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Abstract:

The paper challenges the theoretical and empirical orthodoxy surrounding the debate on international military intervention and mass atrocity endings, via an evidence-based analysis of the situation in East Timor in 1999. By combining existing but under-explored data on mass atrocities with eyewitness accounts, new key informant interviews, and a detailed review of secondary sources, we demonstrate that the wave of militia-perpetrated violence in September 1999 was extinguished prior to the arrival of international military forces. We demonstrate the unique effect of national political factors, which, with the pressures of international diplomacy, combined to end mass atrocities in this particular case. We find that the Indonesian regime was not a uniformly recalcitrant regime opposed to ending the atrocities, and demonstrate how factors operating across the national and sub-national levels combined to force the Indonesian leadership to bring the militia perpetrators of this brutal episode of violence under control. Through our new empirical analysis, and the alternative explanation we present to explain endings of mass atrocities in this case, we challenge the tendency to focus on international military intervention as the means by which mass atrocities come to an end.
Ending Mass Atrocities: An Empirical Reinterpretation of ‘Successful’ International Military Intervention in East Timor

Introduction

The literature on how mass atrocities end has been dominated by the discussion of international military intervention. This debate centres on the moral, legal and strategic facets of such intervention, and, “(w)hile such interventions are not always possible, they are imagined as the most robust and efficacious response in the anti-atrocities toolbox.” However, amongst the multiple roles that international military involvement can play in those contexts affected by mass atrocities, for good and bad, one particular but important area remains poorly understood: The empirical relationship between international military intervention, decisions made by the regimes carrying out atrocities, and the actual endings to those atrocities has received limited attention.

All too often, states in which mass atrocities take place, and which may be held responsible, are treated as uniformly ‘recalcitrant’ regimes, to invoke Wheeler and Dunne’s term. This definition blurs and distorts the contests going on within those regimes, between different factions and branches of the state, the outcomes of which can tip towards escalations of atrocities, or, indeed, their endings. These national and local sites of factional contest within perpetrating regimes, the dynamic processes of political change among state institutions during armed conflict, and the role of national leadership during mass atrocities, have each been critically under-examined in the international interventions literature.

East Timor presents an ideal case for a closer examination of the relationship between international military intervention, national and sub-national political dynamics and endings to mass atrocities. In the run up to, and then following, the declaration of independence from Indonesia in 1999, East Timor experienced a dramatic episode of violence against civilians by state-sponsored militias. The international military intervention that followed is widely presented by the leading scholars as a model example of international success, in which the armed international coalition rapidly and directly ended the killing of civilians. However, despite the current scholarly consensus

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1 We define mass atrocities as the, “widespread and systematic violence against civilians, largely characterised by killing”, in line with the definition used by Conley-Zilic, “How Mass Atrocities End”, 1
2 Ibid
3 Paris, “Responsibility to Protect”, 570-572
over this interpretation, the precise relationship between the intervention, and the
timing and means by which these mass atrocities ended, has not yet been examined in
empirical detail. Further, as a result of the dominance of the conventional explanation,
the relevant decisions made at the national level have been considered only to the extent
that they contributed to accepting international military intervention.

Our paper contributes two key findings to the discussion of international military
intervention and mass atrocity endings in East Timor. First, by considering the available
empirical evidence, including a new descriptive statistical analysis, we find that the mass
atrocities of September 1999 had largely ended prior to the arrival of international troops
on the ground. Second, through analysis of decisions made within the Indonesian national
leadership, we find that impacts of decisions at the national level explain the ending to
atrocities observed in the statistical analysis. Whilst responsibility for the killings in East
Timor lies absolutely with the Indonesian regime, we demonstrate that the Indonesian
leadership was more conflicted over its approach to East Timor than has been assumed
previously. We demonstrate how a decisive end to mass atrocities eventually became
possible through the decisions of two relatively moderate leaders in the Indonesian
regime. Their decision to impose martial law - a move discardad at the time as ineffective
by the international community - was, we argue, a central factor in the control of those
perpetrating the violence. We also introduce the wider question of why this imperative
for action came about, and highlight the need for further primary research in this regard.

Our reinterpretation of the ending to mass atrocities in East Timor has relevance not only
for an improved understanding this case, but also for the wider study of endings to mass
atrocities in the interventions literature. By unpacking the national context, we move the
lens of analysis away from sole attention to the international dimension of military
intervention, and towards the interaction between national and sub-national political
decisions during a period of contested political change. In doing so, we find that the
factors behind the sudden decline in mass atrocities in East Timor in September 1999 -
just prior to the arrival of international forces - come into focus. It is, we argue, a
combined set of political factors within and between the civilian and military dimensions
of politics – and driven by international diplomatic and economic pressures - that made
the difference.

The literature on how mass atrocities end

To clarify the contributions of our analysis, and to situate our argument in the wider
literature, we discuss here three relevant areas. First, we consider the anti-atrocity
interventionist literature, and in particular the tendency to treat perpetrating regimes as
uniformly recalcitrant. Second, we consider the tendency to confine the examination of
internal state dynamics to the *escalation* of mass atrocities, rather than their contribution to endings. Finally, we situate our empirical analysis of the ending to mass atrocities in East Timor within an emergent body of comparative political research on endings, which focuses on the national dimensions of politics. This links to the turn within the peacebuilding literature towards examining the local and hybrid nature of peace during international interventions.\(^5\)

*The bias towards examining the international military role in mass atrocity endings*

The major debates in the literature on international military - or humanitarian - intervention regarding mass atrocities lie in questions around the normative, legal and strategic frameworks justifying such interventions.\(^6\) A related field of enquiry explores practical and operational realities, including the effects on the civilian population, and implications for surrounding countries.\(^7\) This literature is stratified by debates over the extent to which the unintended consequences of intervention, such as civilian deaths, or increased refugee flows, should limit its scope. But throughout this literature runs the common assumption that international military intervention necessarily has the capacity to end mass atrocities on the ground.

