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Forecast-Based Interference: Modelling Multicore Interference from Observable Factors

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ABSTRACT

While there is significant interest in the use of COTS multicore platforms for Real-time Systems, there has been very little in terms of practical methods to calculate the interference multiplier (i.e., the increase in execution time due to interference) between tasks on such systems. COTS multicore platforms present two distinct challenges: first, the variable interference between tasks competing for shared resources such as cache, and secondly the complexity of the hardware mechanisms and policies used, which may result in a system which is very difficult if not impossible to analyse; assuming that the exact details of the hardware are even disclosed! This paper proposes a new technique, Forecast-Based Interference analysis, which mitigates both of these issues by combining measurement-based techniques with statistical techniques and forecast modelling to enable the prediction of an interference multiplier for a given set of tasks, in an automated and reliable manner. The combination of execution times and interference multipliers can be used both in the design, e.g. for specifying timing watchdogs, and analysis, e.g. verifying schedulability.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The main driver of change in real-time computing systems is the movement towards faster and cheaper platforms. Partly driven by practical limits on processor clock speeds, there is a shift to multicore platforms, where two or more processor cores concurrently execute instructions while sharing a number of resources. The transition to multicore systems has resulted in a well-known problem: interference between tasks. Interference between multiple cores occurs when they compete for the same resource. Interference is especially problematic as the amount of interference generated by a contender task may not be specified or may be highly variable, and may not be bounded. Hence there are cases where traditional techniques, such as measurement based analysis, are incapable of giving useful results. For example, in the development of a system, not all tasks may be implemented, and as such the current state-of-the-art measurement-based analysis is incapable of giving any information about the effects of interference from currently unimplemented tasks. Therefore, in the case that due to the phased development of software not all contender tasks are available upon completion of the task under analysis, the measurement based analysis is not useful which makes incremental timing verification impossible. This is important in that if testing could be carried out on tasks as they become available, these tests could determine probable bounds on their resource usage, and this, in turn, could be used to shape the development of the unavailable tasks and reduce the likelihood of problems once they are integrated into the complete system.

The use of Common Off-The-Shelf (COTS) platforms presents an additional challenge: the surrender of control over hardware. When using specially designed real-time platforms, e.g. the avionic systems platform described by Law [13], a number of features could be implemented to aid the computation of timing behaviours. As the name implies, COTS processors may not have these features, limiting the applicability of techniques and in some cases may implement schemes which are unknown due to manufacturers wishing to obscure the details of their platform from competitors for the sake of protecting their intellectual property. Therefore classes of techniques, such as static WCET analysis [29], single-core equivalence [16], and multicore response time analysis [2], which rely on fully understanding the properties of the system under analysis become infeasible. Further, even in the case where hardware does have the requisite features, the real-time properties of such schemes may not work as expected. One example of this is cache partitioning [25]. Cache partitioning is implemented by restricting the ability of concurrently running tasks to utilise the entire shared cache. As the tasks no longer contend for space in the cache, the interference
is reduced. However, recently it has been shown by Farshchi et al. [20] that even with cache partitioning in place, it is still possible for cache related competition to occur, and for the effects of this competition to be significant. Indeed, Farshchi et al. showed that competition for cache miss status holding registers can cause a slowdown of up to twenty times, demonstrating that even when interference is mitigated there still exists the possibility of large and unpredictable effects from tasks running on other cores.

In light of these observations, there is a strong argument that approaches reliant on either completely understanding or completely mitigating multicore interference are at best difficult to apply to COTS platforms, and at worst impossible. As it is not desirable to return to the higher costs and lower performance of specialist or customised real-time processors, a different approach is required to characterise multicore interference. At this stage, black box techniques, such as statistical methods [15] appear to be free of these limitations. Unfortunately, the black box techniques used to date tend to be univariate which leads to a significant limitation; whilst they may be able to determine if a property of a system holds, they do not work as well when the system is not completely defined. For example, in the implementation of a system, different teams may be tasked with implementing different subsystems. Each team of implementers will want to be able to test their component in isolation to ensure that it will work on the finished system, but black box testing is only capable of determining properties relating to the interference between tasks when all tasks are present. Therefore, it is impossible for each team of implementers to guarantee that their component will work in the finished system, which complicates development and testing. If these issues were addressed by some form of an intermediate model, this would open the door to effective parallel development and compositional analysis, where different components developed in parallel have temporal properties that interact in a well-defined manner. In addition, the model would allow the designers to consider how the impact of interference could be reduced, not only in magnitude but also the degree of variability.

