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Regulation for E-payment Systems—Analytical Approaches beyond Private
Ordering

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ABSTRACT

Technology-driven payment instruments and services are facilitating the development
of e-commerce; however, security concerns beleaguer their implementation,
particularly in developing countries. This article considers the limits of private ordering
in the regulation of e-payment systems. We use Nigeria to exemplify a developing
country that is increasingly pushing for adoption of a regulatory framework for e-
payment systems based on private ordering. We argue that although technical
standards and self-regulation by the financial industry are important, the law is an
essential regulatory mechanism that is largely missing. This article proposes that law
be used as a mechanism to set and compel compliance with technical and industry
standards, thus building trust, catering to public interest concerns and legitimising the
regulatory process.

Keywords E-payments, Regulation, Private ordering, Public interest, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, a “silent revolution” in payment systems has occurred with the
introduction and implementation of e-payment systems. Aided by the rapid proliferation
of information and technology, it has not been without inherent problems. Although e-
payment systems have enhanced interoperability, convergence, and competition in
the payment industry – and, from a user’s point of view, efficiency and flexibility – the
ensuing migration to the systems has aggravated the risk of cybercrime and
undermined trust and confidence in payment services and their providers. 1 Likewise,
banks and other providers of e-payment services have become more susceptible to large-scale data breaches, while users face the risk of financial losses from identity theft and fraud. Therefore, effective e-payment regulation is central to building trust and confidence in electronic transactions, particularly for developing countries in their bid to bridge the digital gap and leverage the benefits of the global market.

The European Central Bank defines e-payments aptly as payments made over the internet using remote payment card transactions, online banking systems or e-payment providers with which the consumer has set up individual accounts. Nigeria is a good example of a developing nation that is increasingly pushing for the adoption of these systems. As recent government policies demonstrate, the objectives include developing internationally recognised payment systems and achieving global digital market integration. Thus, migration to card transactions and other electronic payments have increased. However, with the migration, Nigeria now faces significant challenges in securing payments. Because of its rather unsavoury reputation related to scams, advance fee fraud, identity theft, and cybercrime in general, there is a shadow of suspicion over electronic transactions and communications originating from or terminating in the country. Effective regulation of the relatively new e-payment systems could, therefore, represent a significant aspect of building trust and controlling crimes in e-payment systems.

In this article, we argue that as presently constituted, regulation in Nigeria focuses

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1 See European Commission, *Towards an Integrated European Market for Card, Internet and Mobile Payments* (COM 941 2011) para 2.3.
3 Other countries particularly in Africa are also involved in this drive, for instance Kenya’s M-pesa is the largest market for mobile money; South Africa has the most developed e-payment systems in Africa; and Ghana and Tanzania are pushing for wider adoption of e-payment systems; see e.g. KPMG, *Payment Developments in Africa* (2015) vol. 1 available at: https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/za/pdf/2016/09/Payment-Developments-in-Africa-2015.pdf (last accessed 20/12/2016)
4 These include National Payment Systems Vision (NPSV) 2020 developed by the federal government and the cashless policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
exclusively on technology-based solutions and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCIDSS), an industry private ordering not supported by any mandatory legal requirements. This approach is unsustainable for three reasons: One, e-payments are a multi-stakeholder environment comprising banks, financial and non-financial institutions. As such, a private ordering arrangement designed for banks and other financial institutions may not be effective outside that industry unless it is recognized as applicable and binding. Two, the technical standards on which the system depends are inefficient because there are no laws mandating security standards or compliance with the standards. Three, there are serious public interest concerns that limit the effectiveness of private ordering. In the context of e-payments, public interest concerns include controlling cybercrime and correcting market failures, as well as the need for fairness, transparency, and clarity in the adjudication and administration of justice.

We argue that law is crucial to engendering efficiency and legitimacy of e-payment regulation because of its capacity to regulate multiple players in the heterogeneous e-payment market and to enforce technical standards. Law plays a central role in ensuring that public concerns in e-payment systems are adequately addressed. However, since the choice between private ordering and state regulation cannot be binary in the complex environment of the internet, we use Lessig's theory of modalities of regulation in cyberspace to highlight how the law would regulate efficiently in the context of e-payment systems and services. Lessig's model is essential to a critical understanding of our argument that private ordering is inherently weak and subject to manipulation by the payment industry. The theory also justifies the proposition that regulation through formal rules is better at securing recognition and acceptance for regulatory mechanisms, and fostering compliance.

The article is structured as follows. The article starts with a brief analysis of how private ordering fits into the broader debate on regulation. It then considers the threats posed to e-payment systems and how the integration and convergence of e-payment and other services undergird the inadequacy of regulation in Nigeria. The paper further evaluates the efficiency of industry-mandated technical standards and the PCIDSS as

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7 The concept of public interest is discussed in the next section.
a private ordering mechanism. We argue that while private ordering can be quite efficient, it is inherently limited in heterogeneous markets and seldom caters to public interest. Therefore, to achieve the non-efficient goals of regulation, government needs to constrain private actors. The article concludes with a proposal for a regulatory approach that models Lessig’s theory of modalities of regulation in cyberspace. We reformulate Lessig’s regulatory modalities of code, market, norms, and law to develop a proposal that incorporates technologies, users, industry, and law. We argue that a correct synthesis of these modalities leads to efficient regulation of e-payment processes, instruments, and institutions, legitimises the regulatory process, and addresses public interest concerns.

**REGULATION BY PRIVATE ORDERING - LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONCERNS**

The meaning and scope of regulation is varied and contested. Morgan and Yeung, have argued that “regulation is a phenomenon that is notoriously difficult to define with clarity and precision, as its meaning and the scope of its inquiry are unsettled and contested.” However, a useful way to navigate the regulatory debate is to consider its broad and narrow meanings based on the origin or source of a regulatory framework. In a narrow sense, regulation refers to formal legal rules aimed at controlling the behaviour of entities or individuals. This so-called command and control model of regulation implies regulation by law or at least by state-appointed actors with the objective of benefiting society or a section of society. In a broader sense, regulation refers to any form of behavioural control, whatever its origin. This notion of regulation includes both state and non-state actors and includes all forms of social and economic influence designed to affect behaviour, whether it is state-based, from markets, or self-regulatory mechanisms in professions or trades.

Private ordering refers to rules, regulations, and codes of practice developed by private actors – such as industry, firms, and sectors – to influence behaviour within

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9 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge *Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy and Practice* (2nd ed. 2012 OUP) at 3
10 Id.
11 Id.
the firm, sector, or industry. They are observed without government sanction and enforcement. The PCIDSS is an example of private ordering in the payment industry. PCIDSS is an established global standard for cardholder account protection across all parties in the payment chain, including acquirers, third-party processors, and merchants. Its core framework consists of 12 requirements organised under six functional goals and requires a combination of physical, technical, and operational measures to protect cardholder data whether in storage or transmission. The standard was developed in response to increasing incidents of cardholder account theft and is intended to help organisations proactively protect customer account data.

The purported legitimacy of private ordering comes from its ability to utilise market incentives to allocate public resources. Because it can avoid expensive rule-making and enforcement processes that accompany state regulation, the most obvious advantages of private ordering are its efficiency in cost saving and its expertise in the rule-making process. Conversely, because the rule maker ultimately expects compliance from itself, and because compliance with private ordering is almost always entirely voluntary, private ordering tends to undermine the “consequences” element of regulation. Also, because private ordering mechanisms can be diffuse — in that they tend to apply to homogenous sectors and the goals can therefore be quite narrow — private ordering tends to be limited in the way it addresses broader issues of public interest. In line with Ogus, we suggest, if the term “regulation”

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12 They have also been defined more broadly to include rules originated by the private sector but put in place by sovereign governments, and rules put in place by private actors by government delegation; however, a critical reading of the literature suggests that these more aptly describe self-regulation generally and could refer to other models of regulation such as co-regulation and meta-regulation. See S Schwarz “Private Ordering” (2002-2003) *Nw. U. L. Rev* 319, 324; see also C Coglianese and E Mendelson “Meta-Regulation and self-Regulation” (Penn Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-11)1 at 6-9.
13 Id Schwarz.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Schwarz above note 11 at 319.
is used to denote law that implements a collectivist system, then it must be taken that regulation contains the idea of a superior authority, which is the State. It has a directive function and compels individuals and groups to behave in particular ways, and threatens sanctions if they do not comply. As a public law, it enforces requirements that cannot be circumvented by private agreement, because the state plays a central role in its formulation. This suggests that the characteristics of sanctions are often more noticeable in state or formal regulatory regimes and that state regulation is more efficient at modifying behaviour because it carries the threat of state enforcement and sanctions. It may also explain why references to regulation in political rhetoric are seldom taken to mean non-state regulation.\(^{19}\) Furthermore, as Black defines it, regulation is: “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others to standards or goals with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard setting, information gathering and behaviour modification.”\(^{20}\) Therefore, even when non-state actors – such as social norms, technologies, or markets – influence how regulatory systems operate, and while regulatory systems might harness these influences toward a regulatory end, they do not themselves constitute regulation.\(^{21}\) Again, the suggestion here is that formal or legal rules are better at setting standards and achieving behaviour modification.