Whilst wider questions around the humanitarian capacity of military forces are informed by a diversity of cases, the assumptions surrounding the efficacy of military intervention specifically in terminating mass atrocities persist principally on the basis of the endings to violence in Rwanda and in the Nazi Holocaust. In both of these cases the involvement of a foreign military force can be related directly to the termination of the atrocity. In the case of Rwanda, this also offers an example of missed opportunity for appropriate international military intervention.\(^8\) Despite the highly atypical nature of the mass atrocity in both instances, the study of these cases has led to the dominance of a normative discourse which conceptualises endings with reference to international intervention – actual or imagined.\(^9\)

The strength of the normative discourse around the value of international military intervention is most evident in Evans’ recommendations on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).\(^10\) Evans argues not only that intervention has the

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\(^5\) MacGinty, *International Peacebuilding*; MacGinty and Richmond, “The Local Turn”; MacGinty and Richmond “Constructing hybrid political orders”

\(^6\) Paris, “Responsibility to Protect”, 570


\(^8\) De Waal et al, “How Mass Atrocities End”

\(^9\) Conley-Zilkic, ed., *How Mass Atrocities End*

\(^10\) R2P
capacity to bring a termination to humanitarian crises, but that the debate surrounding the role of the international community should centre only on the manner and timing of some manner of intervention.\footnote{Evans, \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, 7.} This argument resonates with Sampford and Thakur’s three pillars of R2P which, even while placing the prevention of mass atrocities within the domain of the state, places the guarantee of these commitments firmly in the realm of international collective force.\footnote{Sampford, \textit{From the right to Persecute}, 38.} As then British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, at the highpoint of post-Cold War internationalist and interventionist thinking in Western foreign policy, “[w]e are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not”.\footnote{Blair, \textit{Doctrine of the International Community}} But such internationalist arguments obscure an important arena of action where atrocities actually end.

The violence in East Timor in 1999 is frequently invoked to reinforce the dominant ‘military intervention’ interpretation of endings to mass atrocities, including how endings to killings of civilians take place. This position is best articulated by the influence of Wheeler and Dunne’s assertion that East Timor represented a “new humanitarianism” on behalf of Western actors.\footnote{Wheeler & Dunne, “New Humanitarian Interventionism”} In developing this case, Wheeler and Dunne examine a set of economic and political factors argued to be relevant to Jakarta’s consent for international military intervention. However, when they consider the overlapping international and national level factors influencing Jakarta, these are considered only with reference to the conditions under which consent for military intervention was obtained. This is mirrored in Cotton’s work which, whilst noting the limited opposition faced by international military forces, nonetheless considers the national-international dynamic only insofar as it had an affect on Jakarta’s consent for intervention, not on national decisions to end civilian killings.\footnote{Cotton, “Against the Grain”}

Wheeler and Dunne’s approach to understanding Jakarta’s decisions in the East Timor cases has influenced a number of discussions on humanitarian intervention and R2P.\footnote{Wheeler and Dunne, “New Humanitarian Interventionism”} Pattison, for example, uses the case of East Timor as an example of the effective use of military force in the development of a hybrid model of intervention.\footnote{Pattison, “Humanitarian Intervention”} Elsewhere, Wertheim asserts that, along with Iraq in 1991, the case of intervention in East Timor represents “how war could save lives”.\footnote{Wertheim, “A Solution from Hell”, 161} Elizabeth and Perez also invoke the case in

\begin{footnotes}
11 Evans, \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, 7.
12 Sampford, \textit{From the right to Persecute}, 38.
13 Blair, \textit{Doctrine of the International Community}
14 Wheeler & Dunne, “New Humanitarian Interventionism”
15 Cotton, “Against the Grain”
16 Wheeler and Dunne, “New Humanitarian Interventionism”
17 Pattison, “Humanitarian Intervention”
18 Wertheim, “A Solution from Hell”, 161
\end{footnotes}
discussions over the role of state self-interest in intervention.\textsuperscript{19} As with Wheeler and Dunne, these works consider the dynamics between national and international factors only in terms of how they created the conditions under which the Indonesian government consented to intervention, rather than the government’s specific and decisive role in directly reducing violence on the ground.\textsuperscript{20} This body of analysis on the East Timor case has thus added to the general consensus over the capacity of military intervention to end mass atrocities.

Given the consensus outlined above, what concerns us in this paper is to interrogate the assumptions made about the influence of international military intervention on endings, and to improve understanding of the national arena of political decision making. The latter is frequently overlooked in the interventionist literature, including in the East Timor case. We interrogate the actions and forces at play within the regime responsible for the killings. This is in order to unpack how and why an apparently recalcitrant regime, responsible for over two decades of mass violence, eventually acted to end atrocities prior to international intervention in September 1999.

\textit{Moving focus from escalations to endings of mass atrocities}

The missing dimension we hope to shed light on here - the relationship between internal regime dynamics and mass atrocity endings - has been further precluded by another tendency within the interventionist literature. This is the tendency to confine the examination of internal state dynamics to the \textit{escalation} of mass atrocities, rather than their contribution to endings. This is evident in two ways:

First, as Bellamy, and Sampford and Thakur, describe, the question of national sovereignty within R2P is tied to the provision of an environment free of mass atrocities.\textsuperscript{21} Sovereignty, from this perspective, is sacrificed to external intervention in instances where the state is the perpetrator of mass atrocities. As the R2P doctrine is framed around the needs and actions of the international community, it is unsurprising that accounts of the termination of mass atrocities within this framework minimise the role of the national state. Our attention, here, to the role of the national state, and its constraints and actions during periods of regime change, aims to address these limitations within the R2P-framed literature.

Second, in the dominant R2P literature, mass atrocities are linked to chaotic transitional contexts, where the state is presumed to be in crisis. While elements of this assumption

\begin{footnotes}
\item[19] Elizabeth and Perez, “Beyond Good Intentions”
\item[21] Bellamy, “Realizing the Responsibility to Protect”; Sampford & Thakur, \textit{From the right to Persecute}
\end{footnotes}
might be true, the wider literature on mass atrocities shows that such acts can form part of a strategic goal of the perpetrating state, rather than being a chaotic side effect.\textsuperscript{22} But even in those cases, the strategic goals of violence can be overstated – as if, without external intervention, rogue states or state elements will never be persuaded to act otherwise, due to their own violent internal logic. The situation is usually more nuanced and more complicated: those states conducting or condoning mass atrocities may be in a leadership crisis, may have elements of the state acting beyond orders, and/or may be following a strategic logic, all at the same time. There may be chaos \textit{and} strategy wrapped up in the same mass atrocity.

