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ABSOLUTISM, RELATIVISM, AND ANARCHY: ALAIN LOCKE AND WILLIAM JAMES ON VALUE PLURALISM

§1. INTRODUCTION

It would not be an exaggeration to say that pluralism was central to the philosophical thought of William James. Repeatedly, James claimed that the difference between monism and pluralism was the “most pregnant” in philosophy (1910, SPP: 61).¹ Radical empiricism, James’s distinctive metaphysical vision, was first introduced as the view that pluralism was a plausible hypothesis about the permanent state of the world, and this pluralism continued to be a central feature of his philosophy in later years (James, 1897, WB: 5-6).²

The assertion that pluralism was a valid philosophical hypothesis was not merely theoretical, but practical. James often connected pluralism with democracy, and monism with “despotism” (James, 1882, WB: 202). Whereas monism – in any field – was required to assert that everything must be unified in one substance, or in one intellectual system, pluralism was content with a world of interconnected powers, with no one power being completely dominant over the others (James, 1909, PU: 145). In this sense monism understood the world under a kind of authoritarian interpretation, and pluralism was a way of viewing the world democratically. This is the key to understanding James’s assertion that his radical empiricism “frankly interprets the universe after a social analogy” (James, 1905-6, ML: 367).³ According to James, it was the monist tendency to assert one ideal as absolute, at the expense of all others, which was the “root of most human injustices and cruelties”. And, vice versa, it was the attitude which allowed us to see other people’s values as different but no less real than our own which was “the basis of all our tolerance, social, religious and political” (James, 1899, TT: 150-1). As such, the rejection of monism, dogmatism and absolutism, and the adoption of a more reasonable and fallibilistic pluralism, was meant to be a large step in the direction of a more tolerant world.

James spent his career combating monism and absolutism within philosophy, and it is a testament to his efforts that pluralism looked like a reasonable position to the thinkers who followed him. One such thinker was Alain LeRoy Locke. Locke was writing at a time when pluralism was not merely a potential philosophical position, but a necessary political one. Multiculturalism was struggling to emerge within his own society, and totalitarianism was flourishing outside of it. For Locke, then, it was not enough to merely deny the philosophical validity of absolutism, as he took James to do. One must also present a positive and functional pluralistic axiology.

Like James, Locke saw the tendency in human nature to assert one value or system of values as absolute as the root of most evils in the world. In both theory and practice, such absolutism inevitably leads to conflict:

Whether [...] on the plane of reason or that of action, whether 'above the battle' in the conflict of 'isms' and the 'bloodless ballet of ideas' or in the battle for partisans with their conflicting and irreconcilable ways of life, the same essential strife goes on in the name of eternal ends and deified ultimates (Locke, 1935: 35).⁴

Locke, also like James, connected his pluralism with democracy, arguing that there was a "vital connection" between the two (Locke, 1942: 53). Concerning the practical results of pluralism, and the pernicious effects of absolutism, James and Locke are very similar in project and vision.

Locke, however, was much clearer on what a pluralist view needed to consist in, if it were to be successful. A pluralist view must be positioned between two negative extremes: absolutism on one side, and what he called "value anarchism" or "anarchic relativism" on the other. According to Locke, James was an example of the latter.⁵ Locke's observation was that the pluralistic philosophies which had proceeded him:

avoided [the] normative aspects, which has led them into a bloodless behaviourism as arid as the intellectualism they have abandoned or else resulted in a completely individualistic and anarchistic relativism which has rightly been characterised as "philosophic Nihilism" (Locke, 1935: 34).

In reaction to such philosophies, Locke saw himself as attempting to present an account of value which not only avoided absolutism, but also positivism and value anarchism. His own account aimed for a more "systematic relativism", as opposed to the anarchistic relativism of James (Locke, 1942: 55).⁶

The central problem with the "anarchic" and positivistic forms of relativism rejected by Locke was their incapacity to account for normativity and objectivity. Here is Locke presenting his central project clearly and forcefully:

To my thinking, the gravest problem of contemporary philosophy is how to ground some normative principle or criterion of objective validity for values without resort to dogmatism and absolutism on the intellectual plane, and without falling into their corollaries, on the plane of social behaviour and action, of intolerance and mass coercion (Locke, 1935: 36).

The positive pluralistic axiology which Locke aimed to present sought to provide enough space for different values to be tolerated, and even mutually respected, rather

than being seen as necessarily in conflict (the rejection of absolutism), whilst at the same time allowing them to be normatively motivating and to come into meaningful contact and communication with each other (the rejection of individualism or anarchistic relativism).

From this broad project, we can delineate three separate problems which concerned Locke in the formation of his pluralistic axiology. The first is providing an account which enables values to be normative, without linking them to some universal or absolute principle or set of principles. We can call this the *normativity* project. The second is providing an account with enough objectivity so that meaningful comparisons can be made across value systems and different cultures. Call this the *objectivity* project. The third is providing an account which allows us to wholeheartedly maintain our own values as important and motivating, whilst at the same time being tolerant of other people's values. Locke refers to this as value-loyalty (Locke, 1944: 70), so we shall call this the *loyalty* project.

The paper will examine each of these projects in turn, and look at how the different pluralisms of Locke and James attempt to meet them. My overall argument will be that Locke was incorrect to call James a value anarchist, but that in avoiding anarchic relativism James appeals to a kind of realism which Locke rejects. I will also argue that Locke's approach to pluralism should be supplemented with this Jamesian realism if it is to successfully meet his three projects. The "realism" I have in mind here is broad and vague, and I will not aim to defend it in this paper. Suffice to say at the outset that, according to James, pluralism requires two moderately realist elements if it is to provide an adequately normative and objective account of value: our values must refer to and be responsive to objective properties in the world, and we must be able to move closer to truth about our values through communal inquiry.

§2. NORMATIVITY

The first challenge in developing a pluralistic account of value is providing an account of normativity. Any anti-absolutist account must abandon the idea that there are absolute, universal values. However, in "dethroning our absolutes", we must "take care not to exile our imperatives, for, after all, we live by them" (Locke 1935: 34). So, though we might reject the absolute nature of certain values, we cannot reject their "functional character as imperatives of action and as norms of preference and choice" (Locke 1935: 35). These are the normative aspects, then, that Locke is most anxious to keep.

