Rhetoric and pedagogy

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Abstract: This article traces the development of rhetorical pedagogy from Homer to late antiquity. It is clear from Homer that effective public speaking was valued in archaic Greece, and seen as a teachable skill. Formalised and theorised rhetorical pedagogy was developed gradually by the sophists of the fifth and early fourth centuries BC, but the evidence for their work is very limited. Isocrates and the author of the Rhetoric to Alexander build on earlier sophistic rhetoric in different ways. Evidence becomes most abundant in late antiquity, from the second century AD onwards. Innovations in rhetorical theory and concurrent changes in the structure of pedagogical practice in this period reflect the perennial responsiveness of rhetoric as a practical discipline to its socio-cultural context.

Keywords: rhetoric, pedagogy, Homer, sophists, Isocrates, late antiquity

We use language to influence other people’s beliefs, attitudes and decisions—in short, to persuade. Since some people are more consistently successful in this than others, and experience is one of the factors that contribute to success, it is clear that skill in the persuasive use of language can in some measure be learned. Can it also be taught? The assumption that it can is present in the very earliest stages of the Greek literary tradition. In the Iliad, Achilles’ father Peleus assigns his son a tutor, Phoenix, tasked ‘to teach you all these things, to make you a speaker of words and a doer of deeds’ (Il. 9.440-3). Achilles later acknowledges his failure to master one half of the curriculum: ‘I, a man without equal… in war, though there are others better skilled at debate’ (18.105f.). Achilles’ self-assessment is realistic: his mishandling of the assembly in Iliad 1 has had catastrophic consequences. The fact that he had been tutored makes his failure less excusable than that of Odysseus’ son Telemachus, a young man who has grown up without paternal oversight in a community in which normal political life has been in abeyance (his mother remarks on his inexperience: Od. 4.818). When he convenes an assembly to challenge the position of a powerful clique, it is not surprising that the outcome is a humiliating failure (Heitman 2005, 14-28).

These two cases illustrate situations in which success or failure in persuasion have significant public consequences, and in which the teachability of effective speech carries the greatest premium. Greeks accordingly came to associate rhetoric paradigmatically with the use of language to persuade in certain kinds of public dispute. Deliberative disputes may be directly concerned with the welfare of a whole community, though the outcome will also affect the disputants’ public standing. Individual status, property or life are directly at stake in judicial disputes. There are, however, also contexts requiring skilled public speech in which it would be a faux pas to treat a proposition as open to dispute. If you are welcoming a visiting dignitary, for example, it would be inappropriate to argue that he is an important person whose presence is an honour and a delight; you must take that for granted and exhibit the (putatively) acknowledged fact. No deliberative or judicial decision is demanded of the audience, but your words will, if successful, make certain facts more salient to those already inclined to accept them. Even here, then, language is used to influence attitudes.
The classification of speeches into deliberative, judicial and ceremonial (epideictic) kinds constructed in the previous paragraph is so familiar that it may seem self-evident. As we shall see, however, other ways of conceptualising the domain of rhetoric remained current at least to the end of the fourth century BC. This provides a simple reminder of two essential features of the Greek rhetorical tradition. First, it was in constant evolution: according canonical status to any particular theorisation or theorist (Aristotle, for example, or Cicero or Quintilian) inevitably falsifies the historical reality. Secondly, rhetorical pedagogy and its evolution were inseparably connected with the evolution of theoretical codifications of rhetoric (Heath 2009a). It is characteristic of the Greek rhetorical tradition that teachers enhanced their pedagogy by providing their pupils with a guiding framework based on explicit categorisations and principles abstracted from the untidy complexities of successful practice. Aristotle’s Rhetoric begins by recognising that rhetoric, like reasoning, is something with which everyone has some acquaintance; the function of art (τεκμή) is to transform spontaneous or habitual persuasion into a methodical practice by determining the factors that explain success (Rhet. 1.1, 1354a1-11). Speaking of arts in general, he distinguishes experts who can give an explanation of successful practice from skilled practitioners whose ability to achieve success is based on experience and is relatively inarticulate. The former have more prestige and are better able to teach (Met. 1.1, 980b25-b10). But Aristotle does not deny that practical success, which depends on judgement of individual cases, may owe more to experience than to theoretical generalisation (981a12-24). Though the rejection of theory was an eccentric minority view (e.g. Quintilian 2.11f., with Heath 2009a, 71f.), Greek rhetoricians never questioned, and usually emphasised, the importance of tacit procedural insight to successful persuasion.

