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From Henley to Harvard, at Hyderabad?
(Post and Neo-) Colonialism in Management Education in India

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Author’s Biography
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Before launching the Ford Foundation’s (henceforth FF) international programmes, FF’s then President Paul G. Hoffman (1950–3) set off on an overseas tour of Asia in 1951. He described their mission as building a “better understanding between the free peoples of the world.”² FF’s subsequent international programmes were part of USA’s wider efforts at countering communism in the so-called “Third World” countries.³ Following Truman’s Four Point Program launched in his inaugural address in 1949, FF’s international interventions were framed through and legitimized in the name of international development.⁴ Such interventions were aimed at re-making a new global order, with USA at the helm of it as the dominant neo-colonial power. Crucial to the US global rise was its “soft power,” which in Nye’s widely cited formulation is understood as power over countries by which “one country gets other countries to want what it wants.”⁵ In the making of American soft power, the US philanthropic foundations, according to International Relations scholar Inderjeet Parmar, played an influential role.⁶ Significant among these, were the “Big Three” foundations—that is, Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford—which funded international development programmes with the explicit aims of alleviating hunger and poverty, supporting economic development, and uplifting living standards in the third world. However, their unstated objectives were to combat communism, contain anti-American sentiment, and promote Americanism across the third world by sponsoring elite but purposive knowledge networks.⁷

In FF’s fight against communism during the Cold War, India was seen as an “essential democracy.”⁸ The successful outcome of development in the country were deemed crucial to the future fortunes of democracy and development globally. Hoffman, for example, viewed India as the “next critical battleground of the Cold War” after China, which he believed had already been lost.⁹ It is hardly surprising, then, that FF’s first overseas office was opened in New Delhi, India in 1951.
Although its early programmes in the country were targeted at community development, from 1958 onwards FF made a number of large programme grants for the establishment and institutionalization of management education in the country, including most notably the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) at Ahmedabad and Calcutta.¹⁰

Modelled on the Harvard Business School (henceforth HBS) and MIT’s Sloan School respectively, the establishment of management education institutions in India has commonly been characterized as “mimicry.”¹¹ The mimicry of American management education in India (theory, curriculum, and pedagogy) was part of the wider Americanization of management knowledge and practice, on which there is a wider and more established scholarship.¹² Postcolonial critics of management have characterized the Americanization of management in the previously colonized-third world countries as a colonial continuity: driven by similar logic, built on earlier colonial infrastructures, and which reinforced the binary colonial representations of the “West” and Rest of the World and its peoples.¹³ Frenkel and Shenhav, for example, have argued that the Americanization of Israel’s productivity models in the 1950s was built on the prior institutional infrastructures and logics from British colonialism.¹⁴

Although widely acknowledged, the influential role of USA’s philanthropic foundations in the Americanization of management education in third world countries remains under-analysed.¹⁵ More so as organisations such as FF have operated as a “dominating institution” which, according to Khurana, Kimura and Fourcade, worked purposively to change other institutions and exercise their dominance.¹⁶ They do so in three key ways: brokering across institutions (where previously there were structural holes between key actors, sectors and disciplines); legitimizing or stigmatizing particular organisations and their practices (by stigmatizing well-entrenched routines and legitimizing new rational truths); and creating dependencies for resources within institutions they are trying to change.

This article interrogates and explains FF’s influential but problematic role in institutionalizing the mimicry of American management education in India. Operating as a dominating institution, FF purposively engineered the severing of India’s post-colonial institutions’ prior connections with British institutions, following imperialism; and supplanting them with American institutions and their
practices. This was part of distinguishing American interests and presence in India from British colonial institutions, against whom—FF believed—there had come to be considerable but expected resentment. Placed in its contemporary context of post-colonial development in India and the Cold War being fought in third world countries, FF’s brokering of management education pedagogy—the article argues—was driven by the American need to establish its supremacy by displacing the dominance of British institutions and making its institutions as the dominant referent for India’s institutions, indeed its development too. Although distinct, management education in India, I conclude, has been imbricated in related forms of colonialism.

The article is based on FF’s interventions at the Administrative Staff College of India (henceforth ASCI) in Hyderabad, India from 1958 onwards. Modelled on the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames, UK (henceforth Henley), ASCI also used syndicates in its training programmes, which were targeted mid-career managers; in addition to replicating Henley’s physical setting, institutional leadership, and role of staff. In particular, the article focuses on FF’s financial and technical support to ASCI for facilitating the use of the case-method in the latter’s training programmes to replace syndicates, including the appointment of Andrew R Towl, the first Director of Case Development at HBS as a technical expert at ASCI in 1960. As a dominating institution, FF engaged in a persistent but purposive stigmatization of Henley and ASCI (in particular its instructional method of syndicates), as well as deficits of modernity in Indian society and economy. And further, FF-appointed staff and consultants engaged in legitimizing USA’s management institutions, such as HBS and its instructional methods, as the template for India’s post-colonial management institutions. The article makes a contribution by contextualizing and explaining FF’s interest in ASCI and outlining the mechanics of its influence as a dominating institution. Not to mention, in challenging—following Cooke and Alcadipani—their limits as a dominating institution.

The focus on ASCI and management pedagogy are, I would argue, significant. Least of all, as ASCI has received limited attention in the history of management education in India. Departing from Hill et al’s three-phased classification of development of management education in the country, I would argue that ASCI—which they place in the rather short and unimpressive second stage—was significant despite its small size and now prestige. Planned as a collaboration between the state and
industry, it marked the recognition of the incipient nation-state’s need for trained administrators, both by its public and private industrial sectors as well as public administration, for its overall development. Secondly, less like the IIMs at Ahmedabad and Calcutta, ASCI was organized as part of the Nehruvian mixed economic model, where the post-colonial state was involved in industrial sectors deemed crucial to national interest. Established before and outside FF’s influence on management education in the country (most notably in the form of IIMs), the article’s focus on ASCI therefore provides not only a pre-history of Americanization of management education in India, howsoever short; but also the mechanics of FF’s purposive and influential role in the history of Americanization of management education in the country. The article makes a contribution in bringing into relief the mimicry of British institutions of management education and training and their practices in post-colonial India, which preceded the mimicry of American management education.

The article’s focus on pedagogy is also instructive as prior scholarship on Americanization of management education has tended to focus on institutional models (B-schools), management knowledge and theory, and curricular resources, while teaching and training methods have received comparatively lesser attention. Elsewhere, prior scholarship on pedagogy has focussed on the effectiveness (or lack of) different methods in meeting the challenges of training tomorrow’s managers, the article contextualises management pedagogy. In doing so, it makes a further contribution. Although FF-staff and consultants frequently presented it as a struggle over pedagogic and institutional effectiveness, it was in effect, the article argues, a struggle over influence.

The article draws on archival research conducted at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), USA, and University of Reading’s Special Collections (UR) and London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) in UK. FF’s archival material at RAC included official grant documents such as grant letters, extension and financial reports; grant requests, narrative and evaluation reports submitted to FF; correspondence among FF-appointed consultants and staff; as well as their correspondence with ASCI’s leadership. In addition to which, a number of unpublished and previously uncatalogued evaluation and travel reports were also consulted. Sources consulted at UR’s Special Collections included archival material relating to Henley’s Staff College, which were particularly useful in understanding the context and practice of syndicates at Henley itself but also elsewhere across the
globe. Finally, the Latham Papers at LMA contained the only available and systematic study of syndicates when compared to other pedagogic methods, particularly the case-method.