Locke is contrasting his approach with one in which values are seen as the result of rational judgements, or evaluations in which we apply logical predicates. On these

kinds of accounts, we apply certain universal categories, values, or logical predicates such as “The Good” and “The Beautiful” to our experience, and their application brings with it categorical imperatives of action. In abandoning the absolutism whilst attempting to maintain the normativity of such a picture, Locke inverts it. Instead of appealing to logic, Locke appeals to phenomenology and psychology. Instead of universal values, he roots normativity in “modes or kinds of valuing” (Locke, 1935: 38). Instead of thinking about value in terms of the application of logical predicates to our experience, we should instead think of it in terms of an experience of *valuing* which can only subsequently be articulated in terms of a logical predicate. According to Locke:

These [value- or feeling-] modes co-assert their own relevant norms; each sets up a categorical imperative of its own, not of the Kantian sort with rationalized universality and objectivity, but instead the psychological urgency (shall we say, necessity?) to construe the situation as of a particular qualitative form-character (Locke, 1935: 41).

Experiences of valuing bring their own normativity. So instead of making the normativity of particular instances of valuing dependent on the application of certain categories, Locke makes the normativity of these categories dependent on experiences of valuing.

We need to say more about how valuing experiences come to have normativity outside of explicit evaluation. Locke's assertion is that though we later come to rationalise our experience in terms of predicates, values such as “beauty, goodness, truth (as approval or acceptance) [and] righteousness are known in immediate recognitions of qualitative apprehension” (Locke 1935: 39). Values are first qualitative and affective, and only subsequently rational. But these affective values are not without normativity. In fact, Locke's claim is that the values set up “directly through feeling, a qualitative category, which [...] constitutes an emotionally mediated form of experience” (Locke 1935: 38). We set up, through valuing, a *mood* or an emotionally charged kind of experience. In this experience of valuing a “qualitative universal is given” (Locke, 1935: 39), and this qualitative universal generates “dispositional imperatives of action choices” (Locke, 1935: 36). Certain actions appear right and certain actions appear wrong, given the mood of the experience. Accordingly, these qualitative values are “normatively stamped” by feeling in “the original value experience”, and subsequent rational evaluation “merely renders explicit what was implicit in the original value sensing” (Locke, 1935: 39).

We see here that Locke appeals to *types* or *modes* of feeling and valuing. Unlike the value anarchist, Locke's systematic relativism suggests that there are “basic and fundamental feeling-modes” which are common to different people and across

cultures (Locke 1935: 39). There are common types of feeling, which give rise to common types of experience, and common types of value. An appeal to common-sense tells Locke that the moral, the aesthetic, the logical, and the religious are the most common categories of value. As these different categories of value must first be identified at the qualitative level of feeling, Locke delineates four different “feeling-modes”. For instance, it is the feeling-mode of *exaltation* which grounds religious experience. This feeling of exultation itself sets up a mode of experience in which we feel that there are normative imperatives to perform, or refrain from performing, certain actions and interpretations. In the same way, the feeling of *tension* grounds our ethical experiences; the feeling of *acceptance* grounds logical value; and the feeling of *repose* grounds aesthetic value (Locke, 1935: 43).⁷

Locke’s complete account of normativity, then, is something like this: there are certain common feelings (such as exultation and tension), which ground moods or types of experience (such as religious or ethical experiences), which come with normative imperatives to interpret the situation in certain ways and to engage in certain actions, and that this is what subsequently, in rational analysis, comes to be expressed in the language of “value ultimates” (such as “The Holy” or “The Good”).

Throughout this account, Locke maintains a strict anti-realism, as he associates the realist claim that our values refer to something outside of our attitudes with absolutism.⁸ The realist’s attempt to discover the “true” value of some object is taken to be a sign of a particular fallacy:

[f]rom the functionalist’s point of view the basic error lies in regarding the formal value as the cause of the valuation or as an essence of the value object rather than the system value of the mode of valuing (Locke, 1945: 86).

The realist assumes that our judgements of value result from the application of necessary categories, or result from essential properties of the object of value. The “functionalist” view, in comparison, interprets the claim that some object is valuable *within* the context of the type of experience that this claim emerges from, and analyses the role that such claims play, and the behaviours which they make appropriate, within that context. They are *not* interpreted as a claim about the properties of the object. As a result, systematic relativism does not foster conflict between value systems in the way that absolutism does. If it is the attitude of valuation, rather than the properties of an object, which determines value, then when you are interpreting an object as beautiful, and I am interpreting it as morally important, then we are not disagreeing. We are merely operating under different value-modes or -systems, neither of which is taken to be a more correct account of reality. Arguments over which value represent the *summum bonum* are “doomed to perpetual logical opposition because their basic value attitudes are psychologically incompatible”

(Locke, 1935: 45). Systematic relativism avoids such conflict, without abandoning a sense of normativity.

One of the strengths of Locke's vision is its ability to account for what Locke calls "trans-valuations". Trans-valuations are times when we switch between value-modes whilst valuing the same object. Examples include when we appreciate an intellectual formula as beautiful rather than true or correct (Locke 1935: 44), or when an artist comes to see the work they are creating as an act of duty rather than an act of creative activity (Locke, 1935: 41). In these cases, the feeling with which we are engaging with the object changes, and our categorisation of the value of that object changes accordingly. The absolutist must explain away these cases as illusory, mistaken, or merely metaphorical. For Locke these trans-valuations are a real and normal part of our lives.

Locke appeals to examples of trans-valuation to do three things. First, the fact that changes in our feeling towards an object changes the categorisation of the value we place on it seems to provide support for Locke's assertion that the affective is prior to the evaluative. "Once a different form-feeling is evoked", Locke tells us, "the situation and the value type are, *ipso facto*, changed. Change the attitude, and, irrespective of content, you change the value type; the appropriate new predicates automatically follow" (Locke, 1935: 44).⁹ Second, this is meant to be an instance in which Locke's systematic relativism can account for a feature of everyday experience which the absolutist cannot. Whereas the absolutist must explain away such cases, Locke's theory "apply[s] a common principle of explanation" to all experiences of value (Locke 1935: 44). Thirdly, these trans-valuations are meant to provide us with an analogy for how we can react to other people's values with tolerance. If we find that within our own experience apparently opposed values are harmonised, and merge into each other, then this may lead us to think the same about differing values between persons. When we realise that different values have "complementary character in human experience", we stop thinking that only one value can be the correct one (Locke, 1935: 47).

So, unlike the "anarchic relativism", attributed by Locke to James and others, "systematic relativism" can provide some account of normativity, whilst also avoiding absolutism. This is the "middle ground" that Locke was looking for (Locke, 1935: 38).