Surely, if regulation formally involves interference by a party that is not directly involved in or part of the activity involved,\(^{22}\) the legitimacy of private ordering should be subject to scrutiny. However, we argue that legitimacy is not necessarily tied to rules made by the legislature, and that legitimacy also connotes recognition of the source of the rule, confidence in the rule-making process, and acceptance of the source and process through compliance with the rules, so we must also look for alternative measurements for any claim to legitimacy by private ordering systems.\(^{23}\) Baldwin, Cave and Lodge provide a broader basis for adjudicating good regulation. According to the authors, although legislative mandate, which implies that a regulatory

\(^{19}\) A Ogus *Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory* (Hart Publishing 2004), 15.
\(^{21}\) Id.
framework derives authorisation from an elected legislature, is one of the essential
criteria of good regulatory regimes, good regulation must also satisfy four additional
criteria. These are one, accountability and control, which underscores the need for
regulators to be properly accountable. Two, due process, which presupposes support
for regulation because the procedures are fair, open, and accessible. Three, regulatory
expertise, which denotes trusted regulator judgment based upon specialised
knowledge, skills, and experience; and four, efficiency, which implies that the
legislative mandate in support of a regulatory regime is being implemented
effectively. In effect, while some of the criteria appear to depend on some formal
monitoring or enforcement process, others such as regulatory expertise depend more
on the industry and may arguably be attained by private ordering. Nevertheless, we
argue that for a regulatory regime to be perceived as good and perhaps legitimate, it
should satisfy all five criteria.

More significantly, since rationalisation that regulation proceeds in the “public
interest” is often at the base of most regulatory instruments, it is important for
regulation to account for the public interest components of the regulated activity. As
Mitnick argues, regulation is “...the public administrative policing of a private activity
with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest." Selznik sees regulation as
“a sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are
valued by a community” and in Lennes' view, the deliberateness and intentionality to
bring about a regulatory end, which must be seen as a deliberate supervision of private
activity in the interest of public rights, interests, and welfare, is what qualifies an activity
as truly regulatory in the first place. These definitions underline the public interest
theory of regulation, which justifies regulation as a corrective to perceived deficiencies
in the operation of the market. The theory underpins regulation as a restrictive

24 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge above note 8 at 25.
25 Id at 25-39.
26 Mitnick above note 21.
27 Id at 7.
28 P Selznick “Focusing Organisational Research Regulation” in R Noll (ed.) Regulatory
29 R Leenes “Framing Techno-Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-state Regulation
by Technology” (2012) 5(2) Legisprudence Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series No 10/2012 143 at 149.
activity directed toward private entities on the basis of general rules that are conducive to public interest.\textsuperscript{31}

It is not our intention to get into the extensive argument about the meaning and scope of public interest, yet it is relevant to note that public interest is a contested and nebulous concept. Public interest has been described as a vague and indeterminable concept,\textsuperscript{32} and a catch-all phrase for the subjective interest of lawmakers or powerful interest groups.\textsuperscript{33} According to Feintuck, although “...public interest has an air of democratic propriety, the absence of identifiable normative content renders the concept insubstantial, and hopelessly vulnerable to annexation and colonization.”\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless, he argues, some common elements of its contents are ascertainable.\textsuperscript{35} It is argued that public interest must assume or underpin the existence of some interests common to all members of the society and therefore mesh with dominant values of the society.\textsuperscript{36} It underlines certain democratic values and serves as a complement to human rights.\textsuperscript{37} Public interest also assumes an ideal of general welfare and maintenance of conditions that permit an ongoing social order.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, the nebulous nature of public interest notwithstanding, it is certainly right to assert that in regulatory context, intervention into private activity is justified by reference to an economic belief in the efficacy of competitive market forces.\textsuperscript{39} For example, if market efficiency is a public good\textsuperscript{40} that could arguably be achieved by private ordering or self-regulation, it would still ultimately fall on government to regulate


\textsuperscript{32} Mitnick above note 21 at 91.

\textsuperscript{33} E.g. Posner above note 29 at 4-5.

\textsuperscript{34} M Feintuck The public Interest in Regulation (2004, Oxford University Press) at 33.

\textsuperscript{35} Id at 38.

\textsuperscript{36} Id at 11.

\textsuperscript{37} Id at 39.

\textsuperscript{38} Id at 39 -41.

\textsuperscript{39} Id at 58.

\textsuperscript{40} A public good is a commodity the benefit from which is shared by the public as a whole, or by a group within it. It consists of two characteristics; one, consumption by one person does not leave less for others to consume. Two it is impossible or too costly for the supplier to exclude those who do not pay for the good but enjoy the benefit. See Ogus above note 18 at 33.
market efficiency in order to correct market failures. This is because public goods are susceptible to free-rider problems.\textsuperscript{41} In this sense, even if the public interest is debatable, it appears that regulation in public interest must seek the welfare and protection and benefit of the public at large or at least a section of the society. Correspondingly, we can argue that if regulation ultimately controls crimes, prevents or corrects market failures, and imbues transparency in adjudication, it is unequivocally in the public interest.

The definitions and characteristics of regulation above suggest that there are two problems with using private ordering as a regulatory model. The first is that it raises questions about whether the private ordering is legitimate in the sense that it satisfies the criteria of good regulation. The second and more crucial problem is whether it accounts for public interest concerns in e-payment services and systems. In the following sections, we highlight how new cybercrime threats have forced new regulations and the ways in which these create legitimacy problems.

THE THREAT LANDSCAPE - CYBERCRIME AND LIMITS OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL GUIDELINES

There is a profound irony at the heart of this debate. Fraud was already endemic in Nigeria, even before the widespread use of computer systems. However, it is widely acknowledged that the use of electronic systems acted as a great facilitator and made the so-called “419” or “advance-fee” e-mail frauds remarkably successful.\textsuperscript{42} The proliferation of “419 spam” exemplifies the internet-created opportunity. By offering global accessibility,\textsuperscript{43} the internet effectively enabled fraudsters to send spam e-mails; typically requesting assistance in transferring some illegally sourced funds to bank accounts abroad.\textsuperscript{44} Perhaps due to the limited infrastructure for electronic money transfers and the stigmatisation of the Nigerian political class as highly corrupt, many perceived these e-mails as credible and the e-mails were particularly successful with

\textsuperscript{41} Id; see also further notes below at p ...
\textsuperscript{42} A Smith “Nigerian Scam E-Mails and the Charms of Capital” (2009) 23/1 Cultural Studies 27.
\textsuperscript{43} M Zook “Your Urgent Assistance is requested: The Intersection of 419 Spam and New Networks of Imagination” (2007) 10/1 Ethics, Place & Environment 65.
\textsuperscript{44} J Oboh and Y Schoenmakers “Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud in Transnational Perspective” (2010) 15 Policing Multiple Communities 235.
victims outside the country. The scale of the problem forced PayPal, the global payment service provider, to close all Nigerian accounts in 2005.  

In part because of existing cybercrime threats, government policies to promote e-payments in Nigeria were unsuccessful at first. However, in 2011, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced the “Cashless Nigeria” project. The project significantly improved the migration to e-payments primarily because it penalised cash transactions. With the increasing adoption of e-payments, the threat for cybercrime changed significantly. Targets became more domestic, and schemes evolved to match the increasing online population. As the CBN admitted, fraud migrated to card-not-present (CNP) transactions and other web-based payment applications. Due to the ubiquity of the internet and increasing payment mobility (Nigeria has about 60 million internet users), it is reasonable to assume that data breaches, identity theft, and fraud will be on the rise. Hence, the CBN has made a significant effort not only to increase awareness of cybercriminals’ tactics and how users of e-payment services can avoid victimisation, but also to recommend increases in the resilience of the payment systems’ infrastructure and work-streams to encourage the use of e-payment systems.

