This is a repository copy of *Building Peaceful Citizens? Nation-building in divided societies*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/116323/

Version: Accepted Version

**Article:**

https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2017.1330383

---

**Reuse**
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item.

**Takedown**
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.
Building Peaceful Citizens? Nation-building in divided societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal:</th>
<th>Space and Polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manuscript ID:</td>
<td>Draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuscript Type:</td>
<td>Original Article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keywords:</td>
<td>citizenship, peace, civil society, governmentality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Nation-building and citizenship formation practices in divided and post-conflict societies often prioritise the promotion and entrenchment of ‘peace’ as a cornerstone for sustained socio-economic development and the strengthening of robust political institutions. Such agendas are often driven by international policy interventions that prioritise a double-agenda of peace- and democracy-building in ‘troubled’ states (Hippler, 2008), and which are rooted in dominant liberal and neo-liberal political and economic ideologies. Efforts to promote ‘peace’ are thus entwined not only in tensions over differing definitions, meanings and practices of ‘peace’, but also the scales at which ‘peace’ exists, and also questions regarding with whom ‘peace’ is supposed to be achieved. Interventions aimed at building democratic institutions are often linked to projects to (re)build the political institutions of the state and ‘roll back’ the state while promoting civil society as a key sphere to realise democracy and development (Cubitt 2013). Simultaneously, peace-building efforts seek to mould, through pedagogical practices, responsible citizens who participate in and legitimate those democratic institutions and promote – through their disposition and practices – peaceful citizenship. These peace-promotion activities inherently involve the expression and assertion of power in defining ‘peace’ and associated language and behaviours, and also defining who is included or excluded from belonging, citizenship and security.

Peace, therefore, needs to be acknowledged as a potential arena of governmentality on multiple scales. It is recognised that peace is a contested and complex concept, imbued with and deployed to exert power (see Galtung, 1969, 1990; Lloyd, 2012; Richmond, 2008a; Williams and McConnell, 2011; also the exchanges between Springer and Megoran: Megoran, 2011, 2014; Springer, 2014a, b). Dominant international pedagogies and policies for peace-building are often critiqued for being neo-colonial interventions which serve to entrench existing geopolitical power hierarchies and promote (neo)liberal ideologies. Meanwhile, local peace-building initiatives may be lauded as providing contextually-sensitive responses to violence and conflict, but attention must be paid to potentially exclusive aspects and marginalisation of claims to justice in the name of peaceful reconciliation (Lundy and McGovern 2008).
Across these scales, discourses of peace may be used to stifle dissent and criticism through exhortations to patriotism, unity, civility, and nation-building: in other words, peace and peace-building may be deployed as tools of governmentality.

Such discursive strategies do not go unchallenged; these practices often depend on pedagogies of citizenship to promote top-down notions of peace-building which are often disrupted in the learning process (Pykett, 2010). Everyday encounters with, and negotiations of, pedagogies of peace can encourage a reflexive scepticism rather than a uniform reproduction of prevailing liberal notions of peace or citizenship. In addressing peace-as-governmentality there is a need to understand the situated knowledges and contextual definitions of peace – in Koopman’s (2011: 193-194) words, to ‘unsettle “peace” by exposing how it is both portrayed and visualized, as well as practiced and materialized’. To do so allows us to understand peace as mutable and dynamic, ‘a socio-spatial relation that is always made and made again’ (Koopman, 2011: 194). The ‘goodness’ of peace not only makes this concept a useful technique of governance, but also gives it a productive ambiguity which allows it to be re-claimed and re-defined to suit counter-hegemonic political purposes that open up questions over the meanings and practices of ‘peace’ and the power inherent in dominant ‘liberal peace’ agendas.

