Between Soft Power, Neo-Westphalianism and Transnationalism: The European Union, (Trans)National Interests and the Politics of Strategy

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Abstract

Can we speak of a joined-up European Union (EU) Grand Strategy in the world? Strategy-based policy-making in the EU is a shared enterprise between the EU and its member state governments. The EU and its member states focus in the EUGS (2016) on the EU homeland as a priority and not the Neighbourhood or the global level of diplomacy as was the case previously in the ESS (2003). This is partly as a result of changing EU foreign policy priorities and partly as a result of the reassertion of national interests into the EU’s transnational foreign policy. EU grand strategy has shifted focus from the global to the regional level reflecting the new pragmatic turn in EU foreign policy. The new strategy is more regional, more pragmatic, and less ambitious in furthering the EU as a global actor as a result.

Keywords: European Union; Grand Strategy; Security Culture; Transnationalism; Sovereignty.
**Introduction: Beyond Strategic Culture? Grand Strategy, the European Union and Security Cooperation**

The Global Strategy for *the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy* (EUGS) was launched on 30 June 2016 just one week after the historic Brexit vote. The stakes could not have been higher. The EUGS represented a change in EU global strategy. Indeed: “A critical reading of the document shows that concepts such as normative power and differentiated inclusion of neighbours in the EU’s system of governance have all but disappeared” (Pischikova and Piras 2017, 103). The new watch words in EU external security strategy are principled pragmatism in policy-making, policy coherence in EU external policies and the building up of resilience of contiguous countries in the EU’s Neighbourhood (European Union 2016; Juncos 2017, 1-18). Thus how far is the EU able to pursue a coherent, principled-pragmatic and resilient transnational Grand Strategy in Europe and the wider world?

In terms of the paper’s running order, the paper initially analyses the literature on strategic culture as it relates to state and non-state actors. The paper then goes onto outline specific forms of state-based and transnational forms of strategy as they relate to EU foreign policy to better understand how we might analyse EU strategy in the wider world and the prospects for an EU strategy. The paper then goes onto analyse the entomology of the literature on EU Grand Strategy as a means to understand varieties of thinking on the subject in the literature as well as possibilities of strategic action in EU foreign policy. The penultimate section of the paper focuses more squarely on what the EU does in strategic actor terms comparing and contrasting the European Security Strategy (2003) with the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) and the prospects for EU global strategy. In conclusion, the paper returns to the main question guiding the analysis of how far the EU is able to fashion a Grand Strategy that is able to achieve the objectives of EU foreign policy more generally.
Strategic Culture Beyond the Nation-State

The idea of strategic culture is an ever present part of the literature on EU foreign policy. Traditionally, strategic culture is defined in historical terms by reference to ideas of war and peace derived from military and non-military foreign policy strategies of states (Al-Rodhan 2009, 2). More recently the EU literature has acknowledged softer forms of strategic culture which encompass broader social and political influences in a socially constructed context (Hadfield 2007, 59-72). Strategic culture literature has also taken a transnational turn in recent years to reflect the increasingly broad range of international actors engaged in international politics beyond traditional state boundaries (Lantis and Howlett 2016, 84-101). In this context, transnational refers to interactions between state and non-state actors extending or operating across national boundaries (Schmidt and Zyla 2013, 1-10). Following Cooper, the EU is conceptualised as being a transnational rather than a supranational actor, meaning that that the EU’s member states still have autonomy in domestic politics and still control their national foreign policies. The EU is also engaged in post-modern international relations predicated on human rights and human security (Cooper 2000, 27). Thus what can we learn from the conceptualisations in the literature of strategic culture in analysing transnational actors such as the EU and what this tells us about broader security cooperation in Europe and beyond? Therefore, crucially to what extent can the EU forge a Grand Strategy that is coherent? The paper will grapple with these questions by reference to conceptual and empirical analysis.

