58</sup>

If the friend is a kind of ‘cork’ which prevents the philosopher from sinking into his own depths, such a rescue does not come without its own dangers. Indeed, the very need for friendship may betray a kind of weakness in the philosopher. The longing for the friend can show that the philosopher has a lack of faith in himself.<sup>59</sup> Ultimately, for Nietzsche, there is a danger which mirrors the danger it is intended to remedy. Just as the individual can sink into himself, so too can the friends sink into each other. There is a danger in friendship which would see the individuality of the friends destroyed through shared understanding and pity.<sup>60</sup> Nietzsche has Zarathustra ask: “Can you go near to your friend without going over to him?”,<sup>61</sup> in other words, is it possible to have proximity to the friend without simply becoming in some way ‘his’? Such a relationship fails to maintain the distinctiveness of the friends, their ability to pursue their own path in their own way, and represents a colonization of one friend by the other. For these reasons Nietzsche stresses the need for friends to ‘adorn’ themselves, and not appear naked before each other. The pity that friends might show each other, their negative judgment of each other in their all too human state, is likely to throw the friends from their philosophical task. Rather than open up and share emotions, friends are advised to become hard and act as enemies to each other: “if you have a suffering friend, be a resting-place for his suffering, but a resting-place like a hard bed, a camp-bed; thus you will serve him best”.<sup>62</sup>

Nietzsche proposes that friends should not save each other from pain through sharing it, but by encouraging each other to endure pain and to learn from it.<sup>63</sup> The reciprocation here is not one of shared feeling, but of working towards a shared goal. Paradoxically, that shared goal is individuation and the maintenance of distance between the friends. The friends seek to cultivate difference in self and other. First, this means opposing the friend and ‘waging war’ both for and against him.<sup>64</sup> Second, it also means saving the friend from his own solitude.<sup>65</sup> Thus, friendship requires the correct

maintenance of distance, knowing when and how to get close, and when to keep a distance from the friend. Nietzsche tells us: “It is not in how one soul approaches another but in how it distances itself from it that I recognize their affinity and relatedness”.<sup>66</sup> In this friendship reciprocity is the recognition that the friends are engaged on the same task. The friends are already distanced (internally) from their own self, and (externally) from each other. The friends display reciprocity as correspondence not because they share emotions or specific virtues, but because they aid each other on the way to self-development. Ultimately the aim of friendship is to overcome the need for friendship.<sup>67</sup>

### **2.3 *Friendship near and far***

In the friendship that has been discussed so far, friends are implied to be in regular contact with each other. As such, Nietzsche is concerned about the basis and nature of their interaction, an interaction which is based on reciprocal recognition rather than exchange. Friends have the necessary strength of character to prevent a collapse of the self; either for the individual collapsing into their own self, or for the selves of the friends to collapse into each other. This basis of friendship in character and quest is reflected in another strand of Nietzsche’s thinking about friendship in *The Gay Science* and echoed in his thought of “friends to come” in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Nietzsche experiments with possibilities of friendship that stress the separateness and distance between friends not only in terms of their relationship, but also in terms of space and time. This aspect of Nietzsche’s thought offers a suggestive glimpse into the possibilities of friendship with very thin forms of reciprocity – perhaps even no reciprocity at all.

The passage “star friendship”<sup>68</sup> is illustrative of this claim. In this passage Nietzsche offers an understanding of friendship which plays-down or even dispenses with reciprocation altogether. He speaks of friends who once sailed together under the same

sun, but whose destinies separated them to the point of becoming strangers. In this passage Nietzsche entertains the idea that friendship can endure even after the friends have separated and their interactions have ceased. The friends have become strangers, but this does not dissolve the friendship.<sup>69</sup> Although the friends were compelled to follow different paths, they *share the memory* of their friendship and maintain high respect for it.<sup>70</sup> If there is reciprocation here it is perhaps no more than a correspondence formed around a memory, although for Nietzsche this clearly implies some impression on present and future actions. The closeness of the friends is not stressed in this account, nor is there mutual knowledge of goodwill. Indeed, this passage is another instance of the connection between friendship and enmity. Nietzsche exhorts his friends to “*believe* in our star friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies”.<sup>71</sup> Here the sense of estrangement is complete, but not the dissolution of the friendship. The *belief* in friendship – the recognition of kinship of character and a sense of purpose – overcomes the potential destructive forces of enmity. The enemies are capable of friendship, and this capacity makes enmity possible.

