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## JNeuroscience

### Research Articles: Behavioral/Cognitive

### Updating Beliefs Under Perceived Threat

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### **Updating Beliefs Under Perceived Threat**

2 Authors: Neil Garrett<sup>a,c\*</sup>, Ana María González-Garzón<sup>a</sup>, Lucy Foulkes<sup>a</sup>, Liat Levita<sup>b</sup> & Tali 3 4 Sharot<sup>a\*</sup> 5 6 Affiliations: <sup>a</sup>Affective Brain Lab, Experimental Psychology, University College London, WC1H 0AP; <sup>b</sup>Liat Levita, Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, S10 2TP; 7 8 <sup>c</sup>Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540. 9 10 \*Corresponding authors: Neil Garrett: Email: ngarrett@princeton.edu; Tali Sharot, Email: 11 t.sharot@ucl.ac.uk, Affective Brain Lab, Experimental Psychology, University College 12 London, WC1H 0AP. 13 14 Number of Pages: 34 15 Number of Figures: 5 16 Number of Tables: 4 17 Number of words: Abstract (156), Introduction (617), Discussion (905) 18 19 Acknowledgements: We thank Einar Jensen and the South Metro Fire Rescue Authority for 20 providing resources and assistance for Experiment II; Jon Roiser, Oliver Robinson, Stephanie 21 Lazzaro, Andreas Kappes, Caroline Charpentier and Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez for helpful 22 comments on earlier editions of this manuscript; Dominik Bach for advice on SCR collection 23 and analysis. 24 25 Competing Financial Interests Statement: The authors declare no competing financial 26 interests with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. 27 28 Funding: This research was supported by a Wellcome Trust Career Development Fellowship 29 to T. Sharot and a UCL Impact Award to N. Garrett. 30

### 31 Abstract

32 Humans are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable. This 33 asymmetry poses an evolutionary puzzle, as it can lead to an underestimation of risk and thus 34 failure to take precautionary action. Here, we suggest a mechanism that can speak to this 35 conundrum. In particular, we show that the bias vanishes in response to perceived threat in 36 the environment. We report that an improvement in participants' tendency to incorporate bad 37 news into their beliefs is associated with physiological arousal in response to threat indexed 38 by galvanic skin response and self-reported anxiety. This pattern of results was observed in a 39 controlled laboratory setting (Experiment I), where perceived threat was manipulated, and in 40 firefighters on duty (Experiment II), where it naturally varied. Such flexibility in how 41 individuals integrate information may enhance the likelihood of responding to warnings with 42 caution in environments rife with threat, while maintaining a positivity bias otherwise, a 43 strategy that can increase well-being.

### 45 Significance Statement

The human tendency to be overly optimistic has mystified scholars and lay people for decades: how could biased beliefs have been selected for over unbiased beliefs? Scholars have suggested that while the optimism bias can lead to negative outcomes, including financial collapse and war, it can also facilitate health and productivity. Here, we demonstrate that a mechanism generating the optimism bias, namely asymmetric information integration, evaporates under threat. Such flexibility could result in enhanced caution in dangerous environments while supporting an optimism bias otherwise, potentially increasing well-being.

### 54 Introduction

55 Whether a piece of news is good or bad is critical in determining whether it will alter our 56 beliefs. In particular, people readily incorporate favorable news into their existing beliefs, yet 57 tend to underweight the strength of unfavorable information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Kuzmanovic 58 and Rigoux, 2017; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Lefebvre et al., 2017; Mobius et al., 2012; 59 Sharot et al., 2011; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). For example, when learning that their risk of 60 experiencing future aversive events, such as robbery, is higher than they had expected, people 61 are less likely to integrate these data into prior beliefs relative to a situation in which they 62 learn that their risk is lower than expected (Sharot et al., 2011). The same pattern emerges 63 when people receive desirable and undesirable information about their financial prospects 64 (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015), or feedback about their intellectual abilities (Eil and Rao, 2011; 65 Mobius et al., 2012), personality (Korn et al., 2012) and physical traits (Eil and Rao, 2011). 66 This is known as a valence-dependent learning asymmetry (Sharot and Garrett, 2016).

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68 Incorporating desirable information about the self at a higher rate than undesirable (Korn et 69 al., 2012) will subsequently lead to overconfidence and optimistically biased predictions 70 (Sharot et al., 2011). On the upside an optimistic outlook, even when biased, can improve 71 physical and mental health (Taylor and Brown, 1988), boost motivation (Bandura, 1989), 72 exploration (Tiger, 1979) and persistence (Sherman, 1980), thus enhancing success and well-73 being (for a review, see (Chang, 2001). However, ignoring negative information can result in 74 faulty assessment and lack of precautionary action leading to, for example, ill preparedness in 75 the face of natural disasters, and financial market bubbles (Shefrin, 2009).

76

77 These apparent costs present a conundrum; why have humans evolved a bias in learning that 78 leads to systematic errors in judgement? The common answer is that people make errors that 79 are costly in certain situations, because those errors are advantageous in other situations, and 80 on balance the benefits outweigh the costs (McKay and Dennett, 2010). There is another 81 possibility though - that the asymmetry fluctuates in response to environmental demands. For 82 example, in relatively safe surroundings, where potential harm is low, an asymmetry in 83 information integration may be prominent leading to biased expectations. Yet in 84 environments rife with threats, a physiological/psychological response may trigger changes to 85 how information is integrated leading to more balanced information integration which may be 86 adaptive in environments where potential costs are high (see Johnson and Fowler, 2011).

87

Because affect provides an internal signal about the external context, it could potentially be used to adaptively modulate cognitive biases. Specifically, we suggest that the key is a learning mechanism that is modulated by the two core aspects of affect: valence and arousal. A valence-dependent learning mechanism biases judgements and an arousal-dependent switch
 controls the degree and perhaps sign of the bias.

93

94 To test this prediction, we exposed participants to an acute threat manipulation in the lab 95 (Experiment I) or tested participants in a real-life environment (firefighters tested on call, 96 Experiment II). After measuring indicators of arousal, stress and anxiety, participants 97 completed the belief update task (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Kappes et al., 2018; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et 98 99 al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) (Fig. 1). Past studies have shown that 100 participants put more weight on good news (i.e. that a negative life event is less likely to 101 occur than expected, Fig. 1a) compared to bad news (i.e. that a negative event is more likely 102 to occur than expected, Fig. 1b) in altering beliefs in this task. Here we test whether 103 heightened response to threat abolishes this bias.

104

## 105 Materials & Methods106

### 107 Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis: Experiment I

108 Participants. Thirty-six participants recruited via the UCL participant pool participated in the 109 study. Participants gave informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study was 110 approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University College London. One 111 participant's responses resulted in only two good news trials (out of a possible 40), which 112 prevented us from calculating a meaningful information integration parameter (we define how 113 we calculate information integration parameters below), thus this participant's data had to be 114 excluded. Two participant's cortisol samples were insufficient for analysis, and samples of six 115 participants who were suspected to have depression (BDI score greater than 10) were never 116 sent to be analyzed. Thus, analysis that includes cortisol scores is given for n = 27. Note, 117 however, that either excluding those participants all together from all analysis or including 118 them as done here generated similar results. Each participant was randomly assigned to either 119 the threat manipulation condition (13 females, 6 males, mean age = 26.37 years, SD = 6.58) or the control condition (10 females, 6 males, mean age = 24.94 years, SD = 3.82). 120

121

122 Manipulation Procedure. We designed the experiment such that the perceived threat was 123 unrelated to the information presented in the task. Thus, we could test whether the effect of 124 perceived threat on information integration was general rather than specific to the source of 125 the threat itself.