It is worth noting at this stage that James should in principle be on board with Locke's "affective theory of valuation" (Locke, 1935: 45). Locke's bold and original move is to attempt to provide an account of normativity without appealing to anything outside of affective experience. As such, the Jamesian can recognise in Locke a kind of radical empiricist approach to normativity.¹⁰ However, there are a number of concerns which James might raise in the light of Locke's anti-realism.

Locke's account of normativity is based on the idea that certain types of feeling come with imperatives to interpret and act in certain ways. What Locke does *not* supply is an account of why we ought to feel certain ways in certain situations. Why is it appropriate to feel exultation in certain situations, and not in others? When my next-door neighbour demonstrates a sense of exultation and holy awe in response to his new garden fence, do I have grounds for criticising what appears to be his misplaced feeling? Can the systematic relativist have anything to say to someone who feels no tension in what is, to others, a situation that requires moral interpretation? These are not original problems to level at the relativist, but it seems that these are the kinds of concern that Locke's systematic relativism is meant to avoid. Locke can provide normativity in the sense of having shared modes of valuation which have imperative norms of action and interpretation attached. But there is nothing on his account of value which would tell us that certain affective responses are appropriate or inappropriate in certain situations.

Locke cannot appeal to objective features of the environment to provide this normativity.¹¹ We have seen that Locke equates any form of moral realism with absolutism. Our values are relational in nature, in that they are directed towards the objective world, and emerge in an "emotionally mediated form of experience" (Locke, 1935: 38-39). But the claim by Locke that these values "are rooted in attitudes, not in reality, and pertain to ourselves, not to the world" suggests that there are no features on the objective pole of this relation which determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular attitude (Locke, 1935: 46). Locke asserts that though valuation always has some content, that content never determines the feeling which grounds that valuation: "*feeling-quality, irrespective of content, makes a value of a given kind*" (Locke, 1935: 40, emphasis mine).¹²

In fact, James would suggest that this strict anti-realism might block the very motivational aspects of normativity which Locke is interested in preserving. According to James, our emotional feelings, such as fear, rapture, and sadness, have an immediate "objective reference", and must be held to have an "outward cause". Any philosophy which explained away this reference, or provided a description solely in terms of "subjective states", leaves a person "with little to care or act for", and as a result the motivational "force of [the] feelings would evaporate". Faced with a world in which our ideals and feelings have no real reference, we are overcome with a "nameless *unheimlichkeit*" (James, 1882, WB: 71).¹³

James tended to call any philosophy in which feelings were not responsive to objective properties of the world "subjectivism" (James, 1884, WB: 128). "Moralism" is the opposing view, in which our feelings (or at least our moral feelings) refer to something objective. As James describes it, the (pluralistic) moralist is someone who believes that the universe is a "series of *shoulds* all the way down" (James, 1882, WB: 85). The motivational deficiencies of subjectivism are most clearly demonstrated when we are

called upon to act on our moral ideals in the face of some social, institutional, or personal obstacle. In such a situation, the subjectivist – holding as they do that moral feelings are “mere data”, and not indicative of anything objective – is free to “pervert [the feelings] or lull them to sleep”, and so diminish their feelings of injustice or immorality rather than acting on them (James, 1882, WB: 86). As such, subjectivism encourages a kind of “ethical indifference”, in which we are provided with no motivation to perform difficult but moral acts. Moralism, on the other hand, suggests that we “regard something else than our feeling as our limit”, and holds that there are certain “outward duties” which must be met regardless of our feelings (James, 1884, WB: 132-136). Thus, moralism provides us with a normative imperative to act on our moral feelings, even at great personal detriment.¹⁴

James expresses his position succinctly in the following passage from “Is Life Worth Living?” (1895):

[i]f this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight – as if there were something really wild in the universe which we [...] are needed to redeem (1895, WB: 55).

James’s simple point is that if we want to understand the “willingness to act, no matter how we feel” then we must hold that our feelings are responsive to features of the world, such that our “acts are really good and bad”, and that something which is valuable – outside of our feelings – can be truly gained or lost through our action (1884, WB: 135). This element of modest realism is required for us to find our values fully motivating. Locke’s anti-realism seems to reject this possibility. Thus, James would contend that Locke’s theory of value entails the very indifferentism he was concerned to avoid.¹⁵

§3. OBJECTIVITY

The second challenge to providing a pluralistic account of value is objectivity. If we are going to have meaningful discourse about values between different people and different cultures, then we must have something objective on which to ground such interactions. Locke wants to provide an account in which value is grounded on something more objective than subjective opinion (the value anarchist position), but less objective than universal values to which all of humanity should be held accountable (the absolutist position). Locke has already rejected the possibility that properties of objects or situations can provide the basis for this objectivity, and so he must look elsewhere. To this end, he introduces what he calls “functional constants”

(Locke, 1942: 55).¹⁶

Locke's basic strategy is to appeal to "objective but neutral common denominators", which operate between different valuers and cultures (Locke, 1944: 73). We have already seen this strategy at work in Locke's appeal to common feeling types which ground our different ways of valuing. Though we may have several different instances of a type of value, these different valuations are all connected by virtue of a common feeling which brings about a qualitative universal and a set of imperative norms. These valuations may have different *objects*, but they have common attitudes, and thus norms, by which we can assess them.

A good example of this strategy is Locke's approach to modern art. Many traditionalists rejected modern art *as* art, and according to Locke this was because they were wedded to a particular idea of "Beauty". The traditionalists thought that beauty was a matter of certain objects demonstrating particular properties, and that modern works of art did not demonstrate these properties. Locke's interpretation of modern art, by comparison, sees modernism as making progress over the traditional approaches. The modernist has *enlarged* the scope of our artistic norms to include objects which were not previously included. Though the objects are different, our "basic attitudinal qualities" have not altered, and so we can recognise modern works of art as being part of the same value system as the more traditional pieces. If we judge the different art styles by a fixed absolute, such as a particular vision of beauty, then they appear to be divergent activities, at odds with one another. However, if we consider these different styles to have a broad functional commonality, such as allowing our contemplative feeling-attitudes to express themselves, then we can recognise both the traditional and the modernist approaches as fulfilling this role in different, but comparable ways. Locke contends that the "widening of the variety of styles and aesthetic" by the modernist, "has actually been accompanied by a deepening of aesthetic taste and a sharpening of critical discrimination" (Locke, 1945: 90). We can see the modernist approach as an adaptation and refinement of the kind of valuation activity which the traditionalist was also engaged in.