Another suggestion of friendship based on a stretched view of reciprocation as correspondence appears in the ‘Epode’ of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

Oh longing of youth, which did not know itself! Those I longed for, those  
I deemed changed into kin of mine - that they have aged is what has  
banished them: only he who changes remains akin to me.

Oh life's midday! Oh second youth! Oh garden of summer! I wait in  
restless ecstasy, I stand and watch and wait - it is friends I await, in

readiness day and night, new friends. Come now! It is time you were here!<sup>72</sup>

In speaking of “friends to come” Nietzsche repeats his longing for the philosophers of the future, and the idea that friendship is possible with them. If these friends are to be found in the future then clearly there is no possibility of reciprocation as exchange. There is only the possibility of acknowledgement, admiration, and understanding that Nietzsche and his distant friends are of the same kind and share the same quest despite their distance. The temporal distance of Nietzsche and his friends therefore correlates with the distance already established in other accounts of friendship; the distance between the friend and their own self; the distance between friends who can become enemies; the distance between estranged friends in the “star-friendship”.

Nietzsche’s thought of friends to come is intriguing. Nietzsche’s friends to come follow the same structural form as his other accounts of friendship, stressing the distance needed between self and other. If there is reciprocation this is based on similarity of project (individuation) not similarity or affinity of character in a wider sense. In the “friends to come” this structure of difference and separation is extended over time. Nietzsche’s future friends share in his philosophical purpose. They aid him by being a point of inspiration – and in him they find a fellow traveller and inspiration in turn. This kind of friendship is neither close nor directly reciprocal – but it can still be understood to be a friendship.

Taken as a whole, Nietzsche’s work complicates what it means to be a friend not only by restricting who is capable of friendship, but also by restricting and stretching the

notion of reciprocity. The friends correspond to each other, but this is a correspondence of difference and even antagonism. Moreover, mutual recognition does not seem to be necessary. In reconfiguring friendship and reciprocity in this way, Nietzsche opens the possibility that friendship can exist over both space and time. He does so by stressing that the self is already divided, and that separateness and difference are important in friendship. As will now be seen, Blanchot shows how this can be taken to its extreme.

### **3.1 Reciprocity abandoned: Blanchot, responsibility and friendship**

In Blanchot's thought we see both an acknowledgement that reciprocation forms the vital element of Greek friendship, and a radical departure from this kind of friendship. Indeed, not only does Blanchot abandon friendship as reciprocity, he also abandons its underlying structure of self-self correspondence. Taking this beyond Aristotle and Nietzsche, Blanchot does not focus on the togetherness and similarities of friends or even on their differences, but on their total otherness. Thus friendship is characterized by strangeness and alterity. Reciprocity is abandoned and replaced by responsibility; and it is responsibility rather than reciprocity that is central to friendship. As Blanchot writes: "Greek *philia* is reciprocity, exchange of the Same for the Same, but never opening onto the Other, discovery of the Other as responsible for him (...)"<sup>73</sup>

As we observed with Nietzsche's friendships, Blanchot's approach to friendship was not 'merely' theoretical. His life shows that he held some deep friendships, notably with Emmanuel Levinas (from 1925 until Levinas' death in 1995), and with Georges Bataille (from 1940 until Bataille's death in 1962). Although the friendships were deep and lasting they are not friendships of sameness or oneness. Both friendships were occasions to think about and to encounter difference and otherness. Although the thought

of both Levinas and Bataille would influence Blanchot his response is not to simply pay tribute or to find points of similarity between himself and his friends. On the contrary, Blanchot enters into dialogue with his friends as others, and engages with their work to stress difference and separation. Blanchot stresses the uniqueness and singularity of their encounter. It is these themes which are also seen to run through his written work on friendship.