127 Participants assigned to the threat manipulation group were told that they would be exposed 128 to an uncomfortable, stressful, event at the end of the study. Specifically, they were informed 129 that at the end of the experiment they would be required to deliver a speech on a surprise 130 topic, which would be recorded on video and judged live by a panel of staff members. They 131 were shown an adjacent room across a double mirror window where chairs and tables were 132 already organized for the panel. In addition, participants were presented with six difficult 133 mathematical problems which they were asked to try and solve in 30 seconds. This 134 manipulation is a variation of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) (Birkett, 2011) with the 135 main difference between the typical TSST procedure and the one used here being that 136 participants were threatened by the possibility of a stressful social event, and completed the 137 main task under threat, but the threat was never executed. Having the participants believe the 138 stressful event will take place at the end of the task, rather than before, increased the 139 likelihood that participants' arousal levels remained high throughout the task. Participants 140 assigned to the control condition were informed that at the end of the experiment they would 141 be required to write a short essay on a surprise topic, which would not be judged. They were 142 then presented with six elementary mathematical problems to solve in 30 seconds.

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Manipulation Check. We examine if the threat manipulation resulted in the following
psychological and physiological changes, which are typically observed in studies using
variations of TSST (Birkett, 2011).

Self-Report. Before and after the induction procedure participants filled out a short-form of the State scale of the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory developed by Marteau and Bekker (Marteau and Bekker, 1992). Participants reported their current anxiety state according to 6 statements (e.g. I am worried) on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 4 = very much). Possible scores range from 6 to 24 with high scores indicating high levels of state anxiety.

154 2. Skin Conductance Level (SCL). SCL is an index of sympathetic tone which reflects 155 changes in autonomic arousal. Skin conductance was recorded for 2 minutes pre- and 156 post-induction whilst participants stared at a fixation cross using disposable 157 electrodermal gel electrodes (Biopac, EL507) attached to the distal phalanx of the 158 pointer and middle fingers of the participants' non-dominant hand. Skin conductance 159 responses were monitored using a MP36R system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, 160 CA) and analyzed with BIOPAC software AcqKnowledge. The difference in mean 161 SCL in each period were taken as a change in participants' autonomic arousal levels.

*Cortisol Level.* To measure changes in participants' cortisol levels, saliva samples
 were collected using Salivette collection devices, (Salimetrics, UK). Four samples

164 were taken at different time points: before the induction procedure (baseline: t0); 165 immediately after the induction procedure but prior to undertaking the task (10 min 166 after the threat/control manipulation: t1); halfway through the task (30min after the 167 threat/control manipulation: t2); after the task and completion of post experiment 168 questionnaires (+1hr after the threat/control manipulation: t3). The experiment was 169 conducted between 2pm and 4pm, restricted to these times to control for the diurnal 170 cycle of cortisol. Samples were stored at -80°C before being assayed. Analysis of 171 salivary cortisol was completed by Salimetrics. Intra-assay and inter-assay 172 coefficients of variation were all below 6.1% (M = 1.5%, SD = 1.2). Cortisol values 173 were measured in µg/dL. Shapiro-Wilk (SW) tests on cortisol levels at each sample 174 period revealed that these were not normally distributed (one sample SW < .01 for all 175 four sample intervals). As a result, cortisol values were log transformed. Since 176 cortisol stress response has a temporal delay (mediated by the slower time scale HPA 177 axis), it is difficult to precisely align the time of the cortisol response to perceived 178 levels of threat at different points in the task. Because of this, the main cortisol 179 measure we use in the manuscript was calculate as the mean difference between 180 cortisol levels at time periods t1, t2 and t3 from baseline cortisol levels at t0, as done 181 previously (Lenow et al., 2017; Lighthall et al., 2013; Otto et al., 2013). This measure 182 represents the average cortisol response throughout the duration of task performance. 183 Below is the formula we used to derive this index where log cort is the natural log-184 transformed cortisol concentrations:

$$\log \operatorname{cort} \Delta = \frac{\log \operatorname{cort}_{t1} + \log \operatorname{cort}_{t2} + \log \operatorname{cort}_{t3}}{3} - \log \operatorname{cort}_{t0}$$

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Behavioral Task. The task was adopted from past studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett
and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot
et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b).

190

191 Stimuli. Stimuli (80 short descriptions of different negative life events, for example: domestic 192 burglary, card fraud) were separated into two lists, each containing 40 events. Participants 193 were randomly assigned one of the two lists of 40 evens at the start of the experiment. For 194 each event the average probability of that event occurring at least once to someone from the 195 UK within the same age range as the participants was calculated from data compiled from 196 online resources (including the Office for National Statistics and PubMed). Very rare or very 197 common events were not included; all event probabilities lay between 10% and 70%. To 198 ensure that the range of possible overestimation was equal to the range of possible

underestimation, participants were told that the range of probabilities lay between 3% and 77% and they were only permitted to enter estimates within this range. Note that differences between the average probabilities provided to participants and the actual probabilities for the sample of participants tested cannot explain differences between the two groups, as we randomly assign participants to either the threat manipulation condition of the control condition.

205

206 Behavioral Task (Fig. 1). Participants completed a practice session comprising 3 trials 207 before beginning the main experiment. The main experiment comprised 40 trials. On each 208 trial one of 40 adverse life events were presented for 3s, and participants were asked to 209 estimate how likely the event was to happen to them in the future. Participants had up to 5s to 210 respond. If participants had already experienced an event in their lifetime they were instructed 211 to estimate the likelihood of that event happening to them again in the future. If the 212 participant failed to respond, that trial was excluded from all subsequent analyses (M = 1.31, 213 SD = 1.39). Following presentation of a fixation cross (5-10s jittered) participants were then 214 presented with the base rate of the event in a demographically similar population for 2s 215 followed by a fixation cross (5-10s jittered). In a second session, immediately after the first, 216 participants were asked again to provide estimates of their likelihood of encountering the 217 same events so that we could assess how they updated their estimate in response to the 218 information presented.

219

220 Note, that studies have shown that the update bias exists both when classifying trials 221 according to participants' estimates of self-risk and when trials are classified according to 222 estimates of base rates (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015). Thus, we used 223 the traditional design and analysis here (Sharot et al., 2011). Moreover, multiple past studies 224 have shown that the amount of update bias does not alter whether participants are asked to 225 estimate the likelihood of the event happening in the future or the likelihood of the event not 226 happening in the future (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Sharot et al., 2011). 227 Thus, scores are not driven by response to high and low numbers, but rather by valence per 228 se. As this has been established in the past we used the standard version of the task here (i.e. 229 eliciting estimation of an event happening).

230

231 Memory control. To test for memory effects participants were asked at the end of the 232 experiment to provide the actual probability previously presented of each event. Memory 233 errors were calculated as the absolute difference between the probability previously presented 234 and the participants' recollection of that statistic:

### 236 Memory Error = | Probability Presented - Recollection of Probability Presented |

237

238 Other controls. At the end of experiment, participants also rated stimuli on 6-point scales for 239 vividness [for the question "How vividly could you imagine this event?" (1 = not at all vivid240 to 6 = very vividly], familiarity [for the question "Regardless if this event has happened to 241 you before, how familiar do you feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies, and so on?" (1 =242 not at all familiar to 6 = very familiar), prior experience [for the question "Has this event 243 happened to you before?" (1 = never to 6 = very often), emotional arousal [for the question 244 "When you imagine this event, how emotionally arousing do you find the image in your 245 mind?" (1 = not at all arousing to 6 = very arousing)] and negativity [for the question "How 246 negative would this event be/is this event for you?" 1 = not negative at all to 6 = very247 negative)].