Since 1989 the study of “strategic culture” has taken on new salience in international relations. Significant inquiries into strategy that emphasise the study of political community, identity, sovereignty, and transnational political organisation have dominated the study of European security over the past two decades with a renewed emphasis on constructivist socio-cultural analyses (Lantis and Howlett 2016, 84-101). In this paper, strategic culture is defined as a `set
of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours patterns...’ (Snyder 1977, 8). The analysis defines Grand Strategy as the relationship between means and ends in policy to achieve set objectives (Gaddis 2009, 1). Transnationally-derived processes of social denationalisation of national politics have become more prevalent in everyday political life. This has been accompanied by a reconfiguration of power in the global security environment that is characterised by a shift from inter- to intra-state war (Donbrowski and Reich 2017, 1016-1018). Following Charles Tilly, with reference to intra-state conflict, civil violence is the product of three main influencing factors: coercive; capitalist and capitalised coercive. Tilly implies that inter-communal wars within existing national-state structures challenge received wisdom on the ways in which scholars understand and study community, identity, sovereignty and organisation (Tilly 1990). This reconfiguration of territory, identity and function during and after the 1990s goes beyond state boundaries into the international relations arena and is defined and studied in largely in transnational terms (Charles and Dauvergne 2016, 415). As such, Robert Cooper speaks of a “liberal order Europe” and juxtaposes this with the EU’s illiberal actions overseas in pursuit of power and resources that are guided by EU and member state interests alike (Cooper 2003, 1-5), ultimately comparing national foreign policy with transnational priorities for the EU and EU member states alike. Cooper argues that the EU is not supranational, but is transnational in the sense that the EU’s member states are subject the external authority of the EU but they still have autonomy domestically and in foreign policy overseas (Cooper 2000, 27). We will return to Cooper later in the analysis and will now focus on varieties of European sovereignty in the literature ultimately conceptualising the EU as a transnational foreign policy project predicated on shared sovereignty (Krasner 2005, 76) (see below). Once we have established the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, the paper then analyses the prospects for EU global strategy in the subsequent sections of the analysis.
Changes in Conceptions of European Sovereignty: From Classical Realism to Transnationalism

Classical realist analyses opposed the notion of transnationalism as both a legitimate mode of analysis of international relations and as an empirical explanation of how the world was changing after the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1990, 5-56). In this worldview international politics returned to a system of competing states that determined policy outcomes. Others have looked to modes of analysis which combine forms of realist and transnational premises not solely relying on traditional Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty.²

One such theory is neo-medievalism which was deployed to explain international governance after the end of Cold War (Winn 2004, 1). Bull defines neo-medievalism as a system of 'overlapping authorities and criss-crossing loyalties' which eliminate the absolute authority claimed and exercised by sovereign states (Bull 1977, 246). Not only does this challenge the idea of international society, but such a system would radically transform political life itself, returning it to something analogous to the medieval world: a lack of mutual recognition among entities, an absence of 'anarchy' in the Waltzian neo-realist sense, and a more complex pattern of relationships to consider (Bull 1977, 246; Waltz 1979, 5). In essence, the theory derived from Bull’s conception of international society contains realist and transnational elements. Neo-medievalism does not, on the one hand, deny that the nation-state is an important actor’ in the operation of EU foreign policy (Hyde-Price 2006, 217-234). On the other hand, neo-medieval theory also recognises the need to accommodate non-state actors into any analysis of international phenomena. The theory of neo-medievalism has its limits as a mode of empirical analysis though and cannot fully explain the role of norms, identity and socialisation in international relations. Neo-medievalism also overplays degrees of disintegration in the wider
world and suffers from othering non-Western cultures as being “medieval” such as Islam in the era of the War on Terror (Holsinger 2007, 48). The point in the context of the analysis is that as a mode of analysis and as a description of international relations neo-medievalism is worthy of attention given its emphasis on state as well as non-state conceptions of international society that include transnational forms of analysis.

We also see forms of transnationalism in the European legal order which obviate traditional conceptions’ of sovereignty. In legal terms EU member state governments have given up national powers to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), thereby intertwining national and post-national conceptions of sovereignty. Indeed, ‘...constitutional courts [in EU member states] adopt post-sovereign perspectives of a constitutional democratic state while keeping the semantics of [national] constitutional sovereignty as their persisting point of reference and empowerment’ (Priban 2015, 199). In this way, the EU represents a post-sovereign regional system characterised by a transnational legal order where national courts are subservient to the ECJ and sovereignty is shared.