The CBN regulates e-payment services and transactions by issuing guidelines specific to different transactions. For example, Guidelines on Point of Sale (POS) Card Acceptance Services deal with card systems, mobile regulations deal with mobile payments and mobile moneys, and so on. The problem is not that there are different

45 See Countries and Regions Supported by PayPal available at: https://developer.paypal.com/docs/classic/api/country_codes/ (last accessed 26/03/2016).
46 E.g. the CBN had directed Nigeria banks to charge processing fees on all cash transactions but none for e-payments, see CBN letter titled ‘Industry Policy on Retail Cash Collection and Lodgement’ (IITP/C/01 Circular BPS/DIR/GEN/CIR/01/003) dated 16th March 2012.
47 E.g. ATM fraud was the leading consumer complaint to the CBN between 2010 and 2012 because of which the CBN directed the system to migrate from Chip and PIN to EMV cards. See Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Report and Statement of Account 2010, 2011 and 2012 available at: http://ndic.org.ng/publications.html (last accessed 20/03/2016).
48 Id.
regulations but whether the regulations are applicable across the broad spectrum of e-payment services and providers. To illustrate, the Guidelines on POS stipulate that computer networks used to transmit financial data over the internet must meet the required standards specified for data confidentiality and integrity. The precise standards specified by the regulations are that all payment service providers comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCIDSS), use as a minimum the 3DES encryption standard, and apply a minimum of two-factor authentication to verify user access to systems and services.51 The use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is optional as the e-banking guidelines provide that banks may need to consider the use of PKI for authentication of users.52

Apart from the fact that Nigerian banks are affiliated with global card service providers, and are therefore obligated to comply with the PCIDSS by contractual agreements with relevant card networks, the CBN mandates compliance with the PCIDSS by providing in Item 3.1:

All industry stakeholders who process and/or store cardholder information shall ensure that their terminals, applications and processing systems comply with the minimum requirements of the following [PCIDSS] Standards and Best Practices … In addition, all terminals, applications and processing systems should also comply with the standards specified by the various card schemes.53

The primary concern here is whether guidelines issued by the CBN will be accepted as generally binding by non-banks and non-financial institutions within the payment chain. The national electronic identity card clearly illustrates the problem. The e-identity card is expected to offer PIN and fingerprint authentication, digital signature and payment functionalities, and it has been proposed that all Nigerians be issued a national identity number (NIN), which will be used for identification and account establishment purposes.54 The card is designed to serve as both an identity card and a bankcard. This suggests that although banks may be leading providers of e-payment services, non-banks and non-financial institutions, including the identity management authority, are now industry stakeholders who could potentially process and/or store

51 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines 2011.
52 Item 1.5.2 E-banking Guidelines (emphasis added).
53 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines.
cardholder information. If we assume that unregulated access could compromise consumer data on the database of the Nigerian Identity Management Commission (NIMC), we begin to see how the adoption of technical security standards prescribed by the CBN could become problematic. Stated differently, although the POS guidelines cited above mention industry stakeholders, it must be presumed that these are stakeholders within the banking industry to which banking regulations apply and institutions like the NIMC may not consider themselves bound to implement 3DES encryption or apply two-factor authentication or even comply with the PCIDSS. The same argument applies to mobile network providers (MNOs), which are regarded as providers of infrastructure or platforms on which mobile payments may be initiated and completed, or mobile money stored.55

Although the above can raise questions of legitimacy in the sense that the CBN rules and standards are not generally accepted or recognised as binding, it could also implicitly suggest that the guidelines are inherently limiting. In the sections that follow, we analyse the limits of technical standards mandated by the CBN and the PCIDSS even within the banking and financial industry where they must apply. We also assess the constraints of the PCIDSS as a specific form of private ordering. Our analysis highlights areas where formal laws would produce better regulation.

THE LIMITS OF TECHNICAL STANDARDS

It was noted above that the CBN prescribes compliance with the PCIDSS, the use of 3DES encryption standard, and a minimum of two-factor authentication, as well as the optional deployment of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a sense, therefore, industry relies on technology to regulate e-payment services and systems. Although technology-based security systems are of immense importance to users because technology regulates behaviour without requiring users themselves to change their behaviour,56 there are constraints on technology and three clear areas that may inhibit efficient regulation in Nigeria. These are cost, the industry-centred character of technology application, and the fact that no security is completely impervious to threats.

55 See Revised Guidelines on Stored Value/Pre-Paid Card Issuance and Operation 2012.
56 See further notes below at p 10.
Technology is Expensive

The cost of implementing mandatory technologies, particularly the PCIDSS, affects the willingness of industry stakeholders to deploy them. For example, although all parties — including acquirers, third-party processors and merchants, as well as all entities that store, process, or transmit cardholder data — are expected to comply with the PCIDSS, the level of compliance in Nigeria is questionable.

According to one estimate, the cost of fully implementing the PCIDSS for a merchant in Nigeria is about $20,000 USD, which is considerably more than the total operating capital of an average merchant. Thereafter, the business needs an additional $1,000 per year for payment of software updates to electronic points of sale. Merchants must also bear the additional cost of periodic system vulnerability and compliance scans from third-party firms appointed by PCIDSS operators to ensure full and ongoing compliance. Arguably, this prohibitive cost can only be borne by the big players in the industry, such as banks and switching companies. Invariably, cost is a barrier to entry into e-payment services and may also lead to compromises in security standards. As noted in the PCIDSS’ own guidelines, the prohibitive cost of compliance invariably leads to compromises in consumer information such that businesses that are unable to encrypt data because of technical constraints or business limitations adopt compensating controls designed to mitigate associated risks.

However, beyond identifying the likely impacts of the prohibitive cost of the PCIDSS, the payment industry has offered no viable solution. In fact, the possibility that service provider organisations will not deploy PCIDSS is heightened by the lax oversight. As an example, although the PCIDSS requirements are couched in mandatory terms, compliance is primarily determined through self-assessment. Additionally, while the Security Standards Council (SSC) sets the PCIDSS, it has no obligation to validate or enforce any organisation’s compliance with the standards or

58 Id.
59 Id at 189-190.
to impose penalties for non-compliance. Enforcement and penalties are governed by card brands and their partners, who may impose financial penalties or withdraw card acceptance services. Therefore, there is a lack of uniformity in the implementation of the standards because each card brand has different programs for compliance, validation, and enforcement.

Whether these drawbacks indicate a need to re-evaluate the PCIDSS, we firmly argue in favour of the establishment of an independent legal authority to enforce the standards, on behalf of either the Council or the card brands. Alternatively and more efficiently, the law may set legal standards for securing card transactions and other e-payment services. Indeed, with developing countries such as Nigeria, the failure to legislate the regulation of payment card transactions translates to governments effectively ceding consumer protection to private law-making by card associations and banks.

Technology is Industry Regulation - Misuse in Evidential Matters

Another important aspect of regulation by technology is its near-total dependence on industry for implementation. Because of its highly technical nature, the deployment of technology is better understood by industry, and this may lead to discriminatory and even abusive use. Lessig noted that because of the self-executing and independent nature of technology (or code) regulation, the application of law or legal constraints in cyberspace is inherently limited. The most persuasive argument made, however, is that because code or technology can control better and more effectively than law, it may be misused – particularly by the market. As such, code may not strike a proper balance or protect the various values prescribed by law and may become quite arbitrary in its application. In other words, technology is not always a positive regulator, and it does not always constrain in a manner that promotes the law. Wu makes this

61 Id.
63 Id at 551.
65 Id at 127.
point more forcibly by asserting that code could be used as a mechanism of avoidance rather than protection.\footnote{66 T Wu “When Code isn’t Law” (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 101 at 106.}

Although there have been no cases on this point in Nigeria, some cases in England demonstrate how abusive uses of technology by the financial and payment industry can undermine the judicial process and result in injustice.\footnote{67 Cases from England are particularly relevant here because they constitute persuasive authorities in Nigerian courts as Nigeria was a former British colony and operates a common-law system.} In \textit{Job v Halifax PLC},\footnote{68 (Case number 7BQ00307 30 April 2009) in A Kelman, “Case Judgement: England and Wales” (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 235.} the claim was for the sum of £2,100 (with interest), which the claimant argued had been wrongfully debited from his account with Halifax Bank through the fraudulent use of his debit card. The bank admitted the debit but argued that it was justified because the money was withdrawn from the claimant’s account using his card and correct PIN. However, in providing evidence, the bank declined to disclose card authentication keys because they were derived from a batch and would compromise other cards in issue. It was argued on behalf of the bank that key management procedures were commercially sensitive information, and an outside expert witness could not verify the authentication codes in the logs. However, the claimant argued that these pieces of evidence were essential to the bank’s claim that the transactions occurred. They were also necessary to prove that the protocols were flawless and tamper-proof, and particularly that the bank maintained appropriate security controls related to key management. Notwithstanding the failure of the bank to produce the evidence, the claimant failed, and judgment was entered in favour of the bank.\footnote{69 Id at 238.}