We find that the main literature on endings to mass atrocities, framed around the R2P perspective, has taken such a predominantly international focus that it does not sufficiently unpack two crucial issues. These are, first, the internal politics of how perpetrating states and their leaders operate during periods of highly contested (rather than unopposed) armed conflict;\textsuperscript{23} and, second, why mass atrocities in such contexts rise and fall in response to leadership contests over controlling the state. The dominant literature’s bias towards examining the effects of the international system on mass atrocities, means that potentially important elite contests and political dynamics at the national and sub-national levels have not been adequately accounted. Recent comparative cross-country research, within which we situate our paper, has begun to address this bias with a new framework for analysing mass atrocity endings.

\textit{The new body of comparative mass atrocity ending research}

Within the new body of comparative mass atrocity ending research, several authors have identified that national political agendas have a significant effect on local decisions around mass atrocity endings, including in response to international agendas.\textsuperscript{24} This body of work builds on analyses of the \textit{causes} of genocide by Straus, Valentino and Wood et al, which variously attend to the nature of regimes and national politics during genocide.\textsuperscript{25} The new arena of work on mass atrocity endings, which we build on, specifically unpacks the interaction between national and local dynamics of mass atrocities, as well as how national regimes respond to influences from the international arena, when and where relevant to endings. This new research focus within the study of mass atrocities finds that the role of international intervention - where it has been relevant - is usually secondary to, or, at least, indirectly linked to, the more significant influence of national and local

\textsuperscript{22} Downes, “Desperate Times”; Wood et al, “Armed Intervention”
\textsuperscript{23} See Smith, “Indonesia”, on how the Indonesian regime acted very differently during periods when the international community did not contest armed conflicts that directly affected civilians
\textsuperscript{24} Conley-Zilkic, \textit{How Mass Atrocities End}
factors on those endings.\textsuperscript{26} The new body of cross-country comparative work on mass atrocity endings is in parallel with, although not directly related to, the now large body of critical work on the local or hybrid nature of peacebuilding, lead by MacGinty and Richmond.\textsuperscript{27} The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding analysis focuses on the post-conflict period, following the intervention of the international community in many cases, and explicitly considers the national and sub-national interactions between the activities of international peacebuilding organisations and actors, and those at the national and local level. Whilst our focus here is on the period prior to international intervention, rather than after its cessation, insights drawn from the local turn in peacebuilding scholarship, especially on the critical role of local actors in how ‘peacebuilding’ turns out, are also valuable here.

Our paper makes a new contribution to the empirical analysis of mass atrocity endings by taking this multi-layered mode of analysis to the East Timor case. While we recognise the undoubted effect the threat of credible international military intervention had on Indonesia’s final decision to accept international forces, our focus is on the internal dynamics of national and sub-national elements within the regime, as international pressure mounted. It was the national decision to end the Indonesian military action causing mass atrocities in East Timor that must interest us here, as atrocities ended prior to international boots landing on the ground. To reach this conclusion we consider a range of empirical data on the rise and fall of mass atrocities in East Timor, and generate new insights. We then consider the interaction between different elements of the Indonesian regime, and the escalation and de-escalation of atrocities, as political dynamics dramatically shifted through 1999.

The analytic shift that we make, from the international to the national, while simple, is nonetheless important because our data shows that mass atrocity trajectories in East Timor had largely terminated prior to international military intervention. In taking a more contextualised, nationally focused, and multi-layered analysis of the endings to mass atrocities in East Timor, in the context of the build up to international intervention, we therefore make a new empirical contribution to the literature aimed at understanding this important case. We also provide a new set of insights to the wider study of mass atrocity endings, by shifting analytical focus from consent (of the regime) to accepting international forces, onto the impact of decisions in the regime leadership on mass


\textsuperscript{27} MacGinty, \textit{International Peacebuilding}; MacGinty and Richmond, “The local turn in peacebuilding”; MacGinty and Richmond “The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders”
atrocity endings on the ground. We hope that both these actions will add to developing a more nuanced theory of mass atrocity endings.

**Mass atrocity trajectories in East Timor during the Indonesian transition**

In this section we present a mixed methods analysis of the trajectory of mass atrocities in East Timor. Within this, we combine the results of descriptive quantitative analysis of the extent of civilian killings with eyewitness accounts to analyse the ending to mass atrocities in relation to the international intervention. These eyewitness accounts include both the set of existing published accounts on the violence, and new qualitative data gathered through interviews and documentary footage. Through the combination of these data, we demonstrate that, contrary to the dominant narrative on this case, the key period of de-escalation occurred prior to the arrival of international forces. Following from the theoretical discussions above, we then turn to unpacking decisions at the national level to consider how the ending to mass violence was brought about.

**Data and Methodology**

Across the many examples of mass atrocities globally, the case of East Timor presents one of few opportunities for the mixed-methods analysis of endings in the manner to follow. This is due to the existence of a dataset of human rights violations collected by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) - one of very few examples of such datasets globally. This dataset facilitates descriptive analysis of trends in the level of civilian killing over time, in a manner not possible with eyewitness accounts alone. We have, however, selected a mixed methods analysis over a purely quantitative approach. This reflects the limitations inherent in quantitative datasets of civilian killings which, as discussed with reference to the outcomes of our analysis, includes the impact of errors in recollection, victim fear and reporting biases. The triangulation of data between sources therefore serves to minimise the scope for error, in a context in which sources are necessarily contested and partial.

Our analysis of the testimonies and other data provided to the CAVR has been undertaken using two datasets - the *Human Rights Violations Database* (HRVD) and the *raw testimony evidence*28. The HRVD was constructed on behalf of the Commission, and presents basic information on reported human rights violations between 1975 and 1999. The detail within the HRVD is limited by an anonymisation process, which is restricted to the month and district in which each killing took place. The HRVD is thus useful for the analysis of the distribution of killings between 1974 and 1999 as a whole, but has limited

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28 See Silva & Ball, “Human Rights Violations”
applicability to the analysis of the 1999 intervention alone.