We conclude there are hard real-time systems for which there is no real method to understand their detailed timing behaviour. Instead multi-variate statistical verification that relates the inflation in execution times to the platform and software factors that cause it must be used to determine the validity of the system, and give guarantees about its timing properties. As the critical definition of real-time systems is that the timeliness of an answer impacts the correctness of a system, one can argue that it is not necessary to fully understand the method by which a worst-case execution time estimate is obtained, provided that sufficient statistical testing can be carried out to validate its accuracy. This opens up the possibility that Deep Learning algorithms can be used to compute components of the execution time, such as multicore interference, where the state of the art is unable to do so using traditional methods. The key difference to more traditional neural networks is that Deep Learning uses many more layers that allow the resulting network to represent the systems in a hierarchical fashion. From a timing perspective, this means the network can automatically separately learn the behaviour of parts of the system corresponding to when significant effects occur (e.g. preemption from a new task, effectively resulting in a cache flush) and then for each of these significant effects a more detailed model is separately established. The overall network is an ensemble of the collection of effects (significant or otherwise). The Deep Learning’s hierarchy in effect gives a divide and conquer approach allowing detailed models to be established and learned without confusion from un-related events. Our initial assessments showed Deep Learning to be much more effective than a holistic traditional neural network approach. A similar trend has been found in other domains, e.g. [8, 26].

1.1 Contribution
To take advantage of the observation that Deep Learning with statistical guarantees is an appropriate approach for a number of hard real-time systems, a new type of analysis is proposed. The purpose of this analysis is not to determine the single-core Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) estimate for a task executed in isolation as this can be calculated using existing techniques such as those based on search-based techniques [13], static analysis [29], Extreme Value Theory [5], and commercial measurement-based tools such as Raptime [24]. Instead, this paper is specifically concerned with calculating how the execution time of the task may be inflated by interferences from tasks sharing resources in a multi-core context. The intention is that the analysis provides a parameterised model of the interference so that a worst-case interference multiplier can be determined without restrictions on resource usage, the interference multiplier can be tightened if the sharing of resources is controlled (e.g. by limiting the number of accesses to a shared bus by each task), and where tasks do have restrictions on their use of shared resources then their usage can be verified as appropriate.

![Figure 1: Overview of FBI Analysis](image-url)

Illustrated in Figure 1, the proposed technique, Forecast Based Interference (FBI) analysis, takes both execution times and observations made on the task under analysis. The observations are used to characterise the interference from a set of synthetic contender tasks. By applying techniques from forecasting [17] and Deep Learning [3, 7], FBI analysis constructs an FBI model of the task which provides a mapping between observed rates of interference and the effect of that interference on the execution time of the task under analysis. The resulting FBI model can be queried with the parameters given for the system as it will be deployed to find an appropriate interference multiplier. As Deep Learning is used to construct the model, no attempt is made to
understand how the model works; instead, statistical testing on an unseen data set is used to determine the accuracy of the model to the required level of confidence. Finally, the interference multiplier can be applied to a single-core WCET estimate (obtained by any appropriate method) to derive a multicore WCET estimate for the given level of interference. To the best of our knowledge, the construction and deployment of such a model has not been accomplished before. The primary advantage of FBI analysis is that it makes few assumptions about processor features or behaviours, instead relying only on features such as Performance Monitoring Counters (PMC) commonly found in COTS hardware.

In addition to the usage outlined above, the FBI model is versatile enough to support alternative uses. For example, one can use the FBI model to find the maximum possible interference that could be observed (by means of search on the model). A second example is the use of the FBI model to facilitate parallel or incremental development by including the maximum level of interference a subsystem may generate as part of the specification of the subsystem. In this case, even though there may be no available observations for the actual co-running tasks, the model is capable of giving a prediction about their effects. If hardware or software support is available, these bounds could also be enforced by a control mechanism (e.g., throttling), which would give further confidence in the results at the expense of additional overheads.

1.2 Related Work

Radojković et al. [23] provide an empirical evaluation of the effects of interference from contender tasks. While the COTS processor chosen is not common for real-time applications, they demonstrate that there are a wide variety of factors which can have a substantial impact on the execution time of a task. This confirms that any WCET analysis of a multicore system must take into account any factors which have not been controlled for. Recent work by Yun et al. [30] has provided an accurate, multicore model of the memory subsystem of a COTS processor. In addition to demonstrating the complexity of COTS hardware, this work also shows that there is a significant gap between the theoretical worst-case performance of a system and what can be observed given a set of contender tasks.

Forecasting [17] is the name given to the family of techniques used to predict information about events which have not yet been observed. There are many different types of forecasting, but all rely on the same principle: constructing a forecast model of the system under study which can be used to predict how the system will behave under unobserved conditions. In the field of real-time systems, Zheng [31] applied linear regression techniques to relate the amount of resource accesses (obtained via the PMCs) to the inflation in the execution times caused by the accesses; however, in our experience, a linear relationship does not hold for most tasks and platforms. Griffin et al. [9] employed forecasting to determine information about the behaviour of tasks when their execution time budgets were exceeded, by constructing a model based on the observed behaviour of the tasks’ execution times. While Griffin et al.’s work focused on the technique of extrapolation, this paper employs Deep Learning Neural Networks (DLNNs) [19], a machine learning approach capable of learning sophisticated patterns in data and making predictions based on these learned patterns. One of the benefits of this approach is that it is more capable of handling multivariate models, as opposed to extrapolation which is better suited to univariate problems.

