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Retirement Planning for Dictators: What Happens to Outgoing Dictators?*

Seiki Tanaka†

Abstract

What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a key benefit by holding competitive elections: a better post-tenure fate. According to my argument, autocrats who introduce competitive elections receive implicit or explicit assurances that they will be able to leave office and retire peacefully. By contrast, failing to hold a competitive election is more likely to result in a violent removal such as execution, prosecution, and/or foreign intervention. The paper tests the argument by analyzing a cross-national dataset of autocrats’ fates between 1960-2004, and the results provide evidence that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections are more likely to lose power peacefully, and the result holds regardless of regime types.

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1 Introduction

The introduction of political institutions such as multiparty elections, political parties, legislatures, and constitutions may not be just “window-dressing” for autocratic leaders. Instead, implementing such reforms, some argue, helps autocrats retain power, because they appear to increase legitimacy, placate citizens, and satisfy members of the opposition (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Blaydes 2011; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Kim 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Wright 2008).\(^1\) While many scholars have attempted to illuminate what happens to autocratic regimes after the introduction of such political institutions, what happens to autocratic leaders who approve their adoption remains murky. This paper examines leaders’ fates by focusing on one democratic institution - competitive elections, defined as a contest with at least two candidates on the ballot - and asks what happens to dictators who hold a competitive election.\(^2\)

For some autocrats, introducing a competitive election is a gamble. In the Philippines in 1986, Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, and Madagascar in 2001, leaders lost elections that they introduced, and failed to remain in power. Further, even for those who win an election, the introduction of competition may have a destabilizing effect on the regime and shorten its duration (Brownlee 2007, Howard and Roessler 2006, Lindberg 2009, Tucker 2007). And the risks do not end with the election outcome: after losing power between 1946 and 2004, 47% of dictators faced dire outcomes such as imprisonment, killings, execution, and exile (Escribà-Folch 2013). Yet in spite of the risks, many autocrats engage in competitive elections: 136

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\(^1\)There are some counter-arguments. See, for example, Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012).

\(^2\)In this article, competitive elections under dictatorship and semi-competitive elections are used interchangeably. Competitive elections do not necessarily mean that elections are free and fair, but in this paper, a competitive election has to satisfy all three of the following criteria: opposition is allowed; there is more than one legal party legal; and there is a choice of candidates on the ballot. The criteria can be determined before an election, while evaluating whether elections were free and fair is difficult and can be done only ex-post (Hyde and Marinov 2012). See also Diamond (2002); Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009); Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010) and Schedler (2002; 2013) about the concept of competitive elections.
competitive elections were held in autocratic regimes between 1960 and 2004.

To illuminate why, I extend autocratic leaders’ time horizons to the period following their rule, the post-tenure period, and argue that while autocratic leaders may not be able to secure a long tenure by introducing competitive elections, they can secure a safe exit -by which I mean that autocrats can avoid violent removal such as prosecution, execution, exile, and/or foreign intervention when they lose power. In other words, the possibility or guarantee of post-tenure political survival following competitive elections is a substantial pay-off for autocrats who introduce competitive elections.

With this motivation in mind, I present a theory of how holding competitive elections leads to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. My central argument is that by holding competitive elections, autocrats can receive implicit or explicit assurances about their post-tenure retirement. Implicitly, competitive elections generate legitimacy for autocrats, which makes it more difficult for other actors to punish them than their counterparts who do not hold competitive elections. Elections have become common practice in the world, and the international community and domestic movements alike demand that autocrats hold elections (Staniland 2014). Accordingly, if an autocrat concedes and holds a competitive election, domestic actors will find it more difficult to punish him and international actors will face a disincentive to do so, to avoid deterring others from holding elections. As a result, the autocrat who implements a competitive election will face fewer threats to a peaceful post-tenure fate. Autocrats can also hold a competitive election in exchange for an explicit reassurance that he can retire peacefully, in the form of immunity from prosecution or a new political position. The implications of both implicit and explicit reassurance are that autocrats who hold competitive elections should be more likely to enjoy a safe retirement.