In order to trace the reconfiguration of friendship through the abandonment of reciprocity it is necessary to consider two other themes in Blanchot's thought about friendship. The first is the contrast that Blanchot makes between friendship and comradeship; the second is the connection he makes between friendship, memory, and death. These issues are connected by the motif of strangeness.<sup>74</sup> Blanchot links this theme to the very meaning of being that leads him away from reciprocation. Beings that are radically other can share nothing but the acknowledgement of the distance between them. As Derrida observes, in Blanchot's thought reciprocity is an ontological impossibility.<sup>75</sup>

In *The Unavowable Community*<sup>76</sup> Blanchot links the basis of communication (and thus community) to friendship which he characterizes as "a relation without relation".<sup>77</sup> Blanchot moves away from another form of community based on the "immanence of man to man" which treats man as a work.<sup>78</sup> Its underlying structure is really a relationship between same and same. Nothing 'other' transcends the relations where persons attempt to fashion the world in their own image. This is a problem that Blanchot shares with Levinas. The concern is about trying to think about the Other in a way which does not make that Other an object of knowledge or a product of the Self. Hole explains the danger: "The other is always illuminated for the subject through her own understanding of the world".<sup>79</sup> Conscious of this problem, Blanchot questions this perspective of immanence and the reciprocity it implies. He writes: "However, if the relation of man with man ceases

to be that of the Same with the Same, but rather the other as irreducible and – given the equality between them – always in a situation of dissymmetry in relation to the one looking at that other, then a completely different relationship imposes itself and another form of society which one would hardly dare call a ‘community’.”<sup>80</sup>

This is essential to Blanchot’s view of friendship: it is not a meeting of self with self, but a dissymmetry between self and other.<sup>81</sup> This space or separation is all that is truly recognized, and it is essential for friendship. It makes friends aware of their own self.<sup>82</sup> This echoes and amplifies Nietzsche’s views on friendship and especially his stress on the separateness of friends and the possibility of maintaining the relationship over space and time. For Nietzsche the friends could still mirror one another – albeit that a mirror provides a cold and unyielding surface.<sup>83</sup> Nietzsche connects the friends through a taut reciprocity of correspondence by focusing friendship around a reciprocal appreciation and acknowledgement of character and project. Blanchot abandons this idea. Blanchot’s friends are other to each other and share nothing save the space that exists between them as a result of acknowledging each other’s alterity. In this sense, friendship is not about affinity, sameness, and closeness, but about secrecy, difference, and the unknown. “In the friend I do not find the mirror of myself, rather between myself and the friend something unknown and unspoken remains. This means that friendship is not part of the logic of recognition through which I construct my identity, but on the contrary places me outside of myself. Thus, friendship, properly speaking, is not a stage on the way to a community founded on the ‘we’.”<sup>84</sup>

It is perhaps some of these concerns which inform Blanchot’s recollection of the Action Committees of May 1968 in *For Friendship* where he comments on comradeship. Blanchot contrasts the use of the familiar form *tu* used amongst his comrades which “did not allow for age differences or the recognition of prior fame” with the continued use of



*vous* between Blanchot and those with whom he had pre-established friendships.<sup>85</sup> Blanchot then draws attention to a prohibition written on the walls: “It is forbidden to grow old”. The relationship of comradeship is fundamentally an act of work. Comradeship is formed around a task; comrades fashion the world and others in their *own* image. It involves agreement and equality and rejects difference. It is a relationship of Same-Same. The prohibition against growing old could mean that a person should not give up youthful optimism and vitality. However, from another perspective the prohibition forbids difference to occur. It prevents the presence of one of the essential ingredients of friendship for Blanchot: the passage of time.<sup>86</sup> The comrades are locked in the familiar form of *tu* and the difference and distance indicated by the use of *vous* is not allowed to emerge. This distance and difference between persons is crucial to Blanchot’s conception of (negative) community. It is also crucial to his conception of friendship. In contrast to the same-same relationships indicated by the agreement and work of comradeship, Blanchot comments that his friends need not, and did not, “agree”, but were “united even in our disagreements”.<sup>87</sup> The reproduction of sameness is not, therefore, necessary in Blanchot’s friendship. In this sense he looks to difference. However, Blanchot’s view is more radical than this: he connects friendship not only to difference, but to Otherness.