How early did the theoretical tendency become established? In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates refers to the handbooks on rhetoric that Nestor and Odysseus wrote in their spare time during the Trojan War (261b-c). Phaedrus sees a reference to more recent figures behind this playful anachronism. In reality, Homeric education would not have dealt in theoretical abstractions. The closest we come to seeing Phoenix acting as teacher is in Iliad 9, where he is a member of the delegation sent to persuade Achilles to rejoin the fighting. Advising Achilles how to behave in a crisis limits Phoenix’s options: there is, for example, no opportunity to expose Achilles to live models, to demonstrate techniques, or to rehearse his pupil and give feedback. But he can tell stories that provide Achilles with models to emulate or avoid, and he can offer situation-specific instructions, supported by general injunctions. Such seemingly universal imperatives always presuppose an assessment of the specific situation. So Phoenix also draws his pupil’s attention to circumstances that make the recommended assessment appropriate to the situation. One function of theory in later times will be to help students bridge the gap between universal precepts and particular situations.

When we turn to the sophists of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, we are on only slightly firmer ground. The diversity of the intellectual interests of the sophistic movement (Kerferd 1981; Ford 2001) makes it unrealistic to suppose that rhetoric was a primary concern of every sophist—though even contemporaries could make the misleading generalisation that sophists in general were experts in making people ‘clever at speaking’ (PL. Prot. 312d). But Gorgias certainly undertook to make people clever at speaking about the most important human affairs—that is, capable of persuading by speech in courts and deliberative bodies (Pl. Gorg. 448e-9e, 451d, 452d-e, 454b; Meno 95c). According to Aristotle, Gorgias’ teaching consisted in
supplying his pupils with speeches to be learned by heart. This, he complains, provided the pupils with products of the art of rhetoric but not with the art itself. Aristotle scornfully compares this technique to teaching someone to avoid sore feet by providing them with lots of different shoes: a need has been met, but no expertise has been imparted (SE 34, 183b36-4a8). Texts such as Gorgias’ Helen and Defence of Palamedes are likely to have been written as such exemplars (Cole 1991a, 71-94); the uncomfortable density of their stylistic and argumentative devices suggests that they were designed as concentrated repositories of techniques, to be quarried rather than faithfully reproduced. The example of Plato’s Phaedrus, who has borrowed and memorised a speech by Lysias (Phdr. 228d-e), provides further attestation for this pattern of teaching.

Gorgias is mentioned in Plato’s Phaedrus as asserting the superiority of probabilities (eikota) to truth, and the capacity of rhetoric to make small things seem large and vice versa (267a). Since such claims (relevant to advertising the power of persuasive speech, as in the Helen) would be more convincingly supported by demonstration than by theory, Plato’s evidence is consistent with Aristotle’s characterisation of Gorgias’ teaching methods. Plato here pairs Gorgias with an earlier rhetorician, Tisias. This shadowy figure must be approached with extreme caution (Cole 1991b). According to some later sources, Tisias and his teacher Corax founded the art of rhetoric and in doing so anticipated theoretical doctrines not otherwise attested until a much later date. This ‘evidence’ is thoroughly unreliable: it is compromised by the persistent tendency of doxographic traditions to fill evidential voids by conjecture (a tendency which still flourishes in the modern literature on sophistic rhetoric). The earliest stratum of surviving evidence is a safer guide. There are two references to Tisias in Phaedrus, both associating him with arguments from probability (267a, 273a-e), defined as ‘what most people think’ (267a). Aristotle mentions Tisias as one of the earliest contributors to the development of rhetoric (SE 34, 183b302), and reports that arguments from probability were the sole content of the art of Corax (Rhet. 2.24, 1402a18). Corax (‘Crow’) is likely to be a nickname, and it has been plausibly suggested that Tisias and Corax are in fact one person (Cole 1991b, 80-83). Plato provides evidence that a written text by Tisias was available for Phaedrus to study (Phdr. 273a), but all that we can infer about that text is that it was about arguments from probability and included examples.