To analyse the levels of killings within the immediate pre and post intervention periods, we used the raw testimony evidence dataset. This dataset has been constructed specifically for the purposes of this analysis through extracting information on civilian killings from the final report of the CAVR. In constructing this dataset, we cross-referenced estimates of civilian deaths within major concentrations of mass killing with two other investigations into the scope of the killing\(^\text{29}\) - favouring minimum estimates in all cases. Outside of those noted events, the small number of testimonies which do not include a precise date and number of deaths were excluded from the dataset to minimise potential sources of inaccuracy.

*Patterns of Civilian Killings*

Turning to the overall profile of killings shown in Figure 1, the spike in the level of killings in 1999 shown in Figure 1 attests to the exceptional nature of the violence that year, compared with recent Timorese history. Figure 2 confirms that this episode of mass killing was concentrated in the aftermath of the UN-supervised Popular Consultation in September, rather than as part of an escalation throughout 1999. The conventional account of the violence follows that, immediately after the announcement of the result on the 4\(^{th}\) September, widespread killings were perpetrated by militias armed by ABRI, often under the observation of ABRI\(^\text{30}\) and police\(^\text{31}\) personnel. The killings targeted alleged independence supporters\(^\text{32}\), those who fled to refugee camps in West Timor\(^\text{33}\), and the wider civilian population\(^\text{34}\). The ending to this episode of mass killings is then typically been ascribed to the arrival of Australian troops on the 20th September, as part of the *International Force for East Timor* (INTERFET).

[Figure 1]

[Figure 2]

By breaking down reported killings on a day-by-day basis through September 1999, we are able to examine more closely the impact of the arrival of international forces. As

\(^{29}\) Dunn, *Crimes Against Humanity*; Robinson, “East Timor 1999”  
\(^{30}\) CAVR, *Chega!,* 488  
\(^{31}\) Ibid  
\(^{32}\) Dunn, *Crimes Against Humanity,* 28.  
\(^{33}\) Achmad, “East Timorese Refugees”, 201  
\(^{34}\) Robinson, “East Timor 1999”; 49. CAVR, *Chega!,* 300; Dunn, *Crimes Against Humanity,* 28
shown in Figure 3, recorded civilian killings were at their greatest between the 5th and 11th of September, and had declined substantially by the arrival of INTERFET on the 20th September. Indeed, considering the moving mean of civilian killings shown in Figure 4, the average number of daily civilian killings had declined to a level similar to that of the pre-referendum result period by the date of INTERFET deployment. The data therefore indicate that factors other than the arrival of INTERFET troops in Dili were responsible for the rapid decline in the levels of killings observed.

[Figure 3]
[Figure 4]

This finding that the level of killings in September 1999 had declined substantially before the arrival of INTERFET is a significant departure from the general treatment of this case, as discussed previously. Given the extent of this departure, we consider and dismiss two alternate explanations for the trend observed in the data. First, it is possible that the number of unknown dates within the testimony evidence presented in the final report of the CAVR - given in Table 1 below - could distort the pattern of killings observed. Second, it is possible that issues with testimony evidence, particularly errors in recollection and survivorship amongst witnesses, have produced a skewed impression of the distribution of killings within this period.

Addressing these points in turn, there is no reason to suspect that a disproportionate quantity of those killings for which the precise date is unknown fall between the 11th and 20th of September. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, of those 25 killings for which a precise date is unknown but a range of dates is provided, only 6 have the potential to have fallen within this period. Nothing further can be added on the 20 killings for which the date is entirely unknown, but confidence is gained from the fact that even if all of these fell within the highlighted period, the decrease in the level of violence from its peak prior to the arrival of INTERFET would still be evident. Second, whilst concerns over the validity of testimony evidence in analysing patterns of civilian killings are legitimate, the small time period being studied means that there is no foreseeable variation in these factors which would explain the observed trend.

[Table 1]

Corroborating Evidence

The evidence available from the CAVR indicates that the level of civilian killings in East Timor had substantially declined prior to the arrival of INTERFET. To further corroborate
this, we conducted a review of the accounts produced by journalists, UN staff and other witnesses to the violence.

It is consistent across eye-witness accounts that militia-perpetrated violence began within hours of the independence result of September 4th.\textsuperscript{35} Two days later, Carter Centre observers\textsuperscript{36} describe not only the complete control of militias over Dili, but the massive scope of the destruction which had been unleashed\textsuperscript{37}. Satellite imagery captured on the 8th September confirms the intensity of destruction within this early period,\textsuperscript{38} with members of the UNSC delegation describing that mass looting and destruction had been unleashed in Dili by the 11th September\textsuperscript{39}. Outside Dili, militia violence and pressure from ABRI forced UNAMET District staff to retreat to their central compound on the 8th, and to evacuate entirely by the 14th. As such, the next point at which detailed information is provided from external or international sources comes with the arrival of INTERFET on the 20th. Our examination of archived documentary footage – which was locally recorded between the 15th and 18th September 1999 - showed images from Dili, with burning buildings, and sheltering civilians, with limited evidence of ongoing direct attacks on civilians by ABRI or militia during this period.

The situation in Dili when international troops arrived on the 20th has thus been described as one of almost complete destruction and displacement. However, multiple accounts of the deployment of INTERFET indicate that international troops faced little armed opposition on arrival in East Timor, as follows:

Following an uncontested deployment via Hercules C-130 - selected over the combat-capable Black Hawk helicopter\textsuperscript{41} - the initially tense exchanges between INTERFET and ABRI personnel did not result in outright combat. Indeed, there is no indication of shots being exchanged with ABRI in Dili as INTERFET troops established control over what remained of Dili’s infrastructure\textsuperscript{42}, nor as troops moved into the suburbs of Dili\textsuperscript{43}. On the role of the militia, whilst aggressive encounters occurred as INTERFET and ABRI personnel shared security duties over Dili port, displays and threats did not result in

\textsuperscript{35} Greenlees & Garran, \textit{Deliverance}, 198
\textsuperscript{36} Carter Centre, \textit{Postelection Statement}
\textsuperscript{37} Carter Centre, \textit{1999 Public Consultation}
\textsuperscript{38} Schimmer, \textit{Violence by Fire}
\textsuperscript{39} UNSC, \textit{Security Council Mission}, 5
\textsuperscript{40} Cristalis, \textit{East Timor}, 229
\textsuperscript{41} Breen, \textit{Mission Accomplished}, 28
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 35
\textsuperscript{43} The incident in Becora was amongst the most tense, but was “resolved after confrontation but without violence”. Kingsbury, \textit{East Timor}, 75
These accounts are corroborated by filmed interviews in Dili with Australian troops, which confirmed a lack of outward threats or combat exchanges between INTERFET and ABRI in the city. When questioned on the threat from ABRI, Australian soldiers are filmed on camera saying, “[w]e’ve had no trouble ... they’ve gone back in their cordons.”