Similarly, in \textit{Rahman v Barclays Bank},\footnote{70 (Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court Case No 1YE003643 24 October 2012) in S Mason and N Bohm, ‘Commentary on Case on Appeal: England and Wales’ (2013) 10 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 175.} the claimant sought reimbursement from his bank for money debited from his account because of the fraudulent use of his debit card by a third party. Without requiring the defendant/bank to provide strict proof, the court accepted its explanation that the fraud was committed because the claimant was negligent in that he gave the thief his card and other authenticating information. Also without proof, the court accepted the defendant’s assertions about the security of...
its authentication process and its electronic banking system. As the court itself observed, “The bank did not put before the court any detailed evidence about the security information it sought from the fraudster. It had no record of the transaction, save in general terms.”\(^7\) An important factor in this case is that the claimant might have prejudiced his case by his alleged untruthfulness regarding the circumstances surrounding the fraud. Nevertheless, when banks can succeed in defending claims by their customers without producing crucial evidence, there is a disincentive to retain such evidence and produce it when required. Conversely, if the law renders the production of such evidence mandatory, banks would have no choice but to retain the evidence. As Mason and Bohm argue, “If their [the bank’s] defence fails for lack of relevant evidence, they will soon enough learn to make sure to retain and produce it. Soft cases make bad law.”\(^7\)

The aforementioned cases demonstrate how technology can serve as a shield and can also be used to manipulate legal and judicial processes. Such manipulations may lead to doubt as to whether justice was served in cases involving disputed transactions between banks and their customers. The provisions of the Nigerian Evidence Act give some indication that Nigerian courts may arrive at conclusions similar to Job and Rahman. The Evidence Act admits electronic signatures generally.\(^7\) Section 93(2) of the Act provides that “Where a rule of evidence requires a signature or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed, an electronic signature satisfies that rule of law or avoids those consequences.” However, regarding the nature of e-signatures or the evidential weight or standard and burden of proof, the provisions of the law are quite vague. For example, Section 93(3) provides that “All electronic signatures may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which it is necessary for a person, to proceed further with a transaction, to have executed a symbol or security procedure for verifying that an electronic record is that of the person.”

It is not clear whether the law is referring to the mere generation of an e-signature or whether it incorporates the means of verifying the correctness of the procedure for creating the signature. For evidential purposes, the fact that a signature

\(^7\) Id at 185.  
\(^7\) Id at 187.  
\(^7\) See ss 93-97 Evidence Act (Nigeria) 2011.
exists is not terribly important. It is more important to be able to verify the signer and to ensure that correct security protocols were implemented in creating the signature. Therefore, the manner of proving a signature depends largely on the type of signature in question. To illustrate, in contrast to simple e-signatures, advanced e-signatures (often referred to as digital signatures) use a combination of a mathematical algorithm and a key system to create a unique digital fingerprint associated with a person or entity. Moreover, digital signatures are supported by public key infrastructure, or PKI, which enables third-party certification authorities to verify the authenticity of the signer. By logical assumption, therefore, a digital signature may be proved by reference to the protocols used to create the signature and the authority verifying its authenticity. However, because the law provides that a signature can be authenticated in any manner, regarding some symbols or procedures, this vagueness may allow banks and other service providers to make arguments like those in Job and Rahman cited above. Stated differently, a bank may simply have to prove that certain security protocols exist without also having to prove that such protocols were, in fact, applied or correctly implemented. It is arguable therefore, that the vagueness in the Evidence Act derives from the fact that Nigeria has no digital signature law. Digital signature laws often define different forms of e-signatures and delineate procedures for the creation and verification of the signatures and courts could routinely refer to such laws to determine the type of e-signature at issue, how it is created, and who bears the burden of proof, as well as the weight or evidential value to ascribe to the signature.  

Security is never “Absolute”

Secured payments often depend on authenticating technologies. However, authenticators have different degrees of reliability. PINs, passwords, tokens, and access codes that are based on authentication protocols of what a person knows or has are susceptible to criminal attacks and can be forged or stolen by hackers and phishers. Additionally, encryption combined with stronger authentication technologies such as digital signatures is still susceptible to criminal attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MiTM) unless PKI is fully deployed to minimise the risks.  

74 See e.g., Regulations on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market Reg 910/2014/EU see in particular regs 3, 13, 25, 26 & 32.

In addressing the limits of technical security measures, it is pertinent to discuss biometrics, which are now touted as the “silver bullet” in combatting identity-related cybercrime in Nigeria. The CBN introduced the use of biometrics for account holder verification in February 2014. Under the initiative, tagged biometric verification number (BVN), banks are required to register their customers’ biometric information, including their fingerprints and facial image. The objective of the BVN is to use biometrics for identification and authentication of account holders across the financial industry, thereby reducing customers’ exposure to identity theft and fraud.\(^76\) However, while it is true that unlike PINs, passwords and tokens, biometrics are permanently linked to a person, it is also correct that biometric characteristics, whether biological or behavioural, carry the risk of false performance. That is, biometrics can generate false positives and false negatives. False negatives deny access to otherwise authentic users, while false positives grant access to fraudulent users, or impostors.\(^77\)

Fingerprint readers used during the Nigerian general elections sometimes failed to identify authentic voters, which highlights the problems associated with false negatives. In e-payment transactions, e-commerce, and e-banking, false negatives and false positives may have further implications for financial loss. False negatives may cause payment systems to decline otherwise authentic transactions, while false positives may grant fraudsters access to victims’ financial information or even to the databases of organisations.

More crucially, because the nature of the threat to identity databases includes its very primacy as a target of hackers for identity theft, databases where biometric information is stored are prone to vulnerabilities and attacks. In the case of the BVN, the stakes are even higher, as a compromise to the database of any bank in Nigeria could potentially endanger biometric information stored by all banks in the country. For example, if legitimate user data is replaced with false data or stored biometric templates are deleted to facilitate re-enrolment, the same information is compromised across all payment institutions and chains because the unique biometric is identical on all systems. This susceptibility suggests the need for another law – a data protection

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\(^76\) See Bank Verification Number available at: http://www.bvn.com.ng/ (last accessed 15/03/2016).

law that would set standards of protection for personal data collected and stored in proprietary databases.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{THE PCIDSS AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS - INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND EXTERNALITIES}

Although industry standard-setting is a rule-making process and has a regulatory effect, we maintain that even if industry were willing, it would be unable to regulate e-payment systems to prevent cybercrimes such as identity theft and fraud without the coercive force of law. Market economy considerations create inefficiencies that limit the effects of industry's initiatives and discourage its investment in technological solutions.

\textit{Market Systems and Asymmetric Information}

Information asymmetry exists in markets where information about goods and services is unilaterally known to one party. This may be the seller or the buyer. In any case, markets in which information asymmetry exists are characterised by low quality products and high prices because products cannot be distinguished by their characteristics. Where sellers hold exclusive information, for example, buyers are deprived of making informed decisions about price and quality. In other words, because information about quality is known only to the sellers, prices fail to signify quality to buyers, and sellers of low quality products can sell at prices comparative to high quality products. This information deficit has additional consequences. First, it drives the sellers of high quality products out of the market because they cannot increase the prices of their products because of buyer ignorance regarding quality. The second consequence is the proliferation of poor quality products in the marketplace, which leads to buyer withdrawal from the market and ultimately market failure.\textsuperscript{79} In financial and payment services terms, asymmetric information comes into play when

\textsuperscript{78} This would be a general or omnibus data protection law modelled after the EU data protection law. Although, a detailed discussion of the problems with the EU law is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that a proposal to adopt the EU approach does not also suggest that a Nigerian law on data protection replicate the exact provisions of the EU law particularly because of its broad and rather nebulous definition of personal data.

providers of payment services promote or disclose the strong qualities of their products, such as efficiency, while withholding the negative features, such as weak security.  

Concerns about information asymmetry are particularly useful in assessing the risk of identity theft in e-payment systems. Since non-cash transactions involve the transfer of personal information from the consumer to the seller, the seller’s standard of safeguarding information is material to the customer's evaluation of the risk of the transaction. Where there is laxity, the cost of the product should be reduced to reflect the risk of misuse. That is, less secure products should sell for less, and more secure products should sell for more. However, because information asymmetry exists, this is not the case. Both secure and insecure products and services sell at relative prices. Providers of less secure products and services will not lower their prices because consumers' associate high price with high quality, and sellers of more secure products are unable to attract customers desiring such products because of the lack of price differentials. Overall, sellers of better security products operate at a loss, while providers of less secure products are profitable. Nevertheless, because payment systems' integrity and efficiency are public goods in the sense that the market as a whole suffers the consequences of identity theft – sellers with less security have no incentive to provide better security. In other words, if bad security precipitates data breaches and increased incidents of identity theft, consumers associate losses with the entire market, and may therefore migrate from e-payment systems causing market failure or total collapse.