Multicore interference and its effect on the WCET of a task has been explored in work by Paolieri et al. [22] who describe the IA3 algorithm. IA3 is an interference aware multicore resource allocation algorithm which allows for each task to have multiple WCETs, depending on the amount of interference generated by co-running tasks. In evaluating their algorithm, Paolieri et al. attempt to find the worst case interference by using synthetic contenders which access shared resources as frequently as possible. For the platform used in [21], this is a reasonable assumption, it leaves open the question of how the approach can be extended to COTS platforms where the worst case interference is non-trivial to find.

1.3 Organisation

Section 2 provides detail on the new approach, FBI analysis. An evaluation on the test platform is carried out in Section 3, which includes publicly available synthetic benchmarks as well as an industrial case study. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.

2 FBI ANALYSIS

The goal of FBI analysis is to create a black box model which can map between a set of easily observable PMCs and their effect on the interference suffered by a task. As path data is not used, the model must be capable of handling information from various paths through the task. The length of an execution path impacts the number of observed interference events during execution, whereas event rates are comparable even if the execution time of distinct paths differs. Hence, the model is described as taking the rate at which the observed PMCs change and finding an interference multiplier which can be applied to a single core execution time estimate to produce a multicore execution time estimate which is valid for the given rates of interference. However the model is constructed, it must be able to handle complex features in the data set. If the model is too simple, it will not be able to handle features such as discontinuities in the effects of interference [19]. These effects are likely to be caused by how different paths of a task react to interference and are thus relatively common.

As with any measurement-based technique, the execution time of a job is a critical piece of information to gather. To support interference analysis (including for multi-core) it is also required that observations are made which capture data on the events that occur on the cores of the platform during the job’s execution; for this work, we utilise the PMCs which most modern processors possess [11, 27]. While PMCs are primarily used in applications such as compiler optimisation, the information they expose can be used to characterise the use of shared resources [6]. For example, PMCs indicating cache misses signify an access to main memory over the shared bus. As each core is able to write to its own PMCs, it is possible to use PMCs to obtain a characterisation of each core’s use of shared resources. Using PMCs in this way does present some problems: however: there are typically more PMCs available than physical registers in which they can be stored [11, 27], and so the selection of PMCs is critical. If the PMCs used for the analysis do not correspond to useful interference effects then any analysis based on
these metrics would be inaccurate (either pessimistic or optimistic). Further, while it can be inferred that there is some relation between the PMCs and the execution time of the analysed tasks, for this to be useful an analysis technique based on these PMCs must define this relationship.

2.1 Overview

FBI analysis consists of five principal stages. The first two of these stages have already been presented in detail in [14]. They are therefore summarised below in sufficient depth to understand the other three stages and the evaluation.

1. **Initial Data Collection**: Data collection is carried out by testing the task of interest on a multicore platform against contender tasks and capturing as many performance counters as possible in addition to execution times. All measurements are made using end-to-end runs of the task; there is no requirement to collect data at any intermediate point during execution. Further details on this step are given in Section 2.2.

2. **PMC Selection**: While in traditional machine learning approaches as much data as possible would be used, the practical reality is that available PMCs are limited and repeating tests to capture the effects of a wider range of PMCs would be expensive. Therefore, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique is applied to identify correlated PMCs along the axes of the Principal Components (PCs) of the gathered data. Using the information in the principal components, a set of PMCs are chosen. Details on this step are given in Section 2.4.

3. **Main Data Collection**: Once the representative PMCs have been identified, the main data collection is carried out only collecting measurements from the PMCs selected by PCA as well as execution times. Again, the measurements required are end-to-end measurements of the task running against contender tasks. As this is a restricted form of the initial data gathering step, the details are the same as given in Section 2.2.

4. **Modelling**: Using the data gathered in the main data collection stage, multiple forecast models are constructed using automated modelling to determine the effect of interferences on the task, which are expressed as a multiplier. As these models are constructed using DLNNs, additional precautions have to be taken against accepting models which are not accurate on a portion of the domain; this is accomplished by the creation of multiple models which are used to implement Ensemble Modelling [19]. Additional details are given in Section 2.5.

5. **Trust**: Once the model has been created, it is necessary to determine the trustworthiness of the model. This is accomplished by evaluating its forecast accuracy against unseen experimental data, which yields both a margin for error and the statistical confidence that this margin represents an upper bound on the interference effects. This is described in Section 2.6.

It is important to note that every stage of the process is dependent on the task and platform being analysed, e.g. one task may make more use of data than another task which mainly accesses devices. Therefore all of the above five steps in the process have to be repeated for each combination of the task under analysis and the platform.