248

249 Statistical analysis. Trials were partitioned according to participants' first estimates into ones 250 in which participants received good news [i.e., the probability presented was lower than the 251 first estimate of their own probability (Fig. 1a)] or bad news [i.e., the probability presented 252 was higher (Fig. 1b)]. While information can be better or worse than expected, all stimuli are 253 negative (i.e. robbery, card fraud), thus comparison is never between positive and negative 254 stimuli, but between information that is better or worse than expected.

255

256 Trials for which the estimation error was zero were excluded from subsequent analyses as 257 these could not be categorized into either condition (M = 0.89 trials, SD = 0.92).

258

259 For each trial an estimation error term was calculated as the difference between the 260 probability presented and participants' first estimate on that trial:

261

### 262 Estimation Error = Probability Presented - First Estimate

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264 Update was calculated for each trial such that positive updates indicate a change toward the 265 probability presented and negative updates a change away from the probability presented:

266

### 267 Update (Good News) = First Estimate – Second Estimate

### 268 Update (Bad News) = Second Estimate – First Estimate

269

270 Formal models suggest that learning from information that disconfirms one's expectations is 271 mediated by a prediction error signal that quantifies a difference between expectation and 272

outcome (Sutton and Barto, 1998). We have previously shown that an analogous mechanism

273 underpins belief updating in this task (Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, the difference 274 between participants' initial estimations and the information provided (that is, estimation 275 error = probability presented – first estimate) predicts subsequent updates, as would be 276 expected from learning models (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Hence, similar to our previous 277 papers (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011), we estimated the 278 extent to which participants integrated new information into their beliefs by correlating 279 estimation errors and update scores with one another separately for good and bad news trials 280 for each participant. This resulted in two pearson correlation values for each participant: one 281 for good news trials and one for bad news trials. We denote these Pearson correlation scores 282 as good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) and bad news ( $\alpha_B$ ) information integration parameters. Shapiro-Wilk tests 283 were applied to check the values of  $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$  were normally distributed. To check the values 284 of  $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$  were not at floor or ceiling, we conducted one sample t-tests (separately  $\alpha_G$  and 285  $\alpha_B$ ) against values of 0 (to test for floor effects) and 1 (to test for ceiling effects).

286

To determine whether information integration from good and/or bad news was altered by the threat manipulation, the resulting information integration parameters were submitted to a 2 by 2 ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) as a repeated-measure and group (threat manipulation/control) as a between-subjects factor.

291

292 We identified possible confounds to add as covariates to our analysis as follows; first, for 293 factors that were not task related and therefore did not have a valence component 294 (specifically: initial self-reported anxiety, initial SCL, initial cortisol and BDI) we conducted 295 independent sample t-tests (control vs threat manipulation group) for each factor separately to 296 determine if a group difference existed (Table 1). For task related variables that could be 297 divided by valence (specifically; number of trials, memory scores, ratings on familiarity, 298 vividness, past experience, negativity, emotional arousal and mean first estimates) we 299 calculated the difference between mean good news and mean bad news for each participant 300 for each of these factors. This gives a bias score for each factor for each subject whereby 301 positive scores indicate a bias towards good news and negative scores indicate a bias towards 302 bad news. We then conducted a one sample t-test (versus 0) on each of these scores for each 303 group separately to isolate those factors which had valence effects in either set of participants. 304 Next we conducted a series of independent sample t-tests to compare the control groups 305 difference scores to the threat manipulation groups scores for each factor (this is equivalent to 306 testing for an interaction between valence and group). For all of these tests we applied a 307 threshold of p<0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple comparisons. This is because 308 the purpose was to identify all potential confounds; by not correcting we are being more 309 stringent. Any factor which showed a group effect or a valence effect was added as a

covariate. These were: mean first estimates, ratings of vividness, familiarity, past experienceand emotional arousal (Table 1).

312

313 To explore whether differences in information integration related to any of the specific 314 physiological and psychological changes, we constructed a general linear model (GLM) with 315  $\alpha$  entered as the dependent variable and changes in SCL, self-report anxiety and cortisol as 316 independent variables. This was done separately for information integration parameters for 317 good ( $\alpha_{\rm G}$ ) and bad ( $\alpha_{\rm B}$ ) news. To control for general changes in information integration and 318 allow us to detect valence-specific effects, we entered information integration parameters for 319 good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) as a covariate when estimating information integration parameters for bad 320 news ( $\alpha_B$ ) and vice versa (Moutsiana et al., 2013). In addition, following the same selection 321 procedure outlined above we controlled for any variable where there was a significant 322 (p<0.05) difference between groups, between types of information (i.e. valence) or a 323 group\*valence interaction, by including these in the GLM as covariates.

324

325 For  $\alpha_B$  the formula for the regression in full therefore is as follows:

326

327  $\alpha_{\rm B} = \beta 0 + \beta 1$ \*Change in SCL +  $\beta 2$ \*Change in Self-report +  $\beta 3$ \*Change in Cortisol + 328  $\beta 4$ \*Mean Initial Estimate +  $\beta 5$ \*Initial Self-report anxiety+  $\beta 6$ \*Mean Bad News Vividness 329 Rating +  $\beta 7$ \*Mean Bad News Familiarity Rating +  $\beta 8$ \*Mean Prior Experience Bad News 330 Rating +  $\beta 9$ \*Mean Emotional Arousal Bad News Rating +  $\beta 10^* \alpha_{\rm G}$ 

331

332 For  $(\alpha_G)$  the formula for this was as follows:

333

334  $\alpha_{\rm G} = \beta 0 + \beta 1$ \*Change in SCL +  $\beta 2$ \*Change in Self-report +  $\beta 3$ \*Change in Cortisol + 335  $\beta 4$ \*Mean Initial Estimate +  $\beta 5$ \*Initial Self-report anxiety +  $\beta 6$ \*Mean Good News Vividness 336 Rating +  $\beta 7$ \*Mean Good News Familiarity Rating +  $\beta 8$ \*Mean Prior Experience Good News 337 Rating +  $\beta 9$ \*Mean Emotional Arousal Good News Rating +  $\beta 10^{*}\alpha_{\rm B}$ 