The rest of this article explores peace as a tool of governmentality and the deployment of this in efforts to promote and produce ‘peaceful citizens’. The article begins with a conceptual exploration of ‘peace’, before examining the complex ways in which discourses of peace are used to promote nation-building and citizenship-formation in divided societies. This framework allows us to think about peace as a mechanism to facilitate specific forms of citizenship rooted in liberal approaches to peace, and thus to explore the problematic experience of these efforts in (politically) divided contexts.

**Defining Peace**

The perception of peace as a universal good means it is easily martialled into hegemonic political discourse, most commonly the ‘liberal peace’ orthodoxy dominant in Western policy realms (Boege et
al., 2009; Richmond, 2008a; Stokke, 2009). This concept of liberal peace is rooted in Kantian thought and tied to efforts to promote democratisation, founded on the belief that ‘democracies do not go to war with each other’ (Mac Ginty 2008: 143). At its core liberal peace is concerned with exporting liberal democratic and market ideals to (post)conflict environments and the promotion of stability, justice and the entrenchment of human rights therein (Chandler, 2010; Richmond 2008a, 2008b; Jones 2012). Such efforts not only require international co-operation but also underpin the Westphalian political and global economic systems, as well as the security and development (pre)requisites of the liberal democratic system: in other words, serving to entrench the status quo of international geopolitics and power relations (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). Thus, discourses of liberal peace are enrolled in governance projects across a variety of scales, from post-conflict state-building efforts (e.g. Manning 2006) to local peace-building programs seeking to mould democratic citizen-subjects through the promotion of participation, empowerment, and engagement (e.g. Manning 2007). Such efforts are orientated not only at constructing democratic institutions and actors (citizens), but also co-opting them as agents promoting liberal peace and democracy (Zahar, 2012; Jones 2012: 129).

However, such efforts to promote and entrench a formulaic and universal understanding of liberal peace fail to adequately acknowledge local historical and political contexts, the long and bloody history of liberal peace in the West, and the various power dynamics infusing the discourses, practices and politics of peace (Boege et al., 2009; Öjendal and Ou, 2015; Williams, 2015). The outcomes of these practices, critics argue, is the realisation in post-conflict settings of ‘virtual’ or ‘negative’ peace; the absence of war and existence of empty institutions providing a veneer of peaceful existence without promoting efforts to social integration, social justice and the overcoming of structural violence (Galtung, 1964, 1969; Richmond, 2008a; Sooka, 2011). Goetshcel and Hagmann (2009) offer a similar critique, arguing that peace-building missions focus on bureaucratic issues and produce an instrumentalist and depoliticised ‘donor peace’, a process illustrated by Stokke’s (2009) work on the elite-driven peace process in Sri Lanka. Richmond (2009: 324) argues that the failure of many liberal-peace-building interventions to achieve substantive change and peace has resulted in recipient communities remaining
as ‘subjects’ rather than ‘becoming agential, liberal citizens’. Building on this critique, it is evident that failing to acknowledge the grassroots social, political, and economic drivers of conflict, as well as local understandings of peace, risks exacerbating conflicts and of peace being viewed as an abstract outcome or status rather than a grounded, everyday process (see Lloyd, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008; Öjendal and Ou, 2015; Williams, 2015).

Recognising peace as an ongoing process exposes the multi-scalar politics and power relations that are continually negotiated to produce socially-, spatially- and temporally-specific forms of peace (Williams, 2015). These engagements underpin ideas of ‘hybrid’ and ‘everyday’ peace (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2009; Williams, 2015) while providing space to think through different conceptions, forms and understandings of peace and violence as physical, structural, psychological, emotional, cultural, and representational (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Lloyd, 2012). These ideas have emerged in response to a key critique of liberal peace approaches, namely that liberal approaches can reproduce the individualism associated with (neo)liberalism while overlooking the indirect and structural forms of violence which undermine peace-building efforts by ‘replicating the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the conflict in the original instance’ (Ross, 2011: 198). Such criticisms often call for a focus on social justice and greater engagement with the power relations that frame efforts at peace-building – dynamics which may be deployed by elites to disrupt or prevent the realisation of social justice and peace (Richmond, 2008a: 446; Williams, Megoran, and McConnell, 2014: 14). Mac Ginty (2010: 394) summarises these critiques, arguing that liberal peace ‘is an essentially conservative and realist philosophy that reinforces the position of powerholders… [and thus] becomes a neoliberal peace and engages in “aggressive social engineering”, whereby the private sector is privileged over notions of the common good’.