At a cultural level, Locke's claim is the same. Though the *content* of what different cultural groups value may differ, these different values provide the same *functional role*. This notion is what Locke calls "cultural equivalence", and he suggests it is one of three logical corollaries of applying his systematic relativism on the cultural level. The other two are the *reciprocity* of different values, the claim that we can reject assertions of any culture's superiority, but still engage in "scientific, point-by-point comparisons" to see how well they perform their functional role; and *limited cultural convertibility*, or the view that because there are shared functional attitudes between cultures, cultural transference can take place, but should be limited by certain sociological factors (Locke, 1944: 73).¹⁷

Locke's pluralistic vision is meant to have very practical results for democracy:

[I]t puts the premium upon equivalence not upon identity, calls for co-operation rather than for conformity and promotes reciprocity instead of factional antagonism. Authoritarianism, dogmatism, and bigotry just cannot take root and grow in such intellectual soil (Locke, 1942: 60).

Though both the relativist and the absolutist are aiming for peace within the political sphere, the absolutist confuses *uniformity* for *unity*. Uniformity is identity in form or content, whereas unity on the relativist picture can be achieved by the recognition of common functions or purposes, though perhaps clothed very differently (Locke, 1942: 53). The absolutist, because of their association of unity with uniformity, must pursue unity via orthodoxy, which “involves authoritarian conformity and subordination” (Locke, 1944: 70). As such, absolutism leads to dogmatism, struggle, and the very conflict which it aims to avoid. Relativism, on the other hand,

with no arbitrary specifications of unity, no imperious demand for universality, nevertheless enjoins a beneficent neutrality between divergent positions, and, in the case of the contacts of cultures, would in due course promote, step by step, from an initial stage of cultural tolerance, mutual respect, reciprocal exchange, some specific communities of agreement and, finally, with sufficient mutual understanding and confidence, commonality of purpose and action (Locke, 1944: 70-71).

As Harris tells us, Locke's claim is that “[t]he unity of peoples can exist without uniformity of cultural modalities” (Harris, 1989: 68).¹⁸

In summary, Locke believes that his systematic relativism provides us with the capacity for objective analysis between different valuers and cultures. Though different cultures might value different *things*, these values are underpinned by a common type of feeling, and common functional roles. Though what we find beautiful might differ, our feeling of beauty, the inchoate norms that emerge from this feeling, and the functions of the practices based on this feeling, are all essentially similar. We might worship different Gods, but what it means to worship, and the kind of role it plays in our lives and societies, are commonalities which unify us. It is Locke's suggestion that focusing on these “neutral common denominators”, rather than “superficial institutional divergence”, gives us a basis for analysing different values according to one standard, and is more likely to lead to cross-cultural discussion and cooperation than absolutism. And it is this objectivity which he accuses the anarchic relativist of lacking (Locke, 1944: 73).

The anarchic relativist, according to Locke, rejects objectivity in favour of a kind of

laissez faire individualism. Considering some portions of James's work, we might not think that Locke's interpretation of him as anarchic is at all unfair. For instance, in his explicit work on ethics, James makes the seemingly individualistic claim that the good is nothing but the satisfaction of demand, and that each demand *prima facie* deserves to be met. In fact, James is insistent that *nothing* common underlies our various values (or "ideals" in James's vocabulary).¹⁹ However, a closer look at James's work as a whole reveals that he, like Locke, frequently appeals to fundamental affective and functional similarities when looking for an objective way of assessing very divergent positions. I'll briefly address three examples here: James's approach to philosophy as a whole, James's approach to religion, and James's pragmatism.

Throughout his career, but most forcefully in *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), James argues that one of the central goals of philosophy is to provide us with an account of the universe such that we can feel "at home" in it. He expresses this by suggesting that "intimacy", an affective measure of how "at home" a particular theory allows us to feel, is one criterion by which we should assess different metaphysical visions. On this view, then, though metaphysical visions appear to assert any number of contradictory things, they have a shared purpose which allows these different philosophies to enter into conversation, and be assessed by the same criteria (James, 1909, PU: 11). Over the course of the work, James argues that his own pluralistic account meets this affective and functional criterion of intimacy better than monism. This is not the time to present this argument in detail, but what it tells us is that James accepts something very similar to Locke's approach of finding objectivity in underlying "common denominators" which different views share, rather than in common objects.²⁰

A second example can be found in James's work on religion. In *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), and elsewhere, James analyses the various claims of very different religious beliefs, and finds that there are common functional aims beneath them. In *Varieties* this is stated as:

the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and his ideals (James, 1902, VRE: 413).

We can find similar statements of the broad functional aim of religion elsewhere in James work.²¹ This might seem like a very weak definition of religion, but James is not offering us a definitive account of religious belief. Instead, he is suggesting that there are common functions which every religious account is attempting to meet, and by which we can assess the different religious hypotheses. James, like Locke, does not want this "common denominator" to determine content. It leaves open, for instance, such questions as whether God is infinite or finite, whether human immortality is possible, and whether the best religious hypothesis is monotheistic, polytheistic, or

panpsychic. James asserts that a pluralistic thesis of religion, which sees God as finite, is “the hypothesis by which the largest number of legitimate requirements are met”, but this remains a fallible hypothesis, rather than a dogmatic assertion (James, 1902, VRE: 411-3).²²

Perhaps the most obvious instance of this strategy is James’s pragmatism, aptly demonstrated in his famous “corridor” metaphor. Pragmatism provides a common language and methodology which can bring very different philosophical projects into communication, without restricting their content (1907, P: 32).²³

These three examples show that James can appeal to the same basic “common denominator” account of objectivity that Locke can, though James has a far less structured approach. But this is not the only notion of objectivity which James has available to him. We can see this in James’s explicit engagement with relativism. James does, in fact, call himself a relativist, by which he simply means an anti-absolutist (James, 1909, MT: 142). But he explicitly rejects from his relativism the notion that any opinion is as good as any other, which is what Locke’s accusation of anarchic relativism amounts to. “Opinion”, for the pragmatist, is something rooted in “the whole environment of social communication of which they are a part and out of which they take their rise”. These opinions have been *tested*, and will continue to be tested, against experience, and we have to trust that experience will help us select which opinions are true in the long run (James, 1909, MT: 145).²⁴ Over time, and through communal experience and inquiry, we make progress towards true beliefs. James’s relativism, then, does not deny absolute truth:

No relativist who ever actually walked the earth has denied the regulative character in his own thinking of the notion of absolute truth. What is challenged by the relativists is the pretence on anyone’s part to have found for certain at any given moment what the shape of that truth is (James, 1909, MT: 143).