338

339 Finally, we reran the analysis above this time controlling for within-subject covariates at the 340 within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject level. Specifically, for 341 each participant we computed an alternative set of information integration parameters - one 342 for good news ( $\alpha_{G_partial}$ ) and one for bad news ( $\alpha_{B_partial}$ ) - by carrying out a series of partial 343 correlations in which absolute estimation error and update were the two variables of interest. 344 Within-subject covariates - identified as above (first estimate, vividness, familiarity, past 345 experience and emotional arousal) - were controlled for on a trial by trial basis. We examined 346 whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_{B partial}$ ) related to 347 change in self report and/or change in SCL controlling for any additional between subject 348 confounds as above (initial self-report anxiety ratings and information integration for good 349 news). This was done by entering alternative information integration parameters for bad news 350  $(\alpha_{B \text{ partial}})$  as the dependent variable into 2 GLMs as follows: 351 352  $\alpha_{\rm B \ partial} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^{*}$ Change in Self-report +  $\beta 2^{*}$ Initial Self-report anxiety +  $\beta 3^{*}\alpha_{\rm G \ partial}$ 353  $\alpha_{\rm B partial} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^{*}$ Change in SCL +  $\beta 2^{*}$ Initial Self-report +  $\beta 3^{*}\alpha_{\rm G partial}$ 354 355 We then examined the significance of the regression weights in each GLM for change in Self 356 Report and change in SCL. To visualize the effect of each of these (Fig. 4) we generated two 357 partial regression plots. These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent variable 358  $(\alpha_{B \text{ partial}})$  and the independent variable (either Change in Self-report or Change in SCL) when 359 these are regressed on the rest of the independent variables (Initial Self report and  $\alpha_{G partial}$ ). 360 361 We ran the equivalent analysis for good news ( $\alpha_{G \text{ partial}}$ ) as follows: 362  $\alpha_{G_{partial}} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^*$ Change in Self-report +  $\beta 2^*$ Initial Self-report +  $\beta 3^* \alpha_{B_{partial}}$ 363 364  $\alpha_{G \text{ partial}} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^{*}$ Change in SCL +  $\beta 2^{*}$ Initial Self-report +  $\beta 3^{*}\alpha_{B \text{ partial}}$ 365 366 **Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis: Experiment II** 367 368 Participants. Thirty-three operational staff stationed across seventeen fire stations within the 369 South Metro Fire and Rescue Authority of the State of Colorado in the United States 370 participated in the study. Five of these participants failed to complete the study leaving 28 371 participants (1 female, 27 males, mean age = 43.15 years, SD = 9.87). A link to an online 372 version of the experiment was sent by email to operational staff inviting them to participate in 373 the study whilst on duty. Employees were given 18 days to attempt the experiment. They 374 were permitted to take the experiment once in this time period and were explicitly requested 375 to do so whilst on shift (i.e. in the station between calls). Participation in the experiment was

anonymous, voluntary and unpaid.

377

Task, stimuli and control variables. An online version of the task used in Experiment I was designed using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The task began by asking basic demographic questions (age, gender, marital status, level of education and number of children) and some questions pertaining to their work (including how long they had worked in the service, how many people they supervised, number of emergency they went on, what their 383 rank in the service was) and social environment (social support at work and outside, and 384 stress experienced at home).

385

386 After providing this information, participants read task instructions on screen at their own 387 pace and then undertook a practice session comprising 3 practice trials. As in Experiment I, 388 stimuli (80 short descriptions of different negative life events; the majority of these were the 389 same as those used in Experiment I but 18 events were exchanged with alternative negative 390 life events) were separated into two lists, each containing 40 negative life events. Participants 391 were randomly assigned one of the two lists of 40 events at the start of the experiment. The 392 task was the same as in Experiment I, except that there was only one fixation cross displayed 393 in each session (for 1s) after participants submitted estimates (i.e. in the first session, unlike in 394 Experiment I, a second fixation cross was not displayed after base rate presentation). 395 Furthermore, mindful of the firefighters' unpredictable time constraints, memory for the 396 information given and subjective ratings (past experience with the event and negativity) were 397 elicited for half the stimuli and participants completed a short version of the state scale of the 398 self-report at the beginning of the study (Chlan et al., 2003), without providing physiological 399 measures of autonomic arousal.

400

401 Statistical analysis: Linear regressions were performed using ordinary least squares 402 implemented using SPSS version 25 for bad news and good news separately, with  $\alpha$  entered 403 as the dependent variable and self-reported state anxiety as the independent variable. To rule 404 out potential confounds we followed a similar procedure as in Experiment I. Specifically, we 405 separately tested whether a range of potential confounding factors had valence effects. These 406 factors were: mean first estimates, memory scores, ratings of negativity, ratings of past 407 experience and number of trials. We did this by calculating the difference between mean good 408 news and mean bad news for each participant for each of these factors. This gives a bias score 409 for each factor for each subject whereby positive scores indicate a bias towards good news 410 and negative scores indicate a bias towards bad news. We then conducted a one sample t-test 411 (versus 0) on each of these scores to identify factors which had valence effects. We used a 412 threshold of p<0.05 and deliberately did not correct for multiple comparisons. This is because 413 the purpose was to identify all potential confounds; by not correcting we are being more 414 stringent. Any factor which showed a valence effect was then added as a covariate. These 415 were mean first estimates, ratings of past experience and number of trials (Table 3).

416

417 To test for a relationship between anxiety and the asymmetry within the firefighters (i.e. 418 preferential updating for bad news over good) we calculated an information integration bias 419 score for each participant. This is simply the difference between  $\alpha_{G}$  and  $\alpha_{B}$ . A score of 0

- 425 Information Integration Bias Score  $(\alpha_{G} \alpha_{B}) = \beta 0 + \beta 1$ \*Self-Reported Anxiety +  $\beta 2$ \*Mean 426 Initial Estimate +  $\beta 3$ \*Mean Prior Experience Bias Score (Mean Prior Experience Bad News 427 Rating - Mean Prior Experience Good News Rating) +  $\beta 4$ \*Number of Trials Bias Score 428 (Number of Good News Trials - Number of Bad News Trials)
- 430 Next we ran a GLM for each of the two sets of information integration parameters ( $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$ ) 431 separately. To ensure effects were valence specific rather than reflecting general changes in 432 information integration, good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) was also added as a covariate when examining 433 information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_B$ ) and vice versa when examining 434 information integration for good news.
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- 436 For bad news information integration parameter ( $\alpha_B$ ), the formula for the regression in full 437 therefore is as follows:
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439  $\alpha_{\rm B} = \beta 0 + \beta 1$ \*Self-Reported Anxiety +  $\beta 2$ \*Mean Initial Estimate +  $\beta 3$ \*Mean Prior 440 Experience Bad News Rating +  $\beta 4$ \*Number of Bad News Trials +  $\beta 5$ \* $\alpha_{\rm G}$ 

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442 For good news information integration parameter ( $\alpha_G$ ), the formula for the regression in full 443 therefore is as follows:

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445  $\alpha_{G} = \beta 0 + \beta 1$ \*Self-Reported Anxiety +  $\beta 2$ \*Mean Initial Estimate +  $\beta 3$ \*Mean Prior 446 Experience Good News Rating +  $\beta 4$ \*Number of Good News Trials +  $\beta 5^{*}\alpha_{B}$ 

448 Finally, we reran the analysis above this time controlling for within-subject covariates at the 449 within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-subject level. Specifically, for 450 each participant we computed an alternative set of information integration parameters - one 451 for good news ( $\alpha_{G, partial}$ ) and one for bad news ( $\alpha_{B, partial}$ ) - by carrying out a series of partial 452 correlations in which absolute estimation error and update were the two variables of interest. 453 Within-subject covariates (first estimates), were controlled for on a trial by trial basis (note it 454 was not possible to control for past experience on a trial by trial basis here because 455 participants in this study completed ratings only for a subset of events). We then examined 456 whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_{B partial}$ ) related to 457 self-reported anxiety, controlling for additional between subject covariates (number of bad