2.2 Data Collection - Initial and Main

As the FBI approach relies on detailed task-level instrumentation, it is necessary to define the precise requirements. In addition to the execution time of the analysed task, it is also necessary to collect other metrics in order to establish links between observed events and their impact on the execution time. In order to accomplish this, the PMCs which the hardware platform exposes are utilised. PMCs allow for counts of specific events, e.g. cache misses or pipeline stalls, which can then be used as a proxy for the actual level of interference between tasks at a high level. For example, a high level of cache misses, but only when running against a task contending for the cache, is indicative of a high level of cache-related interference.

Initially, all PMCs must be captured. The platform used, the Infineon AURIX [11], is representative of the typical problem faced: the AURIX, like many real-world systems, is incapable of capturing all PMCs simultaneously as there are only a limited number of registers available for PMC use. In order to combat this, tasks were run multiple times with the same inputs, capturing different PMCs on each run. As the traces for identical runs produce different results, due to interference from uncontrollable sources (e.g. physical instability in the chip, uninitialised values when the chip is powered on), it was necessary to find the level of error that this approach introduces. This was accomplished by monitoring a particular reference performance counter whilst a specific set of inputs were repeatedly applied to the system. Each time a set of inputs was repeated, the other performance counters monitored different PMCs and the errors were assessed. The error was the difference in what the reference performance counter reported for a given set of inputs. The error was found to be minimal (< 5%). Further, the Wald-Wolfowitz [28] test was employed, which confirmed that the error observed could be reasonably characterised as random noise, and therefore the error would not introduce systematic failings [28]. In practice, these tests only need to be carried out once per platform, and therefore once these properties have been verified, instrumentation can be fully automated.

Data collection must observe the effects of competition from contending tasks. These contending tasks could be the actual tasks competing for resources when the system is deployed. However, for the reasons previously discussed, there are a number of situations where these tasks cannot be used (e.g. the tasks have not been developed yet). As such, FBI analysis uses synthetic contenders which are held in and executed from main memory. Unlike in previous work [22], where synthetic contenders were used to create an assumed worst-case scenario, the synthetic contenders used in FBI analysis must be able to exercise resources at varying rates of interference. The contenders are designed to exercise the shared resources over the range of values of interest, i.e. to systematically exercise the resource to give a good quality model. For example, a synthetic contender task may access shared
memory every $N$ cycles, and the shared bus every $M$ cycles. The values of $M$ and $N$ are stepped through the desired range of the model. We note that the resulting model is only valid for this range. In this paper, synthetic contenders are used which exercise shared memory at a controlled rate; as all tasks under consideration are run from the scratchpad with the generated data being stored in shared memory, this satisfies the condition that all sources of contention can be exercised at different interference levels. In this framework, varying and exercising interferences relies on the synthetic contenders. In the absence of scratchpad, instruction memory layers, e.g. Flash or cache, could be additional sources of interference and would need to be observed under different interference configurations to apply the analysis. More details on the implementation of the contenders for the AURIX platform can be found in [14].

### 2.3 Evaluation Platform

To illustrate the difficulty in capturing all sources of execution variability caused by interference, a brief description of the platform used in this paper, the Infineon AURIX Tricore [11] is given. The AURIX is a platform designed for use in real-time automotive systems and has a number of features to facilitate reliable computation. However, as the AURIX is designed to host multiple tasks, with different requirements, the three processor cores of the AURIX each have different capabilities, suited to their intended roles. These capabilities are as follows:

- **Core 0**: Energy Efficient Tricore 1.6E.
- **Core 1**: High Performance Tricore 1.6P.
- **Core 2**: High Performance Tricore 1.6P.

Each core has access to a crossbar which connects a 472KB SRAM unit, 4MB of flash memory, and any external peripherals. Further details about the processor cores, such as local cache or scratchpad configurations, are not publicly available, which complicates any analysis which requires this knowledge. Inter-core interference is typically caused by contested accesses to one of the external resources; for example, if two cores access the flash memory simultaneously they will contend as the flash cannot serve multiple requests simultaneously.

Each core also exposes its own 12 PMCs (9 in the case of Core 0), which have the capability to monitor performance metrics such as cache hits/misses and pipeline stalls. The PMC configuration on different cores are independent; however, each core only has 3 registers to monitor its PMCs. Further, each individual PMC on a core can only be mapped onto a single register, and so not all combinations of 3 PMCs may be monitored simultaneously. For example, it is impossible to monitor the number of hits for both the instruction and data caches of Core 1 simultaneously.

In the best case, to capture data on all PMCs of the AURIX, it would be necessary to run each test four times, which is undesirable in that it increases the amount of testing that is required of the user. While it is possible to run experiments four times to gather all data for this platform, other platforms expose far more PMCs which makes gathering all PMC data infeasible (e.g. the P4080 platform [27] exposes approximately 128 PMCs, with 4 registers per core, and would require each experiment to be repeated 32 times). There is also a need to remove PMCs which do not contribute to the analysis, as the use of low-quality PMCs can result in poor quality models; for example, a computationally heavy task may not fetch much data, and therefore the number of data cache hits does not provide any useful information for analysis of such a task.