**Post-sovereignty and Shared-sovereignty: The European Union**

Since the late 19th Century there has been an inexorable expansion of state powers into the private sphere and the state still greatly influences national foreign policy priorities (Hill 1993; Hill 2003, 2; Hill 2016). However, as Krasner writes, in a transnational world sovereignty is becoming shared globally to a greater degree than ever before (Krasner 2005, 76). To Krasner:

Shared-sovereignty institutions require three preconditions. First, there must be an international legal sovereign that can sign the compact with the external partner. A country where some outside power wields executive authority is unsuited to shared sovereignty. Second, the agreement must be voluntary. While the bargaining that leads up to it may be lopsided, there can be no coercion and all parties must believe that the deal will help them. Third, the arrangement must not ask the external party to kick in large resources, for the simple reason that a partner who is footing the bill is unlikely to accept the limits on its control that shared sovereignty demands (Krasner, 2005, 76).
Indeed, the EU is somewhat of a transnational trend-setter in that sense, combining national, post-modern and post-sovereign arrangements in a form of “shared sovereignty” internally through its multi-level governance system (Mamadu and Studlar 2009, 73-97), and, externally, through its willingness to share sovereignty with bodies such as the United Nations (Sicurelli, 2016). Since the mid-1960s – and increasingly so – there has occurred a blurring of responsibilities and identities between state, nation, international organisation and multinational company as is evidenced below in Table One.

[Table One. See end page of manuscript]

With specific reference to Table One (above) regarding changes to international order over time, the classical state system between the late 18th Century and the mid-20th Century was based loosely on patriotism, internal security and the defence of the realm. The key referent unit was the nation-state and the dominant mode of interaction was competition predicated on the balance of power between states. This was embellished in the Cold War with superpower rivalry, the emergence of rival blocs and Western transnational institutions. A choice between rival Western and Communist ideologies was underpinned by nuclear deterrence on both sides that emphasised a balance between order, anarchy and hierarchy, whilst the post-war economic system in the West was defined by a system of complex interdependencies between national economies and transnational actors (Keohane and Nye 1972). In the period after 1989 – and since the new millennium – transnational policies and ideas co-exist alongside national and regional approaches towards international relations. Identity has been arguably thrust to the top of the security agenda expressed through refreshed conceptions of individual human rights, multiculturalism, diversity and mutual tolerance. Intra-state war has replaced inter-state conflict as the dominant expression of violence in the global security system. Finally, there has been an extension of the rule of law internationally and conceptions of humanitarian
intervention into the domestic affairs of rogue states. The EU, as Krasner states, is a case of “shared sovereignty” (Krasner 2005, 76), sharing responsibilities between multiple levels of governance thereby combining and transforming sovereignties into something that is sui generis in Europe and in the wider world. In the end, the EU is a shared political project in search of a transnational strategy.

In a modern 21st Century context power is `...the capacity to cause other (extra-EU) actors to behave in ways that they would not do otherwise’ (Webber 2014, 1), building on Robert Dahl’s classic definition of power: A has power over B to the extent that B will do something that he would not do otherwise (Dahl 1957, 202-203). In this context, the EU possesses two types of transnational power: First, Materially-based powers such as: (a) military threat or use of force, and (b) economics (sanctions and restriction of EU market access) as being part of the European power structures. Second, the EU possesses Normative “Soft Power” Ideology – via persuasion and diplomacy – as being at least as significant as material power in explaining EU actorness and strategy (Webber 2014, 1-5; Manners 2002, 235-258). This is the context within which EU Grand Strategy operates in an environment that is shaped transnationally by the material and ideational arenas of EU foreign and security policy.