Using cross-national data on elections and autocrats’ post-tenure fates, I test the argument. Estimating the effect of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-tenure fates is not straightforward, because there is a concern that those who introduce competitive elections
are systematically different from those who do not, and the elections adopters are already more likely to enjoy a peaceful exit. To address these concerns, the empirical analyses estimate the impact of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-election fates while holding observables constant, and rely on entropy balancing to adjust imbalances in covariates (Hain-mueller 2012). In other words, this paper estimates whether the “treatment” (i.e., holding a competitive election) provides a better post-tenure fate than the “control” (i.e., not holding such an election). The analyses show that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections have a better post-tenure fate than those who do not.

Other work such as Cox (2009) and Escribà-Folch (2013) broadly examine autocratic leaders and track outgoing leaders in transition. However, by focusing on the impact of competitive elections on post-tenure fates of autocratic leaders and employing a more rigorous inference strategy, this paper shows that competitive elections enable autocrats to secure better post-tenure fates. This finding holds regardless of regime type. While regimes with a political party system may be less likely to punish autocrats (Cox 2009; Geddes et al. 2014; Escribà-Folch 2013), this paper shows that holding competitive elections can help autocrats improve their post-tenure fates even in regimes without political parties: compared to not holding competitive elections, competitive elections reduce the likelihood that other actors will seek to punish the autocrat.

The paper also suggests that learning about the fates of dictators provides new insights into autocrats’ decisions at critical points when political liberalization becomes possible. First, revealing the importance of ex-post political survival for an autocrat may affect the likelihood of holding a competitive election. Though some scholars contend that the spread of human rights norms could be counter-productive for political development (e.g., Escribà-Folch and Wright 2012; Mchangama and Verdirame 2013), my argument indicates a more nuanced association: the threat of international prosecution for human rights violations does not prevent autocrats from liberalizing; rather, they may be more likely to introduce reforms
and step down in exchange for immunity. Further, shifting the explanatory unit to leaders and discussing the possible path of leadership change under autocracy contributes to the recent literature of regime types (Geddes et al. 2014; Schuler et al. 2013), because holding competitive elections tends to result in political liberalization in the long-term (Howard and Roessler 2006, Lindberg 2009). This, in turn, suggests that offering better post-tenure fates after competitive elections may increase the chance of political liberalization.

This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the literature and outlines the paper’s hypotheses to explain variation in autocrats’ post-tenure fates. Section three outlines my research design, and section four presents the empirical analyses. Finally, section five concludes by discussing policy implications and the contributions of the paper.

2 Competitive Election and Post-tenure Fates

This paper argues that holding competitive elections leads to a key benefit for autocrats: a safer retirement. In most theoretical frameworks, the choice that dictators face is whether to retain power or step down, and losing office results in zero or negative payoff (e.g., Tullock 1987). Following this logic, if competitive elections lead to a shorter tenure and autocrats eventually lose power (e.g., Howard and Roessler 2006), then they have an incentive to hold competitive elections only when a revolutionary threat is imminent (e.g., Cox 2009; Geddes 2006). However, some scholars suggest that there are important cases in which autocrats introduce competitive elections because they are reassured about their post-tenure fates, and the payoff associated with losing power is non-zero, or positive (e.g., Przeworski 1988). On the other hand, a growing number of former autocratic leaders have faced criminal prosecutions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2012; Kim and Sikkink 2010). Escribà-Folch and

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3A similar argument has been offered by other scholars (Cox 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2009). Cox (2009), for instance, argues that autocratic regimes hold competitive elections in order to gain information that would reduce the risk of violent removal from office via a coup d’état or revolution.
Wright (2012) argue that prosecutions of dictators increase the cost of leaving office due to past human rights violations and the possibility of facing prosecution, and contemporary autocrats are less likely to step down.

I argue that a dictator’s dilemma is not the choice to retain power or step down, but: (1) either not to hold a competitive election, retain power as long as possible, and eventually face a “high-risk” exit; or (2) to hold a competitive election and avoid a high-risk exit, even though it may shorten how long the autocrat retains power. Here, I consider three exit possibilities as high-risk: exile, prosecution in domestic and international courts, or execution. In other words, I argue that there is a strong association between competitive elections and the avoidance of such high-risk exits.

How does holding a competitive election lead to an improved post-tenure fate for autocrats? Schelling (1966) suggests that in order for an autocrat to hold an election, an implicit or explicit reassurance has to be offered to an autocrat so that his payoff for losing power becomes non-zero. I identify two types of reassurance autocrats can receive through competitive elections: (1) legitimacy; and (2) an explicit pact.