In this connection to otherness a deeper understanding of the prohibition against growing old shows how Blanchot’s comradeship differs from friendship. It removes the effects of time from human relations, and not least fact of death.<sup>88</sup> Blanchot claims that we know when friendship comes to an end, but we do not know when it begins.<sup>89</sup> it takes time and in this sense he can claim: “We were friends and did not know it”.<sup>90</sup> This is surprising in two senses. First we might compare Blanchot’s claim to one of Socrates when he states he and his friends recognize each other’s friendship, but cannot say what it is. Aristotle

continues this need for mutual recognition in this account of friendship. Here we have instances of reciprocity as correspondence as being central to friendship. In Nietzsche's thought the friends recognise each other as friends, albeit that this is not simultaneous. In Blanchot's formulation friendship this is carried through to friendship in the present. Being in a friendship, is not connected the logic of reciprocity in any way. And whilst reciprocity invites a logic of the same with same, for Blanchot friendship is based around a logic of Self with Other.

This separation and distance between friends is brought out by the activity of the friendship itself. In a sense, the only thing which is essential in friendship is the recognition that the other shares the fundamental separation which exists between friends, and that friends experience each other as an interruption of being.<sup>91</sup> It is difficult to know how to interpret Blanchot on this point. Could it be that once a person realises that they cannot know the other, then they are in a 'relationship' with everyone (albeit a kind of negative relationship)? From one perspective this is surely ontologically true for Blanchot. Yet, his point seems to be somewhat different – or at least the significance of his point in relation to friendship. Blanchot seems to be saying that friendship occurs when the person encounters the other and they mutually recognise their estrangement or difference. This, then, moves the position towards mutual recognition, and it must be conceded that it does not appear possible in Blanchot's scheme to have a friendship without this mutual recognition of difference. Is this, then, a form of reciprocity after all? What militates against this conclusion is that for Blanchot whilst both parties recognise their separation from each other, the recognition of separation *as such* is not dependent on the response or reciprocity of the other. Indeed, we can never know how the other responds precisely because of the separation. Thus, friendship is perhaps less of an ontological state than an attitude or ethos towards the other. The other is different and

separate. Friendship involves a special obligation to the other (responsibility) but this is demanded by the very otherness and separateness of the friends, not because they are involved in an economy of *quid pro quo*. In other words, they respond, rather than correspond.

What is clear from Blanchot's account is that without the possibility of difference and distance the friendship breaks-down. This is illustrated when Blanchot considers the relationship between friendship and death. From one perspective death can be expected to place a limit on friendship. The friends know the inevitability that one of them will die. When this happens, the dead friend is said to have 'left' the living friend behind and the friendship has ended. It is this separation which forestalls communication, action, and reciprocity. Yet, in a reversal of this common assumption, Blanchot claims that death ends a friendship not because of the imposition of absolute separation but because death effaces the very possibility of separation. In the absence of the presence of the other, death reveals that separation between self and other was present all along. The death of the friend is a kind of abandonment which forces the remaining friend back on to their self.<sup>92</sup> It is ironic, therefore, that it is death, the termination of friendship, that reveals the truth of friendship. Blanchot writes: "(...) death has the false virtue of appearing to return to intimacy those who have been divided by grave disagreements. This is because with death all that separates disappears".<sup>93</sup>

Even in life friendship is not based on disclosure, transparency, or similarity, even though it appears to leave room for this. Friendship is not about knowing or recognising the friend. For Blanchot, death makes obvious our inability to know another person. We can talk *to* them, but not *about* them; we can speak *with* them, but not *for* them.<sup>94</sup> Even the books and letters that a person may leave behind are no clue to their fundamental being which remains separate and inaccessible. In death the dead friend is held as an

image or memory. Such an image or memory is not really the friend and we do not, and cannot, continue a friendship with them. What becomes clear in death is that this was also the case in life. It is not the friend who is known, but an image of the friend. This image of the other is not the truth of the other, it is a part of the mind of the self. The other remains totally other. Friendship is the recognition and maintenance of this condition, not a correspondence with the other. Once the possibility of separation is lost – once the friend becomes nothing more than a memory – they are colonised into the self of the living.