The first exchange of fire between INTERFET and the militia documented in the accounts available is reported to have occurred on the 6th October - over two weeks after the international deployment. The incident, an ambush in Suai as INTERFET sought to clear routes from Dili, resulted in the deaths of four militia and injuries to two Australian troops. What Kilcullen describes as the largest clash between INTERFET and ABRI occurred five days later in the border village of Motaain, which was acknowledged by both sides as resulting from mutual confusion over the border with Indonesian West Timor. These events were, however, the exception to the general pattern of expansion of INTERFET to the border area, which saw troops arriving to communities from which ABRI and the militia had already retreated. Hence, whilst some encounters with retreating Indonesian troops and militias required skilful management by INTERFET, their expansion was largely unopposed.

These qualitative accounts thus corroborate the finding of the quantitative analysis: the reduction in the level of civilian killings in mid to late September 1999 preceded the arrival of international troops. The accounts available do not document instances of troops intervening in ongoing atrocities against civilians, there was no documented incidents of armed resistance provided by the Indonesian forces as international forces spread their control across East Timor, and the militia appear to have largely withdrawn along with TNI, ahead of INTERFET expansion.

**The national dimension to the ending of mass atrocities**

Now we have demonstrated that the mass killing of civilians in East Timor ended prior to the arrival of international troops, here we present our alternative thesis on why this happened, focusing on decisions made at the national political level, which had an impact on the local level. This is not to dismiss the role of international diplomacy entirely, a point to which the conclusions of these discussion returns, but rather to highlight the

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44 Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, 34
45 Film documentary footage of interviews with Australian troops in Dili, archive number MDV-99-0041 (dated 25/09/99), viewed by the author at the Centre Archives Max Stahl (CAMS), Dili, 3 May 2014.
46 Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, 70
47 Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 127
48 Smith & Dee, *Peacekeeping*, 46
national mechanisms by which the actions of the militias in East Timor were controlled by the Indonesian military, prior to the arrival of international troops. First, we outline the broad contest live in Indonesian politics in 1999, prior to and building from the referendum on East Timor’s status. Second, we outline the background to the pro-Indonesian Timorese militias, and highlight the important links between these militia and the hardline elements in the central military command. Third, we highlight the impact of martial law on ultimately reducing the levels of violence and associated atrocities prior to international intervention. Finally, we consider the important international influence on national decision making during this concentrated and contested period in Indonesian politics.

The Indonesian political context

Turning to the national political context, during the year after Suharto stepped down in May 1998, Indonesia’s political elite was a highly fractious group. Key amongst this group was the recently appointed President, Habibie, the nominated successor to Suharto, who was keen to be seen as a ‘reformer’ to both a domestic and international audience. These reformist inclinations were critical to how Habibie viewed the East Timor crisis, particularly to the view that a referendum on Timorese independence would demonstrate commitment to democratisation. This is despite Habibie sharing the objection to Indonesian withdrawal which was widespread in the political and military elite at the time. Indeed, Habibie believed that a democratic vote would support autonomy over independence, and would thus signal his reformist intent, whilst retaining Indonesian territorial integrity.

In this same context, General Wiranto, then Minister of Defence and Security, was also attempting to safeguard his long-term position. The situation in East Timor was equally central to this, with senior branches of the military and traditionalist politicians determined to retain the territory via military means, and reformists including Wiranto more open to Habibie’s democratic gambit. Wiranto’s relationship with Habibie had, however, become increasingly strained through mid to late 1999. The interdependent relationship between the civilian and military leadership had thus far survived the post-Suharto transition, but Habibie’s vulnerability in the run up to the presidential elections lead Wiranto to distance himself from Habibie’s campaign. This came to a head when Wiranto formally separated the military from Golkar, Habibie’s political vehicle, and

49 Interview with Lambang Triyono, Universitas Gadja Mada, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2015.
50 Lloyd, “Diplomacy on East Timor”, 84
51 Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 16 November 2015.
52 Ibid
removed himself from running as Habibie’s Vice-Presidential candidate.⁵³

Concurrent to the decision to distance himself from Habibie, Wiranto was also vying for control of the military against Prabowo Subianto, the renegade former commander of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), and later of Kostrad.⁵⁴ Kopassus forces had been extensively deployed in East Timor during Prabowo’s period of service, and his subsequent command from 1995-1998 saw a massive increase in recruitment amongst these units.⁵⁵ Loyalty to Prabowo stemmed from his reputation as a special forces commander - particularly in East Timor - as well as his past proximity to Suharto, and from those pursuing explicit Islamist political agendas.⁵⁶ Despite moves by Prabowo to improve relations with Wiranto in early 1999, the divide between them hardened over their approaches to the East Timor crisis, with Prabowo advocating the hardline approach popular amongst much of the military elite.

Far from confined to the political argument, amongst the means by which Prabowo wielded influence was through the exploitation of instability, which he orchestrated as a means of undermining Wiranto’s reputation on national security. This was on display within the uprisings of 1998, in which Kostrad - and other elements where loyalty to Prabowo was concentrated - were linked with the ‘provocateur’ groups that targeted the ethnic Chinese community.⁵⁷ This provocation was intended to undermine Wiranto’s control of the demonstrations, and involved troops committing abuses against civilians far outside of the formal chain of command.⁵⁸ This loyalty and willingness to work outside of the formal structures of the military far from ended with Prabowo’s dismissal from command in August 1998, particularly within Kostrad and Kopassus.⁵⁹

_The Timorese Militias_

The connection between the national political context outlined above, and the ending to mass violence in East Timor, comes to the fore when the background of this violence - and the background of the militias which perpetrated it in particular - is considered. Critically, whilst Wiranto was far from blameless in the mass atrocities which ensued⁶⁰, the militias who were its main perpetrators shared a complex set of loyalties with

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⁵³ Virgöe, “Impunity Resurgent”, 99
⁵⁴ Army Strategic Reserve Command
⁵⁵ _Kingsbury, Power Politics_, 117
⁵⁶ Ibid 180
⁵⁷ Purdey, “Victims in Reformasi Indonesia”, 614
⁵⁸ Gledhill, “Competing for Change”, 67
⁵⁹ Schulze, “East Timor Referendum Crisis”, 80
⁶⁰ Ibid
different elements of the fragmented military command. This included elements throughout the militia leadership with a close historical link to Kopassus, and with a high residual loyalty to Prabowo. As we now demonstrate, the termination of the violence was therefore the result of an internal power struggle within the military - with Wiranto gaining control over these elements within East Timor through the imposition of martial law.