First, competitive elections can generate international and domestic legitimacy for autocrats (Alagappa 1995). Autocrats can secure better post-tenure fates because holding a competitive election increases their reputation as politicians and even after they lose power, they can be respected as a “good” politician who followed the rule of law and held a competitive election. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies have made it clear that they prefer governments elected through competitive elections (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Marinov and Goemans 2013). Such a policy posture makes it relatively more difficult for other actors to punish autocrats who hold competitive elections, because the international community does not want to deter other autocrats from holding elections.

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Their argument is based on the existence of international election observers but it is highly correlated with whether or not an election is competitive.
This legitimacy-generating effect can happen even for unpopular dictators. For example, after 10 years of repressive rule, by holding the first competitive election in a decade, Ghana’s president Rawlings gained respect and stepped down as the guardian of a democratic transition. Though holding competitive elections does not provide autocrats with immunity for past crimes, I expect that domestic and international actors are less likely to punish autocrats who hold competitive elections, as opposed to those who lack electoral legitimacy.\(^5\)

Some autocrats may feel insecure about their retirement plan if they do not have *explicit* reassurances. Without a third party to ensure a safe retirement, the autocrats may not trust that holding a competitive election will pay off (North 1990; North and Weingast 1989; Olsen 1993; Weingast 1997). In this case, autocrats can leverage a promise of elections in exchange for a pact that can provide an explicit reassurance. This type of reassurance typically includes an immunity clause in the constitution, a pact between between autocrats and the opposition, or a new position in the government that sometimes involves lifetime immunity. Przeworski (1988) calls these types of explicit pacts “negotiated transitions to democracy,” in which political institutions protect interests associated with the authoritarian regimes, and thus minimize the extent of eventual transformations.\(^6\) For instance, Rawlings of Ghana wrote a new constitution in 1989, two years before his first competitive elections, which gave members of the regime immunity from domestic prosecution following a transition.

In exchange for holding a competitive election, outgoing dictators can also receive a new position in the government. As a result of negotiations with the opposition, for example,

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5In addition to the reputation benefits of legitimacy, some contemporary autocrats have access to monetary benefits. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, founded by the Sudanese billionaire, gives multi-million dollar awards to African leaders who are elected to office, promote democracy, do not steal from the people, and cede power peacefully. The aim of the Ibrahim Prize is to induce African leaders to ensure that they do not remain in office because they lack a retirement plan. Recipients receive five million dollars over ten years, and a lifetime grant of two hundred thousand dollars annually. The prize was first awarded in 2007, to Joaquim Chissano, the former President of Mozambique. Festus Mogae of Botswana won the prize in 2008 (Auletta 2011).

6Some scholars suggest that these explicit pacts between elites sometimes facilitate successful transitions to democracy, by sharing office and/or distributing the rents of office (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992; Karl 1990).
General Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland gained a post in the government – Jaruzelski convened talks to negotiate a transition process, and held a competitive election in 1989, which paved the way toward democratization. Although he resigned from power then, Jaruzelski held the newly created post of president following the election.\(^7\) Regardless of title, a new post in the government may also come with lifetime immunity from prosecution. Though it turned out to be unsuccessful in the end, Augusto Pinochet of Chile was initially provided lifetime tenure as a senator and thus immunity from any legal action by the Chilean constitution written by his regime.\(^8\)

Explicit or implicit reassurance may motivate autocrats to hold a competitive election because they will have a “safe exit” and retirement compared to if they tried to retain power otherwise. While implicit reassurance (i.e., legitimacy) and explicit reassurance (e.g., constitutions) are distinct, the observable implications are the same: both can to a better post-tenure fate for an autocrats. This could hold even if it leads to a shorter tenure for the autocrat. Accordingly, competitive elections are likely to result in better post-tenure fates for autocrats.

This safe exit argument is especially relevant in the contemporary international system, in which dictators are not necessarily “safe” internationally or domestically after they lose power. The international community is developing accepted mechanisms for holding autocrats responsible for past human rights violations or misdeeds against citizens, with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its predecessors, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Once autocrats step down from power, they may be prosecuted by inter-

\(^7\)He then stepped down after one-term, and a general election was held to choose his successor. By contrast, Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania was General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965 to 1989, but his regime suddenly collapsed due to anti-government protests in December 1989. Although he tried to flee the country, he was eventually captured and executed.