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459 done by entering alternative information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_{B \text{ partial}}$ ) as the 460 dependent variable into a GLM as follows: 461 462  $\alpha_{\rm B \ partial} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^*$  Self-Reported Anxiety +  $\beta 2^*$ Number of Bad News Trials +  $\beta 3^* \alpha_{\rm G \ partial}$ 463 464 We then examined the significance of the regression weight for Self-Reported Anxiety. 465 466 We ran the same analysis for information integration parameters for good news ( $\alpha_{G \text{ partial}}$ ) as 467 follows: 468  $\alpha_{G \text{ partial}} = \beta 0 + \beta 1^*$  Self-Reported Anxiety +  $\beta 2^*$ Number of Good News Trials +  $\beta 3^* \alpha_{B \text{ partial}}$ 469 470 To visualize the effect of each of these (Fig. 5) we generated two partial regression plots. 471 These are scatterplots of the residuals of the dependent variable ( $\alpha_{B\_partial}$  or  $\alpha_{G\_partial}$ ) and the 472 473 independent variable of interest (Self-Reported Anxiety) when these are regressed on the rest 474 of the independent variables (Number of Bad News Trials and  $\alpha_{G \text{ partial}}$  when examining 475  $\alpha_B$  partial, Number of Good News Trials and  $\alpha_B$  partial when examining  $\alpha_G$  partial). 476 477 **Results** 478 479 **Experiment I** 480 Threat manipulation was successful. Subjective self-reports of anxiety and physiological 481 measures of skin conductance level (SCL) and cortisol showed that the manipulation was 482 effective. Specifically, following the manipulation, self-report anxiety (Fig. 2a) and SCL 483 (Fig. 2b) showed an increase relative to before (baseline), which was greater in the threat 484 manipulation group relative to controls (self-reported anxiety: t(33) = 4.16, p < .001; SCL: 485 t(33) = 3.32, p = .002, independent sample t-test). There were no baseline (t0) differences in 486 cortisol levels between the two groups (t(25) = -.89, p = 0.38). Mean cortisol levels (averaged 487 across t1, t2 and t3) relative to baseline (t0) showed a trend towards being higher in the threat 488 manipulation group relative to controls (t(25) = 1.90, p = .07). This effect was driven by a 489 reduction in cortisol levels over time in the control group (main effect of time at t1, t2 and t3

news trials and information integration for good news) at the between subject level. This was

- 490 relative to baseline: F(2,26) = 17.19, p < .001, repeated measures ANOVA) an effect 491 previously observed when participants become familiar with a novel experiment context 492 (Stones et al., 1999) - but an absence of this common reduction in the threat manipulation 493 group (main effect of time: F(2,22) = 1.00, p > .25; **Fig. 2c**). Across participants, these
- 494 measures were correlated with each other (self-report & SCL: r(33) = .39, p = .02; SCL &

495 cortisol: r(25) = .47, p = .01; trend for cortisol & self-report: r(25) = .33, p = .09). To control 496 for the diurnal cycle of cortisol, each participant undertook the experiment between 2pm and 497 4pm.

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499 Threat eliminates asymmetric information integration. Our results show that the acute 500 threat manipulation eliminated the well-established asymmetry in information integration 501 (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, the two sets of 502 information integration parameters ( $\alpha_G, \alpha_B$ ) were entered into a group (control/threat) by 503 valence (good news/bad news) ANOVA controlling for possible confounds (see Methods). 504 The analysis revealed a group by valence interaction (F(1,27) = 7.56, p = .01,  $\eta_p^2 = .22$ ), 505 which also remained if estimation errors were controlled for (F(1,26) = 7.88, p = .01) (Garrett 506 and Sharot, 2017) and if the difference between number of good and bad news trials are 507 controlled for (F(1,26) = 6.97, p = .01).

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509 Post hoc tests revealed that the group by valence interaction was the result of asymmetric 510 information integration in the control group, such that the information integration parameter 511 was larger for good news than bad (t(15) = 3.34, p = .004, paired sample t-test), but absent in 512 the threat manipulation group (t(18) = .92, p > .25, paired sample t-test; Fig. 3). Participants 513 in the threat manipulation group were more likely to effectively integrate bad news into their 514 beliefs relative to those in the control group (significant difference in bad news information 515 integration parameters  $\alpha_{\rm B}$ : t(33) = 2.44, p = .02, independent sample t-test), whilst 516 information integration parameters for good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) did not differ between groups (t(33) =517 .611, p > .250, independent sample t-test). There were no floor or ceiling effects for  $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$ 518 in the threat manipulation or control group (all at p < .001, one sample t-tests versus 0 and 1 519 respectively) and participants first estimates were not significantly different from the 520 information provided (t(34) = -0.45, p = .65, one sample t-test versus 0 on the difference 521 between participants' first estimates and the information provided).

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523 Past studies show that asymmetric information integration in this task is not associated with 524 an asymmetry in memory (Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b). In fact, 525 asymmetry in information integration is observed even when the second estimate is elicited 526 immediately after information is on screen (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Kuzmanovic and 527 Rigoux, 2017). Here, we submitted memory scores to a group (threat manipulation/control) 528 by valence (good news/bad news) ANOVA (see Methods for details). This did not reveal a 529 main effect of valence (F(1,33) = 1.24, p > .25), or a main effect of group (F(1,33) = 1.03, p > .25) 530 .25) or an interaction (F(1,33) = .62, p > .25). This suggests that valence dependent changes

in information integration across groups cannot be attributed to memory orencoding/attention.

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534 Conducting an ANOVA on participants' first estimates with valence (good/bad news) as a 535 repeated factor and group (threat/control) as a between participant factor revealed no main 536 effect of group (F(1,33) = 1.18, p > .25), the obvious main effect of valence (as trials are 537 binned into good and bad according to first estimates, F(1,33) = 278.08, p < .001) and a group 538 by valence interaction (F(1,33) = 6.71, p = .014). The interaction was characterized by the 539 threat group providing lower first estimates than controls for stimuli which will subsequently 540 be categorized as good news (t(33) = -2.30, p = .028) but no significant difference for trials 541 that will be subsequently categorized as bad news (t(33) = 1.59, p = .123). Controlling for the 542 difference between first estimates on good and bad news trials in the main ANOVA looking 543 at information integration parameters did not alter the results (F(1,26) = 5.43, p = .028).

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545 What therefore could account for the selective fluctuations in information integration of 546 bad news? To examine which of the changes to the psychological and physiological 547 measures (SCL, cortisol level, self-report) could independently explain alterations in 548 information integration of bad news, we ran a General Linear Model (GLM) in which 549 information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_B$ ) were entered as the dependent variable 550 and changes in self report, SCL, and cortisol as independent variables (all entered together in 551 one regression). To ensure that effects were valance-specific and could not be accounted for 552 by general changes to information integration, information integration parameters for good 553 news ( $\alpha_G$ ) were added as a covariate as done before (Moutsiana et al., 2013) [note that the 554 same pattern of results pertains if we omit this covariate (self-reported anxiety: F(1,17) =555 4.75, p = 0.04, SCL: F(1,17) = 8.81, p = .009]. We also controlled for all other possible 556 confounds (see Methods). The analysis revealed that changes in self-reported anxiety 557  $(F(1,16) = 6.90, p = .02, b_i = .03, \eta_p^2 = .0.30)$  and change in physiological stress indicated by SCL (F(1,16) = 4.99, p = .04,  $b_i = .05$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .24$ ) explained the variance in information 558 559 integration parameters for bad news, each of which remained significant if estimation errors were also controlled for (self-reported stress: F(1,15) = 4.61, p = .048, SCL: F(1,15) = 4.67, p 560 561 = .047) (Garrett and Sharot, 2017). In other words, participants who showed the greatest 562 increase in SCL (which reflects the sympathetic component of the autonomic nervous system 563 stress response (Bechara et al., 1996; Figner and Murphy, 2011) and self-reported anxiety 564 were most likely to change their beliefs in proportion to the difference between their first 565 estimates and the bad news received. Change in cortisol (which is suggested to reflect the 566 hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Gunnar and Quevedo, 2007) component of the 567 stress response) did not relate to information integration for bad news (F(1,16) = .46, p > .25,

568  $b_i = -.04$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ ). The null result for cortisol may indicate either that the increase in bad 569 news information integration is not associated specifically with cortisol level increase, or a 570 Type II error. Ratings of emotional arousal, familiarity and information integration 571 parameters for good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) were also significant predictors in the regression (see **Table 2** 572 for parameter estimates of covariates).