EU Grand Strategy: Literature Review

The EU is a political project at its heart and is guided by strategy. In order to assess the extent to which the EU is able to pursue a grand strategy we first need to briefly establish the state-of-the-art in the field. The next section will then focus on the implementation of EU grand strategy to assess its effectiveness in advancing the objectives of EU foreign and security policy. Strategic culture in this context is a linked to culture more generally. As is stated above, strategic culture is a `set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours patterns...’ (Snyder 1977, 8). Others see strategic culture as being part of the socio-psychological arena of decision
choices available to policy-makers, whereas others till see strategic culture as being part of the beliefs and assumptions framing choices (Baylis, J. Wirtz, J.J. and Gray, C.S. 2016, 1-16). Strategic culture can be influenced by international norms and social constructions of the wider world and internally-processed norms. The constructivist turn in International Relations (IR) has highlighted that material norms alone in themselves cannot explain strategic choices and values underlying these norms also influence what is understood as culture or strategic culture (Rogers 2009, 831-862). EU strategic culture is a relatively under-researched field, but has gained saliency in the literature in recent years (Schmidt and Zyla 2011, 484-493). Work in the field has been done by Howorth (2007 and 2010, 455-474) and Bispoc and Coelmont (2011a) to define how we might think of strategic culture and how the EU responds to this in its search for a grand strategy. Meyer (2005, 523-549; 2006) has contributed a constructivist analysis of strategic culture in the EU to the debates. Menon has fused institutionalist and realist approaches toward CSDP in his work (Menon 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011a). Chappell has written on CSDP from the perspective of strategic culture and role theory (Chappell 2012). Luis Simon has written on CSDP strategy and crisis management (Simon 2012). Mattelaer has written on EU military operations and their relationship with strategy (Mattelaer 2013). Michael E. Smith has combined aspects of institutionalism and realism in his analysis of CSDP (Smith 2011). Kempin and Mawdsley have written on the relationship between CSDP strategy and US hegemony (Kempin & Mawdsley 2013). In 2011, a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy was devoted to CSDP and strategic culture with articles on different aspects of EU security policy and strategic culture from various theoretical perspectives (Haglund 2011; Haine 2011; Kammel 2011; Norheim-Martinsen 2011; Pentland 2011; Peters 2011; Rynning 2011a, Rynning 2011b; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt & Zyla 2011; Zyla 2011). A similar, theoretically aware collection of articles on CSDP was also published as a special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies in 2011 using Foucauldian theory, policy networks,
realism, social constructivism, institutionalism, and varieties of social theory (Bickerton 2011; Bickerton, Irondelle, & Menon 2011; Hofmann 2011; Menon 2011a; Merand 2011 b; Merand, Hofmann & Irondelle 2011; Merlingen 2011; Meyer & Strickmann 2011; Rynning 2011b; Toje 2011).

In many ways, the EU is a mixture of material factors and ideational beliefs in foreign policy terms. The ideology of normative power Europe is one such prominent example of this. Indeed, the EU is nothing if not a normative as well as well as a partially conceived material project that is predicated on building a broader European peace project alongside broadly European economic material foundations. The normative power Europe concept is also an extremely useful analytical framework for analysis (Manners 2002, 235-258). Others go further claiming that the ESS – and its subsequent revisions – has reset the European strategic mindset to go beyond traditional national and materially-based definitions of power towards an ideationally-defined conception of European security and also constructivist modes of analysis for this new Europe of ideas. Grand strategy is a set of ideas and actions made up of political, economic, military and cultural bases that help to define foreign policy. EU Grand Strategy comprises aspects of physical security, economic statecraft and value projection (Smith 2011, 150).

Having analysed the literature on EU grand strategy and strategic culture we shall now focus on what the EU actually does in the real world juxtaposing this with the grand strategy debates in the literature to get a sense of what the Union actually does versus the theory and, crucially, to what extent the EU is actually forging a transnational Grand Strategy advancing the objectives of EU foreign and security policy.

The EU has been in need of a revised transnational strategy for modern times but also needs to respond to material threats as they arise in a pragmatic and not only a normative way. The dated ESS needed updating, even beyond its more recent revisions and was finally renewed in June 2016 (European Union 2016). The question is, to what extent is the EU capable of fashioning a global security strategy that can respond to a range of transnational threats in Europe and abroad thereby advancing EU foreign and security policy?

Ever since the drafting of the ESS (2003) and the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the EU has needed to offer a joined up sense of security beyond the confines of the current stove-piped arrangements of the post-Lisbon treaty period where different areas of foreign and security policy are hived off into functional areas of interest that are driven as much by procedure as they are by substance (Verdun 2013, 1128-1142). At present it would be fair to say that the EU foreign and security policy provides a framework for member states to discuss areas of co-operation in their external policies. The EU is a civilian power (especially espousing economic power) and has deficits in the military field beyond regional crisis management in Europe’s Near Abroad.