\(^8\)See Albertus and Menaldo (2014) for discussion and analysis of the role of constitutions in democratic transitions.
national courts for past human rights violations or misdeeds against their citizens.9

At the same time, political liberalization by elections has become a mode of transition, and elections are now considered the hallmark of democracy and promoted by the international community (Lindberg 2006). Holding a competitive election may not only protect against international prosecution, but may also deter international actors from intervening in the state. As discussed previously, the international community may be reluctant to topple autocrats who hold competitive elections, because they have more international and domestic legitimacy than those who do not hold competitive elections, and intervention might create strong disincentives for other autocrats to implement elections. Based on the same logic, I expect the following to be true: those who hold competitive elections are less likely to be removed by foreign forces than those who do not hold such elections.

Here, it is important to note that there are some broad conditions under which the argument may not be applicable; in particular, some autocrats may not need to hold competitive elections because they already have decent post-tenure fates. For example, if the incumbents are confident of no violent removal, they may not hold costly and risky competitive elections to secure political survival after losing power. Since the established succession system can lower the likelihood of violent exit of autocratic leaders (Escribà-Folch 2013; Geddes et al. 2014), autocrats in such a system may not hold competitive elections. Escribà-Folch (2013) in particular argues that an established succession system facilitates post-tenure political survival of autocrats, because it is possible for outgoing dictators to remain in the ruling coalition in such regimes with institutionalized procedures for leadership succession. Yet, even in regimes with an established succession system or in non-personalist regimes, this paper argues that if the incumbent leader is not sure about his post-tenure fate, he will be better off holding a competitive election because it can generate better retirement options.

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9 Whereas the majority of prosecutions used to be domestic, international prosecutions have increased over time, and they outnumbered domestic trials at the end of 2000s (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2012).
Thus, I expect that regardless of regime type, competitive elections lead to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. For example, Kaunda of Zambia introduced a competitive election in 1991 in which he lost to the opposition candidate Chiluba. Although Zambia did not have an established succession system at the time, Kaunda did not face dire outcomes such as execution and exile.

This argument speaks to the literature about why autocrats hold competitive elections. Competitive elections may not be a fair gamble, and the incumbents may win them in most cases (Przeworski 2015; Svolik 2012), but we know that some incumbent autocrats do suffer electoral defeats (Huntington 1991; Kaminsky 1999; Schuler et al. 2013). Further, when autocrats win, they tend to suffer from long-term destabilizing effects of competitive elections such as a mobilized opposition (e.g., Howard and Roessler 2006). Competitive elections are also costly, because once a competitive election is introduced, autocrats typically need to increase the vote-buying effort to secure coalition members’ loyalty, as well as to reach other supporters from expanded political bases. For example, Magaloni’s (2006) work on Mexico demonstrates that elites need to mobilize support by distributing public goods so that lower-level politicians remain loyal to the party.10 However, despite the risks and costs associated with competitive elections, autocrats hold competitive elections. I argue that one overlooked reason is that competitive elections increase the probability that autocrats can retire peacefully.11

In sum, autocrats can secure better post-tenure fates by holding competitive elections

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10 Similar to Magaloni’s point, Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory shows that in order to satisfy a large number of voters, the incumbents have an incentive to provide more public goods rather than private goods. As an extension of the argument, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that an increase in public goods provision is paradoxically detrimental to incumbents because the provision of core public goods, such as freedom of assembly, free press, free speech, and transparent government, facilitates the organization of the opposition. This suggests that even after successfully distributing enough benefits to supporters and winning the election, the leader may still suffer because those efforts could impair her tenure over the long-term by empowering opposition groups (see also Gallagher and Hanson 2013).

11 Although this paper does not examine this empirically, the Appendix provides further theoretical discussion.
because it tends to increase legitimacy or involve explicit pacts for immunity, relative to not holding competitive elections. While we do not have data for explicit pacts and it is difficult to measure legitimacy, if the argument is correct, we should observe that holding competitive elections leads to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. Further, the second implication is that competitive elections are likely to result in less international intervention because it is difficult for the international community to topple dictators who hold a competitive election, and doing so might deter other autocrats from democratizing. The next section tests these propositions.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 Methods