The PMCs exposed by the AURIX platform cannot monitor the number of accesses to the crossbar or each resource in isolation, e.g. accesses to shared variables bypass the cache and thus neither hit nor miss. The maximum latency suffered by accesses to specific resources, e.g. as a result of arbitration between concurrent accesses, is also unclear. This limits the application of approaches such as $IA^3$ [22] which rely on those two values to incorporate the contribution of interferences into WCET analysis.

Taking these points into account, it can be argued that it is desirable, and at times necessary, to reduce the number of PMCs to a smaller and more manageable set, and rely on existing observable events to build an understanding of the impact of interferences. However, without prior knowledge of the usefulness of PMCs, it is necessary to build a small dataset with all PMCs in order to determine their usefulness. To this end, the next section details an automatic PMC selection phase, which uses Principal Component Analysis to find a set of PMCs which are capable of representing the variability in the data.

### 2.4 PMC Selection

The literature on statistical methods refers to techniques for reducing the number of dimensions, PMCs in our case, as either *dimensionality reduction* or *feature selection*. The goal for this step is to identify the PMCs which are correlated, and then select a set of representative PMCs which can be captured in a single trace while still describing the majority of variability in the data. While it is inevitable that some detail in the data will be lost at this stage, the reduction in the amount of effort required to get a single data point enables more data to be collected, which in turn increases the amount of data used in the forecast model, and therefore the accuracy of the predictions made.

In order to accomplish this, the technique of **Principal Component Analysis** [12] is employed. PCA is a technique which identifies correlations within a dataset by finding the **Principal Components** of the data, with each PC describing the amount of variance attributed to each correlated vector. In the context of this work, an example PC is the number of accesses to a shared bus. Finding which PCs represent the most variance is normally most useful in reducing the complexity of the dataset. For example, if a PC accounts for less than 10% of the variance of the entire dataset, then this can be interpreted as sampling error and thus data along this PC can be ignored. The end goal of PMC selection is to find a small number of easily observable PMCs to measure. This small number is normally dictated by the number of PMCs available on the platform being used. An ILP solver [10] is used to determine the set of PMCs which represent the maximum amount of variance in the data set collected. A detailed evaluation of PMC selection can be found in [14].

One issue that may be encountered as a consequence of PMC selection occurs if poor quality PMCs are selected; this can happen if user constraints prevent high quality PMCs from being selected, or high quality PMCs simply do not exist. That is, there are no significant effects from interference either due to restrictions on
the contenders employed by the user, due to the design the hardware, or of the task itself. However, this does not lead to invalid results: If this is the case then the outcome of the algorithm is that model construction in the next stage of FBI will immediately fail, see section 2.5. The reason is that there will be no link between interference and execution time. Hence one can simply conclude that for the task being evaluated, multicore interference does not impact the execution time; this can occur if, for example, all code and data for the task is consistently cached locally to the core, and therefore unaffected by multicore interference.

2.5 Modelling

Once enough data describing the major variations in the PMCs has been collected, i.e. the previous phase succeeds in selecting PMCs, it can be used to develop forecast models. In this paper, the technique used to construct the model is the TensorFlow Deep Learning Neural Network (DLNN) implementation [7] via the Keras framework [3]; TensorFlow was chosen as it has a proven record of being able to model complex data [7] and has well optimised implementations available. The desired output of these models is a multiplication factor which can be applied to a single-core execution time estimate to give the corresponding execution time estimate in a multi-core environment, subject to a given rate of interference from the contender cores. An important consideration for an analysis technique is that users of the approach are unlikely to appreciate having to repeatedly test the same path through a task under varying rates of interference to obtain an interference multiplier specific to that path. Further, this approach may be unsound, as even if this was carried out for the worst-case path of the task in a single core environment, there is no guarantee that the worst-case path of the task in a multicore environment is the same. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that variability in the execution times of a task may come from the path taken and/or multicore interference, and that there must be a way to distinguish between the two.

FBI analysis does not record the path of the task under analysis but it does have information available about the nature of the resources each path requires via the PMC data of the core under analysis. Hence, by converting the raw PMC data into a rate of change, corresponding to the rate at which the underlying resource is accessed, it is possible to compare the amount of resource each path requires. It is easy to surmise that if two paths differ in length but access resources at the same rate, then the effect of interference is likely to be proportionally the same. Conversely, if paths of the task access shared resources at different rates, then the effect of interference on these paths will be different. Hence, this allows FBI to abstract away some of the issues of multi-path programs.

However, even with this encoding, it can be expected that some issues with multi-path programs remain. Hence, FBI is allowed to select PMCs from the core under analysis, which gives an indication of which path has been taken. For example, a similarity in the number of cache misses suggests whether the same path is being executed. This means that FBI is capable of incorporating the difference between path execution times into the interference multiplier if required, allowing the technique to handle cases when the encoding of the problem does not fully remove the differences between multiple paths.