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574 For completeness we repeated the analysis on information integration parameters for good news,  $\alpha_G$  (including information integration parameters for bad news,  $\alpha_B$ , and all possible covariates mentioned above) and found no significant effects (change in self report: F(1,16) =.47, p > .25,  $b_i = -.01$ ; change in SCL: F(1,16) = .61, p > .25,  $b_i = .03$ ; change in cortisol:  $F(1,16) = .72, p > .25, b_i = .07).$ 

Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed when controlling for withinsubject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors at the betweensubject level. Specifically, for each participant we computed an alternative set of information integration parameters by correlating absolute estimation error and update controlling for the same within-subject covariates as above (first estimate, vividness, familiarity, past experience and emotional arousal) but controlling for them on a trial by trial basis. We then examined whether these alternative information integration parameters for bad news related to changes in self-reported anxiety and/or changes in SCL (additional between subject factors - initial self-report and the alternative information integration parameters for good news - were also entered as control variables). Indeed, both effects were significant using this approach (change in self report: F(1,31) = 10.57, p = .003,  $b_i = .05$ ; change in SCL: F(1,31) = 4.51, p = .05.04,  $b_i = .08$ , Fig. 4a, b), while the equivalent analysis on information integration parameters from good news was not (change in self report: F(1,31) = .001, p = > .25,  $b_i = -.001$ ; change in SCL: F(1,31) = .55, p = > .25,  $b_i = .036$ ).

The results of Experiment I suggested that inducing threat abolishes valence dependent 596 asymmetry in information integration. Thus, the previously observed bias in information 597 integration (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 598 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) is not constant but changes with perceived 599 threat in the environment.

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### 601 **Experiment II**

602 Next we set out to extend our findings from Experiment I in a natural setting. Here, we did 603 not fashion a perceived threat, but instead measured anxiety in an environment in which 604 perceived threats would be naturally volatile. Specifically, firefighters from the state of 605 Colorado performed the belief update task whilst on duty at their respective fire stations. We 606 targeted this group of participants because they would have a naturally large range of anxiety 607 levels owing to the volatile nature of their profession. Changes in cortisol levels were not 608 found to be a significant predictor of information integration parameters for bad news in 609 Experiment I. Therefore, we ruled out collecting this as a measure in Experiment II. Whilst 610 changes in self-reported anxiety and changes in SCR were both found to be significant 611 predictors in Experiment I, these two measures were correlated with one another (r(33) = .39), p = .02). Since self-reported anxiety had the larger effect size and was easier to collect, we 612 613 opted to make this our main measure.

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615 Self-reported anxiety was significantly correlated (r(26) = -.51, p < .01) with the bias in 616 information integration (that is  $\alpha_{\rm G}$  minus  $\alpha_{\rm B}$ ). In particular, heightened anxiety was associated 617 with a reduction in the bias. This result remained significant when controlling for possible 618 confounds (see **Methods**), F(1,23) = 6.67, p = .02,  $\eta_{\rm p}^2 = .23$ ,  $b_i = -.05$ .

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620 To examine whether the relationship between heightened anxiety and reduced bias was the 621 result of increased sensitivity to bad news, reduced sensitivity to good news, or both we first 622 constructed a GLM in which information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_B$ ) was 623 regressed on self-reported anxiety, controlling for possible confounds (mean first estimates, 624 mean ratings of prior experience and number of bad news trials, see Methods for details). In 625 addition, to ensure effects were valence-specific and could not be accounted for by general 626 changes in information integration, information integration parameters for good news ( $\alpha_G$ ) 627 were also added as a covariate (note however that the self-reported anxiety effect pertains if 628 we omit this covariate: F(1,23) = 9.77, p = .005). This analysis revealed that self-reported 629 anxiety significantly explained the variance in information integration parameters for bad news,  $\alpha_{\rm B}(F(1,22) = 10.52, p = .004, \eta_{\rm p}^2 = .32, b_i = .05$ ; **Table 4**), an effect which remained 630 631 significant if estimation errors are also controlled for (F(1,21) = 9.79, p = .005) (Garrett and 632 Sharot, 2017). The higher the acute anxiety reported by a firefighter, the more likely the 633 firefighter was to integrate bad news into beliefs in proportion to the difference between their 634 first estimations and the information provided. In this model, information integration from 635 good news (F(1,22) = 4.69, p = .04) was also a significant predictor of information integration 636 from bad news. There were no floor or ceiling effects for  $\alpha_{\rm G}$  or  $\alpha_{\rm B}$  (all at p < .001, one sample t-tests against values of 0 and 1). 637

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639 We then conducted the same analysis on information integration parameters for good news 640 ( $\alpha_G$ ) with information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_B$ ), mean first estimates, mean 641 ratings of prior experience and number of good news trials as covariates. This revealed a nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction than for information integration parameters for bad news,  $\alpha_{\rm B}$  (*F*(1,22) = 3.86, *p* = .06,  $\eta_{\rm p}^2$  = .15, *b<sub>i</sub>* = -.05), such that greater self-reported anxiety was related to a trend for *less* information integration in response to good news. Information integration parameters for bad news ( $\alpha_{\rm B}$ ) was also significant (*F*(1,22) = 7.44, *p* = 0.01,  $\eta_{\rm p}^2$  = .25, *b<sub>i</sub>* = 0.75).

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648 Finally, we examined whether the same results are observed when controlling for within-649 subject covariates at the within-subject level and between-subject factors at the between-650 subject level. Under this alternative approach higher self-reported anxiety was related to 651 greater information integration in response to bad news (F(1,24) = 8.34, p = .008,  $b_i = .03$ , 652 Fig. 5a). For good news the opposite effect was found such that higher self-reported anxiety 653 was related to reduced information integration (F(1,24) = 4.80, p = .038,  $b_i = -.045$ , Fig. 5b). 654 It is interesting that this latter effect was observed only in Experiment 2 and not Experiment 655 1, which may indicate that natural real-life threats could have an especially strong impact on 656 information integration processes.

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These results suggest that anxiety is related to a valence-dependent enhancement in the ability to adjust beliefs in response to new information. We highlight that whilst in Experiment I, threat was manipulated and thus causation could be inferred by comparing the threat manipulation and control groups, Experiment II was conducted to reveal an *association* in "real life". Together, the experiments suggest that under a perceived threat (whether manipulated or naturally occurring) positively biased integration of information is not observed.

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### 666 Discussion

667 Our results provide evidence that the well-documented asymmetry in belief formation 668 evaporates under perceived threat. Specifically, Experiment I shows that in a low threat 669 environment individuals integrated information asymmetrically, faithfully incorporating good 670 news into their existing beliefs while relatively disregarding bad news (Eil and Rao, 2011; 671 Sharot et al., 2011). Under perceived threat however, this asymmetry disappeared; 672 participants showed an increased capacity to integrate bad news into prior beliefs. Increased 673 physiological arousal and self-reported anxiety were found to correlate with enhanced 674 integration of unfavorable information into beliefs. In Experiment II, firefighters on duty who 675 reported higher state anxiety also exhibited greater selective integration of bad news. Because 676 the increase in information integration in both experiments was valence specific it cannot 677 reflect a general improvement in learning, and because memory for the information presented 678 was not affected, modulation of attention is an unlikely explanation.