To examine whether competitive elections increases the likelihood of better post-tenure fates, I employ a multinomial logit model, where I distinguish between the risk of safe removal and violent removal, comparing both to the reference category of staying in power. To test the implication on international intervention, I further divide the violent removal category into two: violent removal driven by domestic forces and violent removal by foreign forces. In other words, the polychotomous dependent variable measures whether an autocrat stays in power, loses power safely, loses power violently by domestic forces, or loses power violently by foreign forces.\footnote{With the same dataset, I conduct an analysis of whether holding a competitive election shortens autocrats’ tenure length, and I find that an autocrat who holds a competitive election has a shorter tenure than the counterpart who does not hold such an election. This is consistent with my argument as well as previous studies (Howard and Roessler 2006; Schuler et al. 2013).}

Estimating the effect of competitive elections is intrinsically difficult because we cannot observe what would have happened if a leader did not hold a competitive election as opposed to if the leader does hold one. In other words, we cannot observe the same leader’s behavior.
both with and without a competitive election. Given this difficulty, I compare the post-tenure fates of leaders who hold a competitive election with those who did not hold such an election. Furthermore, considering that observed differences in autocrats could account for holding a competitive election (and therefore their post-tenure fates), I employ an entropy balancing method to control for imbalances in covariates (Hainmueller 2012). Entropy balancing re-weights covariates in the control group so that the treatment and control group share the same mean and variance (and possibly skewness) in the covariates. Then, entropy balancing searches for the set of weights that remains as close as possible to uniform weights (Hainmueller 2012). In the following analyses, the weights are selected so that the control group has the same mean and variance as the treatment group for all covariates. Then, I estimate the average treatment effect of competitive elections with the weights obtained in the first step. Further, I also control for all the covariates used in the first step to account for unexplained variance in the dependent variable. Below, I report both the results of the multinominal logic analyses with and without entropy balancing.

3.2 Data

The dependent variables come from the Archigos dataset, which contains information on the post-tenure fate of dictators (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). Specifically, I construct two dependent variables by relying on the dataset’s “exit” variable, which differentiates types of exit modes into “Regular,” “Irregular,” and “Foreign.” The first dependent variable has three categories (i.e, 0=“Stay in Power”; 1=“Regular Exit”; and 2=“Irregular exit.”

13In addition, entropy balancing’s single-step iterative process to find a proper set of background characteristics is more efficient than propensity score matching’s manually iterative search for balances in covariates. Note that entropy balancing directly calculates weights to balance covariates in the control group for known sample distributions, while propensity score matching methods indirectly estimate a propensity of a treatment through a logistic or probit regression (Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Generally, entropy balancing is considered more effective than common propensity score matching methods, because it improves the balance across all covariates.

14The variable has another category “Natural Death or Suicide,” and the current analysis treats the category as “Regular” exit.
Exit”), while the second variable has four categories (i.e., 0=“Stay in Power”; 1=“Regular Exit”; 2=“Domestic-driven irregular Exit”; and 3=“Foreign-driven irregular Exit”).\textsuperscript{15}

The independent variable of interest, \textit{Competitive Election}, is drawn from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Following Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug (2013), I define elections as competitive when opposition was allowed (NELDA3), more than one party was legal (NELDA4), and there was a choice of candidates on the ballot (NELDA5). I code the variable 1 if all three conditions are met, and 0 otherwise. I only consider national-level elections (i.e., presidential or parliamentary or constituent assembly elections) and the time period ranges from 1960 to 2004, when the NELDA and Archigos datasets overlap.

To minimize concerns that omitted variables could bias the results, I include a set of control variables associated with dictators’ post-election fates. First, I account for the different types of dictatorship defined by Geddes et al. (2014). These categories include monarchies, military regimes, one-party, and personalist regimes.\textsuperscript{16} Second, for economic covariates, I rely on the Penn World Tables v6.3 and include the logarithm of the 3-year moving average of a country’s per capita GDP (3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita)) and the 3-year moving average of its population (3yr Mean ln(Population)). Further, I account for political conditions that autocrats face by including the 3-year moving average of polity scores (3yr Mean Polity), ethnic fractionalization data (Ethnic Fractionalization) (Fearon 2003), and human rights violations (Adjusted HR Violations). As previous studies argue, ethnic fractionalization or

\textsuperscript{15}While I use the “exit” variable as a proxy for post-tenure fates of autocratic leaders, the Archigos dataset has another variable called Post Tenure Fate which may be a more direct proxy. However, when the variable is recoded into the current analysis’ time-series format, the variable becomes an identical variable as the exit variable (Chi-square=1717.399, p<0.001) except one value (i.e., -999 in the post tenure fate variable, which is a missing value because leaders lost office in the year when the data collection ended and they could not track their fates). This means that those who have the value of “Irregular” exit almost alway have violent post-tenure fates such as exile, prosecution or execution in the post-tenure fate variable, while those who have the value of “Regular” exit almost always have non-violent post-tenure fates in the post-tenure fate variable.