In response to the liberal peace discourse, the ‘local turn’ in peace literatures emerged during the 1990s (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). This approach focuses on the agency of individuals and communities to realise peace rather than on higher-level state- and peace-building agendas (Paffenholz, 2015). The
local turn prioritises contextually-rooted and bottom-up approaches to sustainable peace-building while recognising that the ‘local’ is not simply a cartographic location but is a more holistic collective of people, institutions and other factors that inform and frame any peacebuilding context (Schierenbeck, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Furthermore, emphasis is also placed on ensuring critical recognition of local power dynamics and the agency of all involved actors and their negotiations of and entanglements with broader power structures and influences (Schierenbeck, 2015). Thus, concerns often focus on local institutions and issues of accountability, transparency, governance and legitimisation of decisions and decision makers (Schierenbeck, 2015).

Critics of the local turn have noted a tendency to homogenise, in dichotomous ways, local and global actors and reify the local as a source of resistance or opposition to liberal peace agendas or to assume the local is readily co-opted into these agendas (Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; Williams, 2015). Instead, the importance of ‘placing’ peace is linked to recognising how the local is a site of contestation and negotiation of multiple peaces, violences and peacebuilding agendas (Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; Williams, 2015). This effort represents a move beyond the binary dichotomy of local and global or vernacular and liberal forms of peace, and towards notions of ‘hybrid’ and ‘everyday’ peace. This idea of ‘hybridity’ provides for recognition not only of the ambivalence and agency of multiple actors in peace processes (while avoiding essentialising the different agents involved) as intertwined and implicated in liberal and illiberal manifestations of peace governance (Paffenholz, 2015: 863). This approach allows for peace to be recognised not as an inevitable outcome of structural process, but as a ‘highly contingent’ situated practice or social construction (Kobayashi 2009, p. 825; Williams, 2015). This allows for the development of contextually-sensitive engagements that acknowledge multiple actors, scales and spaces as implicated in everyday peace and violence: from the intimate and domestic, to the communal, national and international (Dutta et al., 2016; Lloyd, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008, 2010). As Richmond (2009: 331) outlines, this provides the foundations for a ‘post-liberal peace’ or an ‘everyday peace’ grounded in a ‘hybridized form of peacebuilding, aware of its built-in dynamics, of its own structure and agency issues, and of the dangers of depoliticization’. 
Recognising the multiple power relations, scales and discourses at play in contextual negotiations of peace informs Williams’ (2015) call to ‘place peace’, and the need to understand peace as an ongoing process (rather than a status) comprising multiple layers of understanding and practice (Dutta et al., 2016; Williams, 2015; see also Staeheli, 2010). Everyday peace, therefore, is not only contextually rooted and dependent upon individual agency and capacity to negotiate the power dynamics of both governance structures and informal spheres of interpersonal and intergroup interaction. Rather, it is ‘the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and minimize conflict and awkward situations at both inter- and intra-group levels’ (Mac Ginty, 2014: 553).

This thinking allows for greater recognition of the everyday encounters with power, violence and peace, and the need to understand these in terms of intimate and embodied experience (see Brickell, 2015; Kobayashi, 2009; Pain, 2015; Richmond, 2009), resonating with feminist geopolitics approaches to peace and conflict as everyday, embodied practices (Hyndman 2000).