This discussion can be placed in the context of the Nigerian financial market, which has been described as “a market where fraud information is kept top secret.” This lack of transparency, which is characteristic of virtually all aspects of banking and financial transactions, includes information about conditions related to the use of

80 Id (Schreft) at 23.
81 See definition of public goods above at note 39.
82 Schreft above at note 79.
83 Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) Annual Report 2012 (Although, a copy of this report was obtained for the purpose of the research, further reference could be provided as it is unclear whether the report was subsequently published or otherwise made publicly available).
financial products, transaction costs, and so on. Recognizing the need to review of transparency practices in the financial market, the CBN noted:

An important component of the review exercise was the development of a minimum disclosure requirement that stipulates the information banks are required to disclose to all customers prior to the consummation of every credit transaction. ...The overreaching goal ... is to produce a Guide that... will accommodate the freedom of operators to charge competitive prices, while protecting consumers from arbitrary and excess charges.\textsuperscript{84}

These observations imply that service charges in the financial industry are seldom reflective of value and may be arbitrary regardless of quality. Banking applications and implementation standards for EMV cards exemplify how asymmetric information works in e-payment systems. According to Murdoch and Anderson, not only does the security of banking apps vary across platforms and suppliers, but because most apps are proprietary, their vulnerabilities are known only to service providers. Additionally, while acknowledging the security of the EMV protocol, we argue that the protocol has numerous vulnerabilities, which are the inevitable result of implementation choices. Banks can choose, for example, to issue relatively inexpensive cards that use public key cryptography in the card authentication step or opt for cheaper cards that merely present a certificate signed by the issuing bank. These cheaper cards, which do not use PKI, are easier to clone.\textsuperscript{85}

It is possible to argue that consumers may be completely unaware of banks and other payment service providers with lax security systems. Consequently, products, services, and charges are not comparatively and competitively priced. The CBN itself recognises the effects of asymmetric information on the financial market and has concluded that it invariably leads to distrust and market collapse. Per the CBN, “...customers do not perceive fraud as an issue with a specific bank, but with electronic

\textsuperscript{84} Letter from Central Bank of Nigeria to all deposit Money Banks Reference No CFP/DIR/GDL/01/018 dated 6th July 2012.

payments overall, which eventually affects the entire industry and not just the institutions that have been impacted by fraud."\textsuperscript{86}

It is important to note that as information asymmetry is invariably a part of traditional markets, this position is unlikely to change. Organisations expect to protect their brands and withhold adverse information from customers unless they are compelled by law. Therefore, it is the role of government to correct transactional imbalances and impose transparency rules through legislation.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Market Systems and Negative Externalities}

Externalities operate to confer costs or benefits on entities other than those who should bear them. They can be positive or negative. Positive externalities confer benefits on those who cannot be charged for the benefits, while negative externalities confer costs on those who should not bear the cost. In markets where the externalities are negative, entities most often engage in activities that impose costs on others and less often in activities that benefit others.\textsuperscript{88} In the context of e-payments, if the risks of weak security, data breaches, and identity theft and fraud are borne not by payment service providers but, rather, by individuals, society or other organisations, there is less incentive for organisations to provide better security and therefore prevent the proliferation of negative externalities.\textsuperscript{89} Two activities in the Nigerian payment industry demonstrate how externalities operate to displace the cost of fraud. First, the liability allocation regime already places the burden of fraud on the consumer or user. Second, through law enforcement, society appears to have assumed the cost of preventing fraud on e-payment platforms, thus providing further disincentive to industry.

\textbf{(a) How Unclear Rules about Liability Allocation Promote the Operation of Externalities -}

The transaction alert system introduced by banks in Nigeria is a good example of how unclear policies promote externalities. Under the system, card or account holders receive alerts or notifications immediately when a transaction occurs on their accounts.

\textsuperscript{86} Central Bank of Nigeria, “About the Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum” available at: \texttt{<http://www.cenbank.org/neff/about.asp>} (last accessed 09/04/2015).
\textsuperscript{87} See e.g., Payment Services Regulations (PSR) 2009 SI 2009/209 (UK) Part 5.
\textsuperscript{89} Schreft above note 78 at 5.
or payment cards. The effect is to instantly alert the card or account holder to fraudulent transactions and forestall further fraud. Customers who receive notifications of unauthorised transactions are expected to immediately notify the service provider, which then “blocks” the account or card to prevent further use by the fraudster. Invariably, because it allows at least one fraudulent transaction even if it prevents others, the system amounts to “bolting the barn after the horse has escaped.” More importantly, bank customers may still be liable for losses that occur before the transaction alert, as even if a transaction is fraudulent, the customer is not assured to be reimbursed or indemnified for the loss, nor does the bank guarantee that it would even investigate the loss.

This practice is correct since the regulatory framework allows parties the flexibility to determine where fraud liability falls. Under the e-banking guidelines, “agreements reached between providers and users of e-banking products and services should clearly state the responsibilities and liabilities of all parties involved in the transactions.” The guidelines fail to provide any meaningful guidance on the allocation of liabilities and offers little, if any, protection for users of electronic banking and payment systems. It is arguable, for instance, that while contracts constitute important evidence of an agreement between parties, contracts envisaged by the guidelines will usually be standard form contracts containing extensive exemption of liability clauses. Information asymmetry suggests that the respective bargaining powers of the parties are likely to be unequal because of service providers’ superior knowledge about product functionalities and security defects. Ultimately, however, if consumers bear their own losses, providers of e-payment services such as banks can externalise the cost of fraud.

Perhaps in recognition of the inefficiency (and even unfairness) of the existing liability allocation structure, the CBN proposed a card arbitration framework called the E-payment Dispute Arbitration Framework. The objectives of the framework include provisions of speedy redress for e-payment disputes without involving the courts. The framework is also intended to facilitate the identification of the entity at fault in disputed claims and to shift liability toward that entity. Again, however, apart from

90 Item 3.0(g) CBN Guidelines on Electronic Banking 2003.
the fact that the framework has yet to become operable, some of its provisions already suggest that it would be equally problematic and is unlikely to have much effect on the status quo. For example, Item 5(d) of the framework provides that “where a Cardholder uses an EMV Payment Card on an EMV Terminal and fraud occurs, liability is on the Cardholder. However, it is the responsibility of the issuer to prove to the arbitration panel that the Payment Card issued was the Payment Card used and the Payment Card was not reported stolen.”

Based upon their literal construction, the above provisions already carry a presumption that the cardholder is liable without requiring that evidence on the state of the security of the service provider’s systems be produced. Contrary to the arguments demonstrating that EMV cards can be compromised, especially when issuers influence the security design, the provisions appear to suggest that the cards are completely impregnable. Some provisions of the Payment Services Regulations (PSR) (UK) help to highlight the point here. Section 60(3) PSR provides as follows:

Where a payment service user denies having authorised an executed payment transaction, the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service provider is not in itself necessarily sufficient to prove either that –

(a) the payment transaction was authorised by the payer; or

(b) the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negligence to comply with regulation 57.

Regulation 57 addresses the obligations of the payer/user to provide notification to the service provider of theft, misappropriation, or unauthorised use of the payment instrument in the agreed manner without undue delay upon becoming aware of the fact. The cumulative effect of regulations 57(2) and 60(3) is to displace the presumption of negligence and collusion, which often follows a consumer’s allegation of unauthorised use of a payment instrument. The payment service provider is required to provide strict proof, even when it appears that the actual payment instrument issued has been used, to authorise a disputed transaction.

Unlike the proposed Card Arbitration Framework, the PSR places the burden of proving a disputed payment on the service provider and negates presumptions of

92 Payment Systems Regulations (PSR) above note 86 regs 60(3) & 57(2).
negligence and fraud on the part of the user. Therefore, since it merely promotes the presumption of negligence or collusion on the part of the cardholder, the proposed card arbitration framework in Nigeria may produce results such as those of Job and Rahman cited earlier. As Mason rightly contends, such resulting decisions would be “incorrect decisions based on a misunderstanding of the burden of proof, a failure to properly test the evidence, and an acceptance of unwarranted assumptions.”