The primary difference between absolutism and James’s relativism is not that one believes in absolute truth and the other does not. The difference is that, for the Jamesian relativist, absolute truth is what would be coercive over experience in the long run of human inquiry (James, 1909, MT: 143).

James is quite clear that this account of communal inquiry can in principle be applied to our ethical, aesthetical, and religious beliefs, just as well as it can to the natural sciences. As James puts it quite early in his career:

The only objective criterion of reality is coerciveness, in the long run, over thought. [...] If judgements of what *should-be* are fated to grasp us in this way, they are what “correspond” [to reality] (1878, EPh: 21).²⁵

Of course, in such matters we should expect that objectivity will only be discovered through “the experience of the entire human race”, and with the “co-operation of generations”. And the claim that objective truth *can* be found in such areas is, as ever, a hypothesis and not a dogmatic assertion (1882, WB: 87-8).

So, it seems as if James has access to two sources of objectivity in his account of value pluralism. He shares with Locke a *functionalism*, or an appeal to affective and functional constants which underpin different values. But he also appeals to a kind of *realism*, which sees our values as responsive in the long run to features of experience, so that we can move closer to ethical, aesthetical, and religious truth, through communal inquiry. We can find this second element of objectivity active in the examples that we have already looked at. In James's metaphysics, each account is treated as a hypothesis, the objectivity of which is measured by assessing how well it fulfils certain functional roles *and* how well the continued drift of experience continues to confirm it (James, 1909, PU: 147). And in the case of religion, James tells us to treat our different religious beliefs as hypotheses, which experience will confirm or deny in the long run (James, 1897: WB: 9). James' strategy in these cases is to combine a functional analysis, in which we delineate commonalities in aims and methods in order to assess apparently divergent positions, with a realism, in which we test our various hypotheses against experience.

However, Locke explicitly rejects such a realist or epistemic approach to value. In fact, Locke would see such an approach as being indicative of what he saw as the second large problem with pragmatism.²⁶ According to Locke, contemporary American philosophy was “too analogous to science and too committed to scientific objectivism”. Although many pragmatists claim to be pluralists, Locke argues, they in fact reduce all claims of truth to what is experimentally testable.²⁷ Locke calls this the “logico-experimental” methodology. The tendency to think of truth as “the correct anticipation of experience [or] the confirmation of fact” unduly narrows what we actually mean by truth (Locke, 1935: 36-7). According to Locke, truth

may also sometimes be the sustaining of an attitude, the satisfaction of a way of feeling, the corroboration of a value. To the poet, beauty is truth; to the religious devotee, God is truth; to the enthused moralist, what ought-to-be overtops factual reality (Locke, 1935: 37).

The experimentalist fallacy, on the other hand, is to apply just *one* account of truth, drawn from the natural sciences, to *all* areas.²⁸ The experimentalist looks for objectivity not in the actual processes of valuation, but in “the confirmations of experience or the affirmations of evaluative judgements” (Locke, 1935: 38).²⁹

Interestingly, Locke's concern here is in some sense shared by James. James

continually suggests that philosophy should aim to account not just for intellectual needs, or scientific validity, but also for aesthetic, moral, and practical needs.³⁰ Any philosophy that suggests that only questions of science or logic are answerable will be seen as deficient on James's account. Nonetheless, James sticks to his claim that aesthetic, moral, and religious beliefs are tested in experience in a way analogous to the methodology of the natural sciences. And he does so by broadening the notion of experience beyond the physical. James's radical empiricism is rooted in the claim that everything that is real must be experienceable, and that everything experienceable is real (1904, ERE: 22). This includes religious, aesthetic, and moral experiences. So, James has a broad enough notion of inquiry, and of experience, to avoid Locke's concerns about the experimentalist method. James's experimentalism means nothing more than the notion that we should treat our various ideals and beliefs as hypotheses to be tested against our own experience, and that of humanity as a whole, and that we should be open to their alteration in the face of relevant experience. This account does not seem to narrow the kinds of things which can be seen as real or true in the way which worries Locke.

§4. LOYALTY

The third challenge for developing a non-anarchic relativism is “loyalty”. Whilst being tolerant of values different from our own, we must also be able to find our *own* personal and cultural values meaningful. First and foremost, our values are calls to interpretation and action. Any relativism which abandons the feeling that our own values are meaningful and motivating will essentially lead to nihilism and indifference. This is what Locke believes anarchic relativism, with its “everything goes” approach to value, leads to. Absolutism, on the other hand, maintains that our own values are meaningful and motivating, but only at the expense of dogmatically denying *other* people's values as worthwhile. Locke's own relativism aims for a middle ground: “[it] contradicts value dogmatism and counteracts value bigotry without destroying the sense of active value loyalty” (Locke, 1944: 70). This is the claim we will be assessing in this final section.

According to Locke's anti-absolutism, we cannot think of our cultural or personal values as superior to others'. But Locke does not want us to eradicate the loyalty we feel to our own values, but to *reposition* it. Instead of taking the particular forms or symbols of our values as the “centre of value loyalty”, we should instead take as our centre “the goal of maximizing the value-mode itself as an attitude and activity” (Locke, 1935: 48). Whereas the symbol or content of our values might differ, the nature of our valuation, and the role that our values play in our lives and society, might not. “[E]nlightened value loyalty” is the ability to distinguish between the mere “symbol and form” of our different values, and those underlying functional and affective

commonalities which unite them as their “essence and [...] objective” (Locke, 1942: 60).

According to systematic relativism, we ought to hold our values in a “temperate and enlightened” way, seeing them as functionally similar to other people’s superficially dissimilar values. This is meant to prevent us from holding our values with “fanaticism”, “blind loyalty”, and “dogmatic faith” (Locke, 1942: 60). Certainly, value pluralism of this kind can lead to a perceived loss of prestige for our own particular values. We have to abandon the notion that our value system is *the* correct or superior value system. And this value pluralism appears to involve a somewhat diminished enthusiasm for the values of our particular culture. Locke suggests that relativists must “wear [their] group labels and avow [their] cultural loyalties less provocatively” (Locke, 1944: 74). But, in exchange, we move towards an “effective *pax romana* of values, with greater and more permanent eventual gains” (Locke, 1942: 56). More pessimistically, Locke elsewhere tells us that, though this repositioning of our values might be difficult, it becomes much easier when we see that “the only alternative policy is suicidal” (Locke, 1932-4: 137).