Historically, the development and deployment of militia for military means formed part of the strategy by which ABRI sought to control the Timorese population. The overlap between the military and the militias is well documented, with the militias providing a partly deniable means of population control through brutal violence and intimidation, but under various elements of ABRI command. Whilst the use of militias was far from the sole creation of any individual, a key realisation of this was the creation of Garda Paksi in July 1995, a move funded and orchestrated by Prabowo. Emerging from this Garda Paksi leadership was Eurico Guterres, whose Aitarak militia are amongst the suspected of perpetrators of one of the largest massacres of 1999. Guterres was selected by Prabowo as the leader of Garda Paksi, along with several other protégés, and his actions were facilitated by many of Prabowo’s former subordinates and colleagues within ABRI and Kopassus. Prabowo was also linked to reactivation of Halilintar, which was amongst the first militia groups active in East Timor, and the acceleration of the training and arming of a number of Kopassus proxies.

The militias in East Timor active in 1999 emerged directly out of the remnants of these earlier groups, and were linked more closely with Kopassus than any other segment of the military. Indeed, the process of militia formation was deliberately accelerated in February 1999 with the deployment of two further Kopassus detachments, and Kopassus units deployed covertly into East Timor up to 5th September. The militia provided Kopassus a means of orchestrating violence in a manner which was overtly deniable, and which gave the helpful appearance of a civil conflict between Timorese groups. Prabowo, and those sections of the military which remained loyal to him in 1999, were thus deeply and intimately connected to the main acts of violence against

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61 Wandelt, “Prabowo, Kopassus, and East Timor”
62 Robinson, “People’s War”
63 Schulze, “East Timor Referendum Crisis”, 140; Kingsbury, Power Politics, 117
64 CAVR, Chega!
65 Van Klinken & Bourchier, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 89
66 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 121
67 Ibid
68 Van Klinken & Bourchier, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 146
69 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 122
Timorese civilians through 1999, and to the overall development and deployment of militias across East Timor. It was controlling Prabowo, and his loyalist elements, that was to become the priority for Wiranto in his search to control the military - and to assert his political dominance within the national arena.

The impact of martial law

The outcome of the Indonesian military power struggle throughout 1999 is a critical dimension for understanding the particular way that mass atrocities ended in East Timor in mid-September. In particular, it is vital to appreciate the concentration of loyalty to Prabowo amongst those militias and the Kopassus units which committed the majority of mass atrocities in East Timor, and were therefore the key to its ending. Far from simply signalling the transfer of power from Habibie to Wiranto, the key transformative act for reducing mass atrocity events on the ground in East Timor was the imposition of martial law from the 7th of September. The impact of this act has been largely dismissed elsewhere, but we find it was central to the ending to mass atrocities because of the transformations it entailed for ABRI command in East Timor, and for the relationship between troops and the militia.70

Following the declaration of martial law, and with it the transfer of power to the military in Jakarta, Wiranto placed Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri in charge of operations in East Timor.71 Syahnakri’s operational experience in East Timor, and a longstanding dispute with Prabowo, directly challenged Prabowo’s residual influence within the military, and, in particular, with those troops in East Timor which had been linked with his command.72 With the imposition of martial law, external troops were relocated to the territory to replace units compromised in their attachment to the militia, and to Prabowo.73 Wiranto also made approaches to those orchestrating the militia violence, including meeting with Guterres and other senior militia figures in Dili on the 11th September. These actions, along a meeting in Bali on the 9th, produced the clear demand from the military leadership to cease all extra-military operations, and demonstrated that Wiranto’s power over the military chain of command was resurgent.74

Concurrently with the restoration of Wiranto’s order over East Timor, martial law led to a partial restoration of internal military order, and the return of control over troops in

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70 Lloyd, “Diplomacy on East Timor”, 94
71 CAVR, Careers of Selected Officers, 2
72 Lowry, “Timor Timur”, 88
73 Moore, “Deciding Humanitarian Intervention”, 43
74 Crouch, “East Timor”, 165
East Timor to central military command - replacing the territorial structures which had responsibility up until that point. This process was gradually asserted as fresh troops replaced those closely connected to the militia across the territory, and consisted primarily of “Kostrad, marines and air force special forces” from outside of East Timor. These newly assigned troops were both far more loyal to their commanders and to central command than those who had been under territorial command in East Timor and, whilst sympathetic to the militias and to integration, they were not so deeply connected to either, and acted under the direct orders to withdraw the militias. Eye- witness accounts indicate that, with this chain of decisions, the internal chaos evident in ABRI in the early days of the violence was then bought under stricter control.

The influx of new troops to East Timor, and the restoration of a degree of internal military order did not, however, put ABRI into a direct peacekeeping role, operating against the militia, but instead prioritised the protection of civilian life. Owing to the fact that ABRI had worked so closely with militia groups since the 1975 invasion - and had directly facilitated the ongoing atrocities up until their ending - Syahnakri opted instead to use the troops under his command to relocate the militia to West Timor without direct military engagement. The characterisation of the early days of martial law as failing to produce the engagement necessary to save civilian life - and one in which substantial violence took place - is therefore accurate, but that assessment neglects the gradual impacts of the reassertion of order which came with this move. It was this reassertion of order - and with it control of elements within ABRI who were previously outside of Wiranto’s influence - which began the retreat of militia, and from this the de-escalation of violence against civilians seen in the data and eyewitness accounts.