Williams and McConnell (2011: 929) similarly advocate for more research on the multiple sites and scales at which ‘peace is differentially constructed, materialized and interpreted’ in different places. This entails widening the frame of analysis to include ‘peace-ful’ concepts such as ‘tolerance, friendship, hope, reconciliation, justice, cosmopolitanism, resistance, solidarity, hospitality, and empathy’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930). In so doing, however, there needs to be awareness of and sensitivity towards both the discursive power of these terms (and their potential use as tools of governmentality) and the assumed universal meanings and acceptance of these ideals. As Lloyd (2012) reminds us, different groups of people and different institutional actors deploy terms like war, peace, and violence in different ways, constituting a field of discursive struggle over the meanings of violence and peace. For instance, justice can be understood in multiple ways and based on varied priorities and conditionalities – when talking of justice, are we referring to retributive, restorative, transitional or another form of justice? Do the ideals which underpin each of these approaches have traction and acceptance locally, or are they also contested, imposed constructs? As Mutua (2015) discusses, while transitional justice may often be lauded as a grass-roots basis for post-conflict justice, the underpinning assumption of a
universal understanding and acceptance of human rights is flawed, and the prioritisation of political and civil rights over social and economic rights may overlook local conditions and priorities. Thus, the need remains to engage with questions of power in peace, by asking who benefits from certain formulations of peace and what work these discursive practices perform (Williams et al., 2014) as well as how dominant approaches to/understandings of peace spread and how the liberal scripts of peace are learnt and reworked through networks of power and influence (see Megoran, 2011; also Jeffrey and Staeheli 2015).

By picking apart the contingencies of peace, highlighting mundane peaceful processes and challenging the dominant discourses of liberal peace, we can open up hermetically sealed notions of peace to critical examination in order to identify potential forms of power and violence concealed within. Through such practices, it is possible to question the political processes which, in promoting liberal peace, may result in the ‘replication of the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the conflict in the original instance’ (Ross, 2011: 198) and hinder the realisation of social justice and substantive peace (see Richmond, 2008).

**Peace And Governmentality**

The promotion of liberal peace–building agendas is often intended not only to maintain international political and economic stability, but also to foster the spread and entrenchment of Western liberalism (Hippler, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). Approaches to and policies for peacebuilding reflect underlying political concerns and as such vary over time and space, and reflect the priorities and interests of the ‘interveners’ (Hellmüller 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). For instance, we see how the priorities of the UN’s Peace Building Fund – to promote peaceful conflict resolution, economic revitalisation and administrative rebuilding – prioritise democratic political stability and economic growth as foundations to realising peace (Boege et al., 2009; Stokke, 2009). While the specific priorities and activities favoured by different donors and actors vary, there is often a convergence of outcomes.
around the production of peaceful citizens and institutions of democracy, including a key role for civil
society (Stephenson and Zanotti, 2012;).

Integral to such practices are efforts towards the production of peaceful, democratic citizens who will
both facilitate the development of, and respect the authority of, state institutions and agencies charged
with providing stability, security and social control to maintain peace and repress alternative sources of
violence (Hippler 2008). Discourses of peace and reconciliation are often deployed in profoundly
powerful and political ways through formal and informal education strategies promoting particular
forms of participation, empowerment and engagement and moulding democratic citizen-subjects as
agents for both democracy and peace (Jones, 2012; Zahar, 2012). Peace, therefore, is often used as a
tool of governmentality, a (neoliberal) technique of government used to achieve security through
encouraging self-management by promoting the production of specific kinds of citizen-subjects who will
be productive, supportive members of the nation (Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001).

The quest to develop ‘peaceful citizens’ can therefore be seen as in keeping with the desire of states to
build citizens as governable political subjects and community members (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).
Such practices are foregrounded by citizenship formation projects which seek to inculcate certain
approaches to and embodiments of citizenship. The renegotiations of these by citizens(-in-the-making)
demonstrate that citizenship is a site and process of political struggle (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).
Citizenship formation programmes, meanwhile, seek to root citizenship not only in the status of being a
citizen but also in the emotional connections and practices associated with this belonging (Osler and
Starkey, 2005). These efforts are orientated towards producing ‘good’ citizens who actively participate
in political, social and economic life in specific ways (Isin, 2009; Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).