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, a brief but considered review of scholarship on Americanization and its continuities with colonialism in third world and the significant but problematic role of USA’s philanthropic foundations is presented. It is followed by a brief historical overview of syndicates and case-method of training. The article’s central narrative of making Henley and later Harvard at Hyderabad via syndicates and the case-method respectively are presented next; followed by FF’s attempts at displacing syndicates and supplanting them with the case-method. In the final section, I discuss FF’s programmes at ASCI by re-inserting them into their contemporary context and outline the article’s contributions at the end.

**Americanization, Colonialism and U. S. Foundations**

USA has exercised disproportionate influence on management across the globe. Commonly understood as Americanization, USA’s predominance in management (education but also research, theory, and practice) has led to reduction of other societies and nations to “field experiments in the global laboratory of universalizing US management theory.” Americanization gained impetus in the context of the Cold War where management was deemed crucial for maintaining a strong and growing American economy, and by extension USA’s place in global political and economic order in comparison to the erstwhile USSR. H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., FF’s President from 1953–56 and later the Chair of its Board, recognized as much when he argued, “[t]he Soviet challenge requires that we seek out and utilize the best intelligence of American management—and in turn puts on management a national responsibility of unparalleled dimensions.” Management, therefore, was imbricated in the related pursuits of American war against communism and in installing USA as an economic and political exemplar for the Rest of the World to follow. As it was imported elsewhere, of which the third world is the focus here, it took different foci, form, and trajectories in different geographies and historical eras. Notwithstanding such significant differences in Americanization of management education, it has always been crucial to serving USA’s domestic and global interests and foreign policy objectives at all times.
Compared to the core, the responses to the Americanization of management knowledge and education, Kipping et al suggest, tended to be more extreme in countries located on the global periphery.²⁸ It tended to vacillate between enthusiastic adoption informed by development and modernization or rejection based on nationalism, with rather limited attempts at adapting or translating them into specific contexts. The former of these is commonly understood as “mimicry.” As Americanization of management knowledge and education, mimicry involved the transplanting of American theory, choice of issues, curricular resources and pedagogy, although not always successfully, in third world countries such as Brazil and India.²⁹ It was framed through and legitimated in the name of international development, where management and development were twinned in the mid-twentieth century third world in two related ways.³⁰ As a field of practice, management was required for the organisation, delivery, and control of international development: where rural, agrarian, informal third world economies needed to be transformed rapidly into urbanised, industrial economies.³¹ More, as a field of knowledge, management was conceived as enabling third world countries to “catch up with Western nations in its scientific temperament and its political and cultural modernization.”³² With the “West” installed as the exemplar, management promised a singular trajectory toward a pre-determined goal and where it did not matter “where you [were] in the world or at what time in history you [came] from.³³

Imposed from the outside-in, the transplanting of management from USA to third world countries led, as Ibarra-Colado terms it, to its “epistemic coloniality.” It has been based on the “totalitarian pragmatism of the ‘one best way’ and the supposed scientific character of a set of logical and highly formalized mathematical knowledge.”³⁴ In management’s pursuit of the one best way, people, communities, ecologies, geographies, and industries from the third world were commonly designated as deviant, deficient, or backward. Like colonialism, therefore, management worked to reinforce or reconfigure pre-existing colonial binaries (of modern vs traditional, for example) and order (developed industrial nations of North America and Western Europe as exemplars) in the third world.³⁵ The postcolonial critique of management has, therefore, characterized management in terms of its continuities of colonialism: in its colonizing intent, gaze, and its representations of the Other. It is worth highlighting here that the internationalization of management in third world shared its
colonizing characteristics with its twin: international development. Not only were both characteristically modernizing and universalizing, but were also indexical in their expressions and representations of colonialism.

In the name and as part of international development in the third world, management research and training institutions were established. In this, both US academic institutions such as HBS, Sloan School of Management and Michigan State University, and philanthropic foundations, most notably the Ford and Rockefeller, were involved. They were part of the wider efforts of the US foundations in expanding and consolidating American soft power. In an early signal work, for example, Robert Arnove marked the motivations and programmes of US foundations in the production of public culture and policy as “cultural imperialism.” Contrary to their own claims, the US foundations—Arnove and his contributors argued—had a corrosive influence on democracy. From an international relations perspective, Parmar has argued that USA’s Big Three foundations’ core investment was directed at creating and sustaining elite scholarly networks, which were crucial for serving American foreign policy and its global interests. During the Cold War, for example, the foundations’ sponsored elite, scholarly networks were involved in promoting Americanism and combating anti-Americanism while sharing “close cooperation, shared convictions and worldviews” with the American state. However, the foundations’ programmes were hardly static and frequently mirrored the shifts in US foreign policy. Like Parmar, Gemelli has argued that the shifts in FF’s policies and programmes on management education in western Europe from 1950s-60s reflected the shifts in American foreign policy as it moved from fighting communism first towards the impending internationalization of the Soviet bloc countries and their economies in the 1970s. Still later, Parmar, has argued, the networks worked to promote neoliberal globalization strategies in third world countries; thus, working to complement American foreign policy, even as it shifted over time and across geographies.

As part of their efforts at expanding American soft power, the US foundations sponsored programmes to support specific disciplines and fields across the globe through international institution- and network-building. In India, for example, FF identified management and public administration as its chosen fields of intervention. This choice reflected the needs of an overloaded
and small administrative capacity in the country to lead its post-colonial development, but also their mutual significance for industrial development and private enterprise. In 1957, FF commissioned Charles A Myers to investigate which Indian institutions could be supported for their teaching in “industrial relations and industrial management;” his report identified ASCI as a potential recipient. In addition to ASCI and the IIMs at Ahmedabad and Calcutta mentioned previously, FF supported the founding of a third IIM at Bangalore in 1975 and the Institute of Rural Management, Anand in 1979 for public sector and co-operative management respectively. In each of these institutions, FF’s support was directed, mainly, at providing technical support from USA for adopting an autonomous business-school model in the country. Characteristic features of such institutions in India included: autonomy from accredited universities, postgraduate teaching in a trimester format, and case-based teaching with the objective of insulating management institutions in the country from contrasting imperatives of Indian universities.

Pedagogic Approaches

Before proceeding further, it is worth outlining the historical development, key features, and pedagogic effectiveness of syndicates and the case-method. Even though the latter is now widely known and highly regarded, comparatively lesser is known about the syndicate method.

Henley’s Syndicates

The College at Henley was organised along the models of the Services’ Staff Colleges. Recalling then British Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s visit to the College in April 1948, Noel F. Hall (Henley’s founding Principal) shared that Attlee had regarded Henley as the “civil equivalent of the Imperial Defence College.” There was, according to Hall, a self-evident case for their comparison. Like the Services’ Staff Colleges, Henley provided a platform for personnel, whose training might have been in a different branch or specialism, to exchange ideas. The Staff Colleges provided useful training for personnel moving into positions of seniority, where decision-making was consultative. Similarly, at Henley the central organising idea was to make a “co-ordinated group out of individual specialists.”
At Henley, syndicates involved twelve-weeks of strictly residential training of selected participants who were organized into six groups of ten members (as participants of syndicates were known) each. The members came from the civil services, private and nationalized industries, local government and civilian services, and overseas members, most of whom came from countries that were colonized by Britain. The groups were purposively constituted to ensure a cross-section of the fields the members came from and specialisms they were involved in. Each group was led by a different chairperson, selected from among the group members for each time-bound task assigned to them. As a result of the rotating appointment of chairs, all the members of the syndicate held the responsibility of chairing their group at one point or another. The curricular material was handed out to each group at the beginning of their tasks, with experts invited to deliver talks in their areas of specialisms. For some tasks, the groups made observation visits to selected organisations. At the end of each task, the group presented its report before the College assembly and answering questions in the following open discussion. A faculty member, known as a directing staff, was assigned to each syndicate group. They were responsible for the preparation of task briefs, compiling working materials, and facilitating the discussion in syndicates if called on by the group’s chair. Designed as a self-instructional method, members of the syndicates not only drew on their own professional experiences but also on those of other members within and across groups on various subjects. The subjects covered in the syndicates were categorized into three divisions. While the first division dealt with various sub-fields of management, the second division focussed on cross-sectoral issues such as relations between government and industry. The third division dealt with complex problems of administration, such as major technological developments.