\textsuperscript{16}As a robustness check, I also test other specifications by using Hadenius and Teorell (2007)’s regime type variable, but I find that the results are largely similar (not reported).
polarization may affect economic performance of autocrats and the risk of civil conflicts, thereby influencing post-tenure fates of autocrats (Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Human rights violations are included to indirectly control for autocrats’ popularity – those who have better human rights records should have better post-tenure fates. I use the adjusted, latent human rights variables estimated by Fariss (2014).

To control for whether competitive elections take place in the Cold War or post-Cold War period, I code 1 if the election is after 1990, and 0 otherwise (Cold War). The variable is also expected to capture a possible enhanced relationship between foreign aid and democratization after the Cold War (Dunning 2004; Marinov and Goemans 2013; Wright 2009). All the models also include a variable indicating whether a country holds a non-competitive election (Non-competitive Election). I also include two dictator-level variables: dictators’ age (Age), and how they take power (Entry Mode). To control for time dependence, I include three cubic splines and another variable measuring elapsed time since the occurrence of event, suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).17

Table 1 reports summary statistics, and Figure A in Appendix compares the means in the treatment and control group (before and after entropy balancing). After the re-weighting based on entropy balancing, the means in the control group are balanced with the means in the treatment group.

[Table 1 about here]

17 The use of time dummies to control for time dependence may raise a problem of inefficiency (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010). Instead, splines do not lead to inefficiency nor data separation, and allow us to smooth the relationship between the dependent variable and time by creating a smooth function of time. Finally, following previous studies (Brownlee 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Przeworski et al. 1999), I drop democracies from the analysis using Cheibub et al. (2010).
4 Empirical Analyses

First, a bivariate analysis suggests that those who hold competitive elections have safer post-tenure fates than their counterparts who do not hold competitive elections. Between 1946 and 2004, 63.5% of autocrats who hold competitive elections have safe retirements, while 39.7% of those who do not hold competitive elections have the same safe retirements and the rest have high risk exit.\footnote{The difference is statistically significant (Chi-square=14.61, p<0.01).}

I now consider multivariate analyses. Table 2 provides results for whether competitive elections lead to a better post-tenure fate for the incumbent. Model 1 considers the trichotomous dependent variable, while Model 2 adds a foreign intervention outcome to the dependent variable. The multinomial logit analyses find that the Competitive Election variable leads to “Regular” exit (i.e., the first columns of the models), while they are not associated with “Irregular” exit (i.e., the second column of the model). Since it is difficult to interpret multinomial logit coefficients directly, and the significance of coefficients will depend on the outcomes compared, I calculate the implied substantive results. In terms of predicted probabilities, according to Model 1 of Table 2, holding a competitive election results in a roughly 35% increase in the probability of a regular exit.

[Table 2 about here]

Model 2 tests the likelihood of foreign intervention across autocrats who hold competitive elections and those who do not. I expect that holding a competitive election makes it more difficult for international actors to intervene in domestic politics. Again, the analysis finds that competitive elections tend to result in autocrats’ safe exit. In substantive terms, according to Model 4, holding a competitive election results in a roughly 35% increase in a regular exit, whereas the likelihood of foreign-driven violent removal is almost zero right after a competitive election. Overall, the results are consistent with my argument that holding a
competitive election results in an increase in the likelihood of a regular exit and a decrease in the likelihood of foreign intervention.

Moving to analyses using entropy balancing to address the selection problem, Table 3 presents the results. Consistent with the previous models, I find that regardless of the model, competitive elections have a significant, negative effect on post-tenure fates, which means that competitive elections are more likely to result in dictators’ safe exits. With regard to substantive terms, competitive elections increase the likelihood of autocrats’ safe exit by about 34%. Here, it is important to note that entropy balancing only adjusts imbalances in the covariates based on observables, and thus there remains a concern about a possible bias due to unobservables. However, given the difficulty of applying experimental methods in the current study, the entropy balancing method is the best available to improve our understanding about the effect of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-tenure fates.