Citizenship education programmes, whether formal or informal, embody practices of governmentality:
they are aimed at producing self-disciplined citizens who are productive and constructive members of
society. However, such pedagogies and ideals of citizenship are contested and renegotiated by citizens(-
in-the-making) (Pyckett, 2010). Citizenship is not simply a top-down set of structural conditions, but is
remade through the agency of those claiming and reworking the meanings of both official narratives of
belonging and the claiming of alternatives spaces and practices of citizenship (Barbero, 2012; Lazar and
Nuijten, 2013). Within these practices, peace operates as both a core value – often linked to social
justice – and as a tool of governmentality. The deployment of a dominant narrative of peace – not only
as an ideal but with associated practices, behaviours and dispositions – can marginalise space for
dissent and a critical public sphere, producing a procedural rather than substantive version of peace
which perpetuates hierarchies of power (Durrheim, 1997; Foucault, 2008; Hammett, 2010; Mahrouse,
2006; Waghid 2009).

Discourses and pedagogies of peace in post-conflict societies frequently utilise ideals of
cosmopolitanism to promote ideals of (social) justice, care and non-violence (Osler and Starkey, 2003).
Through such interventions efforts are made to mould and govern citizens, providing a framework for
their relations with each other, as well as with ideals of peace, tolerance, reconciliation and democracy
(Durrheim, 1997). The permeation of peace- and democracy-building agendas into citizenship ideals are
evidenced in both civic education materials as well as in funding and other support for citizenship
development and peacebuilding (see Marshall and Staeheli, 2015; Nagel and Staeheli 2014). The
dominance within such efforts of Western liberalism (and thus, liberal peace ideals) risks not only
overlooking but also actively excluding local contextual factors, understandings and histories that may
be integral to realising substantive, sustainable peace: as Richmond (2009: 329) reminds us, we need to
ask “What type of peace is produced and for whom?“.

The projection and reception of particular understandings of peace can therefore determine not only
who is included or excluded from the ‘peaceful’ nation, but also which histories, injustices and identities
form part of both the peacebuilding process and the legitimating narrative of the nation. Who belongs is
thus not simply a legal administrative concern but a potentially divisive socio-political process rooted in
the social construction of citizenship and both historic and contemporary regional, ethnic, religious and
other divisions (Bah, 2010). These concerns highlight the importance and complexity of developing a
narrative of collective history of a divided society both in resolving contested claims of belonging and in reconciling histories of division, oppression and conflict between groups of citizens (Bah, 2010). Thus, if liberal peacebuilding depends upon the emergence of a liberal state in which all citizens are treated equally, then a reciprocal dynamic is required: governments and political leaders must provide the conditions for liberal citizenship and be accountable to the people for the people to ‘act’ in expected ways (Richmond, 2009; see Hammett, 2008 for an example of when this fails).

These complexities have been identified in various divided societies, from the difficulties of remembering and discussing the injustices of apartheid while seeking to build a multi-racial South Africa (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013) to the deployment of a ‘culture-of-peace’ narrative in Guatemala (Oglesby, 2007). As Oglesby (2007: 80) observes, the culture-of-peace pedagogy is a powerful tool of governmentality, instilling an individualized notion of rights while delimiting boundaries of acceptable memory. By placing responsibility for society’s failings back on the individual citizen, this framework instructed ‘peaceful’ ways of being embedded in a liberal democratic subject (Oglesby, 2007). Thus, while this discourse of peace opened up a space to talk about violence and war the discourse itself was limited to a closed-loop tautological argument about a cultural of violence being the cause of the violence.