From Henley, the syndicate-based model of training was exported to a number of countries across the globe, including third world countries such as India, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines and East Africa and West Indies as part of their post-colonial development; as well as Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Norway as part of their post-War economic development. For scholars of public administration, syndicates were effective as a pre-requisite for “restor[ing] the flexibility and initiative that must always accompany free enterprise” in any industrialized nation. They encouraged initiative, originality, dissent, mutual respect and understanding. As small group-based teaching
methods, syndicates generated motivation and involvement among participants, leading to “deep-level processing” and development of higher-order skills.\textsuperscript{54} They were, however, not without limitations. Adams, for example, has argued that although syndicates were not particularly effective in terms of knowledge acquisition, they worked well though as a forum for exchange of experience, experimenting with one’s behaviour in a team and in creating opportunities for self-development.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Harvard’s Case-method}

First initiated at the Harvard Law School in 1870, the case-method soon migrated into HBS as a result of its then-Dean Edwin Gay’s enthusiasm. Although not immediately successful, moves toward adopting the case method were consolidated under Wallace B. Donham, who took over as HBS’s Dean in 1919 and helped develop the necessary institutional infrastructure.\textsuperscript{56} Primarily geared toward training students to practice ways by which they dealt with business problems, the case-method has since come to occupy the foremost position as an instructional method. Confronted with situations or simulations of real-life or cases, students arrive at conclusions based on systematic analysis of facts, problem-formulation, and discussion.\textsuperscript{57} Focussing on managerial decision-making, the case-method of instruction has only grown more popular and influential since.

Despite its global popularity, the case-method is not without criticism. Scholars have argued that the use of cases underplays social, political and ethical factors related to managerial decision-making.\textsuperscript{58} Elsewhere, Collinson and Tourish have argued that cases fail to reflect diversity of organisational perspectives and perpetuate the myth of charismatic manager/leader.\textsuperscript{59} Notwithstanding the criticisms, the use of the case-method had migrated fields, including medicine and public policy, and geographies and have come to be popularly associated with Harvard University, with its law, medicine, and business schools identified as exemplars.\textsuperscript{60}

In its rise in global power and prestige, Contardo and Wensley have identified three, core, mutually reinforcing ideologies that underpinned the case-method.\textsuperscript{61} These included: managerialism, institutionalism, and American capitalism. In promoting Americanism across the globe—as an ideological endeavour—the case method, therefore presented an appropriate vehicle. As part of Americanization of management education, therefore, the case-method came to be propagated and
adopted in management institutes in India. Foremost among these institutions, were the IIMs at Ahmedabad and Calcutta, particularly the former which was modelled on HBS. There were still other forces at work behind the adoption of the case-method. Srinivas, for example, has argued that compared to other teaching methods, the case-method was seen as enabling “better description of actual working conditions.” It, therefore, helped mediate the tensions between (American) management’s purported universalism and Indians’ need to address the specificities of their context (mixed economic with extensive state-control of private enterprise). While the adoption of case-method at IIMs was relatively straight-forward, it was much less so in ASCI’s case despite FF’s support in the form of capital and technical expertise, on which more in the following three sections.

Making Henley at Hyderabad

As part of the post-World War II development in India, the imperial government’s Central Advisory Board of Education suggested that technical education in the country should be organized on a national and not at provincial level. As part of this, an All India Council for Technical Education was established in 1945 to support higher technical education for industrial development in the country. After attaining independence in 1947, the post-colonial Government of India began exploring the possibility of training its in-coming cadre of civil servants at Henley from 1948 onwards. This was soon found to be unfeasible. In 1949, the All India Council for Technical Education appointed a Joint Committee to plan the organization and development of management training institutions in the country itself. The Committee recommended that an Administrative Staff College should be established as a collaboration between Government of India and the private business community. A separate Planning Committee was setup under the leadership of then-Minister of Commerce and Industry, TT Krishnamachari with prominent members from the industry sector. The Committee’s Joint Secretaries visited Henley in 1953. The following year, Hall visited India for further advisory. As a result of which, ASCI was formally registered on May 18, 1956 with Gen. S. M. Shrinagesh as its first Principal and syndicates as its choice of delivering management training. Before taking charge at ASCI, Shrinagesh spent six weeks at Henley studying, among other things, their use of syndicates. Impressed with what he witnessed, Shrinagesh found syndicates, “so relevant in the Indian
environment,” that he was convinced that ASCI ought to adopt it as far as possible. He arranged for
the secondment of J. W. L. Adams, a member of Henley’s Directing staff (as members of faculty were
known), as Director of Studies to ASCI for its first session to facilitate this.66

Launched in December 1957, ASCI’s syndicates were modelled closely on those used at
Henley, with some adaptation of some features to accommodate the specificities of the Indian
context.67 Like Henley, ASCI’s programme catered to mid-level managers who had recently taken—or
were likely to do so in the near future—a senior administrative position and/or expansion of their
administrative duties. Mimicking Henley’s syndicates, the members were carefully selected based on
an interview and then divided into five syndicates of ten members each. The division of members into
syndicates was also based on their functional specialisms and the type of organization they came from
to ensure diversity within each syndicate group. As at Henley, the members were expected to learn
from their prior experience and contrasting it with that of others through dialogue. There were minor
differences though. Reflecting the post-colonial Indian economic structure where the public sector
played a significant role, the participation of trainees from governmental agencies and public-sector
industries tended to be much higher at ASCI.68

At Hyderabad but also elsewhere, Henley and its syndicates served as a template for a number
of third world countries on which the latter’s post-colonial administrative institutions and practices
were modelled. They were considered to be universally-applicable, irrespective of the differences
within the third world countries. Reviewing the Staff Colleges around the world, Taylor for example,
concluded that syndicates had come to be universally recognized for their efficiency in delivering
management training.69 Unlike Taylor, however, I would argue that the rise of syndicates to universal
prominence—if that—was not simply an outcome of its effectiveness as a pedagogic method. Instead,
it involved concentrated efforts from Henley’s staff too. Throughout the 1950s-60s, Henley actively
solicited nomination of members from third world countries on its own programmes as well as the
secondment of its staff to Colleges in other countries. Hall and other staff members from Henley
toured other Staff Colleges across the globe to provide advisory support as appointed consultants or
on secondment from Henley. In 1963, for example, Henley’s J. P. Martin-Bates approached FF with a
request for financial support so that Henley could continue to provide additional technical assistance
to ASCI. His request was declined by FF as the latter was actively engaged in making Harvard at Hyderabad via the case-method, on which more in the following section.