Locke aligns this repositioning strategy with Josiah Royce's “Loyalty to Loyalty” notion.³¹ Similarly to Locke, Royce appealed to a functional common denominator in his attempt to solve an apparent paradox regarding the value of loyalty. The paradox which concerned Royce consisted in the fact that being loyal to something was a supreme human good, but that the conflict which arises between different groups who are loyal to different things was the supreme human evil (Royce, 1908: 30-31). The common denominator Royce appealed to was loyalty itself. Each of us sees that loyalty is a common good, and we should reposition our loyalty so that we apprehend the value of “universal loyalty” or “loyalty to loyalty”. Our goal becomes the increase of loyalty in humanity as a whole, and not merely the success of the particular cause we happen to be loyal to. We now serve our individual cause with a view to securing “the greatest possible increase in loyalty amongst men” (Royce, 1908: 121). We then seek a good for all humankind, rather than just ourselves: to “make loyalty triumphant in the lives of all men” (Royce, 1908: 129-30).³²

Locke's move to reposition our value loyalty, then, is again dependent on there being shared common denominators between apparently different values. Our aim, if we are truly loyal to a certain value, should be to increase understanding, diversity, or expression within a certain *type* or *mode* of value. To return to our example of art, the modernist is truly loyal to the *essence* of her value, seeing as she wants to increase the diversity and understanding of aesthetic expression and appreciation. The traditionalist is only loyal to a particular *symbol* of value, a particular notion of Beauty or aesthetic appreciation, and so rejects the progress the modernist represents. Similarly, though I am a Hindu and you are a Christian, we both express exultation of the divine, and so what we are loyal to is essentially the same, even though the external

symbols of our respective faiths are different.³³

Conflicts can still occur, for Locke. But they are conflicts *within* a shared context. For instance, Locke considers two conflicting accounts of the atom: the classical theory and the modern theory. The two objects occupy the same functional role within the same value context, and cannot both be correct. However, appealing to the common functional denominator that each theory is attempting to fulfil, we can see that the modern theory “includes and interprets more observable phenomena”, and so we are confident in calling that theory “truer” (Locke, 1945: 89). In a similar way, we might still discuss whether polytheism or monotheism is the better way to worship the divine. This is still a potential disagreement, but one with a common denominator both sides agree to and refer to. Recognition of a shared essence between the two positions leads to reasonable discourse, whereas the assertion that the different symbols of the different faiths are true leads to unhelpful conflicts. Moreover, assuming one side is not absurdly wrong, any new theory tends to incorporate a “good part of the previous theory” (Locke, 1945: 89).

This is a neat way of solving the problem of value loyalty which Locke’s relativism seems to entail. However, a problem emerges from a Jamesian standpoint, when considering Locke’s reliance on common denominators.

Because Locke seeks to provide an objective account of value, but cannot appeal to any form of realism to do so, Locke makes the commonalities which he identifies *within* our modes of valuing very robust. However, the strength of these commonalities endangers the importance of the difference between cultures. The apparently different values which each culture expresses are either part of the same value mode, or they are not. If they are part of the same value mode, then they are in *essence* the same, though they have different symbols or forms of expression, such as when two people have religious feelings directed towards different deities. If they are not part of the same value mode, then the different values are not in conflict at all, but represent different but compatible approaches to the same object, such as when one person apprehends an object as beautiful, whilst another sees it as morally important. The latter option seems to remove the possibility of saying that one value mode is more appropriate than another in a certain context (§2). The former, James would say, unfairly reduces the individual differences to general commonality. We often find Locke suggesting that apparent differences between cultures are “superficial”, or that the particular symbols associated by a culture with the common value modes is done so “irrationally” (Locke, 1942: 60; 1944: 73; 76).

Seemingly, Locke gains harmony between competing values at the expense of the losing their distinctiveness. Locke may well be correct that there are underlying affective and functional constants beneath our apparently different value claims. But it remains unclear how reorienting our loyalty to these constants maintains the

meaning of our personal and cultural values, if we simultaneously hold their distinctiveness to be at best irrelevant and at worst irrational.

So, if we cannot reorient our loyalty to common affective and functional constants, how *are* we to overcome conflicts in value on James's account of value pluralism? According to James, we do so by seeing ourselves as engaged in a common epistemic project of discovering what the right and most inclusive system of goods really is (James, 1888-9, ML: 184). When we find two ideals which are in conflict, we ask ourselves which "will give the best universe", and this question can only be answered by appeal to our own and other people's experience (James, 1891, WB: 158). Ultimately, through the experience of the human race as a whole, we reach some stable views on what is really good and valuable (James, 1882, WB: 87). Though Locke might suggest that James's turn to realism could allow people to dogmatically assert their own ideals as true, James would insist that we hold our values as limited and fallible hypotheses. When we recognise that we are engaged in a communal inquiry into value, and we acknowledge our own individual limitations, and the fact that "the truth is too great for any one actual mind" to cognize, then we are lead to the "practical consequence" that other hypotheses should be seen as equally reasonable, and should be tolerated and respected, if inquiry is to proceed (James, 1899, TT: 4).³⁴ As such, differences in values are supposed to be no more problematic than the differences in scientific hypotheses. It with an appeal to a very broad notion of scientific inquiry, then, that James aims to avoid the dogmatism which Locke assumes goes along with realism.³⁵

One immediate problem arises from such an account. The necessary detachment which appears to be required for us hold our own ideals as fallible hypotheses detracts from their motivational force. We are not moved to verify a hypothesis in the same way as we are moved to appreciate music, right an injustice, or worship a deity. We might be able to alleviate this concern somewhat by spelling out what James means by a "hypothesis". The first thing to say is that James thinks that hypotheses, even in scientific contexts, are adopted (in part) as a result of passional, personal, cultural, and temperamental factors, which make some option appear more plausible or "live" to us.³⁶ This will be especially true in the aesthetic, religious, and moral case. The second thing to say is that James thinks that every hypothesis comes with "a fever of desire for verification" (1880, WB: 186). Thus, seeing something as a hypothesis *itself* generates motivation to act according to it, and so discover evidence for or against its validity. As such, James can provide an account of why we maintain our loyalty to our particular values, and how they maintain motivational force, whilst still holding them to be fallible hypotheses.

According to James, then, our ideals and values are hypotheses about the world, and are amenable to alteration in the face of relevant experience. We can be right or wrong in our assertions that certain ideals, practices, habits, or institutions are valuable. We

need to be aware of the consequences of acting under them, we need to be responsive to the experiences which tell us whether they are valuable in the right ways, and we need to allow other people to express equally plausible hypotheses about value.