The next step is to calculate the interference multipliers; these are defined to be the ratio between the execution time and the low watermark observed. This provides a sound approximation of the actual interference multipliers, and so can be used to provide information to the algorithm. As the technique uses machine learning, it is capable of handling the case when the lowest execution time is not observed, and will predict an interference multiplier lower than 1.

In order to accomplish the actual forecasting, DLNNs [3, 7] are employed. As seen in Figure 2, DLNNs can be trained to learn a function using input/output data for that function. In this case, the input data to the function is provided as the interference rates (derived from the PMCs), and the output is the calculated interference multiplier. For this work, an n-input, 1-output 3-layer dense rectified linear TensorFlow network for regression learning was used with Poisson Regression used for the objective function, where $n$ is the number of selected PMCs. The n-inputs relate to the factors measured via the PMCs and the 1-output is the predicted interference multiplier. The 3-layers of the DLNN are densely connected; that is each neuron is connected to each neuron in the preceding layer. The first layer has 128 neurons, and is used to compute metrics on the observations; the second and third layers have 64 and 32 neurons respectively, and are used to give computational space to collating and combining the output of the first layer. These parameters were chosen as either the most appropriate for this type of regression problem (i.e. the amount of neurons is progressively reduced from the input to the output) or were selected after experimentation determined that further increases in complexity did not yield further increases in accuracy. This configuration also has the advantage that it places a lower penalty on overestimation than underestimation when learning, meaning that the analysis results from DLNNs of this form will consistently be sound (i.e. lead to an overestimation of the interference multiplier). Rectified linear refers to the fact the inputs are normalised to lie within the range of 0 to 1 which is always advised when training DLNN. The Poisson objective function is assumed as it tends to be a good loss function when dealing with outputs that can have a large variation in scale. By contrast, other applicable loss functions, e.g. mean squared, tend to struggle with numbers spread over a large range [19].

![Figure 2: Use of DLNNs](image-url)
The use of DLNNs enables the automated learning of the relationship between interference measurements and their effect on the execution time of a task. One common pitfall in the application of machine learning is the risk of overspecialisation due to poor quality training data. This can be avoided by the use of Ensemble Modelling [4]. Ensemble Modelling is an intuitively simple technique: whenever a model is constructed, there is a random chance that the model is inaccurate for any given portion of the input space. If the random chance is greater than 50% then the Ensemble Model is less accurate than the individual models that it is composed of, then a failure can be detected by automated testing, which would then try to recreate the Ensemble Model using a different configuration or sample. If there is no failure, then the Ensemble Model can be accepted.

FBI analysis takes advantage of Ensemble Modelling by training multiple DLNNs from the data gathered. The training data is first split into equally sized blocks with which to train the DLNNs, using distinct training data. As the training of the DLNNs is handled by the Keras library [3], it is not detailed here. The use of multiple sets of training data allow the Ensemble Model to be populated by multiple distinct models to minimise the risk of overspecialisation. As this work is concerned with learning a normalised multiplier for the model is tested by comparing predictions to observations which is used [17]. Forecast accuracy is a well established metric that determines its forecast accuracy at the 10% level is 99%, a margin for error of 10% will hold for 99% of the data; 99% of the model predictions are within ±10% of the actual value. As this is a simple operation, forecast accuracy is completely automated and calculated after the generation of the model, allowing practitioners a degree of confidence in the results. Note the FBI method does not aim to obtain an absolute WCET bound, but instead an estimate of the impact of interference on the WCET that is valid with a degree of statistical confidence that the designer decides is reasonable. To achieve a higher statistical confidence means more testing is needed. If a higher degree of confidence is necessary, the user can either provide more data for testing or repeat the experiment with new observations.

### 2.7 Integrating Analysis Components

Having defined the individual components of FBI analysis, it remains to outline how these components are combined. Firstly, a small sample of heavily instrumented data is provided to the PMC selection component (Section 2.4). Once appropriate PMCs are selected, the bulk of the data is collected; provided that instrumentation is automated, there is no need for manual intervention at this step. A portion of this data is used to generate an initial model (Section 2.5). This model is then tested with other observations (Section 2.6) to determine the confidence in the model, and therefore the appropriateness of using it. This process is outlined in Algorithm 1.

```python
1 Function FindConfidence(model, dataset, target_accuracy)
2     accurate ← all results in dataset such that
3         abs(model.predict(results_factors)(observed_interference)−
4         1) < target_accuracy
5     return len(accurate)/len(dataset)
6
7 Function FBITrain(simultaneous_pmc, no_of_nets, test_samples, target_confidence)
8     initial_dataset ← data captured with all PMCs instrumented
9     best_pmc ← GetBestPMCs(initial_dataset,
10       simultaneous_pmc)
11     main_raw_dataset ← data captured with best_pmc instrumented
12     main_dataset ← main_raw_dataset / min(main_raw_dataset)
13     partition main_dataset into test_dataset of size test_samples and train_dataset model ←
14     EnsembleModel( no_of_nets, train_dataset)
15     Find minimum margin_for_error such that
16     FindConfidence(model, dataset, margin_for_error) > target_confidence
17     return model, margin_for_error

Algorithm 1: The FBI Training Algorithm
```