Drawing on the postcolonial critique of management, Henley’s attempts represent a colonial continuity in post-colonial India: in their intent to maintain British influence despite the formal demise of colonialism and its universalizing assumption that third world context did not matter very much. In the name of development, Henley’s import of syndicates represented attempts, as the postcolonial scholars Sanjay Seth, Leela Gandhi, and Michael Dutton argue cogently, at re-inscribing the history of third world into one that was not necessarily of its own making, but based on received frameworks.

Making Harvard at Hyderabad

Between 1958 and 1973, FF made four grants to ASCI totalling $1,266,143 towards institutional development, staff research and training, and development of a consultancy division. It is instructive to note that two-thirds of FF’s support was dedicated to technical experts, that is costs associated with salaries, travel, and accommodation of various US scholars who came on short- or long-term consulting and advisory assignments to Hyderabad. Although there is no known archival evidence to suggest that Shrinagesh approached FF for help with the case-method in the first instance; as per FF’s internal documentation from 1960, he approached FF for support to introduce case-based teaching, “following the Harvard pattern,” at Hyderabad. Cases were expected to help develop a focus on decision-making among members of ASCI’s syndicates and supporting its faculty members to develop “their own ideas on management.” Given that cases were already being used alongside lectures, site visits, and simulations in syndicates at Henley as well as Hyderabad, FF’s support was earmarked for guidance and technical expertise in combining the two in its training. However, before case-based teaching could be adopted at ASCI, there was a need for researching and writing cases relevant to the Indian context. As part of FF’s grant 59-21A, it approached Andrew R. Towl at HBS. Although, initially interested in a short-term position of six months, Towl later accepted an eighteen-month assignment on Douglas Ensminger’s—FF’s Representative in India from 1951–70
and widely influential among senior members of Nehru’s cabinet—persuasion to help ASCI develop the case-method. 76

Towl began his ASCI assignment on September 15, 1960, not in Hyderabad but Henley where he met with Hall. Along with R. L. Gupta, ASCI’s then-Principal, Towl discussed Hall’s understanding of administration (as it was known in the US context) and experience of syndicates, before travelling further eastward to Hyderabad. Once at ASCI, Towl began looking for ways in which syndicates and case-method might complement each other, especially as Towl believed that there were a number of institutional and programmatic similarities between HBS’ Advanced Management Programme and management training at both Henley and ASCI, already. In a letter to Ensminger, for example, Towl discussed that the programmes at all three institutes ran for the same duration, typically attracted 40-year old men (sic) with extensive practical experience, emphasized self-directed learning, and envisaged faculty members as instructors and not teachers. 77 Elsewhere, he outlined still other similarities, including their shared recognition of autonomous enterprise and belief that learning ought to challenge individuals. 78 Both the methods, Towl believed, were committed to “administration as an internal process” and to “exposing members to the emotional requirements of management as well as to the intellectual.” 79 He initiated a bi-weekly case discussion programme at Hyderabad to discuss possible ways of using the case-method in syndicates. The active participation of ASCI’s faculty members in the programme led Towl to believe that the problems of merging the two pedagogic methods “seem[ed] manageable.” 80

Despite Towl’s optimism, senior leadership and faculty members at ASCI, particularly Gupta, remained sceptical about merging the two methods. 81 Ignoring Gupta’s reluctance, FF’s advisors coerced him into pursuing the writing of the cases. In April 1961, Towl wrote—self-admittedly—a rather tactless and blunt letter to Gupta. Written on FF’s letter-head, Towl reminded the latter that FF’s grant to ASCI was conditional on its acceptance of case-based instruction at Hyderabad. 82 Responding to Gupta’s concerns, Towl argued that cases could always be discussed as “the eleventh experience at the syndicate table” as its design permitted “the feed back of faculty research without violating the fundamentals” of syndicates. Towl’s somewhat terse response to Gupta over his concerns on incorporating case-based teaching into syndicates was also copied to Ensminger and C.
D. Deshmukh, who until 1956 had served as the Indian Finance Minister and was known for proximity to Nehru and FF. Attached along with Towl’s letter to Gupta was the draft of a separate letter—to be sent out later on Gupta’s behalf—to various Indian universities and companies encouraging their faculty members and senior managers respectively to join Towl’s training programme on case-writing. Particularly revealing here is the extent to which FF exercised its power as a dominating institution in drafting a communique on Gupta’s behalf and coercing him into sending it out, despite his strong reservations about merging the case-method with syndicates.

Following which, a Special Task Force was assembled by June 1961 comprising of senior leaders from industry, banks, industrial associations, and academia, which went on to tour India’s major industrial centres to gather data for case-writing. As a result of the Task Force’s work, more than 75 cases were written over the following six months. Sixty cases were finally completed, of which 55 were compiled in a book titled ASCI Case Collection: Series I, with a Note from Towl on writing and using cases.

Notwithstanding the seeming progress on the development of cases, uncertainty about its use in ASCI’s training programmes continued. In 1962, Gupta voiced his reservation again. Possibly afraid of losing FF’s support, he continued to indicate his interest in finding further ways about merging the case-method within syndicates. With this in mind, Gupta requested FF to fund a separate travel grant for him. Proposing to spend 6-8 weeks with Towl and Ernest C Arbuckle, Dean of Stanford’s Graduate School of Business (GSB), Gupta hoped to gain a “good deal of knowledge and insight” to “co-ordinate the Case Studies with the Syndicate method and to get the best out of the new type of the Staff envisaged.” It is worth mentioning here that Gupta’s reservations about such a merger were also shared within FF. Robert Greenleaf, an FF-appointed consultant and a leading proponent of “servant leadership,” also expressed his “reservations” about the use of cases within syndicates. He said that case method was excellent procedure under a “gifted teacher” but under a mediocre teacher, it would be “a pretty muddled kind of thing and not much good comes out of it.”

Despite their reservations, FF moved on from making a limited case for the use of case-method in training to their institution-wide adoption at Hyderabad. FF-personnel did so by posing ASCI’s problems—perceived or real—with training as a wider institutional problem. Looking back,
Dennis Gallagher (FF-staff in its India Office) suggested, in his evaluation report from 1970, that there had been an absence of integration of research and teaching. Such an integration, he argued, was in any case not possible through syndicates and it had, in turn, failed to create any scope for faculty growth. Elsewhere, in a letter to N. P. (Potla) Sen (ASCI’s then-Principal), Harold Howe (Programme Advisor in Education at FF’s New Delhi Office) repeated that the quality and utility of its syndicate-based teaching had grown to become “the major institutional problem” confronting ASCI. And that even though ASCI had made progress in consulting and research, teaching had continued to lag behind in quality and effectiveness. In an effort to sort the institutional difficulties confronting ASCI, a Consultancy and Applied Research Division (CARD) was established in 1964, on Greenleaf’s recommendation, through FF’s Grant 59-21C. Promoted as a source of additional income for ASCI, CARD was expected to resolve the reservations at Hyderabad over the use of the case-method. It proposed to do so by integrating all of ASCI’s institutional functions: consulting, research, and training in their use of case-method. That is, consultancy was expected to identify and provide data around which cases could be researched and developed, which could later be used by the faculty members in their training programmes. By 1966, CARD had developed rapidly, leading FF-staff to believe that both Gupta and ASCI’s governors had ultimately, although belatedly, come to develop an “understanding and appreciation of the philosophy of the integration of the training and research programs,” that is the case-method. Such assessments, however, proved to be premature as ASCI’s training programmes continued to make use of syndicates.