Further, I consider differential effects of competitive elections on post-tenure fates with truncated samples by regime type. Escribà-Folch (2013) finds that autocrats in personalist regimes are less likely to have regular exits. While Table 2 shows that autocrats in personalist regimes in fact tend not to have regular exits, Table 3 reports that even in personalist regimes, autocrats can increase their chance of safe exit, if they hold competitive elections. This election effect holds even for other regime types – autocrats in one-party regimes and military regimes are more likely to have safe exits once they hold competitive elections. Yet, it is important to note that military regimes have large standard errors. This suggests that there is more variation in the effect of competitive elections on post-tenure fates in military regimes, and other factors should explain the unaccounted variation. Understanding the within-regime variation is an area for future research.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)The only regime type that does not show a statistical significance is monarchy. However, partly because monarchy generally do not hold competitive elections, the analyses did not converge.
5 Conclusion

What happens to dictators who hold competitive elections? I argue that competitive elections allow autocrats to retire safely. The statistical analyses provided evidence that autocrats are less likely to face violent removal after competitive elections, and thus political survival of autocrats after such elections is relatively well assured. As a result, even if competitive elections have a destabilizing effect on the regime, and some dictators may have to step down shortly after holding a competitive election, it may still pay off to implement elections.

The findings indicate that reassurance about a post-tenure fate after a competitive election could affect autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. Previous studies argue that a dictator has no choice but to hold a competitive election when a threat of ouster becomes imminent (e.g., Geddes 2006). Yet, if a dictator is assured that he can step down safely after a competitive election, he should have an incentive to hold such an election before the threat becomes imminent. However, this raises a new dilemma: providing reassurance to autocrats may result in political development, but at the cost of immunity to the autocrats despite their past human rights violations. This is a difficult choice for human rights activists and jurists who want to prosecute dictators who have violated human rights in the past. But providing reassurance may be the lesser of two evils if it encourages the autocrat to exit and relinquish power. Future research could explore a comparison of dictators with explicit reassurances and those without to shed light on the trade-offs between justice and liberalization.

References


Table 1: Summary Statistics

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Table 2: Multinomial Logit Model: Impact of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates

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Observations: 2,856
Log Likelihood: -1001.4

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 3: Matching Analyses: Effect of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates

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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **<0.05; ***<0.01. All the covariates for the balancing stage are included, although omitting the covariates from the analyses do not change the main findings.
Appendix

Entropy Balancing

This figure provides the standardized differences in the means before and after the entropy balancing. The figure shows that all the covariates are balanced between treated and control samples after the entropy balancing.

Figure A: Entropy Balancing
Reassurance and Competitive Elections

This paper suggests that although dictators’ tenure may shorten after a competitive election, the election can provide assurance for dictators that they will have a safe exit from tenure. This Appendix builds on this argument to systematically examine if reassurance about a post-tenure fate affects autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. More specifically, by using simple models, I demonstrate that autocrats with safe exit are likely to hold a competitive election earlier than the counterparts without.

5.1 Competitive Election without Reassurance

To see how reassurance after competitive election matters, I formalize an election game between an incumbent dictator and democratic force. First, I simplify the previous studies’ argument that a dictator has no choice but to hold a competitive election in the following manner (e.g., Geddes 2006). Suppose a situation in which the balance of power between a dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the democratic force in the future. The democratic force is represented by a domestic opposition group and citizens, and backed by international actors. Given the situation, the game begins with the incumbent’s decision of whether to hold a competitive election, \( A_{Dictator} = \{Election, \sim Election\} \). If the incumbent decides to hold the election, he has to step down and may be eventually prosecuted due to past human rights violations. Conversely, if he does not hold the election, the democratic force has to decide whether to revolt against the dictator, \( A_{Democratic\ Force} = \{Revolt, \sim Revolt\} \). If it revolts against the dictator, he wins with probability \( p \) or loses with probability \( 1 - p \), \( A_{Nature} = \{D\ Win, D\ Lose\} \). Figure B shows the sequence of the game.