680 The finding that the positivity bias in belief updating alters flexibly as a function of perceived 681 threat reveals a potentially adaptive mechanism. In particular, the relative failure to 682 incorporate bad news into prior beliefs leads to positively biased beliefs (also known as the 683 optimism bias). This bias can lead to both positive effects – including increased exploration 684 (Berger-Tal and Avgar, 2012) and motivation (Bandura, 1989) - and negative effects -685 including failure to take precautionary action. It has been suggested that overestimating the 686 likelihood of attaining rewards and underestimating the likelihood of harm is adaptive in 687 environments where potential gains are sufficiently greater than costs (Johnson and Fowler, 688 2011). This is because under uncertainty, optimistically biased individuals will claim 689 resources (e.g., a spouse or a job) they could not otherwise attain, as better but less optimistic 690 competitors may walk away from the fight. Moreover, overestimating the value of novel 691 environments can lead to increased rate of exploration allowing the opportunity for the true 692 value of an environment to be learned quicker (Berger-Tal and Avgar, 2012; Sutton and 693 Barto, 1998), which is associated with superior performance in behaviours such as 694 reproduction (Egas and Sabelis, 2001) and foraging (Rutz et al., 2006). However, in 695 environments where potential harm is considerably greater than potential reward, 696 computational models suggest the optimism bias to be disadvantageous (Johnson and Fowler, 697 2011). Thus, a valence dependent bias in information integration that disappears under threat 698 could be optimal in enabling a more accurate assessment of risk.

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700 In our experiments, the source of the threat was unrelated to the information content of the 701 task. Thus, acute stress had a valence-specific, yet general, effect on how participants used 702 information to alter their beliefs (i.e. in response to a social threat, participants did not 703 selectively increase their response to information about social judgment, but to negative 704 information in general). Indeed, many threat induction methods, including threat of electric 705 shock, Cold Pressor Tasks and the Trier Social Stress Test, produce general changes to 706 behavior and neural responses that are not confined to the source of the threat itself 707 (Cavanagh et al., 2010; Lenow et al., 2017; Otto et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2013; Youssef 708 et al., 2012). Similar findings have been observed in non-human animals, where different 709 stressors have been shown to alter the degree of positive biases in a range of decision-making 710 tasks (Harding et al., 2004; Matheson et al., 2008; Rygula et al., 2013). This may be adaptive, 711 as threat may signify a dangerous environment that requires a general enhancement of 712 caution.

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However, if perceived threat is prolonged or dissociated from reality, enhanced integration of negative information over long periods of time could lead to psychiatric problems. We have 716 previously shown that patients suffering from Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) exhibit 717 increased updating of beliefs in response to negative information relative to healthy controls 718 (Garrett et al., 2014). MDD is often triggered by a stressful life event (Caspi et al., 2003; 719 Roiser et al., 2012). In individuals predisposed to MDD such a stressful life event (or series of 720 such events) could result in prolonged periods of perceived threat and thus increased 721 sensitivity to negative information. This in turn can form pessimistic beliefs, a symptom of 722 MDD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Strunk et al., 2006), leading to even greater 723 perceived threat about one's environment. It is possible that a similar mechanism may 724 contribute to symptoms observed in other clinical pathologies such as in clinical anxiety and 725 phobia.

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727 We speculate that stress in response to perceived threat may interfere with top down control 728 mechanisms that may normally inhibit integration of unwanted information (for review see 729 Yu, 2016). A second, not mutually exclusive, possibility is that the stress reaction directly 730 boosts the neural representation of estimation errors generated from bad, but not good, news. 731 Indeed, it has been shown that negative prediction errors in dopamine rich striatal nuclei are 732 selectively amplified under threat (Robinson et al., 2013) - a modulation that could be 733 mediated by stress-induced changes to dopamine release (Frank et al., 2004; Lemos et al., 734 2012; Schultz et al., 1997; Sharot et al., 2012a). Future studies are required to test these 735 hypotheses.

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737 In sum, our results provide evidence that asymmetric information integration is not set in 738 stone, but changes acutely in response to the environment, decreasing under perceived threat. 739 Such flexibility could be adaptive, potentially enhancing our likelihood to respond to 740 warnings with caution in environments where future costs may be high, but enabling us to 741 maintain positive beliefs otherwise, a strategy that has been suggested, on balance, to increase 742 well-being (McKay and Dennett, 2010).

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
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
### 868 Figures and Tables



### 869

### 870 Figure 1. Behavioral Task.

On each trial, participants were presented with a short description of an adverse event and asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to them in the future. They were then presented with the probability of that event occurring to someone from the same age, location and socio-economic background as them. The second session was the same as the first except that the average probability of the event to occur was not presented. Examples of trials for which the participant's estimate was (a) higher or (b) lower than the statistical information provided leading to receipt of good and bad news respectively.




Threat Manipulation Group

879

### 880 Figure 2. Manipulation Check.

881 Measures of (a) self-reported state anxiety, (b) skin conductance and (c) cortisol levels were 882 greater after manipulation relative to before in the threat manipulation group compared to the 883 control group. Time points for cortisol measurements are as follows: t0 = before threat/control 884 manipulation procedure; t1 = immediately after threat/control manipulation procedure, prior 885 to undertaking the task (+10 min from t0); t2 = halfway through the task (+30min from t0); t3 886 = after completion of task and post experiment questionnaires (+1hr from t0). 887 \*\* p < .050; Error bars represent standard error of the mean.




## 890 Figure 3. Bias in Information Integration Parameters Vanishes under Threat891 manipulation.

892 While the control group showed asymmetrical information integration parameters ( $\alpha$ ) in 893 response to good and bad news, this bias vanished in the threat manipulation group, due to an 894 increase in  $\alpha_B$  (information integration parameter for bad news). The Group\*Valence 895 interaction was significant, controlling for all covariates identified in Table 1 (see Methods). 896 \*\* p < .05 independent/paired sample t test as appropriate; Error bars represent standard error 897 of the mean.

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
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Figure 4. Greater integration of bad news related to state anxiety and SCL. Following the manipulation, an increase in both **a.** self-reported anxiety ( $b_i = .049$ , p = .003,  $\eta_p^2 = .25$ ) and **b.** skin conductance (SCL) ( $b_i = .076$ , p = .042,  $\eta_p^2 = .13$ ) were related to larger information integration from bad news, correcting for possible confounds. Plotted are the partial regression plots from two linear models (one for self-report and one for SCL) that

905 control for additional covariates.

906





907

**Figure 5. State anxiety in firefighters differentially relate to integration of good and bad news.** Subjective state anxiety scores (STAI) of firefighters on shift were related to larger information integration from bad news ( $b_i = .03$ , p = .008,  $\eta_p^2 = .26$ ) and lower information integration from good news ( $b_i = -0.045$ , p = .038,  $\eta_p^2 = .17$ ), correcting for possible confounds. Plotted are the partial regression plots for **a.** bad news (partial  $\alpha_B$ ) and **b.** good news (partial  $\alpha_G$ ) from 2 separate linear models (one for bad news and one for good news) that control for additional covariates.