As such in practice the EU has mainly a regional focus in its foreign and security policy via the CSDP, whilst the Union has a global diplomatic presence via its CFSP which has been in existence since 1970 (formerly called European Political Co-operation abbreviated EPC). Progress in the EU foreign affairs system has usually been the result of responses to internal or external crises to Europe as they happen, such as EPC cooperation in the 1970s around Cold War issues, cooperation in the 1980s to combat terrorism, cooperation in the 1990s on climate change and cooperation since the new millennia on a range of issues such as terrorism, crisis management in the Neighbourhood and migration. The main mode of governance in CSDP and CFSP is intergovernmental. Indeed, with specific regard to CSDP ‘...in terms of the improvement of military capabilities...the European Union appears to be more of a power-
enhancing realist actor rather than a normative one’ (Heinikoski 2017, 32). In foreign and security policy the EU is guided by transnationalism rather than supranationalism, to the extent that the EU’s member states are still autonomous in external relations sharing sovereignty with the EU (Priban 2015, 180). As an actor the EU has most power in its foreign external trade policy given its legal basis in the Treaties (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2016, 208-210). Arguably, one of the most powerful political offices in international diplomacy is that of the Commissioner for External Trade in the European Commission. The Commission is the determining factor in the implementation of EU bilateral and multilateral trade agreements forged in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework. This is where EU power makes a difference to the presence of the Union in world affairs and is less dependent on the agency of member state governments. There is a debate in the EU as to whether the Union should do beyond what already exists towards creating a global EU with a concomitant strategy to boot. This would mean perhaps going beyond Europe’s normative power différence in the wider world (which is civilian, multilateral and mainly economic). Thus how far is the EU able to pursue a coherent, principled-pragmatic and resilient transnational Grand Strategy in Europe and the wider world?

The renewed European Security Strategy, titled the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, was launched in late June 2016 (European Union 2016) and was written after wide ranging consultation with interested stakeholders (Tocci 2016, 461-472). The previous ESS (2003) was in need of a significant refresh after nearly a decade and with only one previous update in 2008. Much had changed in the world since 2003 (Tocci 2017a; Tocci 2017b). The new strategy was launched days after the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU (Biscop 2016, 431-445). In general the EU is still highly committed to multilateral world order, a role for international organisations in global policy-making and a rules-based
approach to international relations. The document is really about the means of making policy in the wider world (Davis-Cross 2016, 402-413). The EUGS was a statement of intent to improve the effectiveness of EU foreign and security policy in an era of flux, growing populism and newly emerging security threats that require solutions. The EUGS is formed around “principled pragmatism”, which anchors the EU to a new emphasis on cooperative realism in international relations thereby to a degree moving away from the EU as purely a normative ideational power. The new strategy recognises that the EU has material interests and that the practice of international relations, is not only about a set of ideals as projected into the outside world. As such, the EUGS stops overestimating the transformative power of the EU in the wider world. For instance, the evangelising language of the transformative effects of democracy promotion has been dropped towards the Neighbourhood. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been covertly replaced by the “resilience” of policy relationships with ENP states, in crisis management and humanitarian emergencies (Wagner and Anholt 2016, 414-430), which signals a more pragmatic and realist approach from the EU towards the Near Abroad (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017, 165-176). This is a departure from the previous EU strategy towards the Neighbourhood. The EUGS has moved away from assuming that other states neighbouring the EU want to take on board Union policies and values as a matter of course and that Neighbourhood states have by and large become more authoritarian over the past five years rejecting EU initiatives such as democracy promotion (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017, 165-176). As such, the Union has freed itself from the straightjacket of being trapped between norms and interests, although some thinkers believe that the EU will struggle to reconcile its new principled pragmatism with its values and norms (Juncos 2017, 1-18). Others believe that the EU is pursuing resilience (with all the obligations on the Neighbourhood states) as a means to ensure EU governance from a distance of the Neighbourhood after a series of intervention failures abroad (Joseph 2016, 389). There is a new
emphasis in the EUGS on the internal arrangement and resilience of extra-EU states and the need to deal with political elites and civil societies in those states in a pragmatic way (Gaub and Popescu 2017). Yet, the EUGS also routinizes strategy in the EU as another area of foreign policy activity (Malksoo, 2016 374-388). The EUGS (2016) also seeks to improve defence cooperation and capacities in the EU after Brexit, particularly in crisis management (European Council 2016).