(b) Society’s Assumption of the Cost of Fraud as an Externality

An example of how society bears the cost of fraud in Nigeria is evident by efforts of law enforcement agents aimed at combatting cybercrime. Although Nigeria only recently passed a cybercrime law, law enforcement agents appear to have previously developed a typology of cybercriminals. The typology characterises cybercriminals as male, between the ages of 18 and 33, typically well-educated (in the Nigerian context this means the person has up to university-level education), unemployed and technology savvy. To justify their classification in any of the categories, suspected cybercriminals will also usually be in possession of laptop computers or smartphones with the ability to initiate connectivity to the internet almost 24 hours of the day. Such “suspects” may be classified as “Yahoo! Yahoo! Boys” (named after the search engine Yahoo), or “419ners” (named after the section of the Nigeria criminal code criminalising impersonation). They may also be classified as engaged in a new form of electronic payment fraud called “cashless Lagos” in mimicry of the cashless policy of the CBN. Classifying a person as a cybercriminal is often accompanied by indiscriminate searches of such persons, or of their properties or premises.

Although indiscriminate searches clearly infringe on certain fundamental human rights, the more pressing question is how law enforcement activities operate to externalise the cost of fraud. On the one hand, such activity is wasteful if not futile,

93 Id regs 60(1)-(3).
95 See Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc.) Act 2015.
96 This prototype was given by Law Enforcement agents and forms part of the data used by one of the authors in a broader research into the challenges of implementing cybersecurity in Nigeria.
97 Id.
98 For example, rights to privacy and freedom from discrimination, harassment and intimidation are guaranteed under s 28(1) (a)-(h) Ch IV Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as amended).
because prior to 2015, Nigeria had no cybercrime law under which “suspects” could be prosecuted and convicted. Yet society pays for the time and the resources expended conducting searches and on investigations of arguably non-prosecutable crimes. On the other hand, because the activities raise the presumption that cybercrime is being controlled, whether deliberately or inadvertently, service providers may fail to consider all the costs and benefits of their actions or inactions to other parties. In other words, providers may under-invest in security on the basis that cybercrime is being addressed or that its challenges are only marginal. To ensure that service providers continue to invest in up-to-date security, the law must set minimum security standards below which providers must not fall.

PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE INDEX FOR STRONG REGULATION

We argued that private ordering must meet the index of strong regulation identified as legitimacy, accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency. The establishment of the Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) is a telling illustration of the inefficiency of legislative mandate. The NeFF is an all-stakeholder fraud forum established to monitor electronic fraud and encourage fraud reporting, information dissemination, and information sharing among stakeholders. As stated in the NeFF’s annual returns, the forum was born out of the need for “a holistic approach to combat the menace of fraud and restore confidence in all e-payment mechanisms in the country.”99 The rationale for establishing the body include recognizing that electronic fraud attempts will increase significantly as Nigeria migrates to electronic payments, and the fact that e-fraud incidences are negatively impacting the entire financial industry. The NeFF is mandated to form cohesive and effective fraud risk management practices through information and knowledge sharing with key industry stakeholders. The NeFF, in conjunction with the CBN and the Nigeria Interbank Settlement Systems (NIBSS), has also developed a dedicated portal for fraud reporting in the e-payment industry.100 The establishment of the NeFF is therefore based on the overall assumption that

99 NeFF Annual Report above at note 82.
cybercrime control will be more effective if payment institutions share fraud information and articulate a common requirement to law enforcement agents.\textsuperscript{101}

However, while the NeFF is innovative in promoting collaboration, some of its objectives underscore existing inefficiencies and overall failures on the part of financial regulators. First, because the NeFF is projected as an alternative forum for fraud reporting, it is indicative of the failure of primary fraud reporting systems. It therefore impairs the regulators’ execution of their regulatory mandate and amounts to reinventing the wheel. Second, and consequential to the first reason, the effectiveness of NeFF is questionable because it is likely to be perceived merely as a regulatory watchdog. For instance, if organisations will not report fraud to the CBN as a regulator, why would they exchange fraud information with the NeFF, which is an initiative of the CBN and a convergence of competitors, regulators, and law enforcement? In essence, it is reasonable to expect that fraud information disclosed at the forum will eventually be passed on to regulators, with possible regulatory reprisals. This would inhibit the free dissemination of fraud information, which is the primary objective of the NeFF. From this perspective, the NeFF may invariably represent a classic example of the failure of legislative mandate. That is, the NeFF is indicative of the failure of the CBN’s legislative mandate to protect e-payment systems.

Furthermore, although regulatory guidelines provide that there must be regular and ongoing assessment of compliance with the PCIDSS, there are no fully functional monitoring processes in place in Nigeria. For example, the e-banking guidelines provide that, “each vendor must provide valid certificates showing compliance with these standards, and must regularly review the status of all its terminals to ensure they are still compliant as standards change. [And] there will be a continuous review and recertification on compliance with these and other global industry standards from time to time.”\textsuperscript{102} In contrast to this requirement, organisations are only subject to an initial inspection to determine whether they meet the compliance threshold (for which they receive a certificate). Thereafter, there is no framework to ensure that organisational practices are upgraded.\textsuperscript{103} This invariably promotes the argument that existing

\textsuperscript{102} Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines.
\textsuperscript{103} E.g. statistics are disputed on the levels of compliance with the PCIDSS. As at 2011, only two of the potential target organisations were reported to be PCIDSS compliant. Contested
private ordering lacks accountability, fails to comply with due process, and that the PCIDSS itself is largely ineffective.\textsuperscript{104}

It therefore appears that if we apply the index of measuring strong regulation, industry expertise will be the only strength of regulation by the e-payment industry in Nigeria. However, it has been previously argued that industry can manipulate its technological expertise to serve its own purposes. As such, industry may need to be regulated even in terms of how it applies this expertise. The concluding section of this paper charts the way forward. The analysis justifies the interplay between different regulatory mechanisms and explicates the overall role of law in the regulatory schema.

**HOW LAW REGULATES - LESSIG’S MODALITIES OF REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE AND THE REGULATION OF E-PAYMENTS**

Perhaps because there is much debate about the regulation of the internet itself, governments have been sceptical about the best approach to regulate the activities it mediates or facilitates. For example, it has been argued that to facilitate internet growth, and ensure the protection of fundamental rights, government intervention and formal rules are both unwarranted and unwanted.\textsuperscript{105} However, it has also been argued that an unfettered internet is not an automatic guarantor of human rights and there is a need to regulate self-evolving rules and the institutions that administer them.\textsuperscript{106} Although the latter argument is correct in that it justifies the need for law, much of the argument in this area fails to identify how law would operate in the complex cyberspace environment.\textsuperscript{107} Lessig addresses this gap by proposing that legal and policy solutions to the regulatory dilemma in cyberspace are found in the interplay between different regulatory modalities.

\textsuperscript{104} Morse and Raval above note 61 at 551.
\textsuperscript{105} See e.g., D R Johnson and D Post "Law and Borders -The Rise of Law in Cyberspace" (1996) 48 STAN L REV 1367; see also John Perry Barlow "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" available at: https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last accessed 2/06/2014).
\textsuperscript{107} Id (Goldsmith) at 1201.
Lessig identifies four modalities of regulation, or “things that regulate.” These are law, architecture, norms, and the market. These modalities, as constraints to behaviour in real space, are transposable to cyberspace. According to Lessig, law constraints objectively because it provides a set of commands and threatens punishment for disobedience. As in real space, the constraints of law in cyberspace include the threat of sanctions for violations of certain rights or punishment for certain behaviours. Social norms also limit, although in a manner that differs from the constraints of law. The theory is that members of a community impose normative constraints through slight and sometimes forceful sanctions rather than centralised action of the state. As the third modality of regulation, the market constrains through differential pricing. This is based on the fact that prices signal the point at which a resource can be transferred from one person to another. The fourth, and perhaps most important modality of regulation, is the architecture of an environment, which encompasses the way things are or the way they are made or built. In the context of regulation, architecture can either enable or limit interaction with the environment, but — unlike the other three constraining modalities — architecture is independent of direct human imposition and is often automatically deployed or self-executing. Therefore, code constrains without subjectivity and operates regardless of whether the party being constrained is aware of it. To this extent, code has regulatory potential analogous to regulation by law, and indirectly or metaphorically, “code is law.” However, as an overriding regulatory modality, law can modify, alter, or enforce the code of cyberspace in a way that promotes the demands of commerce, society, policy, and justice.