As uncertainty over FF’s support to ASCI grew, its Principal Sen wrote a detailed letter to Howe in September 1970. Before commenting on FF’s priorities for ASCI, Sen set out to clear ground over teaching methodology and role of research in his letter: such was the significance attached to which teaching method ought to have been used at Hyderabad. Arguing that ASCI was not “indissolubly wedded” to Henley’s syndicate-method, Sen downplayed their use at ASCI and cited the variety of teaching methods used at Hyderabad; and that FF’s support had been productive in the development of cases at ASCI.

Later in 1972, ASCI submitted a request for a grant for INR 10,087,000 (then equivalent to approximately $328,200) for a period of four years to FF. In it, Sen reiterated the use and relevance
of syndicates in training senior executives. Arguing against Towl’s understanding of the sub-division of management in syndicates as its key weakness, Sen wrote that this was both practical and necessary, as well as beneficial. The participation of members from governmental, public, and private organizations in the syndicates, he noted, had been useful in comparing experiences, examining and forming their actions, and not simply absorbing academic theory. Further, the use of syndicates had aided the “development of the member’s personality and on making him (sic) more adept in handling tools and procedures” by improving skills in group-thinking, decision-making, self-expression, etc.

Despite making a strong case for conserving the values of its Henley-style teaching in syndicates, ASCI’s leadership continued to signal its openness to other teaching methods including the case-method, possibly in order to secure FF’s financial support in the near future. In its Prospective Plan for the next decade which was appended to the above grant request from 1972, they re-stated ASCI’s openness to “innovations that will be suggested as greater depth of knowledge about Indian administrative problems emerge” from CARD.91 ASCI’s case for conserving the past while expressing a willingness to change in the future was re-cast in terms of its autonomy as a distinct and Indian institution. The Plan stated that ASCI wished to “evolve into a truly Indian institution that will not be regarded as an adaptation of a foreign model although it will obviously use any superior techniques that others have developed.” Further, that any change, such as the imposition of case-method, should not involve a “sudden abandonment of the old and substitution of the new” but a gradual development toward more rigorous, specific, systems-oriented, and demanding individual work.

The case for making Harvard at Hyderabad began with FF’s proposal to merge case-method into syndicates. As ASCI’s leadership and faculty resisted, the scope of using the case-method was widened and presented as a mechanism for institutional integration. Although the former continued to indicate their willingness to engage with the case-method, the use of Henley’s syndicates at ASCI persisted. Throughout which, FF’s-staff and consultants continued to engage in the stigmatization and legitimation of the two pedagogies and their contexts, on which more next.
With Indian Independence in 1947, the higher education institutional complex in the country—largely modelled on the British system—expectedly turned to it for fulfilling its needs for training administrative cadres in the public- and private-sectors. As with other third world countries, Henley’s Staff College served as a template for ASCI in India. Reflecting this self-belief in the universal applicability of Henley’s syndicates, the concluding chapter of Taylor’s book outlined Henley’s objectives, curriculum, pedagogy i.e. syndicates, constitution, staffing, and conditions of work as an exemplar for other Staff Colleges to follow, with some scope for adaptation as per local conditions. Accompanying Taylor’s offering of Henley as an exemplar, were outlines of specific institutional practices from other Staff Colleges in India, Iran, Pakistan and Philippines. These, however, were framed as exceptions or deviations, only relevant to their own specific contexts. Therefore, while Henley was framed as a universally-relevant template: an exemplar for others’ to emulate; institutional practices from Staff Colleges from the third world were mobilized to demonstrate the flexibility that Henley and its syndicates offered.

The expected affinity toward British institutional imaginary and practices at Hyderabad was acknowledged by FF-appointed staff and consultants. Looking back at the long and extensive historical connections between Hyderabad and Henley, Greenleaf, for example, noted that when ASCI was founded in 1957 it did “as much as could have been done in India at that time.” Further, he argued that although he would have urged the Indians against mimicking Henley’s syndicates, he was certain his advice would have been ignored as the Indians were “still basking in the glow of their newly found freedom, and their development strategy was one of quickly adopting the ways of the Western world.” The mimicry of Henley at Hyderabad was aided, according to Greenleaf, by the limited prerequisites involved in running syndicates: a charismatic leader, an idyllic setting, and non-specialist discussion leaders as staff; and that he was amazed at the: “minutiae of procedure that had been taken over from Henley.” Elsewhere, emphasising the mimicry of Henley’s syndicates, Gallagher argued that ASCI’s choice of syndicates was influenced by the contemporary “general attitude” towards management in India. According to Gallagher, this attitude was the result of:

1. the ‘underdeveloped’ state of management training as a discipline in the world;
2. the degree to which India was clinging to the early 20th century British faith in the generalist
administrator and (3) the extent to which India was subject to the rather common belief of socialist countries that management of industry requires no special technical skills. Alongside the stigmatization of Henley’s connections with Hyderabad, FF-staff and consultants also engaged in the stigmatization of Henley itself. In a letter to Ensminger, for example, Towl argued that Hall’s pattern of syndicates at Henley, and subsequently at Hyderabad, was based on “staff as his ‘eyes and ears’.” It was, therefore, hardly an exemplar unlike Harvard’s “self-governing community of scholars.”

Apart from Greenleaf’s self-evidently problematic characterization of Indian freedom as “found,” which runs counter to the history of the Indian political independence; there are two further points to note here. Firstly, the characterization of Indian management education as mimicry is common-place and extensive in scholarship, it has been used in the context of Americanization. Like Srinivas, Greenleaf and Gallagher (above), it is also important to remember British influence on Indian management community, which has received comparatively lesser attention in the history of Indian management education. The British influence was channelled, notably, through the civil services, expatriate managers, and the managing agencies. Secondly and significant for the discussion here was the stigmatization of syndicates: as not demanding very much, that it was not only a reflection of the “underdeveloped” state of management, outside USA, but was based on a wholly mistaken premise.

As it set about stigmatizing Henley’s syndicates as the received template for post-colonial India’s ASCI, FF-personnel also engaged in stigmatizing the Indian society. Channelling the developmentalist trope of modernization, they argued that the role of management education in India was to support the rapid development of India’s backward economy and society. Towl, for example, argued that the purpose of management in India was to help “young men who have been growing up in a rural bazar family business society prepare for an early responsibility in organized industry.” In this, Indian society was frequently labelled traditional, and which frequently delayed development in the country. Similar to most FF-staff and consultants, Towl argued that Indian culture was characterised by “deeply embedded” stratification and autocratic relations which had resulted in a time lag in understanding and using managerial concepts and knowledge. And that while ideas were
often promptly accepted at the policy-level in India, its adoption and practice required long-term support for its “assimilation.” Similarly, Greenleaf also characterized Indian society, economy, and management as backward, deficient, and “grade B,” and which needed to be thoroughly dismantled and replaced with modern (American) management techniques and practices. Given the developmental challenges confronting India, it could no longer rely on the development of its managers by trial and error.

In an attempt to legitimize its own interventions, Towl argued that a quick and deliberate intervention from outside was necessary as leaving the task to India’s elites was likely to result in perpetuation of their own values and character. Modern management in India, I would argue therefore, ought to be understood as the “modern moment” that according to Arjun Appadurai “by its appearance creates a dramatic and unprecedented break between past and present.” Much like international development, in whose name FF’s programmes in management education in India were organized, management required a breaking-away from the past: ASCI’s and India’s too. In engineering this break from ASCI recent past, FF—in its role as a dominating institution—was involved in the stigmatization of British management, Henley, and its practices. Alongside which, Indian society and its management were re-cast, variously, as traditional, hierarchical, clinging onto its colonial connections with Britain, lagging, and in urgent need of reform, particularly its bazaar-based economic structures, family-businesses which relied on administrators from Britain and their management practices. The legitimacy of FF’s interventions were, therefore, based on the double need of modernizing ASCI and Indian society and economy itself.