Thus, Blanchot's thought can be said to sever the connection between friendship and reciprocity. In a condition of absolute otherness friends are connected only in their recognition of their mutual disconnection. There is an unbridgeable distance between them and they are truly strangers. Yet, far from lamenting this separation, Blanchot celebrates it. To his mind friendship is something more than acting under obligation and expectation. Moreover, friendship is only possible when persons can overcome the desire to seek the same and to reproduce self with self. For Blanchot, friendship is only possible when if reciprocity is abandoned: friendship is acting in a free and responsible way towards others in the knowledge of our strangeness and without the certainty of recognition and reciprocation.

### **Conclusion: friendship and reciprocation reconsidered**

This article started with a discussion of a thinker who places reciprocity at the centre of his account of friendship; it ended with a discussion of a thinker who abandons the link between reciprocity and friendship entirely. In so doing the connection between reciprocity and friendship has been questioned, and a way of thinking about friendship which is not dependent on reciprocity in the usual sense has been identified. Where

reciprocity is seen to be a component of friendship, friendship is framed as a meeting of those who are alike. Similarity, affinity, and sameness are stressed. Where the idea of reciprocity in friendship is stretched or abandoned, friendship is framed in terms of difference. Distance, discontinuity, and otherness are stressed. The meaning and role of reciprocity would thus seem to have significant effects on the nature and potentialities of friendship.

The connection between reciprocity and friendship has been explored by positing the development of two accounts of reciprocity: reciprocity as ‘exchange and dependence’, and reciprocity as ‘correspondence’. These two were initially developed through a discussion of Aristotle. As such, they are constructed to help make clear something that Aristotle and the standard account leave opaque: the exact meaning of reciprocity in relation to friendship. Whilst this article has discussed two ways in which reciprocation can be understood, there might well be other forms of reciprocity yet to be identified and discussed. In order to discover and develop these forms of reciprocity more attention needs to be given to the subtleties and silences of those theorists who make reciprocity central to their accounts of friendship – and attention also needs to be paid to those thinkers who implicitly or explicitly marginalize or even abandon the idea.

This attention is crucial if friendship is to become a part of political analysis. As we noted in the introduction, there is now a body of work which entertains and even advocates friendship as a model or ideal to be realized in civic and political life. However, thus far those focused on friendship have not only assumed that it is a reciprocal relationship, but they have also assumed that it is obvious what reciprocation means. This article has challenged this in two ways. First, it has shown that reciprocation can take different forms. Second, it has suggested that there are forms of friendship which either marginalize or dispense with reciprocation altogether.

If it is the case that there are forms of friendship which do not rely on reciprocation, then this has clear implications for those who are engaged in finding a basis for the social bond in friendship. One, perhaps rather troubling conclusion, might be to accept that some forms of friendship are not reciprocal and that the hopes of forming a social bond are dashed if the route of friendship is followed. Such a non-reciprocal friendship might indicate that the distance and separation between persons is insurmountable – mutual alienation and isolation are simply the common condition. Another, more hopeful approach, would be to accept that non-reciprocal friendship shows us something important about our condition (our separateness), but that whilst this cannot be the basis of the social bond that there might be other features of friendship which can. In other words, friendship might well be a non-reciprocal relationship, but this does not mean that it cannot generate connections between persons or even shared enterprises. Simply because friendship is non-reciprocal does not mean that this is all that it has to offer. Furthermore, if such a non-reciprocal model of friendship were accepted and even embraced then it might well lead theorists to find ways of accepting and preserving difference and singularity within the social sphere.