Despite the gradual impacts of the new TNI policy on the ground, Wiranto’s actions in East Timor were widely judged to have failed at the time. Indeed the perceived failures of the TNI were a significant driving force behind the renewed force behind international military intervention. This was publicly expressed following the visit of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) delegation to Dili on the 11th September and the UNSC debate a day later. For these key international actors, the lack of rapid de-escalation in

75 Interview with Ian Martin, former UN Special Representative to East Timor - commenting on reports from the UN Military Liaison Officer based within the TNI’s HQ in Dili - London, 2 July 2014.
76 Ohnishi, “Coercive Diplomacy”, 67
77 Ibid
78 Interview with Martin, 2 July 2014.
79 Lowry, “Timor Timur”, 91
80 Robinson, “East Timor 1999” 47
81 Interview with Anwar, 16 November 2015, Jakarta; Jago, “INTERFET”
the violence in the first few days of martial law was sufficient to demonstrate that the leadership had no intention of bringing the killings to an end, and that the militias were continuing to perform the function ABRI intended of them. This has informed the conventional account of the ending to violence in East Timor, as it very publicly dismissed the efforts of Wiranto as at best ineffective, and at worst indicative of a will to allow the mass killing of civilians to continue.\textsuperscript{82}

Whilst rightly pointing to the lack regard for civilian life in the conduct of ABRI after martial law was imposed, to dismiss the \textit{overall} impact of this act in ending mass atrocities neglects three constraints on its immediate application, from the perspective of the military leadership. First, the ABRI operation had to manage the deeply embedded connection between troops and militia, which was deliberately cultivated across 24 years of occupation.\textsuperscript{83} This deep relationship reflected both the specific link between the militias and Kopassus discussed above, and the historic use of militias for extra-military purposes in conflicts across Indonesia since independence.\textsuperscript{84} The rapid and combative engagement of the still-rampaging militias by TNI was therefore very far from the agenda of the Indonesian command, even though doing so could have saved civilian life more rapidly.

Second, the loyalty of ABRI troops on the ground to the leadership in Jakarta was limited, and key elements of those troops with the closest connection to the militia were aligned with figures outside of the chain of command - particularly Prabowo.\textsuperscript{85} Given the factional division at the level of the leadership, the ABRI operation could not therefore take effect until these compromised troops had been directly replaced: it was not simply a matter of issuing a change in orders to existing troops. Realising the significance of this situation does not diminish the culpability of key elites in Jakarta - including Wiranto - in the mass atrocities throughout 1999, but it provides a qualification on the capacity of the Indonesian military under his command to immediately bring the mass atrocities to an end once the decision to control the troops actions had been taken.

Finally, partly owing to these complicating factors, Syahnakri did not fully control operations in East Timor until the 10\textsuperscript{th} of September - only one day before the UNSC delegation visited Dili.\textsuperscript{86} Combined with the competing loyalties of the troops on the ground, and their close links with the militia, these factors limited the extent to which the

\begin{small}
\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Lloyd, “Diplomacy on East Timor”, 93
\item Kingsbury, \textit{Power Politics}, 117
\item Kingsbury, \textit{Power Politics}, 121
\item Robinson, “People’s War”
\item Lowry, “Timor Timur”, 90.
\end{thebibliography}
\end{small}
imposition of martial law from the 7th September could have an immediate effect on violence against civilians, as expected by the international community. Rather, the impacts of martial law on the militias and ABRI were still being rolled out when the international community decided that the provision had failed. However, the impacts of martial law had been largely realised before the arrival of international troops ten days later. This finding adds an important nuance to the story of mass atrocities in East Timor, as it sheds more light on the responsibility of the Indonesian military not only for the atrocities but to their ending.

The international influence on national decision making

The final element to the puzzle of how mass atrocities ended in East Timor concerns the conditions under which the order for martial law came about. Far from demonstrating the concern for the loss of civilian life, it is our contention that the decision to implement martial law emerged out of a combination of economic and diplomatic pressure applied to the Indonesian regime. As the final element of this analysis, we briefly consider how the decision to implement martial law came about, despite the competing interests that Wiranto and Habibie had in maintaining control over the territory via military and militia action.

The international pressure applied to East Timor as the scale of the violence became evident on the world stage combined an unprecedented threat to Indonesia’s economy, with diplomatic interventions across regional and global actors towards the Indonesian government. These interventions included the prospect of sanctions to the flow of IMF and World Bank funds, which were keeping the Indonesian economy afloat in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, and - with them - any hope for Habibie to retain power in the upcoming Presidential elections. Bilateral pressure included direct approaches to Habibie, Wiranto and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas from Australia, Portugal and the US, facilitated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The fact that this was extended to include the loss of US military cooperation and direct condemnation from Australia demonstrated the extent to which international conditions had changed since the 1975 annexation and subsequent mass atrocities.

The range of international diplomatic and economic actors focused, first, on the need for Indonesia to contain the violence in general; second, on the need for national martial law

87 Lane et al, “IMF-Supported Programmes”
88 Jago, “INTERFET”, 387
89 Robinson, “How Genocide Was Stopped”, 191; Greenlees & Garran, Deliverance, 246
90 Soderlund & Briggs, “East Timor”, 251
to take effect; and, finally, galvanised around the need for Indonesia to accept an international military force. International actors were not solely focused on the much-analysed matter of achieving consent for international military intervention, as outlined in the wider literature, but instead on a whole range of actions that they wanted the Indonesian government to take in order to control the violence. Given that martial law was judged to have failed after the visit of the UN Security Council delegation on the 11th September, the dominant interpretation of this international pressure emphasises the latter aspect of international involvement alone, rather than considering the full range of pressures for action that were extended. In light of the relations between Habibie and Wiranto, the fact that the decision to implement martial law was taken at all, that it was subsequently pursued on the ground, and that it produced the ultimate series of effects discussed in the previous section, we find this demonstrates that the first two stages of international pressure were significant. They had a direct effect on the Indonesian government taking steps to assure an end to ongoing atrocities.