To overcome the persistent resistance to case-method at Hyderabad, FF-staff engaged in efforts at denaturalizing syndicates by posing them as alien to the Indian context and calling for the development of indigenous pedagogic approaches. In a letter to Ensminger, for example, Towl argued that given the economic challenges confronting India, ASCI needed to develop an “innovation appropriate to Hyderabad.” He went on to suggest that ASCI ought to combine faculty-led research with teaching and training, much like at HBS. Elsewhere, Towl noted the relevance of the case-method in dealing with the specifics of the Indian condition, which resonated with his conception of administration which could not be “satisfied with ‘truth in general.'” Similarly, HBS’s Arthur N.
Turner also argued against mimicry (Britain or American) and called for an organic approach to emerge while suggesting FF’s support for the development of an appropriate (research and teaching) methodology, i.e. the case-method.\(^{107}\) Downplaying the “outsider” status of the case-method, Towl argued that cases did not require external experts and could be organized “within and among” management institutes in India.\(^{108}\) Even Greenleaf who remained unconvinced about merging the case-method with syndicates and argued for developing an indigenous approach only went as far as suggesting the use of systems analysis or industrial dynamics approach.\(^{109}\) Thus, even if the case-method could not be accounted as ASCI lacked “gifted” teachers, American management had other approaches to offer. In all of the above, while FF’s consultants continued to make a case for an indigenous or Indian approach to management, the case-method was presented as organic, potentially responsive to the specifics of Indian conditions, and which could be developed relatively easily, internally.\(^{110}\)

Revealing in all of the above is that FF-staff and consultants’ criticism of syndicates and endorsement of the case-method were neither drawn from any sort of scientific evaluation, research or systematic review of literature, nor did they engage with questions of cultural alienation, participation, and voice—both of which can be found extensively in contemporary scholarship on the use of syndicates.\(^{111}\) More so, they stigmatized syndicates without ever having attended one or despite having commended them for their impact on ASCI’s graduates. For example, although Greenleaf admitted that he had never attended a syndicate, it did not prevent him from calling them “a grade B idea even for England where it started and certainly not a prudent step for India.”\(^{112}\) Elsewhere, Towl generously noted the syndicates’ success: “the remarkable growth many of these men (sic) revealed from the time I first met them on arrival until they left twelve weeks later.”\(^{113}\) He acknowledged that while the programme’s impact on the graduates may not be evident right away but this was only because the new practices and attitudes “did not flower until the man (sic) got back on the job.”

Curiously, even as FF continued to engage in the stigmatization of syndicates and Henley, Henley’s H. J. B. Taylor had, as far back as 1952, published a research report comparing the methods used at HBS’ AMP and at Henley (i.e. case-method versus syndicates).\(^{114}\) In it, Taylor concluded that Henley’s syndicates were “much more suitable” than those used at Harvard or any other US-
institution Taylor had studied; and that the case-method was not essential but could be used for certain, limited, and specialized purposes and their comparison was not only illogical but even meaningless.\textsuperscript{115} There is, however, little in the archival material to suggest FF-staff or consultants took note of Taylor’s study or commissioned one of their own.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

FF’s involvement in India, least of all in management education, as part and in name of its development was part of USA’s global expansionism in consolidating its soft power in third world countries in its fight against communism, combating anti-Americanism and promoting Americanization.\textsuperscript{116} As elsewhere, management was deemed crucial to presenting USA as an economic exemplar for India to emulate as part of its post-colonial development and modernization.\textsuperscript{117} FF played a significant role in the establishment and institutionalization of management education in the country. Seeking to establish autonomous business-schools outside the governing imperatives of Indian universities, new institutions such as the IIMs at Ahmedabad and Calcutta were established in whose institutional design, approach and direction FF had a more formative and lasting influence, unlike at ASCI. The propagation of the case-method at the IIMs but also ASCI was significant as it was organized around the ideologies of managerialism, institutionalism and American capitalism, which were crucial to FF’s contribution to the consolidation of American soft power.\textsuperscript{118}

Its efforts at Americanization at ASCI by way of the case-method, however, were less successful. Within FF, it was recognized that ASCI had already “derived much of its direction and inspiration from British rather than American models of management training.”\textsuperscript{119} Although FF’s initial efforts at ASCI were directed at merging the case-method within syndicates, the persistent use of the latter at Hyderabad led FF-staff and consultants to engage in stigmatization of Henley, ASCI and even Indian society and economy; as well as the simultaneous legitimation of the case-method and HBS. FF’s efforts at ASCI were driven, I would argue, by the pragmatic need to distinguish USA’s neo-colonial developmentalism from British colonialism. FF’s President Hoffman had acknowledged as much when he noted the distrust and suspicion with which the Americans were seen in India. Their distrust, Hoffman believed, grew out of “a century old bitterness directed at us because
we are mistakenly identified with the Western imperialism of a bygone generation.”¹²⁰ Such suspicion, he argued, was likely to be exploited by the communist Russians, from whom India—according to FF—needed to be saved. That is, FF’s financial support to ASCI was driven by its vision to establish USA as the exemplar and its institutions and their practices as templates for India’s development and modernization and distinguishing itself from the earlier British institutions, on which India’s post-colonial institutions were modelled. Although never based on scientific or systematic evaluation of either teaching method, the case for the adoption of case-method at Hyderabad was backed by expertise (such as those of Towl, Greenleaf, Gallagher, etc.) and capital: Hoffman’s formulaic resistance against communism.¹²¹

My argument regarding the role of FF-appointed staff and consultants in distinguishing themselves from British colonialism as part of establishing USA as the neo-colonial power was not restricted to India or for that matter FF alone. Discussing his experience in Pakistan, for example, Cornwall-Jones revealed similar tension between Henley’s consultants and those from Syracuse’s Maxwell School (of Citizenship and Public Affairs).¹²² Brought together through FF’s financial support from FF, course of studies agreed to by Henley and Maxwell’s staff were not adhered to and replaced by those written entirely by the latter’s staff without any input from the former. Attributing it to misunderstandings and mistakes, Cornwall-Jones chose to downplay the differences between Henley’s staff and those from Syracuse. The latter, he noted: “regarded themselves as being in charge of everybody and everything, including me.”¹²³ Unlike Cornwall-Jones, I would argue that in its role as a dominating institution, FF-consultants’ persistent efforts at distinguishing themselves from the British were significant and part of FF’s involvement in USA’s ascendancy as a neo-colonial power. This claim is also corroborated by other large US Foundations’ programmes in other third world countries. In Latin America, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation played a crucial role in American efforts at breaking the earlier academic links between Latin America and Europe, and instead establishing USA as the centre of it.¹²⁴

Greenleaf’s letter to Gupta shortly after his departure from Hyderabad in 1964 provides a final telling anecdote of FF’s attempts at stigmatizing third world countries’ colonial connections with
Britain and offer USA as the template for their post-colonial development, in which management education had a crucial role to play. In it, he said:

We have completed an interesting five days in Pakistan and we are now immersed in a totally new situation here in Kenya (...) I have reviewed their agenda and it is quite a blend of several things (...) It is interesting that they do not feel that they had the talent to do this with an African staff, so it is mostly foreigners. The Director is from the U.K.  