Reciprocity is, then, a feature of friendship; but perhaps not all friendships. This article has questioned what reciprocity might mean, and has focused on a minor strand of friendship which does not foreground reciprocity in the usual sense. The existence of such a strand of thought should give pause to question common assumptions. This article has pointed to large questions which remain unanswered: if there are forms of non-reciprocal friendship, then what are their implications? This is an important question as it points to the possibility that friendship can move away from a relationship of same-same and the limitations of replication and exclusion that this tends to imply. Non-reciprocal friendship points to the possibility of a relationship which is built on maintenance of a distance

between self and other. As such it points to the possibility of a form of being with others which makes room for diversity and difference, and does not seek to replicate the same in others. Such a form of friendship has implications for thinking about both personal and political relations moving beyond the replication of the self towards a true encounter between self and other. The question of reciprocity in friendship should thus be reopened – and much might depend on how it is answered.

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## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> For surveys of the various forms of friendship see: Graham Little, *Friendship: Being Ourselves With Others* (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 1993); Leroy S. Rouner, ed., *The Changing Face of Friendship* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994); Patrick Murphy, ed., 'Friendship', *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (1998); Sandra Bell and Simon Coleman, eds., *The Anthropology of Friendship* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999); Preston King and Heather Devere, eds., 'The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 2, no. 4 (1999); Ray Pahl, *On Friendship* (Great Britain: Polity, 2000); John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko, eds., *Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); Bernadette Descharmes and others, eds., *Varieties of Friendship: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Social Relationships* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress 2010); Mark Vernon, *The Meaning of Friendship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- <sup>2</sup> Preston T. King, 'Friendship in Politics' in Preston T. King and Graham M. Smith (eds.) *Friendship in Politics* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 9-30; Marilyn Friedman, *What Are Friends For?: Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory* (United States: Cornell University Press, 1993).
- <sup>3</sup> Paige E. Digeser, *Friendship Reconsidered: What It Means and How It Matters to Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), chapter 5.
- <sup>4</sup> Jason A. Scorza, "Liberal citizenship and civic friendship", *Political Theory* 32, no. 1 (2004): 85-108.
- <sup>5</sup> Derek Edyvane, *Community and Conflict: The Sources of Liberal Solidarity* (Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 147.
- <sup>6</sup> Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach SA, "On civic friendship", *Ethics* 107, no. 1 (1996): 97-128; Schwarzenbach, "Democracy and Friendship", *Journal of Social Philosophy* 36, no. 2 (2005): 233-54; Schwarzenbach, *On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
- <sup>7</sup> Graham M. Smith, *Friendship and the Political: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schmitt* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011).
- <sup>8</sup> Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith, "Friendship and the new politics: beyond community", *Global Discourse*, (2018), DOI: 10.1080/23269995.2018.1505348.
- <sup>9</sup> Paige E. Digeser, "Friendship as a family of practices", *AMITY: The Journal of Friendship Studies* 1, no. 1 (2013): 34-52; Digeser, *Friendship Reconsidered: What It Means and How It Matters to Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Graham M. Smith, *Friendship and the Political: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schmitt* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011); Graham M. Smith, "Friendship as a Political Concept: A Groundwork for Analysis", *Political Studies Review*, (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918786856>.
- <sup>10</sup> For a discussion of friendship beyond community see Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith "Friendship and the New Politics: Beyond Community", *Global Discourse*, (2018), DOI: 10.1080/23269995.2018.1505348.
- <sup>11</sup> Sheila Lintott approaches this idea from a concrete perspective: social egalitarianism. She develops the idea that homogeneous friendships contribute to social inequality and suggests that diverse friendships should be encouraged, providing some strategies to do so: "Friendship and Bias: Ethical and Epistemic Considerations", *Journal of Social Philosophy* 46, no. 3 (2015): 318–339.