Marshall (2014) has similarly argued in the case of Palestine that interventions promoting ‘peaceful’ forms of expression among Palestinian youngsters may themselves be forms of violence, foreclosing potentially productive political understandings of the Israeli occupation. Promoting vague notions of peace obscures the inherent structural inequalities of asymmetric warfare, limiting young people’s political understanding of violence in ways that damage their sense-making and resiliency (Sousa and Marshall 2015). Exacerbating these concerns are the agendas and histories of those providing and receiving messages of peaceful citizenship, meaning these stakeholders also use their own agency and experience to contest and negotiate the messages and ideals being communicated (Hammett, 2008; Jones, 2012: 127; also Staeheli and Hammett, 2010, 2013).
While peace may have the potential to build inclusive citizenship and realise social justice, processes of peace are imbued with power and practices of governmentality meaning they ‘more often conceal[…] and perpetuate[…] uneven relations of power’ (Williams, 2015: 178). Williams (2015) goes further, cautioning the such practices – which we argue are forms of governmentality – are often used to develop narratives of violence and (in)security that provide the discursive foundations for illiberal mechanisms to produce ‘liberal’ peace. These discussions highlight how deeper understandings of the ways in which – and outcomes of – liberal peacebuilding projects highlight the necessity to go beyond conceptualising peace, conflict and in/security as technical concerns, and confront the political, social, historical and economic contributors to peace and violence, as well as the governmental power of discourses of peace.

Experiencing and Contesting ‘Peace’

As outlined above, ‘peace’ in peace-building programmes is often ‘liberal peace’ focussed on promoting democracy and preventing conflict (Jones, 2012). Drawing upon ongoing research addressing youth citizenship promotion as a mode of peace-building, this section briefly examines the efforts of NGOs to foster peace through the production of peaceful citizens in BiH and Lebanon. Despite very different historical and political contexts, many NGOs of varying size in both countries take strikingly similar approaches to promoting peace through encouraging youth citizenship and engagement. As part of efforts to foster dialogue, tolerance, and reconciliation, for example, many youth-focused peace-building efforts emphasize leadership and organizational skills, entrepreneurialism, project management and budgeting. Moreover, there is an overriding emphasis on addressing local, practical problems relevant to youth and working on achieving immediate, tangible solutions including organizing park clean-ups, school renovations, and playground construction. Such projects not only underscore how youth can ‘make a difference,’ but are also supposed to increase trust between groups. Significantly, however, organizers also view these localized peace-building and citizenship promotion
projects as enhancing trust between individuals and government bodies. Such efforts seek to create peaceful and tolerant individuals, and also employable and productive citizens.

Although such youth citizenship promotion across these distinct contexts draw upon similar techniques of neoliberal governance (including an emphasis on individual responsibility, empowerment, and volunteerism), these is not a frictionless uniformity in their application or outcomes. In both contexts, the terms upon which such peace-building/citizenship promotion efforts are based were highly contested, revealing divergent understandings and priorities among donors and NGOs. In Lebanon many NGOs avoid using the term ‘peace’ or ‘peacebuilding,’ which has connotations of peace with Israel. Instead what many NGOs in Lebanon aim for is ‘silm ahli’ meaning a civil peace, or living together (International NGO, Lebanon, 28 Oct. 2014). In BiH some NGOs reported a suspicion or cynicism surrounding terms like ‘reconciliation,’ ‘dialogue,’ and ‘tolerance’ as being at best ‘cheap’ and meaningless or at worst concealing a hidden Western donor agenda (International NGO, BiH 3 July 2013). Moreover, reconciliation has the connotation of forgiveness without accountability or justice for crimes committed during the war. At best, what many NGOs aim to enhance is understanding and eventually trust.