We return to the more secure ground of extant texts with Antiphon’s Tetralogies, sets of speeches (dating perhaps to the latter part of the fifth century) illustrating how to argue each side of three imaginary homicide cases. These are demonstration texts with an interesting difference (Innes 1991). Each of the three cases requires a different defence: denying the homicide, maintaining that it was accidental, and claiming justification. The complete set therefore provides, not only an illustrative repository of technical means of persuasion, but also a systematic overview of different kinds of dispute that may arise from a legal charge, and the way each party should approach them. This is the aspect of rhetoric that would, in later times, be elaborately theorised in successive versions of the theory of issue (stasis). The Tetralogies themselves do no more than illustrate: they convey no explicit theory. But it is hard to imagine that someone capable of constructing this package of examples would be unable to supplement the texts with at least a minimal articulation of their underlying framework (‘if the defendant disputes the alleged facts, then this is how the case should be argued...’).
Another kind of demonstration text took the form, not of a complete speech, but of a collection of variants on a single part of a speech. An extant example of this genre is the collection of proems attributed to Demosthenes, but others are known to have existed. Antiphon is credited with collections of proems and epilogues (Suda A1325); the Art of Rhetoric attributed to him (Suda M1310) is likely to have comprised these collections of examples rather than explicit theoretical exposition.

Thrasymachus, one of the rhetoricians mentioned in Phaedrus, is credited with another collection of proems (Athenaeus 10, 416a); a lengthy quotation in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dem. 3) is probably one of these model proems (Yunis 1997). In another collection, Thrasymachus demonstrated ways of appealing for pity (Ar. Rhet. 3.1, 1404a14-15). In this case, the examples illustrate, not one part of a speech, but one persuasive technique. Tisias’ work on arguments from probability is likely to have been of this kind.

Although such collections teach by providing examples, they are also evidence of some movement in a theoretical direction. The fact that certain parts of a speech and certain persuasive techniques have been isolated and explicitly identified presupposes a conception, however rudimentary, of the normative structure of a speech and of its various functions. Plato’s Phaedrus again provides corroboration. The context of the second reference to Gorgias is a brief catalogue of the kinds of thing that can be learned from ‘the books written on the art of speeches’ (266d-7d). This catalogue shows unmistakeable signs of the emergent analytical and theoretical tendencies in rhetoric. Its frame adumbrates what would later become a standard account of the structure of a speech (proem, narrative, supporting arguments, and recapitulation), though the analysis is not yet fully explicit and the terminology remains unstable.

Arguments are classified as witness statements, inferential arguments from evidence (tekmeria), and arguments from probability (eikota). Socrates also mentions more refined distinctions among techniques (confirmation and supplementary confirmation; refutation and supplementary refutation; covert allusion and oblique praise) and a variety of contributions concerned with diction and style, as well as Thrasymachus’ techniques for invective and for achieving emotional effects (arousing and assuaging anger or pity, for example). Though teachers may still have been working primarily through demonstration, the proliferation of terminological refinements at which Socrates pokes gentle fun makes it certain that analytical frameworks were under development. A teaching practice based on demonstrations accompanied by explanatory comment is not the same as one based on theoretical precepts illustrated by examples, but the boundary is easily crossed.

The frustrating fact remains that the available evidence does not provide a secure basis for more than the vaguest conjectures about how early sophistic rhetorical pedagogy would have worked in practice. Isocrates raises hopes of more substantial insights. His writings contain passages reflecting on his own pedagogical practice, and contrasting it with that of other teachers of ‘political speeches (logoi)’. This contrast reminds us that we cannot assume uniformity in teaching practice: Isocrates may be an unrepresentative figure from whom we cannot generalise. On the other hand, we should not take Isocrates’ word on trust: when he speaks of rivals in the context of self-promoting polemic, he has an incentive to exaggerate differences. There may, then, be an element of caricature when he criticises teachers of ‘political speeches’ for failing to recognise the importance of experience and natural talent: they treat speaking as if it were the same as spelling—that is, as if it were governed by a set of fixed rules that could be applied across all situations. Isocrates insists that
creativity is an essential component of the art of public speech, since no speaker gains by saying just what has been said already: the key is to say something that others have not thought of, while still speaking appropriately to the subject. Speech needs to fit the specific occasion (kairos), to be appropriate, and to be innovative (Against the Sophists 9-13). For this reason, Isocrates affirms the necessity of talent and experience. Indeed, they are sometimes sufficient: many have become effective speakers and politicians without formal training (14). Training can enhance such people’s skill and resourcefulness: the success they achieve unsystematically becomes more directly accessible (15). The parallel with Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric as the transformation of spontaneous or habitual persuasion into a methodical practice is clear.