Lessig’s theory compels the inference that although individually, the modalities of norm, market, and technology do work but whether they are effective would depend

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109 Id at 123-125.
110 Id at 340-341.
111 Ibid.
112 Id at 342.
113 Ibid.
114 Id at 341.
115 Id at 5.
on the extent to which they are regulated by law. For example, as the “most obvious self-conscious agent of regulation”\textsuperscript{117} law will affect the other modalities in a manner that aids their roles as tools for legal regulation.\textsuperscript{118} In the analysis that follows, we reformulate and synthesise Lessig’s four modalities to propose a workable regulatory agenda for e-payment systems and to underline the primary role of formal rules.

**Regulating with Law, industry, Technology and Users**

Based on our earlier analysis, we can argue that only two of the modalities — technology and market — are presently represented in the regulatory arrangement for e-payment systems.\textsuperscript{119} However, we have argued that technology (or code) can be manipulated and market systems are self-serving in the sense that they allow industry (or the market) to pursue its own goals, and therefore promote the primacy of sector interests.\textsuperscript{120} We suggested that the public interests at stake include the prevention of crimes and correction of market failures as well as certainty and transparency in the administration of justice. Thus, our proposal is to include two additional modalities of law and “users” in the regulatory framework.

We opt to include users as our fourth modality not only because the lines of social norms are often ill-defined but also because it is difficult to develop an agenda for an enforceable norm. For example, Lessig’s proposal of regulation by norms would beg the question of how generally acceptable norms will develop in the first place. This is particularly so as the cultural specificity of norms and the relativity of individual choice, as well the fluidity and mobility on the internet negate the permanence of engagements needed to sustain the development of generally acceptable norms. The idea of a global norm would therefore often be unattractive, as billions of people using the internet would not agree on regulatory norms.\textsuperscript{121} Notably, beyond proposing that “norms could be used to respond to [the] threats … Norms — among commercial entities, for example – may help build trust around certain privacy-protective practices,”\textsuperscript{122} even Lessig was unable to provide clues as to how such normative frameworks would

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Id at 511.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Id at 502.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} See previous arguments at p 9-19.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Our use of ‘technology’ and ‘industry’ is for consistency as they essentially align with Lessig’s concept of code and market.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} J Goldsmith and T Wu *Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless World* (2006 OUP) at 152.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Lessig above note 107 at 223.
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Rather, he concedes that, “how people who need never meet can establish and enforce a rich set of social norms is a question that will push the theories of social norm development far.” Furthermore, because the effectiveness of norms depends largely on voluntary compliance, norms are analogous to the private ordering system and give rise to the same problems. Therefore, it would be correct to assert that the threat of enforcement is still necessary to cause people to conform to norms, and state enforcement is more certain and more secure than private efforts to coerce behaviour because the state can utilise its monopoly on official use of force.

As an alternative to the contested notion of collective norm, “Users” is a more specific term, which underscores the fact that the problem surrounds a group of people more likely to make individual rather than collective decisions. In the context of e-payment systems, it addresses the ability or inability of respective users to articulate their choices in view of the payment instruments, processes, and providers they select. Additionally, because of their susceptibilities to social engineering, users are invariably part of the problem. Humans, unlike technology, can demonstrate extreme levels of variation in skill and do not always follow logical rules in conduct. They can be emotional actors, inevitably partial, driven by perception and emotion as much as by objective reality. Indeed, users are considered the weakest link in the security chain. The Verizon data breach report noted that humans are the “the carbon layer” of information assets and are therefore notoriously susceptible to social tactics, including deception, manipulation, and intimidation. Therefore, as the report concludes, while humans are the most complex creatures on earth, savvy threat agents or criminals have consistently outwitted them or otherwise leveraged them to steal data. Since users are invariably part of the problem, we propose to make them a part of the solution. Murray’s observations that users are not to be considered passive recipients

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124 Id.
of regulatory initiatives support this point.\textsuperscript{128} Again however, like technology and market, users would only operate effectively if law intervenes and sets certain standards.

Scepticism regarding the ability of users to protect themselves ranges from the complexity of technical security to ignorance or lack of awareness. To illustrate, while certificate-based authentication may help users to verify an entity by linking its public and private keys, it is debatable whether lay users can understand why the authentication protocol is necessary or what to look for, such as the security padlock, or even how to check certificates. In Nigeria, three further reasons account for why users cannot regulate themselves or prevent cybercrime. The first is the proliferation of pirated and unlicensed software. In 2011, a global piracy study put the rate of PC software piracy in Nigeria at 82 percent, which is almost double the global piracy rate. The same report put the rate of unlicensed software installations at 81 percent in 2013.\textsuperscript{129} Since the links between cybersecurity and pirated software are well documented, it is safe to assume that if the Nigerian market is saturated with pirated software, most end-user products, including anti-virus programs, would also be defective and unreliable. The second reason that casts doubts on users’ ability to regulate without laws is the volatile threat landscape for e-payments. In other words, cybercrime remains a challenge because the threat landscape is evolving, and it is unlikely that providers and users can keep up with criminal tactics. To illustrate, since mobile devices are increasingly used for banking and payments, criminals are bound to migrate from computers and e-mails to mobile platforms to leverage attacks. In this case, user education serves a limited purpose and may have no effect at all on the rate of victimisation.

The third, and perhaps most important, reason is that technology is now being developed in Nigeria to address user volatility and unpredictability in the regulatory environment. Therefore, users are more likely to be regulated by technologies embedded into payment processes, services, and instruments rather than their own choices. This approach is not particularly complex, but it is controversial. Some

\textsuperscript{128} A D Murray \textit{The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment} (2007 Routledge Cavendish) at 51.

technologies described as having lock-in effects exemplify the potential problems therein. Lock-in technologies modify or alter the behaviour of actors in ways that ensure compliance with law or regulation or with industry standards for protecting privacy and security. Built-in security processes embedded in privacy by design (PbD) and privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) serve as good examples. PbD processes embed privacy features into design specification, implementation, and networked infrastructures from the outset. This entails built-in privacy requirements from the onset of a systems’ development and throughout its life cycle.¹³⁰

Consistent with this approach, and with the notion that technology is self-executing when it comes to constraining human behaviour, the CBN introduced a biometric verification number (BVN) into the Nigerian banking industry. The features of the BVN have been discussed earlier, however, its implications for regulating users is significant. Although it is not entirely clear how the BVN will work, the presumption is that enrolment of individual biometrics would ensure that users are unable to access their accounts unless they are physically present at the point of sale. The BVN system therefore has the potential to create a lock-in effect because it employs technology to bypass certain user behaviours, such as the ability to share one’s PIN with other people. However, precisely because of their capacity to compel obedience, “lock-in technologies” are controversial. They raise questions about legitimacy and choice, as well as legal regulation that are fundamental to user role in regulation and fraud prevention in e-payment systems.

**Beyond Private Ordering - Legitimacy, Accountability and Due Process**

Lock-in technologies also referred to as “techno-regulation”¹³¹ are defined as the deliberate employment of technology to regulate human behaviour.¹³² Jaap-koops characterises them more aptly as “technology with intentionally built-in mechanisms to

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¹³¹ See R Brownsword “Code, Control, and Choice: Why East is East and West is West” (2005) 25/1 Legal Studies 1 at 3-21
influence people’s behaviour.”133 Perhaps significantly in his analysis of technoregulation, Brownsword argues that there are moral and ethical implications of design-based technologies aimed at controlling harm-generating behaviour and technologies when they function in ways that override human choice, free will, and dignity. Such a view allows for little controversy when arguing that human dignity implies that people should be able to choose not only right actions, but also wrong ones. Accordingly, because design-based technologies impose behavioural constraints on their subjects, they deprive such subjects of the opportunity to choose between right and wrong.134

Although a distinction may be made between design-based technologies that operate directly on individuals’ decision-making process and those that seek to restrict the exercise of individual judgement without overriding their judgement altogether, there are legitimate concerns that the technologies may generally jeopardise constitutional values. For example, they may lead to a loss of opportunity to appeal to the discretion and judgement of enforcement officials against the inappropriate or unfair application of regulatory standards.135 Certainly, design-based technologies raise these concerns even when they are incorporated to enforce legal norms. Jaapkoops indicated that if technology’s only use is to enforce prevailing legal norms, its acceptability should be called into question, since the transformation of “ought” or “ought not” to “can” or “cannot” threatens our human interpretation of norms that represent bedrock elements of law in practice.136

The above arguments would be correct to the extent that they identify the corrosive effects of design-based technologies on legitimacy and accountability. However, if the arguments intend to suggest that lock-in technologies reduce users to robotic recipients of industry’s inventions, they would be incorrect. To support this point, it is important to note that progressive technological modifications have been used to respond to user problems in payment systems. As an example, by design, mere possession authenticates the use of credit cards, but this also creates incentive

134 Brownsword above note 130 at 15–17.
135 K Yeung “Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design” in R Brownsword & K Yeung above note 132 at 79–107
136 B Jaap-koops above note 13 at 159.
to steal the card, as any holder may use it. To correct this, subsequent ATM cards were designed with a required PIN. This means that the user must not only have the card but must also know the PIN. There is less incentive to steal this card unless the thief has access to the PIN. However, the technology also proved susceptible because users wrote PINs on their cards or kept them with the cards. To further increase confidence that the holder of the card is the authorised user, biometric technologies such as fingerprints, retinal scans, etc., were introduced. Technology is also now being advanced to integrate behavioural biometrics, including typing speed, touch pad dwell time, key selection, and angle of mouse movements into mobile devices and web applications to build further confidence in authentication processes.