Problematizing the presence of British leadership and seemingly calling for the involvement of Africans themselves in management education, Greenleaf singularly failed to reflect on his own and the wider American presence in Kenya. Despite making frequent arguments for indigenous leadership of management education in third world countries, both Towl and Greenleaf continued to tour the globe promoting the case-method and management education, more widely. Towl, for example, is known to have visited 37 countries, some of them as many as 15 times during his lifetime as part of his role in promoting writing and use of cases. In a way, then, it did not matter if they were at India, Pakistan or Kenya. In serving FF as a dominating institution, they were complicitous in securing USA’s place in the neo-colonial global order among the “free” nations by making its institutions and their practices as exemplars, which required, first, a displacement of and distinguishing from the earlier colonial connections with Britain’s institutions and their practices.

§

This article makes three key contributions.

As mentioned previously, the history of management education in India, limited no doubt, has tended to focus on the IIMs, most significantly the first two at Calcutta and Ahmedabad. Hill, Hayes, and Baumgartel, for example, have posited ASCI as part of the second of three phases of development of management education in the country, suitable for low-level training; followed by its apogee in the form of the IIMs. Elsewhere, ASCI is presented, typically, as a minor stage in the development of management education in the country. In addition to the self-evident empirical contribution, the lack of due attention to ASCI has resulted in the somewhat straightforward characterization of management education in India as mimicry of American management institutions. Preceding the mimicry of the latter, however, was the mimicry of Britain’s institutions and their practices in post-
colonial Indian management institutions, which is the article’s first contribution. Although overlooked, this is hardly unexpected as British institutions, following imperialism, served as the template for post-colonial development of different institutions across the third world. Departing from the characterization of Americanization of management in third world countries as a colonial continuity, I have argued that FF-led Americanization at ASCI was less straightforward than that. It involved, first and foremost, a displacement, which brings me to my second contribution on FF’s influential role as a dominating institution and its specific mechanics.

The making of HBS’ case-method as the template and USA a neo-colonial power required the displacement of Henley’s syndicates, Britain and its institutions as exemplars for India’s post-colonial institutions. From an Indian perspective, though, management education was imbricated in related but distinct forms of colonialism. Placed in its contemporary context of the Cold War and the ensuing deployment of developmental programmes to combat communism, the use of Hoffman’s solution of capital and technical expertise in establishing the use of case-method in Hyderabad by FF were part of USA’s establishment as the neo-colonial power. However, departing from Khurana et al’s straightforward narration of dominance and agreeing with Cooke and Alcadipani’s challenge about FF as the dominating institution in the Americanization of management education in Latin America, in this article I have also outlined the limits of FF’s dominance.130 While FF’s interventions were subverted by their Brazilian counterparts, syndicates continued to be used at ASCI despite FF’s efforts in remaking Hyderabad into Harvard as a dominating institution by way of case-method.

My third contribution is about contextualising instructional methods. Much of the prior scholarship on case methods and syndicates has focussed on its value and limitations, its potential for future managers to learn from, and that which it makes invisible or silences. Such debates are commonly framed around questions of effectiveness, relevance, merit and scientific evidence alone.131 Without detracting from their significance, I would argue that such debates often ignore the historical geo-politics, globally, which can and have affected the choice of instructional method in management institutions. At Hyderabad and elsewhere, FF engaged in struggle over, among other things, pedagogy and curricula to secure USA’s place at the helm of the global political and economic order as the dominant neo-colonial power. This contention is lent further credence by the point discussed earlier
that in its role as a dominating institution, the stigmatization and legitimization that FF engaged were made without any systematic or scientific study of pedagogic methods, the only contemporary study of its kind having been conducted by Henley’s staff. Thus, the use and prestige of the case-method which has since come to be the defining feature of management education, in India—particularly at IIM, Ahmedabad, India’s premier management institution—and elsewhere, were the underlying contemporary global geo-politics. The contrary fortunes of syndicates and the case-method mirrored USA’s rise as a neo-colonial power having, as the renowned postcolonial scholar Edward Said noted, “replaced the greater earlier empires as the dominant outside force.”

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2 Ibid.

3 For a discussion on the discursive and material creation of the “Third World,” see Escobar, Encountering Development, 9.

4 For a discussion on the role of Truman’s Four Point Program outlined in his “Inaugural Address” in combating communism in third world countries in the name of their development, see Esteva, “Development,” 1-3 and Escobar, Encountering Development, 31-9.

5 In his widely cited formulation, American political scientist Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” 166 distinguished soft power from hard or commanding power as one by which “one country gets other countries to want what it wants.” Also see Nye’s Soft Power for an extended discussion.

6 For a more detailed discussion on US Foundations’ role in the rise of American “soft power,” see Parmar’s, Foundations, 7-15.

7 Ibid.

8 Hess, “Foundations in India’s Globalization,” 52. Also see Hess’s “Waging the Cold War;” and Staples, Forty Years for an insider’s account.

9 Sackley, “Foundation in the Field,” 237.

10 Staples, Forty Years, 48-50 for an overview. Also see Hill, Hayes, and Baumgartel, Institution Building for a detailed discussion and evaluation of FF’s institution-building in management education in India.


12 Needless to mention that the Americanization of management took on diverse institutional trajectories, but was also actively resisted. For an overview of the trajectories and responses to Americanization of management knowledge, see Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, Expansion of Management Knowledge. For a more specific discussion, see Kipping, Engwall and Üsdiken, “Preface” on third world countries and see Üsdiken, “Americanization,” 87-8 for an overview in Europe.
13 Prasad, “Gaze of the Other” 3-43; and Prasad et al., “Debating Knowledge,” 3-42.

14 Frenkel and Shenhav, “Americanization to Colonization.”

15 Notable exceptions include Rakesh Khurana’s Higher Aims; Gemelli’s Ford Foundation and Europe; and Cooke and Alcadipani’s “Global History” of FF’s role in the São Paulo School of Business Administration, Brazil.


17 For an overview of its history, see ASCI, “Our History.” For a detailed discussion of ASCI’s similarities and differences from Henley, see Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges, 41-4; and Sen, “Administrative Staff College of India,” 185-7.

18 Cooke and Alcadipani, “Global History,” 494-5.


20 Hill, Hayes and Baumgartel, Institution Building, 10-20, classification is as follows: beginning with the establishment of the Sydenham College in 1913, the first phase was centred around commerce colleges in the country; the second, relatively short phase, is classified as the management studies phase, which involved the establishment of training institutions such as ASCI. Finally, Hill et al argued that the third and final stage from 1960s onward: the apogee of management education in the country, involved the establishment of the IIMs in the country.

21 See Bridgman, “Manager’s Moral Dilemma” and Grey, “Reinventing Business Schools.”

22 Clegg and Ross-Smith, “Revising the Boundaries;” Engwall and Zamagni, Management Education; and Kipping, Engwall and Üsdiken, “Preface.”


24 Khurana, Higher Aims, 239-40; also see Schlossman, Sedlak, and Wechsler, “New Look.”


27 Cooke and Kumar, “Shaping of Management Education.” Also see Parmar, Foundations and Fisher, “Production of Hegemony,” for a similar discussion for international relations and social sciences respectively.


30 See Dar, “Re-connecting Histories” for a discussion on the modernizing and universalizing tendencies of both development and management and their mutual entanglements. Also see, Cooke and Faria, “Development, Administration and Imperialism.”

31 Cooke, “Managing the (Third) World.”

32 Srinivas, “Mimicry and Revival,” 48; and “Authentic Management.”

33 Dar, “Re-connecting Histories,” 104.


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44 See Fisher, “Production of Hegemony,” contributions to Gemelli’s edited volume, Ford Foundation and Europe; and Parmar, Foundations, among others.