A sketch of Isocrates’ own model of rhetorical training follows (16f.). One part is to learn the ideal of speech, the basic forms from which all speeches are constructed (we shall shortly return to the possible meaning of ideai and its variant eidê). This is comparatively easy, given genuinely expert tuition; what is harder is selecting the ideal for any given subject, combining and arranging them. This must be done in a way that fits the specific occasion, and the whole speech must be appropriately elaborated in thought and expression. The student’s contribution is intensive study, which is fruitless without a ‘courageous and imaginative soul’; he must learn the eidê of speech and practice their uses (khrēseis). The teacher’s contribution is to give an accurate and comprehensive exposition of these basics and, for the more advanced aspects, to present himself as an exemplar (paradeigma) on which students can pattern themselves by imitation. Imitation here clearly does not mean merely repeating or adapting the teacher’s demonstrations: it is not the surface of the text that the student must emulate but the underlying, and necessarily creative, art. The pattern that emerges is a two-stage programme: the student first assimilates the exposition of basic theory, and then models his practice on the master’s demonstrations (cf. Antidosis 183). We might expect the master to provide some feedback on the student’s efforts, but there is no positive evidence of this and we should not necessarily assume it: we know of later teachers who disdained to give feedback (Sen. Contr. 9.2.23).

Isocrates mentions the ideai or eidê of speech without elucidation. The so-called Rhetoric to Alexander may help. This is the earliest surviving technical handbook, written in the decades 340-300 BC. It was transmitted under Aristotle’s name, together with the fake dedicatory preface that gave it its traditional title; its real author is uncertain, but Anaximenes of Lampsacus is a plausible conjecture. The dominance of Aristotelian and later conceptions of rhetoric has been an obstacle to understanding this text. Indeed, this was already the case in later antiquity: readers who took the familiar trichotomy of kinds of speech—deliberative, judicial, ceremonial—for granted were perplexed by this treatise’s different classification (the opening sentence, which asserts the trichotomy, is probably a later addition, an attempt to tame the unfamiliar). In fact, the author works with seven ‘species’ (eidê), the capacities and uses (khrēseis) of which he undertakes to enumerate. These species are not kinds of speech, but kinds of thing that can be done in speeches (exhortation, dissuasion, praise, blame, attack, defence and investigation), and they are distributed in various combinations across three contexts of speech: courts, public addresses and private discussions (homiliai). After he has completed a piecemeal discussion of these eidê (1-28), the author turns in the second part of the treatise to how they should be arranged in the body of a complete speech (28-38). The parallel to Isocrates’ reference
to *eidē* and to their uses (*khrēseis*), combinations and arrangement, is unmistakable—though Isocrates’ vague and expansive use of ideai in other contexts makes it hard to pin down the significance of the parallel. The Rhetoric to Alexander is certainly not reproducing Isocratean theory, but both appear to be drawing on a shared, pre-Aristotelian, rhetorical tradition.

In one respect, the Rhetoric to Alexander is likely to be more representative of that tradition than Isocrates. The inclusion of private discussions within rhetoric’s domain may seem surprising, but it is consistent with other evidence for sophistic theory (Pl. Phdr. 261a, Soph. 222c; Alcidamas Soph. 9). Even Gorgias, whose promotional emphasis on ‘the most important human affairs’ (that is, judicial and deliberative debates) has already been noted, is represented as illustrating the power of his rhetorical art from his experience with persuasion in private contexts (Pl. Gorg. 456a-b). This is consistent with Protagoras’ claim to teach how to deliberate well (euboulia) in household as well as civic matters (Pl. Prot. 318e-9a; cf. Meno 91a-b, Rep. 10, 600c-d; Xen. Mem. 1.2.64). Isocrates, too, is concerned with euboulia: rhetorical speech is the outward expression of good deliberation, since the proofs we use to persuade others and those by which we ourselves are convinced in our own reflections are the same (Antidosis 255-7 = Nicocles 7-9). But Isocrates almost completely effaces the private dimension: he says only that rhetorical training may, as a side-effect, improve performance in private homiliai for those who choose not to enter public life (Antidosis 204, cf. 99, 285). Isocrates also departs from the earlier sophistic tradition in disparaging judicial oratory in order to concentrate on public affairs. This narrowing of focus has a moral dimension. Gorgias’ claim to make people clever speakers was accompanied by ridicule of the claims of some other sophists to teach virtue (Pl. Meno 95c; cf. Gorg. 456d-7c for the moral neutrality of Gorgias’ rhetorical teaching). Isocrates, too, dismisses claims to be able to educate in virtue. But he argues, even so, that learning to speak well and persuasively will nevertheless produce moral improvement (Antidosis 274f.), primarily on the grounds that persuasiveness depends on having internalised the values of those one aims to persuade (276-80). (Plato would agree, of course, but deplores the values that the politician must internalise to be persuasive in existing societies.) This position would have been harder to maintain if judicial oratory had not been excluded: the sometimes dishonest tactics recommended in the Rhetoric to Alexander indicate a more purely instrumental, less morally engaged, conception of rhetorical education (the tactical dishonesties of law-court oratory are a persistent worry in ancient discussions of rhetoric: e.g. Quint. 2.17.26-9; 4.5.5; 12.1.33-45; Heath 2009b, 151-3).