To summarize, the application of behaviour-modifying technology is neither new nor novel. Such technologies have progressively evolved, particularly in response to the criminal exploitation of payment instruments and user-associated problems. This position is correct even if regulatory motivations are unclear or when regulatory intentions are not clearly spelt out. It would be sensible to argue that the nature of complex regulatory environments often means that regulation has varying degrees of transparency. Whether noticeable or not, regulation is justified by the need to protect the regulated entity and others. Therefore, one may view technologies that lock in or restrict user choices and preferences as a means of protecting the users even from themselves, while at the same time achieving the interests of government and industry in regulating behaviour. In effect, enrolling user biometrics for account authentication as in the case of the BVN, will not in and of itself be illegitimate. However, to ensure the effectiveness of users in the regulatory framework, the law must also ensure that providers are transparent and accountable.

As examples, while it would be quite arbitrary for the law to impose limitations on how consumers transfer their personal information, law can set standards of behaviour sought to be locked in in the first place. Therefore, law could define what constitutes personal information in order to identify the information that providers are obliged to protect. Additionally, legal requirements that the most effective or up-to-date technical safeguard be used may form the basis for integrating biometric technologies into payment instruments and processes and for securing access to the biometric

137 A D Murray *The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment* (2007 Routledge Cavendish) at 23.
databases. Without such laws, the risk of fraud arising from data breaches, or organisational misuse of data corresponds to the benefits provided by the lock-in technologies. In other words, consumers of the services could be locked into a false sense of security if criminals can gain access to identity databases. Arguably, in such circumstances, criminals would have less need of the information that technology protects.

Furthermore, laws would be needed to set out evidential requirements to establish that correct security protocols have been implemented into payment instruments or processes that have lock-in effects. The cases of Job and Rahman highlight the need for transparent rules on evidence when security protocols are in question. The proposed Nigerian electronic identity card mentioned earlier also clarifies the point here. It was noted that the identity card would be embedded with payment functionalities. Conversely, one of the proposed security features of the card is the deployment of firewall technology to separate and protect the financial information on the card.\textsuperscript{138} It is therefore possible to argue that unless the protocols used to implement such a separation are ascertainable and verifiable, allegations of unauthorised access may be difficult to resolve.

Based on our analysis, the security for e-payments depicted in (Figure 1) below shows how regulation should be framed to enable law to affect each modality within the regulatory schema.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{e-payment regulation based on the theory of modalities of control}
\end{figure}

As shown in Figure 1, the law is at the apex of the regulatory schema. Industry follows because it can readily modify technology. Therefore, direct regulation of industry by

law would promote the development of high technical standards for security. Having derived its legitimacy from legal rules, technology can be used to constrain user behaviour. To cite a few of many possible examples, data protection law may provide that organisations use the most up-to-date, if not state-of-the-art, technology to protect personal information. Additionally, laws regulating electronic payment services may impose liability on providers in certain circumstances where authentication or authorisation is contested. Digital signature laws may allocate evidential value to electronic signatures, and identity management laws would ensure that all organisations, irrespective of sector, implement strong identity management standards.

There are two reasons why the regulatory modalities must operate in the order proposed above. One, the order is important to address the peculiar nature of technology and cyberspace and the inability of the law to directly affect users and technology as modalities of regulation. For example, the law has no direct impact on user behaviour, but technology does. Although technology standards may be translated into legal rules, laws cannot directly regulate technology because technology is evolving, and the volatility of technology means security mechanisms become elementary and outdated quickly. However, since industry can readily modify technology, direct regulation of industry by law would promote the development of high technical standards for data security. The order therefore allows the development of specific rules that may be modified as technology evolves. Two, the order ensures that in any case, the rule-making process starts with explicit efforts of the state rather than industry. Thus, while not effectively displacing private ordering such as the PCIDSS, it does not also require the codification of the standards to achieve desirable security standards. In effect, while involving the state in the regulatory arrangement, the regulatory framework dispenses with the assumption that industry will ultimately write the same rules as the regulator, rather, it promotes legal standards in favour of considerable discretion of the target over internal systems. This point distinguishes the proposed framework in this paper from intermediate regulation such as meta-regulation. Meta-regulation also often referred to as “mandated self-regulation” or “enforced self-regulation” involves efforts by governmental authorities to promote and oversee self-regulation. As we have demonstrated, the public interests at stake undermine an assumption that industry will develop rules congruent to the state. Therefore, a main problem with meta-regulation, also demonstrated in the analysis of
the PCIDSS, is that even if businesses have better information to find solutions to public interest problems, they do not necessarily have better incentives to do so.\textsuperscript{139} We also argue that discretion is undermined by the inability – regardless of willingness – of industry, to protect public goods, or develop legal principles relating to standards of proof and fairness and transparency.

**CONCLUSION**

The question of whether regulation is legitimate or effective must be answered regarding how it addresses the principal characteristics of good regulation and how it meets public interest requirements underpinning regulatory activities. In this article, we have argued that although non-state actors now function as regulatory agents for e-payment systems, their effectiveness is limited because e-payment is a heterogeneous market. Therefore, unless banking rules that require compliance with industry private ordering are generally accepted and recognised, private ordering in e-payments may grapple with questions of legitimacy. Furthermore, because market constraints – such as information asymmetry and externalities– can undermine even the most effective self-regulatory regimes, it is necessary for law to intervene in the regulatory process. The analysis of technical standards for security highlights the fact that given the self-executing nature of technology (or code) and the industry’s expertise in developing and implementing technical standards, technology could be quite effective as a regulatory mechanism. However, the effectiveness of technical standards is also limited because the standards themselves may not apply across the broad spectrum of e-payment services. What becomes clearer from a consideration of Lessig’s theory of modalities of control in cyberspace are the perils of technology-based solutions. While conceding that technology plays a fundamental role in regulating activities online and admitting that “code is law,” Lessig underlines the malleability of technology to abuses and underscores the need for legal regulation of technology and the industry that produces the technology.

Therefore, because industry has the tendency to manipulate technology and abusive use can distort perceptions of fairness and justice, laws must be developed not only to set general standards of technical security but also to build accountability,

due process, and even legitimacy into the regulatory process. As the article further suggests, preventing crime and correcting market failures as well as building trust and confidence in electronic transactions through transparent rules and fair adjudication of contentious cases are public policy issues that override private ordering in e-payment systems. Therefore, government must intervene with rules, setting liability standards so that industry does not use technology to either displace the burden of proof or avoid liability altogether. Because market efficiency is a public good, formal laws are required to correct market failures and displace externalities as broader public interest concerns, which are not necessarily the focus of private ordering systems. Legal regulation as we have demonstrated is justified, not only because law is the most obvious self-conscious agent of regulation, but also because it infuses accountability, due process, and legitimacy, as well as efficiency into the regulatory process.

Significantly, the analyses and findings in the article suggest that the proposed regulatory framework has a wider application beyond Nigeria. For example, Kenya with its widespread adoption of M-pesa, Ghana and Tanzania, which are currently developing electronic means of payment, as well as South Africa, which has the most developed e-payment systems in the African continent, all share similarities in demographics and security and regulatory challenges. The countries all have an increasing population migrating to e-payments with the subsequent global threat posed by cybercrime. They also share a regulatory system based largely on narrow financial industry-driven initiatives. The proposals in this article could therefore be applied to e-payment processes, instruments, and institutions in countries facing similar challenges. For regulatory arrangements more generally, we suggest that while private ordering is not inherently inefficient, its efficiency must be examined in the context of respective activities subject to regulation. Also, when intervening in the regulation of a largely heterogeneous activity, government needs to develop uniform rules in the form of general principles rather than specific rules. In the technology environment such principles must address the malleable and evolving nature of technology and the unpredictability of the regulatory environment.