Nevertheless, the EUGS has received criticism not necessarily for what it proposes, but in what it fails to criticise in current EU foreign and security policies and practices. First, the EUGS fails to criticise the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) (ToL) on the practice of EU foreign and security policy. The ToL made decision-making too compartmentalised and bureaucratised. It removed Foreign Ministers from European Council meetings and a schism was created between the EEAS and Commission in Part V of the ToL in that it created in-built bureaucratic competition between the EU’s institutions. Furthermore, the EEAS and HR/VP have been under-resourced and as a result could have been even more effective than they have been. Additionally, the EUGS does not present a coherent platform for dealing with the Neighbourhood (Smith, M.E. 2016 446-460). Robert Cooper opines further that there needs to be a deep seated change in the culture of EU diplomacy towards a greater acceptance of what is going on abroad as well as transnationalism. The EU is too centralised in Brussels and this impacts on the implementation of EU strategy in the Neighbourhood. Following Cooper: `We need an organisation that puts the posts abroad at the centre of policy making’ (Cooper 2016, 2); the EU is too bureaucratised to do everything from Brussels.

Likewise, the EU has difficulties in defining its international role vis-à-vis emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India and the EUGS does not necessarily address such concerns adequately (Howorth 2016, 389-401). The EUGS has been criticised for not being ambitious enough (Colemont 2016, 9-11). Conley speaks of Brexit as being a potential problem for EU
strategic actorness (Conley 2016, 12-14) but there is also potential to be had from Brexit in improving up EU strategic capabilities (Dassù and Menotti 2016, 15-16). The EUGS has also been criticised for being overly ambitious compared to the global security environment which the EU finds itself (Grand 2016, 19-21), whilst others complain there are few real differences between the ESS (2003) and EUGS (2016) (Howorth 2016, 24-26). Then there are those who maintain that the EUGS lists the problems that the EU faces without necessarily providing solutions (Maull 2016, 24-36). The implementation of the EUGS will also suffer from Brexit, given that the UK is a major foreign policy player in EU foreign and security policy and globally (Smith, K.E. 2017 503-515).

Others have praised the EUGS for raising the profile of policy coherence in EU external relations policy and the issue of the internal resilience of adjacent territories to the EU as they relate to key security issues such as migration and human rights (Altafin, Haász and Podstawa 2017, 122-143), even though the prospects for migration policy coherence in the EUGS is impacted by contested national security discourses in the EU member states on the subject (Ceccorulli and Lucarelli 2017, 83-102). The EUGS is also an attempt to bring coherence into less traditional areas of EU foreign policy such as the governance of cyber security policies in Europe (Carrapacio and Barrinha 2017). The EUGS also speaks of “EU strategic autonomy” in international relations. However, in practice the EU is still dependent to some degree on the US for its security and defence. Additionally, the EUGS is based on a mixture of intergovernmental and communitarised instruments, which potentially, makes policy implementation problematic. The EUGS is important in that it sets the strategic goalposts of the EU for the next decade and beyond. It forms a guide to action and is an important document for this reason (European Union 2017; Drent 2017). Having analysed the state-of-the art in EU
grand strategy studies literature and what the EU actually wants to do with its strategy in the wider world (and to what extent this is effective) we will now conclude the paper.

**Conclusion**

Thus how far is the EU able to pursue a coherent, principled-pragmatic and resilient transnational Grand Strategy in Europe and the wider world? As an actor the EU is a mixture of Westphalian sovereignty, transnational cooperation and ideational preferences. The EU is a form of deep integration in contradistinction to other forms of international cooperation in the wider world which is based on hard legal integration and softer forms of regulatory harmonisation. However, the key obstacle to full legal harmonization is the nation-state with its borders, sovereignty, rule-making abilities and legal jurisdictions that undercut the supranational policies of the EU, especially in the areas of foreign, defence and security policies. The EU is a bon compromis between national interests, transnational forces, cosmopolitan ideals and concomitant forms of post-modern interactions in Europe and at the global level can only bridge this divide to a certain degree. Additionally, European security cooperation is partially dependent on the United States thereby undermining the role that the EU can play in Europe and globally in the management of international security. The intergovernmental nature of decision-making in much of EU foreign and security policy is also an obstacle to implementing the EUGS (Smith, K.E. 2017, 503-518).