§5. CONCLUSION

Locke offers any account of value pluralism three challenges. For pluralism not to devolve into mere anarchic relativism, it must provide an adequate account of normativity, objectivity, and loyalty, whilst avoiding absolutism. We've looked at two attempts to do so: Locke's own systematic relativism, and James's pragmatic pluralism. Despite Locke's claim that James represents an anarchic relativist position, we've seen a great number of similarities between the two thinkers, with one major difference: though James is happy to appeal to a limited realism, Locke holds that any such appeal leads to dogmatism.

Any Jamesian account of value has a great deal to learn from Locke's systematic relativism. Locke provides a structured account of an affective, pluralistic axiology, effectively articulates what such an axiology requires, and presents the problems which must face it. Locke attempts to answer these problems by appealing to common affective and functional constants which lie behind apparently different claims about value. His appeals to cases of trans-valuation, his careful analysis of pluralism and relativism, and his affective account of normativity, are all things which the Jamesian can learn from. However, I have suggested that any attempt to locate normativity *solely* in feeling limits such a theory. Without our valuational feelings being responsive to something outside of themselves (though not outside of experience) and our cultural norms, we cannot fully account for why certain evaluative moods appropriately apply to certain situations and not to others. Without our values having some kind of reference to a reality outside of them, James contends, they become a mere "game of private theatricals", unable to be considered motivational or meaningful.³⁷

To meet the three challenges to pluralism which Locke sets, the Jamesian account appeals to a modest form of realism. We do not need to think of this realism in a strong sense (as our values being *in* the world), but we must think that our values are responsive to objective features of the world, and we must think that communal inquiry can lead us to truer beliefs about what is valuable. I have not defended this realism here. But I have suggested that any value pluralism which wants to meet the three criteria which Locke sets out must appeal to something like Jamesian realism.³⁸

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² Cf. James (1909, PU: 20).

³ See work by David Lamberth (esp. 1997) for detailed analysis of James's "social analogy". Speaking of Alain Locke, and cultural pluralism more generally, Horace Kallen also presents a social analogy. For Kallen, however, the relevant difference between monism and pluralism was not the difference between democracy and authoritarianism, but between "brotherhood" and "friendship". Monists often refer to the *brotherhood* of man, but this word carries the "implication of identical beginning and common end". For Kallen, brotherhood is a relationship defined by identity at the expense of difference. This relationship says: "so that you become completely a brother, you must offer up your own different being to be digested into identification with mine". On the other hand, friendship is a relationship defined by difference. The friend says "I am different from you. You are different from me. The basis of our communion is our difference. Let us exchange the fruits of our differences so that each may enrich the other with what the other is not or has not in himself" (Kallen 1957: 120-1).

⁴All references to Alain Locke's works are taken from Leonard Harris's edited collection *The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond* (1989). References will follow this convention: (Author, date originally written: page).

⁵ Cf. Locke (1942: 55) for an instance of Locke's attribution of value anarchism to James. According to Harris (1989: 32; cf. 95), this is Locke's consistent position.

⁶ Stickers (1999) presents an additional difference between Locke and James. For James, Stickers argues, pluralism was *intrinsically* valuable, something to be celebrated for "the sheer aesthetic enjoyment of difference". For Locke, on the other hand, pluralism was *instrumentally* valuable, as "a means to create a world in which we can all somehow get along peacefully" (Stickers, 1999: 213). This is not a difference I have time to address in this paper. It would be incorrect, I think, to suggest that James was not also aware of the instrumental importance of pluralism. But it is quite right to indicate a tendency in James to see difference, novelty, and diversity as valuable *in itself* in a way that deserves separate investigation.

⁷ Cf. Carter (2012, §2.4) for a detailed overview of Locke's taxonomy of value.

⁸ Cf. Locke (1945: 85).

⁹ Cf. Locke (1945: 84).

¹⁰ Radical empiricism holds that we cannot appeal to anything outside of experience, nor ignore anything within experience (James, 1904, ERE: 22). Applied to value theory, we can see Locke's "affective theory" being a natural result. James's own "affective" approach to (moral) value is attempted in his "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (James, 1891, WB: 141-162).

¹¹ Locke might be able to appeal to features of the cultural environment to ground the appropriateness of certain feeling- or value-modes within particular situations. After all, our practices of valuation always take place against a particular cultural background. If this is right, then Locke would still allow me to judge my neighbour's religious reverence for garden fences, and the insensitive person's lack of moral response to a situation, as inappropriate within a particular culture. But this would seem to merely push the concern back, unless we can appeal to objective features of a situation which make this cultural consensus non-arbitrary. We can see the problem in Locke's own examination of a moral conflict between two cultures. His example comes from a play by the Soviet playwright Korneichuk. In this play, an ancient Inuit tradition obliges a son to kill his father at a certain age. This tradition has emerged from the fact that the elderly represented a problem in the harsh nomadic society of traditional Inuit culture, though Locke notes that this practice has since become "obsolescent". In the play, a young Inuit man has travelled to a Soviet training camp, and has returned with a conflicting moral system, in which parricide is seen as abhorrent. When his traditional culture demands that he kill his father, the young man feels the conflict of two systems of moral duty. Rather than saying, as we might expect him

to, that the obligation emerging from the traditional set of values is now incorrect, invalid, or inappropriate, given the objective features of the situation, Locke in fact says that “each was imperatively right in the context of its own appropriate system”, that the old tradition was right “on its own level”, and that both sides represented normative and coercive “truths” which were in conflict (Locke, 1945: 87-88). Without the capacity to refer to anything outside of feeling or cultural norms, there is no non-arbitrary way of deciding which system is appropriate in a given situation.

¹² Locke makes this claim throughout “Values and Imperatives” (1935). In the aesthetic sphere, Locke approvingly quotes Herbert E. Cory’s suggestion that “anything animate or inanimate, natural or artificial, deed or doer, may be the object [of aesthetic value]” (Cory, 1926: 396, quoted by Locke, 1935: 40). In the moral sphere, Locke suggests that we replace the “pragmatic” idea that we recognise a situation as moral when we experience a conflict of goods, with the idea that a feeling of tension induces a “moral attitude towards the situation, *irrespective of content*” (Locke, 1935: 41, emphasis mine). And when discussing trans-valuation, Locke once again makes the claim that a change in attitude produces a change in value-type “*irrespective of content*” (Locke, 1935: 44).

¹³ It might be contended that James’s criticism here begs the question against Locke. Locke holds that feeling-modes such as *exultation* bring with them norms of interpretation and action which are inherently motivational. James holds that if we found out that such feelings had no reference to an objective world, then they would cease to be motivating. Ultimately, determining which view is correct might be a matter for empirical psychology.

