Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2018) Normative Reference Magnets. Philosophical Review, 127 (1). pp. 41-71. ISSN 0031-8108
Abstract
The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2018 by Cornell University. This is an author produced version of a paper published in The Philosophical Review. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. | ||||
Keywords: | naturalness; metaethics; metasemantics; radical interpretation | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 13 Jun 2017 07:55 | ||||
Last Modified: | 17 Apr 2018 08:07 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | Duke University Press | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4230057 |