I name each outcome Democratization (\( Election \)), Repression (\( \sim Election, Revolt, D\ Win \)), Execution (\( \sim Election, Revolt, D\ Lose \)), and Status Quo (\( \sim Election, \sim Revolt \)). For simplicity, suppose that the payoff ordering for a dictator is: \( StatusQuo \succ Repression \succ \)}
Democratization \succ Execution. The payoff ordering for the democratic force is: Democratization \succ Execution \succ Status Quo \succ Repression. Using backward induction, the value of $p$ shapes the expected payoff associated with a decision for the democratic force to revolt against the dictator. First, consider a situation in which the dictator’s probability of winning a revolt is high such that the expected payoff for the democratic force in the lower subgame is: $E(\text{Status Quo}) \succ E(\text{Repression, Execution})$. In this case, the democratic force will always choose $\sim \text{Revolt}$ over $\text{Revolt}$. Since the payoff for Status Quo is greater than the payoff for Democratization for the dictator, he will not hold an election. The equilibrium for this case is thus: $\{\sim \text{Election}, \sim \text{Revolt}\}$ and democratization will not emerge. In contrast, if the probability for the dictator to win the conflict is low such that the expected payoff for the democratic force is: $E(\text{Repression, Execution}) \succ E(\text{Status Quo})$, the democratic force will always choose to revolt against the dictator. In this case, the dictator must decide whether to hold a competitive election. Since the payoff for Democratization is greater than the expected payoff for Repression and Execution for the dictator, he will agree to hold an election and the outcome Democratization will materialize. From this, in this game, we can see that democratization will emerge when the revolutionary threat from democratic force is high ($p$ is low). In other words, if the revolutionary threat is credible enough, a dictator chooses to democratize the country.

5.2 Competitive Election with Reassurance

I next incorporate the possibility for a dictator to stay in power after competitive elections – I call this possibility reassurance. In this game, if a dictator decides to hold a multiparty election, the democratic force has to decide whether it reassures the dictator that he can have immunity from prosecution and/or execution after the election, $A_{\text{Democratic Force}} = \{\text{Reassurance}, \sim \text{Reassurance}\}$. As with the empirical analysis, I assume
that reassurance is only granted on condition of holding a competitive election. Figure C shows the game. The payoff ordering for a dictator is assumed as follows: Liberal Dictator $\succ$ Status Quo $\succ$ Repression $\succ$ Democratization $\succ$ Execution, where Liberal Dictator is the outcome in which the dictator becomes a guardian of democracy in the country after holding a competitive election. The payoff ordering Liberal Dictator $\succ$ Status Quo is justified, since the balance of power between a dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the democratic force in the future – the dictator is better off introducing a competitive election now and stepping down as a guardian of democracy than retaining the status quo and democratizing in the future when the balance of power is already against the dictator.

In this game, the outcome Liberal Dictator will emerge when the democratic force offers reassurance to the dictator that he will have immunity after the election.\textsuperscript{20} If reassurance is ensured, the equilibrium is achieved independently of the lower-right subgame: the revolutionary threat does not have to be credible. On the other hand, if the democratic force does not give the dictator reassurance after democratization, the dictator will not agree to hold an election and a different equilibrium will emerge depending on $p$.\textsuperscript{21} In this case, the dictator agrees to democratize only if the revolutionary threat becomes credible.

In a nutshell, from the two different games – one without reassurance and the other with reassurance – one can see that autocrats introduce a competitive election even without a serious threat against the regime when the following conditions are met: (1) a dictator is assured that he can step down safely after a competitive election, and (2) the dictator expects that their strength will be weakened in the future. By using the simple models, this Appendix showed that autocrats with reassurance would introduce a competitive election at a

\textsuperscript{20}In other words, the dictator holds an election when the payoff ordering for democratic force is: Liberal Dictator $\succ$ Democratization $\succ$ Execution $\succ$ Status Quo $\succ$ Repression.

\textsuperscript{21}The payoff ordering for democratic force is assumed: Democratization $\succ$ Execution $\succ$ Liberal Dictator $\succ$ Status Quo $\succ$ Repression.
relatively early stage of transition process, whereas counterparts without reassurance resist democratization demands until a revolutionary threat becomes credible. This eventually suggests the following reassurance dilemma: providing reassurance to autocrats may result in political development, but, on the other hand, immunity or a safe post-tenure fate has to be provided to the autocrats despite their past human rights violations.
Figure B: Game without Rassurance
Figure C: Game with Rassurance