¹⁴ The Lockean might be concerned that James steers a little too close to absolutism with his talk of objective outward duties. This concern might be alleviated somewhat by emphasising that, for James, any moral claims are to be treated as fallible hypotheses, revisable in the face of future experience. However, this hypothetical account of value comes with its own set of motivational problems, which we shall examine in the final section (§4).

¹⁵ It is worth noting that this anti-realism is not a necessary result of Locke’s pluralist project. We can suggest that our feelings are responsive to certain elements of a situation, without suggesting that only *one* value-mode is an appropriate response. This pluralistic realism would not be at odds with Locke’s larger project. It is also worth noting that Locke himself did not see values as motivationally inert in the way that James’s criticism contends. Locke himself was keen to challenge problematic social institutions, and often did so through arguing that certain values were more effective at promoting democracy, cosmopolitanism, or cultural pluralism. Therefore, Locke seems reject in his own practice the indifferentism that his value theory, if the Jamesian criticism is correct, would lead to. I am grateful to Jacoby Carter for pressing me on this point.

¹⁶ Or “cultural cognates” on the cultural level (Locke, 1944: 73).

¹⁷ See Carter (2012, §4) for a detailed examination of these three cultural “corollaries” of systematic relativism.

¹⁸ Given the time that Locke was writing, it would be easy to interpret his warnings about absolutism as referring to the explicitly fascist movements of the time. But this would miss the true force of his criticism. Locke is insistent that an ostensibly democratic society can be authoritarian in the way he is concerned about, if instead of recognising essential features of commonality between cultures, they insisted on a conformity of democratic institutions. Cf. Locke (1942: 53ff).

¹⁹ “The various ideals have *no common character* apart from the fact that they are ideals” (James, 1891, WB: 153, emphasis mine).

²⁰ See Stern and Williams (forthcoming) for more detail about this example. Lamberth (2014) has recently done an excellent job of elaborating what I take to be James’s pluralistic meta-philosophy.

²¹ Cf. James (1907, P: 144; 1909, PU: 139).

²² Cf. James (1907, P: 133-142; 1909, PU: 141).

²³ In fact, pragmatism does seem to somewhat restrict the content of what it sees as legitimate philosophical projects. Certain philosophical projects, namely those which have no experientially testable conclusions, will necessarily be rejected as meaningless according to the pragmatic maxim.

²⁴ Locke will agree that all opinions emerge in historical and cultural contexts, but deny that we should

see them as results of experimentation.

²⁵ Cf. James (1897, WB: 8)

²⁶ Fraser (1999) indicates a third criticism, not made by Locke, but made through him. She suggests that the American pragmatism of Peirce, James, Dewey, and even Jane Addams, is too abstract and intellectualised, and that Locke's pragmatism is based on a concrete understanding on inequality, power, domination, and race relations (cf. Fraser 1999: 4-5).

²⁷ It is unlikely that James himself was the target of this criticism, but that Locke was directing it at the more positivistic thinkers who followed James. However, in protecting James from the accusation of anarchic relativism, I am claiming that James appeals to a realism which could potentially be criticised in the same way.

²⁸ Harris analyses these kinds of claims as a rejection of the "epistemological privilege" of inquiry based on the scientific method, and fleshes this out with an example of statistical research in social sciences: "It is not that statistics are of no use in understanding social change for Locke, but that the 'inner' life of the human experience moves forward in advance of statistical research and in ways not capturable by our predictive powers" (Harris 1988: 73).

²⁹ There are places in which Locke seems to indicate more sympathy to an approach to value which was analogous to science. In "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" (1942), for instance, Locke suggests that because "common denominator values" are confirmed by "common human experience", that their justification would "not be so very different from the accepted scientific criterion of proof – confirmable invariability in concrete human experience". He goes on to say that values would be held by the pluralist in a "selective" "tentative" and "revisionist" fashion, akin to the methodology of science. However, Locke stops short of suggesting that *truth* can be reached through such a method, suggesting that "[v]alue assertion would thus be a tolerant assertion of preference" (1942: 56-7). Preferences do not seem like the kind of thing which are truth-apt. For Locke, "correctness" is the method of evaluation within the logical sphere, but not the moral, religious or aesthetic sphere.

³⁰ Cf. James (1909, PU: 55).

³¹ Locke saw Royce's idea as "nothing more or less than a vindication of the principle of unity in diversity carried out to a practical degree of spiritual reciprocity" (Locke, 1932-4: 137).

³² Stikkers summarises this notion of Royce's, with attention to its similarity with Locke's, in the following way:

I come to recognise the loyalty of my neighbor as 'structurally equivalent' to my own – not necessarily equivalent in content – and out of that recognition there may grow a loyalty to an idea of loyalty, which I, my neighbor, and even my enemy might come to share. But loyalty to universal human loyalty through loyalty to loyalty must be grounded first in some particular loyalty, lest it become too abstract, vague and hollow (Stikkers, 1999: 215).

See also (Green, 1999: 88).

³³ See MacMullan (2005: 132) for a similar example, and Carter (2010: 228-229) for discussion.

³⁴ Cf. James (1899, TT: 150-151).

³⁵ James could be accused of having an overly optimistic account of communal inquiry here. Though this view may have been plausible to James, living and writing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it might appear far less plausible to Locke, living and writing in the 1930s and 40s, especially considering their respective backgrounds. As Suckiel notes, in response to James's claim that the "cries of the wounded" will soon inform us when we have gone wrong in moral inquiry:

[James's] view [...] appears to be that if those members of society who are being unjustly treated would only make their demands known with sufficient clarity, then social arrangements will be changed to accommodate them. A glimpse of social history, however, shows that there is little reason to expect this to be true. The powerless may

complain exceedingly and in great numbers, but this in itself often has been shown to provide little motive for social betterment on behalf of those in control (Suckiel, 1982: 68; cf. James 1891, WB: 158).

At the very least, James's picture requires being supplemented by an account of the kind of vested power imbalances which can prevent disadvantaged groups from participating in communal inquiry.

³⁶ Cf. James (1896, WB: 18-9).

³⁷ Cf. James (1895, WB: 55).

³⁸ This paper is an expanded version of one presented at the 2015 *SIAP Conference* in Dublin, and at the *Second European Pragmatism Conference* held in Paris the same year. I would like to thank Christopher Hookway, Robert Stern, and Jacoby Adeshei Carter for reading and commenting on previous versions of this paper.