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	Threat Manipulation	
	Group mean (SD)	Control Group mean (SD)
BDI and Baseline Stress Levels		
BDI	5.79 (5.23)	4.69 (3.22)
Initial Self Report STAI <sup>G</sup>	10.37 (2.65)	8.63 (1.36)
Initial SCL	6.27 (3.29)	5.90 (3.20)
Initial Cortisol (log transformed)	-1.99 (0.59)	-1.79 (0.53)
Task Variables		
First Estimates	$29.82(5.62)^{V}$	31.05 (5.89) <sup>V</sup>
Subjective Scales Questionnaire	B	ias
1 = low to 6 = high	(Good News	– Bad News)
Vividness	$0.41 (0.72)^{\rm V}$	$0.72 (0.65)^{ m V}$
Familiarity	0.30 (0.69)	$0.49~(0.62)^{ m V}$
Prior experience	0.18 (0.61)	$0.33 (0.41)^{V}$
Emotional arousal	$0.33 (0.63)^{\rm V}$	0.13 (0.86)
Negativity	0.20 (0.49)	-0.13 (0.58)
Other Task-related variables		
Number of Trials	-1.58 (8.99)	-1.56 (9.70)
Memory errors	-1.23 (3.16)	-0.21 (4.52)
Estimation errors (absolute)	-0.82 (5.27)	1.11 (5.84)
Update	2.60 (12.67)	4.21 (7.83) <sup>V</sup>

. BDI, Initial Self-Report STAI, Initial SCL, Initial Cortisol, Task-related s, subjective scales, memory in Experiment I. Note that Estimation errors and (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information integration ers ( $\alpha_{\rm G}$  and  $\alpha_{\rm B}$ ) for each participant. ence between Threat Manipulation and Control Groups, tested using independent

-tests (p<0.05).

icant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the bias scores ce between good and bad news) on each group separately.

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					95% Confidence		
					Inter	Interval	
		Std.			Lower	Upper	
	$b_i$	Error	t	р	Bound	Bound	${\eta_p}^2$
Initial Self Report STAI	-0.01	0.01	-1.10	0.29	-0.04	0.01	0.07
First estimates	0.01	0.01	0.89	0.39	-0.01	0.02	0.05
Vividness rating	-0.09	0.05	-1.84	0.09	-0.20	0.01	0.17
Familiarity rating	0.08	0.04	2.16	0.05	0.00	0.16	0.23
Prior experience rating	-0.04	0.06	-0.76	0.46	-0.17	0.08	0.04
Emotional arousal rating	-0.13	0.04	-3.03	0.01	-0.22	-0.04	0.37
Information integration							
parameter, good news ( $\alpha_G$ )	0.39	0.15	2.60	0.02	0.07	0.71	0.30

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934

### 935 Table 2. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I.

936 First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales (vividness,

937 familiarity, past experience and emotional arousal) and  $\alpha_G$  (information integration

938 parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in  $\alpha_B$ 

939 (information integration parameters for bad news).

940

	Mean (SD)
BDI	6.82 (7.45)
Task Variables	
First Estimates <sup>V</sup>	31.22 (6.96)
Subjective Scales Questionnaire	Bias
1 = low to 6 = high	(Good News – Bad News)
Prior experience <sup>V</sup>	0.54 (0.94)
Negativity	0.31 (0.90)
Other Task-related variables	
Number of Trials <sup>V</sup>	-10.89 (9.41)
Memory errors	-2.18 (6.51)
Estimation errors (absolute) <sup>V</sup>	-2.91 (5.16)
Update <sup>V</sup>	9.49 (12.04)

942

### 943 Table 3. Task-related variables, subjective scales and memory in Experiment II. Note

944 that Estimation errors and Update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the

945 information integration parameters ( $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$ ) for each participant.

946 V Significant effect of valence (p < 0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the mean bias

947 scores (difference between good and bad news) for each participant.

948

					95% Confidence		
					Interval		
		Std.			Lower	Upper	
	$b_i$	Error	t	р	Bound	Bound	${\eta_p}^2$
First estimates	0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.97	-0.02	0.02	0.00
Prior experience rating	-0.03	0.09	-0.31	0.76	-0.21	0.15	0.00
Number of bad news trials	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.99	-0.03	0.03	0.00
Information integration							
parameter, good news ( $\alpha_G$ )	0.34	0.16	2.17	0.04	0.02	0.67	0.18


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
### 950 Table 4. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II.


951 First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings of past experience, number of bad


952 news trials and  $\alpha_G$  (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as


953 covariates to account for fluctuations in  $\alpha_B$  (information integration parameters for bad news).











	Threat Manipulation				
	Group mean (SD)	Control Group mean (SD)			
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BDI	5.79 (5.23)	4.69 (3.22)			
Initial Self Report STAI <sup>G</sup>	10.37 (2.65)	8.63 (1.36)			
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Vividness	$0.41 (0.72)^{\rm V}$	$0.72 (0.65)^{ m V}$			
Familiarity	0.30 (0.69)	$0.49~(0.62)^{ m V}$			
Prior experience	0.18 (0.61)	$0.33 (0.41)^{V}$			
Emotional arousal	$0.33 (0.63)^{\rm V}$	0.13 (0.86)			
Negativity	0.20 (0.49)	-0.13 (0.58)			
Other Task-related variables					
Number of Trials	-1.58 (8.99)	-1.56 (9.70)			
Memory errors	-1.23 (3.16)	-0.21 (4.52)			
Estimation errors (absolute)	-0.82 (5.27)	1.11 (5.84)			
Update	2.60 (12.67)	4.21 (7.83) <sup>V</sup>			

Table 1. BDI, Initial Self-Report STAI, Initial SCL, Initial Cortisol, Task-related variables, subjective scales, memory in Experiment I. Note that Estimation errors and Update (the final two rows) are the variables used to compute the information integration parameters ( $\alpha_G$  and  $\alpha_B$ ) for each participant. <sup>G</sup> Difference between Threat Manipulation and Control Groups, tested using independent sample t-tests (p<0.05).

<sup>V</sup> Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the bias scores (difference between good and bad news) on each group separately.

					95% Confidence		
					Inter	Interval	
		Std.			Lower	Upper	
	$b_i$	Error	t	р	Bound	Bound	${\eta_p}^2$
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Vividness rating	-0.09	0.05	-1.84	0.09	-0.20	0.01	0.17
Familiarity rating	0.08	0.04	2.16	0.05	0.00	0.16	0.23
Prior experience rating	-0.04	0.06	-0.76	0.46	-0.17	0.08	0.04
Emotional arousal rating	-0.13	0.04	-3.03	0.01	-0.22	-0.04	0.37
Information integration							
parameter, good news ( $\alpha_G$ )	0.39	0.15	2.60	0.02	0.07	0.71	0.30

### Table 2. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I.

First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales (vividness, familiarity, past experience and emotional arousal) and  $\alpha_G$  (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in  $\alpha_B$  (information integration parameters for bad news).

	Mean (SD)
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Subjective Scales Questionnaire	Bias
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Other Task-related variables	
Number of Trials <sup>V</sup>	-10.89 (9.41)
Memory errors	-2.18 (6.51)
Estimation errors (absolute) <sup>V</sup>	-2.91 (5.16)
Update <sup>V</sup>	9.49 (12.04)

<sup>v</sup> Significant effect of valence (p<0.05), tested using one sample t-test on the mean bias scores (difference between good and bad news) for each participant.

					95% Confidence		
					Interval		
		Std.			Lower	Upper	
	$b_i$	Error	t	р	Bound	Bound	${\eta_p}^2$
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Prior experience rating	-0.03	0.09	-0.31	0.76	-0.21	0.15	0.00
Number of bad news trials	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.99	-0.03	0.03	0.00
Information integration							
parameter, good news ( $\alpha_G$ )	0.34	0.16	2.17	0.04	0.02	0.67	0.18

### Table 4. Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II.

First estimates (i.e. mean initial estimations), mean ratings of past experience, number of bad news trials and  $\alpha_G$  (information integration parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in  $\alpha_B$  (information integration parameters for bad news).