For Habibie, the decision to implement martial law meant acknowledging the failure of his bid to settle the East Timor crisis without ceding control to the military. Indeed, it meant that the lengths to which he had gone to resist the military solution to East Timor, including his willingness to damage relations with elements of the military establishment, had been wasted: he would now have to pass control of the situation to the military command. As discussed above, on the national Indonesian political context, Habibie’s decision occurred at a time in which political relations between Habibie and Wiranto had already substantially deteriorated, and where the balance of power in Jakarta had been slowly edging towards the civilian over the military establishment. Habibie’s final act of defiance within this delicate balance was expressed in the rejection of Wiranto’s request to implement martial law, only for it to be implemented by Presidential Decree hours later. These rapid and highly volatile exchanges at the highest level of Indonesian national politics demonstrate just how contested policy on East Timor was at the time, and how much changed so rapidly.

For Wiranto, despite signalling a victory over Habibie on East Timor, the decision to implement martial law was also driven by more than strategic interest. Given that it

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91 Jago, “INTERFET”; Dee “Coalitions of the Willing”
92 UNSC, Security Council Mission
93 Lloyd, “Diplomacy on East Timor”; Jago, “INTERFET”
94 Honna, Military Politics, 174
95 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 166
96 Ibid
97 Schulze, “East Timor Referendum Crisis”
entailed the withdrawal of ABRI, and, with them, the militias committing atrocities in the
name of integration, the decision entailed a reversal of the military's longstanding
commitment to Indonesian territorial integrity by any means. Indeed, through his
orders to Syahnakri that the militia be withdrawn, Wiranto was coerced into directly
paving the way for the loss of control of the territory. As was reported in the media at
the time, martial law also publicly displayed the extent to which Wiranto had lost control
of events in East Timor, including the elements within his own military establishment.
This did not ultimately damage Wiranto to the extent that it did Habibie, but the
implementation of martial law, and the manner in which it was pursued, far from
represented the realisation of Wiranto's overall political and military strategic interests:
indeed, it directly undermined them.

Martial law, and with it the withdrawal of ABRI and the militias, thus occurred despite the
politics interests of Habibie and Wiranto, and despite the political gulf which had
emerged between them, and between the civilian and military establishments over East
Timor. Whilst tracing the inner nuances of how these figures reacted to each element of
international pressure in the first days of the violence is beyond the scope of our analysis,
the fact that this occurred in a situation of unprecedented and mounting international
pressure provides a convincing chain of causation. Indeed, to remain defiant or internally
divided meant the likelihood of serious national economic decline, a direct threat to the
military budget, a loss of regional legitimacy, and the potential for pariah status
internationally. These are factors which neither Habibie nor Wiranto were ultimately
able to withstand, given their respective struggles for national political influence.

Concluding reflections

Our analysis of the dynamics of violence and political leadership, at the end of the
Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1999, has provided new insights into the causality
of endings to mass atrocities. Contrary to the framing of this case as a 'successful' account
of ending by international military intervention, we have determined two key revisions
to that argument. First, we found that mass atrocities ended before the international
military intervention took place, with the death rate falling dramatically in the days
preceding the arrival of international troops. Second, we have presented an alternative
thesis to the ending to mass civilian killings in this case, arguing that it was the crucial
decisions made within the Indonesian political and military elite that directly ended the

98 Nixon, “Indonesian West Timor”, 169
99 Crouch, “East Timor”, 177
100 Mydans, “Jakarta Concedes”
101 Honna, Military Politics, 175
violence.

Rather than a humanitarian response to the human toll of violence, the decision to implement martial law, and the (very) brief alignment between civilian and military leadership in Jakarta over this decision, had been produced by mounting international economic and diplomatic pressure, which quickly followed the height of the violence. Hence, whilst the evidence we have presented here leads us to reject the conventional account of how international military intervention ended mass atrocities in East Timor, this does not mean we conclude that the international community's actions were irrelevant in enabling an ending to atrocities in this case. This has been demonstrated through our analysis of the interests of key figures within the Indonesian establishment, in an environment of intense and mounting international diplomatic and military pressure. The question of how much, and which kind, of international pressure had the greatest effect on the national decision making process would merit further research into the inner nuances of the relations between these leading political figures at the time.

Further, our reframing of the East Timor case should not be seen as an argument against the significance of international action to enable endings to mass atrocities, and in no way questions the total culpability of the Indonesian administration for the atrocities of 1999. Our approach also does not dismiss the wider role of international military intervention in East Timor, such as creating the conditions for delivering humanitarian aid. Rather, our findings challenge the conventional framing of this case of as one of successful international military intervention to end mass atrocities. We also challenge the casting of the Indonesian regime as a “recalcitrant state”, unanimously opposed to withdrawal, as argued by Wheeler & Dunne. Instead, we find it was a highly contested state, the internal political dynamics of which were key to the nature of, and final ending to, the atrocities of 1999, through the eventual imposition of martial law.

In addition to reframing the existing empirical knowledge of the East Timor case, our analysis has contributed to the development of a broader methodological and analytical approach to understanding the role of effective humanitarian interventions. By examining the same set of events from a range of data perspectives, we have been able to process-trace the relevant decisions and actions at the national and sub-national level that contributed directly to mass atrocity ending. Much as the local turn in peacebuilding scholarship has highlighted the critical role of local actors in constructing how ‘peacebuilding’ eventually turns out, taking a more local turn in the analysis of a mass atrocity ending has provided a deeper insight into the decisions that caused its end in this case. We have not found elsewhere a similar attempt to map and measure the impact of...
international military interventions on endings to mass atrocities using mixed data sources. We find that taking such an approach has added both new theoretical and empirical insights to the analysis of mass atrocity endings, and we hope to develop it further in future comparative research.

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[Figures and Table follow]

Figure 1
Fig. 1
Civillian Killings (HRVD) by Year of Death, 1974-99
Figure 2

Fig. 2
Civilian Killings (HRVD) in 1999 by Month of Death

January  February  March  April  May  June  July  August  September  October
30/8: Independence Ballot Takes Place

4/9: Announcement of Ballot Result – Favouring Independence

7/9: Martial Law Implemented

11/9: UNSC Delegation Visit Dili

20/9: First INTERFET Troops Arrive in Dili

21/10: INTERFET Reach All Areas
Figure 4

Moving Average of Civilian Killings in 1999

31-Jul 31-Aug 30-Sep 31-Oct

7 Day Moving Average 10 Day moving Average
## Table 1: Civilian killings where the Precise Date is Unknown

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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22nd – 28th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Precise date unknown, no additional information</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
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