This raises questions on how to analyse the effectiveness of European foreign policy and the prospects for the EUGS: whether the focus should be on material gains, value projection in the wider world, the EU homeland, or something else entirely? It is clear that the EU has a comparative advantage as an honest broker in international politics based on the projection of its values into the wider world. Nevertheless, material factors also greatly impinge on EU foreign policy. As Hyde-Price has pointed out, national interests and pragmatism often shape
European security outcomes (Hyde-Price 2006, 217). Realist pragmatism, prudence and associated payoffs impact on the EU’s ability to materially and ideationally project itself in the global security environment beyond soft security strategies based on aid, trade, development, the rule of law and human rights. The lack of a coherent transnational EU grand strategy affects the EU’s ability to project itself coherently abroad. It also seems that the EUGS is mainly targeted at the EU homeland and is more regional in focus than the ESS was. The EUGS needs to ensure policy convergence between EU member states and policy coherence within discrete policy sectors of EU foreign policy. However, at least the EUGS (2016) is a pragmatic attempt to address these empirical realities via its ‘principled pragmatic’ strategy: the EUGS recognises that foreign and security policy goes beyond ideational factors and also embraces material factors that inform international relations. As such, the EU is moving beyond normative power towards pragmatic strategies in its external policies. Arguably, however, ‘[t]he emerging EU identity [in the EUGS] appears to be debilitated by the centrifugal processes of internal contestation and a drastically downsized claim for external power projection [globally compared to the ESS]’ (Pischikova and Piras 2017, 103), despite ever greater policy coherence in EU external policies such as in the area of counter-terrorism cooperation (Davis Cross 2017, 609-624).

In a disciplinary sense, the above academic debates in the literature between norms and material interests in EU foreign policy are restricting and, this results in a trapping of these contested debates into niche silos. EU Grand Strategy is about capabilities and the projection of values. Grand Strategy is also about the preservation of the EU project over time trying to make the Union more relevant to managing global security developments (the EUGS 2016 is a prime example of this strategy). EU strategy is partly about the survival of the Union, the maintenance of the EU project over time and also partly about projecting EU values and the balance between these objectives (Novotná 2017, 177-191). The EU is an actor that is guided by humanitarian
considerations in the developing world, by the national security preferences of its member states, and by geopolitics internationally (Kreutz 2015, 195-217). Specifically, with regard to the developing world, the EU still lacks a coherent strategy in global health in order to implement its health policies in the global south more effectively (Speakman, McKee and Coker 2017, 392-393). Indeed, `...[a]...critical shortcoming of EU global strategies is that, overwhelmingly, they go unreported and unnoticed by European citizens, allowing the narrative of a [EU] bureaucratic talking shop to persist’, thereby undermining attempts at forging meaningful and coherent practical policies that have some degree of democratic legitimacy with the European populace at large (Speakman, McKee and Coker 2017, 393). In the end this all impacts on the prospects for transnational forms of EU Grand Strategy in Europe and beyond.
Acknowledgements: An earlier version of this article was presented at the workshop ‘Geopolitics and strategic thinking in EU foreign policy’ at the 3rd European Workshops in International Studies, 6 - 8 April 2016, University of Tübingen. I would like to thank the workshop organisers Cristian Nitoiu and Monika Sus for their thorough feedback and would also like to thank the workshop participants for their valuable comments. Thanks are also due to the International Politics anonymous reviewers and editors for their comprehensive and constructive comments. Author contact: n.winn@leeds.ac.uk

Wesphalian sovereignty means that states control the people and property in their territory. Internationally, all states are equal as sovereign over their own affairs. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 created the notion of national self-determination based on coexisting sovereign states. Wesphalian sovereignty became central to international law and the prevailing Western-defined world order. On the origins and development of the Treaty of Westphalia and the relationship with the concept of state sovereignty see: Filho (2007): 455-475.

This section relies heavily on: Winn (2013): 174-179.


Cooper, R. 2016. The EU’s global strategy: Three quotations, LSE ideas policy brief: 


Drent, M. 2017. A shift in European security interests since the EU Global Strategy?. Clingendael Paper: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs.


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Table One: Political Institutions, Identity and Security

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<td><strong>The new Europe at the Millennium</strong></td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Extension of rule of law and civil society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nation-states</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Elimination of interstate war</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regionalism</td>
<td>Tolerance and diversity</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention</td>
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