- <sup>12</sup> Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 405.
- <sup>13</sup> Lawrence C. Becker ‘reciprocity’ in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.) *Encyclopaedia of Ethics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) 1464.
- <sup>14</sup> Cf. Lawrence Becker ‘Reciprocity’ in Edward Craig (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 130.
- <sup>15</sup> John A. Simpson and Edmund S.C. Weiner (eds.) *The Oxford English Dictionary Volume XIII* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 328.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.
- <sup>18</sup> The discussions of Aristotle’s view of friendship are numerous. Of special note are the following: John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship”, *Review of Metaphysics* 30, no. 4 (1977): 619-648; A.W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany: SUNY, 1995); Loraine Smith Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- <sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 261ff. See also Tutuska who claims: ‘Aristotle himself seems to question the adequacy of these categories’. John Tutuska, “Friendship and Virtue: A Fruitful Tension”, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 44, (2010): 351.
- <sup>20</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between the forms of friendship see: William W. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning”, *Phronesis* 20, no. 1 (1975): 51-62; John M. Cooper “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship”, *Review of Metaphysics*; A.D.M. Walker, “Aristotle’s Account of Friendship in the “Nicomachean Ethics”” *Phronesis* 24, no. 2 (1979): 180-196.
- <sup>21</sup> See, for example, Aristotle, *Ethics*, 269-70.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 297.
- <sup>24</sup> Todd May, *Friendship in an Age of Economics, Resisting the Forces of Neoliberalism* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012), 111.
- <sup>25</sup> As Aristotle points out, reciprocity appears primarily in the realm of justice rather than in that of friendship. Nowadays, reciprocity linked to the concept of justice is central to Rawls’ work. Regarding to this, it is very interesting Thomas Brooks, “Reciprocity as Mutual Recognition,” *The Good Society* 21, no. 1, (2012): 21-33.
- <sup>26</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, 182.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.
- <sup>28</sup> An interesting development of the mutually beneficial exchange on a personal level and its criticism appears in “How Not to Argue for Markets”, James S. Taylor, *Journal of Social Philosophy* 48, no. 2 (2017): 165–179.
- <sup>29</sup> Kenneth D. Alpern, “Aristotle on the Friendships of Utility and Pleasure”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21, no. 3 (1983): 314.
- <sup>30</sup> Alpern, “Aristotle on the Friendships”, 311-14; Cooper, “Forms of Friendship”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 639-40.
- <sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1981), 81-5.
- <sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, 283.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 262-3.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 263.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 293.
- <sup>36</sup> Tutuska, “Friendship and Virtue”, 352.
- <sup>37</sup> Donald N. Schroeder, “Aristotle on the Good of Virtue-Friendship”, *History Of Political Thought* 13, no. 2 (1992): 206-209.
- <sup>38</sup> John M. Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle”, *Philosophical Review* 86, no. 3 (1977): 310-15; Schroeder, “Aristotle on the Good”, *History Of Political Thought*, 209-11; Tutuska, “Friendship and Virtue”, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 354-5.
- <sup>39</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, 267.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 293.
- <sup>43</sup> Schroeder, “Aristotle on the Good”, *History Of Political Thought*, 211.
- <sup>44</sup> Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 171. Cf. Schroeder, “Aristotle on the Good”, *History Of Political Thought*, 211-14.