In order to make a prediction using an FBI model, each DLNN in the Ensemble is queried with the given interference rates. The results of each DLNN are combined into an Ensemble Average by taking their Geometric Mean. This Ensemble Average is then returned as the predicted interference multiplier for the requested interference rate. However, even once all the DLNNs are constructed, it is necessary to find a margin for error for the FBI model. This is accomplished by testing the model with previously
unseen observations and computing the resulting error. Once this is accomplished, the margin for error can be added to any interference multiplier derived from the FBI model, which in turn allows us to have confidence in the accuracy of the results. Next, the FBI model can be used to compute the interference multiplier for a given set of interference rates. The interference multiplier, I, and margin for error, E, can then be applied to the single-core WCET estimate in order to find a WCET estimate with given interference, as in the following equation:

\[
\text{WCET}_{\text{interference}} = \text{WCET}_{\text{single-core}} \times (1 + E) \times I \quad (1)
\]

In order to find the WCET estimate with interference, it is necessary to find the Worst-Case Interference Multiplier (WCIM). As the configuration of interference rates needed for the WCIM may not be the maximum of each interfering source, the simplest way to do so is to search over the FBI model. Such a WCIM is likely to be an over approximation due to configurations of interference rates which do not appear in the deployed system, or indeed are impossible to occur simultaneously. However, such a WCIM is useful in parallel development, as it allows an approximation of the WCET with interference even when the contender tasks are unknown. Once contender tasks are available, the WCIM can be refined based on the rates of interference those tasks actually produce, and FBI still shows a benefit as it is not necessary to repeat the tests on task under analysis; instead one can search over the FBI model, but this time constrained to the levels of interference observed from contender tasks. Even when the contender tasks are available, FBI provides useful information as it is not possible to test all post-deployment configurations of an integrated system. In contrast, FBI provides a convenient means for understanding how the system behaves given bounded ranges on the rates of shared resource use.

3 EVALUATION

To test the FBI approach, various benchmarks (e.g. from Taclebench suite [1]) and industrial software were deployed on the AURIX platform and a small selection chosen for presentation here. The ones selected were the more interesting cases, i.e. the ones were interference was larger with more variability and hence less predictable. Instrumentation was provided by using the Rapita Verification Suite [24] to insert customised instrumentation points before and after the execution of a task, which allows the PMCs of the AURIX to be read. These were then processed to reveal the rate at which the PMCs changed, providing the inputs to FBI. For simplicity, non-preemptive tasks were used to simplify the experimental setup (Note that the FBI method does not impose any constraints that prohibit preemptive tasks.) As the AURIX platform has two distinct types of core, each benchmark was run on both the energy efficient Core 0 (labelled as C0) and the high performance Core 1 (labelled as C1). To the best of the authors knowledge FBI is the first technique which attempts to predict interference multipliers, therefore we use the Nearest Neighbour (NN) method for comparison. NN takes the same input as FBI, but when queried NN returns the observed measurement closest to the queried parameters. This is calculated as the minimum Euclidean Distance between the desired PMC values and the PMCs for the observed test data.

Interference was provided by synthetic contenders running on all cores. The synthetic contenders were implemented by accessing uncached memory addresses at a randomly selected frequency to provide a range of interference values. Care was taken to ensure repeatability between different configurations of contenders (Section 2.2).

In each test, full instrumentation of all PMCs was supplied for 1000 samples, which were then used to determine which PMCs should be gathered, for varying numbers of PMCs and whether or not data gathering should be restricted to a single run of the task. The sample size was set to 1000 as this was observed to consistently return the same results from PMC selection as larger samples, indicating the point of diminishing returns. Once the relevant PMCs were determined, each FBI model was trained using 75 samples, with Ensemble models being composed of 3 sub-models formed by Keras models of the form given in Section 2.5; 75 samples was found to be the minimum number required to achieve consistent results. The collection of all required samples relies on an automated process which took less than 5 minutes per test. This process requires a minimum of \((4 \times 1000) + (75 + 1000) = 5075\) runs of the target task. The number of required runs to build a complete dataset depends on the available PMCs \(P\) and registers \(R\) on the platform and the number \(P' < P\) of selected PMCs: \(\lfloor (P/R) \rfloor + X + \lfloor (P'/R) \rfloor + X'\), where \(X\) captures is the number of samples required for PMC selection (Section 2.4), and \(X'\) the samples used to complete the dataset for training \((75 + 1000)\) on the AURIX).