The link between rhetoric and euboulia makes sense, since any argument you can use to defend a position in public is—unless you know it to be flawed—also a reason for holding that position yourself; and any argument you know to be flawed is a potential liability in defending that position publicly. The persuasive force of tactical manipulations is limited, even in judicial contexts: only the use of substantively good arguments can guard against the risk of canny audiences seeing through, and intelligent opponents pointing out, the merely specious. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, when cases were heard by elite magistrates who had themselves been trained in rhetoric and knew the tactical tricks, the premium on substantively good argument would be even greater. An effective regime of rhetorical training must therefore include procedures for identifying the objectively strong resources for arguing a given case (on both sides, since each party’s strengths are weaknesses on the other side, and vice versa).
At this point we should pause to consider what range of skills skilful practitioners of persuasive speech need. Obviously, one must be able to speak fluently and coherently. But speaking presupposes that you have something to say: the first and fundamental requirement is thus the ability to find what, in any given situation, is worth saying (heuresis, inventio). Once you have found it, you must be able to put your material into coherent and intelligible order (taxis, dispositio) and express it well (lexis or phrasis, elocutio). But these preparations will be wasted if, when the time comes, you cannot remember what you intended to say (mnemē, memoria), or cannot present it effectively in performance (hupokrisis, actio). That catalogue of skills reconstructs another important element of ancient rhetorical theory—the five parts of oratory: invention, disposition, expression, memory, and delivery. But this, too, was not a timeless canon: the theory developed gradually in the Hellenistic period, after Aristotle and before Cicero, and by the end of the second century AD it had broken down, in part for pedagogical reasons. Fundamental to the discovery of good arguments is the ability to identify a relevant and effective way of handling the particular kind of question in dispute: a disputed question of fact, for example, requires different treatment from a dispute about the justification of an admitted fact (the point implicit in Antiphon’s Tetralogies). But it makes little sense to treat under the single heading of invention both the mapping out of a global argumentative strategy and the detailed implementation of that strategy, which must vary between the parts of a speech according to their different functions. This problem, which defeated the authors of Hellenistic and Roman handbooks, was eventually solved by separating out the preliminary analysis under the heading of ‘intellection’ (noēsis). The scope of invention was then narrowed to the parts of a speech, but at the same time expanded to embrace questions of style and tactical organisation that arise within the different parts.

This change in rhetorical theory implies a corresponding change in teaching practice, for which we have relative plentiful evidence. The innovations of the second and early third centuries AD established a new framework which later rhetoricians modified and elaborated, but never dismantled (Heath 2004, 3-89). These innovations therefore mark a watershed in the availability of evidence. The innovations rendered earlier texts obsolete, and in an essentially practical discipline like rhetoric, the obsolete is likely to be discarded. Consequently, very little rhetorical literature survives from before the second century AD (the exceptions are largely works which enjoyed the protection of a famous name), but from the second century onwards the literature is abundant. Moreover, much of that literature is closely connected to pedagogical practice: handbooks which expound the content of rhetorical teaching; texts composed for, or even in, the class-room (lectures might be written up by teachers, or written down by students or stenographers); demonstration texts; and diverse texts which explicitly or allusively comment on or describe elements of classroom practice. Though many gaps and uncertainties remain, it now becomes possible to give a circumstantial account of the practice of rhetorical pedagogy.