45 Staples, Forty Years, 44, 48.

46 Myers’s Memo to Ensminger dated February 04, 1958; Reel 3228, ASCI (05900021), Grants A-B, FF Records, RAC [all archival sources from within ASCI (05900021), Grants A-B, FF Records, RAC henceforth shortened to ASCI, FF, RAC].


49 Ibid.

50 The Method of Work, Administrative Staff College, MSS 5567/Box 6, Special Collections, University of Reading (UR). See Hall’s Higher Executives, and “Staff College;” Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges, 11-19; and Dimock, “College,” 171-3 for an in-depth discussion regarding content, pedagogy, and role of staff in syndicates.

51 Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges.

52 Dimock, “College,” 166.

53 Ibid, 172.

54 Collier, “Syndicate Methods,” 436; and “Peer-Group Learning,” 57.
56 See Bridgman, Cummings, and McLaughlin, “Re-stating the Case” for a history of case-method. In particular, Donham proposed the expansion of HBS’s Bureau of Business Research for producing cases.
59 Collinson and Tourish, “Teaching Leadership Critically,” 590.
60 See Garvin’s “Making the Case,” 65 for a discussion on their use at Harvard’s schools, thus, reinforcing its position as an exemplar of the case-method.
62 For a historical discussion on IIMs adoption of the case-method and the wider context, see Srinivas, “Mimicry and Revival,” 45 and “Cultivating Indian Management,” 161-3. Also see the colloquium published in IIM, Ahmedabad’s journal Vikalpa, Dixit et al, “Future of Case Method,” 87-131. Worth mentioning here that the steps leading to IIM, Ahmedabad’s central building are popularly known as the Harvard Steps.
64 Biswas and Agrawal, Education in India, 315.
65 Ibid, 321; also see Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges, 38-9.
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68 Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges, 40.
69 Ibid.
70 Letter from HL Case, Associate Director, FF to Ensminger dated September 23, 1963; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.
71 Seth, Gandhi and Dutton, “Postcolonial Studies,” 8.
72 Calculated from Gallagher’s Report dated May 23, 1970; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.
Ensminger’s influence in India has been widely noted by other scholars including Krige and Rausch, “Tracing the Knowledge,” 20; Rosen, Western Economists, 53-6.

Letter from Towl to Ensminger dated November 16, 1960; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC. While both the modes of teaching were organised around self-directed learning, scholars such as Dimock, “College,” 172 believed that in comparison to Harvard’s AMP, syndicates encouraged initiative, originality, dissent, and most importantly, respect and understanding built on “knowledge of common concerns.”

Towl’s Supplementary Report, 1963, Reports 000600, Catalogued Reports, Box 31, Reports 1-3254 (FA7391), FF Records, RAC.

Letter from Towl to Ensminger dated November 16, 1960; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Letter from Towl to Ensminger dated January 20, 1961; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Gallagher’s Report dated May 23, 1970; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Letter from Towl to Gupta dated April 21, 1961; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Attached to Towl’s letter to Gupta dated April 21, 1961 is draft communication. This has a further note from Towl to Ensminger saying the former believed that while Gupta could get ‘men’ from companies, it was important faculty members from Indian universities join in. Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Letter from Gupta to Ensminger dated January 09, 1962; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

From Greenleaf’s letter to Gupta dated November 23, 1964; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Gallagher’s Report dated May 23, 1970; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC; underlined in original.

Howe’s letter to Sen dated July 16, 1970. Reel 3227, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Memo from Ensminger to George F Gant dated September 1, 1966; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Sen’s Letter dated September 03, 1970; Reel 3227, ASCI, FF, RAC.
Grant request to FF by ASCI, 1972; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC. A large part of the requested grant was meant to focus on teaching and research staff salaries (88% of total grant request for 48 faculty staff, 27 RAs, and 27 stenographers). The grant-request also included a prospective 10-year institutional plan.

From a document titled ‘Elements of the Ten Year Plan’; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Taylor, Administrative Staff Colleges, 84-98.

Greenleaf’s Comment on Gallagher’s Report (Second Rough Draft), c. 1971, Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Greenleaf’s Comment on Gallagher’s Report (Second Rough Draft), c. 1971, Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Gallagher’s Report dated May 23, 1970; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Ibid.

Letter from Towl to Ensminger dated January 20, 1961; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Srinivas, “Mimicry and Revival;” Mir, Mir, and Srinivas, “Managerial Knowledge.” This is somewhat expected as the history of management education in India has tended to focus on IIMs while ASCI has received relatively minor attention.


Towl’s letter to Ensminger dated January, 1962; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Towl’s Supplementary Report, 1963, Reports 000600, Catalogued Reports, Box 31, Reports 1-3254 (FA7391), FF Records, RAC.

Greenleaf’s Comment on Gallagher’s Report (Second Rough Draft), c. 1971, Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Towl’s Supplementary Report, 1963, Reports 000600, Catalogued Reports, Box 31, Reports 1-3254 (FA7391), FF Records, RAC.

Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 3.

Letter from Towl to Ensminger dated January 20, 1961; Reel 3228, ASCI, FF, RAC.
The industrial dynamics was developed by Jay Forrester at MIT’s Sloan School with financial support from FF; for a brief overview, see Forrester, “Industrial Dynamics.”

The above point resonates with Srinivas’ contention that the case-method mediated, relatively successfully, tensions between the universal and particular; see Srinivas, “Mimicry and Revival;” and “Cultivating Indian Management.”

See for example Collier’s “Experiment” and “Syndicate Methods” for a systematic investigation of use of syndicates from 1960s, or his review of prior research in “Peer-Group Learning.” Also see Adams, “Syndicates” for a balanced evaluation of Henley’s model. For studies on the use of syndicates in international MBA programmes, see Currie, “Beyond Our Imagination;” Griffiths, Winstanley and Gabriel, “Learning Shock;” Gabriel and Griffiths, “International Learning Groups.”

Greenleaf’s Comment on Gallagher’s Report (Second Rough Draft), c. 1971, Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Towl’s Supplementary Report, 1963, Reports 000600, Catalogued Reports, Box 31, Reports 1-3254 (FA7391), FF Records, RAC.

“Report on the Methods Used for Advanced Management Training by the Harvard Business School (USA) and the Administrative Staff College Henley-on-Thames (England),” Project TA57-118, 1952 by HJB Taylor, LMA/4062/06/015, Latham Papers, LMA.

Ibid.


Khurana, Higher Aims, 239-40.

From RM Alt’s (Industrial Economic Advisor, FF) Note on ASCI dated March 25, 1970, Reel 3227, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Hoffman on Tour, Reel AV 1951, Box 2, FA750, Audio-visual Materials, FF Records, RAC.

Sackley, “Foundation in the Field,” 237.

Cornwall-Jones, Education for Leadership, 61-7 for his accounts of the event.

Ibid, 84.

Tosiello, “Max Ascoli.”

From Greenleaf’s letter to Gupta dated November 23, 1964; Reel 1133, ASCI, FF, RAC.

Bryan Marquard, “Andrew R. Towl.”

Hill, Hayes, and Baumgartel, Institution Building, 10-20.

Pylee, “Management Education,” 212.


Smith in “Use and Effectiveness,” 51 has noted the lack of empirical evidence to substantiate the beneficial claims of the case-method.

Said, “Representing the Colonized,” 215, italicization added for emphasis. Also see Spivak, Teaching Machine, 55 for a similar discussion on USA’s emergence as the dominant referent for disciplinary knowledge.