The resulting models were then evaluated against 1000 unseen observations, which enables sufficient statistical confidence, to determine the following properties:

1. **Percentage Error**: The distribution of the percentage errors seen, including the minimum and maximum errors. These results are used to find an appropriate margin for error, defined such that the margin for error is the lowest value that can be added to predictions made by the model which guarantees that the results upper bound the unseen observations (i.e. the data used to evaluate the model) with a given statistical confidence.

2. **Execution Time Distribution**: The execution time distributions of No Interference (task run in isolation), Observed Interference (task run with given interference rates) and Max Interference (task run with maximum possible interference), were compared to the results from the FBI approach to determine the accuracy of the method.

Figure 3 summarises the forecast accuracy across all selected benchmarks for varying configurations of the analysed core for both FBI and NN. The y-axis is the error given by subtracting the actual interference multiplier from the predicted interference multiplier - positive values are pessimistic and negative ones optimistic. The labelling convention is `analyseTechnique − benchmark − core` for the x-axis, e.g. `FBI − duff − C0` is the FBI analysis results for the duff benchmark running on core C0. As each experiment runs a different task on a differently processor, PMC selection is performed for each task and configuration.\(^2\)

\(^2\)PMC selection is discussed in Section 2.4 and in detail in [14].
Across all benchmarks for the FBI approach, these results show that a margin for error of 10% has a confidence of 95% associated with it. It can be seen that for these benchmarks, the NN approach has a much greater range of errors than FBI (meaning it is less reliable), its median is further from zero (meaning its error tends to be bigger) and it has more negative values than FBI (which means its optimistic more often than FBI). It can also be observed that the C0 core is less predictable than C1; this is due to the fact that C0 is the energy-conserving core, and is therefore not designed for predictable performance. As well as the optimisations in the C1 core making its behaviour more predictable, there is also the complicating factor that there are fewer PMCs available on C0, which means that the DLNN model is not able to take into account as accurate observations and therefore will be inherently less precise.

We focus on the worst behaving benchmark matmult on C1 using 4 PMCs. C1 is chosen as even though it was more predictable than C0, the energy-conserving technology means its harder to be certain the changes in execution time are due to interference which could affect the integrity of our findings. The PMCs, selected during the PMC selection phase (Section 2.4), capture cache hits and memory stalls suffered by the contending Core 0 and Core 2. Figures 4 and 5 give an overview of FBI analysis performance for the matmult benchmark. Figure 4 presents the direct comparison of actual and predicted interference multipliers across different experiment runs, i.e. under randomised contenders and thus interferences. While results vary in amplitude, it shows that FBI analysis is capable of predicting the peaks and troughs of interference, e.g. between runs 5 to 10. Further, FBI provides a much closer estimate than NN, which consistently underestimates the impact of interference making it inappropriate for use in real-time systems.

To evaluate the accuracy with which FBI can convert a single core execution time to a multicore execution time with interference, each experiment was conducted with (A) no interference and (B) randomised interference. This is accomplished by taking PMCs from a measurement in (B), querying the FBI model with these PMCs and applying the resulting interference multiplier to the corresponding run of the task in (A), as per Equation (1). This yielded the results shown in Figure 5, which compares the distributions of observed execution times with random interference, two fixed interference profiles and predicted execution times from FBI. Under fixed interference, the task is predictable, meaning that the variation in execution times is due to multicore interference. As can be seen, when used to transform single-core execution times (No interference) to multicore with interference execution times (FBI + Margin for Error), FBI adds a small amount of overhead due to its margin for error and hence consistently upper bounds the actual observations; this is necessary as just using the predictions from FBI (FBI) can result in underestimates of interference, due to the DLNN training process minimising the absolute error.

An important result shown in Figure 5 is that the Max interference does not always give the largest value. This is important as the Max interference corresponds to the situation where the interferences are the maximum possible, e.g. one of the interferences may be the maximum possible rate of access to a shared bus. This means simply stressing testing the software on a given platform may not lead to either the maximum observed or the maximum calculated interference multiplier.

Figure 6 illustrates the effect of increasing the size of the training data on the matmult benchmark. As one can see, increasing the amount of training data increases the accuracy of both FBI analysis and NN. Here, FBI analysis has a superior accuracy to NN; however, for very simple programs which do not respond to interference this may not be the case, if interference does not impact the execution time then for sufficiently high numbers of observations NN can saturate the range of observations. However, in the case that the task is sensitive to interference (such as matmult), FBI consistently provides a better estimate of the interference than NN.
This paper applies Deep Learning Neural Networks to model the link between the PMCs available on a processor and the rate of interference a task suffers so that the maximum execution time of a task can be determined allowing for multi-core interference. As the exact nature of this link varies between processors and applications, machine learning was used to determine the nature of this link in a specific context. The evaluation demonstrates the approach on the Infineon AURIX processor family producing a model of interference multipliers along with the statistical confidence in their correctness. This model can then be used to derive a maximum execution time including interferences to a given level of statistical confidence.

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