The theoretical texts of the period help us to establish a series of stages in rhetorical pedagogy. Beginners worked on a graded series of introductory exercises (progumnasmata: Webb 2001) that familiarised them with a number of techniques that would need to be combined in a complete speech (for example, telling a story, criticising or defending a narrative’s plausibility, arguing a general thesis). Students would then proceed to the more advanced exercise (the Latin term ‘declamation’ may give a misleading impression of its primary point: the Greek name, meletē, means
simply ‘exercise’), in which they were given a hypothetical scenario and asked to speak on one or other side of a judicial or deliberative dispute arising from it (Russell 1983). To prepare them to tackle these advanced exercises, students were taught issue-theory, which distinguished between different kinds of dispute (the number of issues had now stabilised at thirteen) and provided a ‘division’ for each: that is, an ordered set of heads of argument which set a default strategy for handling each kind of dispute. Given a theme for declamation, the student had first to identify the issue, and then apply the division to the particular the case, using its circumstances to give concrete content to the abstract template (Heath 1995, 2007). Issue-theory was the main component of ‘intellation’ (noësis). ‘Invention’ (heuresis) then showed students how to frame the argumentative strategy of the division in the structure of a complete speech, providing schemes for unfolding particular lines of argument in detail (Heath 1997), but also, as already noted, touching on points of verbal expression (hermêneia). Some attention was given to fluency and flexibility in expression at earlier stages: beginners might be asked to repeat an exercise using a series of different grammatical structures; at a higher level paraphrase of existing texts provided a more demanding exercise. But intensive cultivation of stylistic excellence was reserved for the most advanced stage of the programme, which was based on the analysis and deployment of the components of different kinds of style (Wooten 1987).

Theory is not autonomous. At each stage, theoretical exposition prepares the way for the practical exercises fundamental to the acquisition of a practical skill. What is learned through precept must be transformed into a habitual, internalised skill, and it is practice that effects this transformation. The demand for constant and intensive practice on the part of students of rhetoric was a commonplace: when Galen, for example, insists on the importance of practice in studying medicine, he turns to the rhetoric student’s workload to illustrate his point (Plac. Hipp. 2.3.16, 9.2.31). The rhetoric teacher’s workload could also be heavy, since students’ constant practice needed to be supported by individual feedback—a chore which, as noted earlier, some of the most eminent teachers disdained.

Precept also, as Quintilian says, needs to be illustrated by a constant and diverse diet of examples (7.10.5-9). The teacher’s demonstrations therefore provided a further form of support for the student’s practical exercises; public displays by expert rhetorical performers would give added variety, as would visits to the courts to observe professional advocates (specialists in rhetoric, not law) in action. Reading exemplary speeches by the classical orators was also important: though the teacher’s ‘living voice’ is essential, since it demonstrates speech in action with greater immediacy, it cannot convey everything there is to be learned from a masterpiece by Demosthenes (Quint. 2.2.8, 2.5.16). These would be studied in class, with the teacher providing a commentary that might also be the vehicle for advanced theoretical instruction (Heath 2004, 184-213); but private study was yet another addition to the rhetoric student’s heavy workload.

The pattern of teaching and learning that emerged in the second century AD marked the culmination of a long history of experiment and innovation in rhetorical pedagogy. One noteworthy feature is its flexibility: it creates a plurality of exit-points. A student who had, for example, practised the introductory exercises and learned the art of division would be equipped for basic advocacy. He could analyse a case, pinpoint the nature of the dispute, and identify a range of relevant argumentative resources. Missing out on the study of invention and advanced style would not disadvantage him in low-level courts, where any attempt to make a lengthy speech,
elaborately structured and elegantly expressed, was likely to be pre-empted by the interventions of a magistrate with a heavy caseload and a great deal of latitude in the conduct of hearings. It would be primarily in more elite social strata that an advocate would benefit from displaying his stylistic virtuosity, his command of classical Attic linguistic norms, and his familiarity with the inheritance of classical culture. Since contemporary society had a need for trained practitioners at a variety of social and professional levels, the flexibility of this teaching pattern was entirely appropriate. Change in rhetorical theory is symptomatic of change in teaching practice; but changes in teaching practice were themselves sensitive to changing social demands for the skills pedagogy fosters. Rhetoric, as a practical discipline, must be responsive to its social and cultural environment. But rhetoric, in turn, contributed to the shaping of the larger social and cultural environment of which it was part: rhetorical teaching was one of the influences that created the elite culture whose expectations students of rhetoric had to learn to meet.

**Recommendations for further reading**

There is no satisfactory account of for Greek rhetorical education in the classical period. The task may be impossible, in view of the sparse and problematic nature of the evidence. But useful starting-points include Cole 1991 (on the origins of rhetoric), Kennedy 2007 (on early handbooks), Goebel 1989 (on arguments from probability), and Livingstone 1998 (on Isocrates). The evidence, for later antiquity is far more abundant, and in recent years has emerged from comparative neglect. Heath 2004 quarries the technical literature; Cribiore 2007 focuses on the most successful fourth-century teacher of Greek rhetoric, building on her excellent introduction to the educational context (Cribiore 2001).

**References**

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