- <sup>45</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehman (London: Penguin Books, 1994), §368. For a discussion see: Ruth Abbey, 'Circles, Ladders and Stars: Nietzsche on Friendship', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 2, no. 4 (1999): 50-73. Abbey's account remains the standard. This article adds to this by developing the explicit concern with reciprocity in Nietzschean friendship.
- <sup>46</sup> Nietzsche, *Human*, §491.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>48</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), §41.
- <sup>49</sup> Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 87; Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-4.
- <sup>50</sup> Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), xii.
- <sup>51</sup> Berkowitz, *Nietzsche*, 73; Cf. Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, 82.
- <sup>52</sup> Nietzsche, *Beyond*, §260.
- <sup>53</sup> Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, 213.
- <sup>54</sup> Cf. *Beyond*, §260 where friends and enemies seem to be separated, with the latter forming a kind of 'conduit system' for negative emotions so as the former can be approached with good grace. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 'Of the friend', 83; Cf. Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, 86.
- <sup>55</sup> Stanley Rosen, *The Mask Of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 111; Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, 91-2.
- <sup>56</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Friend', 82.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.; Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, 85; Berkowitz, *Nietzsche*, 172.
- <sup>59</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Friend', 82.
- <sup>60</sup> Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, 91-2. Cf. Abbey where some emotions may be exercised in friendship, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, 66-71.
- <sup>61</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Friend', 83.
- <sup>62</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Compassionate', 113-4.
- <sup>63</sup> This view is foreshadowed in *Human* where Nietzsche writes that 'Shared joy, not compassion, makes a friend', §499.
- <sup>64</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Friend', 82.
- <sup>65</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Poesía Completa, bilingual Edition English-Spanish*, (USA: Trotta, 2008).
- <sup>66</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims', §251. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehman (London: Penguin Books, 1994), §368.
- <sup>67</sup> Rosen, *Mask of Enlightenment*, 111; Berkowitz, *Nietzsche*, 173.
- <sup>68</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §279. Abbey discusses this section, 'Circles, Ladders and Stars'.
- <sup>69</sup> Nietzsche, *Science*, §279.
- <sup>70</sup> This is somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle's advice concerning estranged friends.
- <sup>71</sup> Nietzsche, *Science*, §279.
- <sup>72</sup> Nietzsche, *Beyond*, 'Epode'. Cf. Christa Davis Acampora and Keith Ansell Pearson, *Beyond Good and Evil: A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2011), 212-16.
- <sup>73</sup> Maurice Blanchot, 'For Friendship', in *Maurice Blanchot: Political Writings, 1953-1993*, trans. Zakir Paul (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 142-3. Cf. Simon Critchley, 'Forgetfulness Must: Politics and Filiation in Blanchot and Derrida', *Parallax* 12, no. 2 (2006), 16-7.
- <sup>74</sup> William Large, 'Blanchot, Philosophy, Literature, Politics', *Parallax* 12, no. 2 (2006), 4.
- <sup>75</sup> Blanchot. 'For Friendship', 295-6.
- <sup>76</sup> Pierre Joris, 'Preface', in Maurice Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community*, trans. Pierre Joris (New York: Station Hill, 1988), xi.
- <sup>77</sup> Blanchot, *Unavowable Community*, 25.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid., 2.
- <sup>79</sup> Kristin Hole, 'The Ethics of Community: Nancy, Blanchot, Esposito', *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 18, no. 3 (2013), 105. Levinas attempts to avoid replicating this colonial dynamic by recasting the question of the Other from 'What is the Other?' to 'Who is the Other?', see Lars Iyer, 'The Impossibility of Loving: Blanchot, Community, Sexual Difference', *Journal for Cultural Research* 7, no. 3 (2003), 230.
- <sup>80</sup> Blanchot, *Unavowable Community*, 3
- <sup>81</sup> Lars Iyer, "The Impossibility of Loving", 230-1.
- <sup>82</sup> Large, "Blanchot, Philosophy, Literature, Politics", *Parallax* 12, 6.

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- <sup>83</sup> Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 'Of the Friend', 83.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>85</sup> Blanchot, 'For Friendship', 141.
- <sup>86</sup> Critchley, "Forgetfulness Must", *Parallax* 12, 13.
- <sup>87</sup> Blanchot, 'For Friendship', 141.
- <sup>88</sup> Critchley, "Forgetfulness Must", *Parallax* 12, 14; Stella Gaon, 'Communities in Question: Sociality and Solidarity in Nancy and Blanchot', *Journal for Cultural Research* 9, no. 4 (2006), 396; Sandra Lynch, *Philosophy and Friendship* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005) 78-9.
- <sup>89</sup> Blanchot, 'For Friendship', 134.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>91</sup> Lars Iyer, "The Sphinx's Gaze: Art, Friendship, and the Philosophical in Blanchot and Levinas", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 39 (2001), 192.
- <sup>92</sup> Lynch, *Philosophy and Friendship*, 79; Goan, "Communities in Question", *Journal for Cultural Research* 9, 396.
- <sup>93</sup> Maurice Blanchot, *Friendship*, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 292.
- <sup>94</sup> Blanchot, *Friendship*, 291; See also, Critchley, 'Forgetfulness Must', 20.