These divergent understandings of ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ illustrate the need to recognise how intersections of geopolitics and regional histories inform their deployment in citizenship pedagogies. The utilisation of terms like ‘silm ahli’ and ‘trust’ connotes a form of ‘negative peace’, one where there is simply an absence of war or conflict. There is little sense of the possibility of a near-times realisation of a more ‘positive peace’, one in which an absence of war is supplemented by greater social justice (a lack of indirect violence (Roberts, 2008)). This also indicates a fragility to peace in this citizen-building process; peace is correlated with tolerance rather than meaningful reconciliation (people living together but not in a ‘normal’ relationship). Within this context, peace-building projects are caught in a nexus of power relations, linguistic nuances and contested realms of governmentality. Peace thus becomes a site – and term – of contestation, one that reflects religious difference, geopolitical tensions and
experiences of partially-delivered citizenship, and that is rooted in a history of conflict and division: the scars of which remain evident today, but which is largely silenced in discussions of peace- and nation-building.

Despite the plasticity or emptiness of terms like ‘trust’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘peace,’ there is nevertheless a certain uniformity to youth citizenship promotion projects in Lebanon and BiH that seek to foster peace through practical, locally oriented youth engagement activities. For example, we see how NGOs working to promote youth citizenship and engagement utilise direct actions and practical involvement of youth in community-based or community-orientated projects to both promote a sense of responsibility linked to actions of citizenship and belonging in ways that offer alternatives to division and sectarianism. In creating spaces of civic participation, these moments provide opportunities for interaction and engagement between young people from different social groups outside of ‘formal’ spaces of politics. The aspired-for outcomes of such contact is increasing trust (as going beyond simply tolerance) between young people, and well as between young people and local or national institutions.

Allied to these efforts, we see how various endeavours seek to produce tolerant individuals who can instil peace in their local communities through a focus on practical cooperation. Rather than addressing contentious issues, organizations seek to create neutral spaces for dialogue to take place through concrete collaboration, including organizing collective activities –practical material or social interventions, sporting activities and tournaments, etc—for young people in divided schools. Though many recognize that continued social distance prevents sustained inter-group cohesion, what such activities aim for is transformation in individual behaviour and attitudes, including the capacity to listen and speak non-combatively, and an enhanced trust and understanding of others (BiH NGO 3 July 2013).

Significantly, just as in Lebanon, such actions are seen as increasing trust among young people and between citizens and local government. In BiH, this focus on local issues is, in part, a reflection of the politically paralyzing complexity of national-level governance institutions (consisting of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which itself is subdivided into ten autonomous
cantons, as per the 1995 Dayton Agreement.) Although Lebanon’s power-sharing government is similarly hampered by political infighting and stalemate, national institutions like the army and a sense of overarching Lebanese identity garner widespread cross-sectional support and acceptance. Nevertheless, in both BiH and Lebanon there is an emphasis on building peace through producing peaceful citizens who are trustful and trustworthy, as well as accountable to and active in their local communities even when government bodies are not.

What these various peace-building through citizen-building projects have in common is the aim of embedding trust, tolerance and dialogue in daily life and mundane places. Promoting trust as a cornerstone for peace-building recognises how distrust contributes to division and conflict, that trust can be both acquired and lost and is a vital commodity for fostering positive inter-community and government-community relations. In divided societies, it is often the marginalised and poorer who feel most distrust towards governments and elites. The danger in such situations is that a sense of exclusion, distrust and un-entitlement (Hammett, 2008) may build, pushing groups and individuals away from a common, civil, peaceful citizenship.

Distrust between citizens and the state contributes to inter-communal tensions and conflict, meaning that peace-building in divided societies requires more than the simple replication of Western liberal democratic institutions. Rather, the realisation of meaningful – and contextually appropriate – democracy, represented through functioning and accountable institutions and practices of democracy are necessary to achieve peace. However, the process of building ‘real democracy’ and substantive peace is never straightforward and often requires directly confronting the barriers meaningful democratic participation. Such thinking builds on ideas from transnational justice scholars, who argue that peace-building strategies must include efforts towards social justice, reconciliation, emotional reparations and both economic and socio-political security at multiple scales (Pillay, 2011). In other words, a (perceived or actual) lack of equality or any opportunity to overcome (individually or collectively) marginalisation can undermine peacebuilding; as Murtagh and Keaveney (2006: 188) argue...
peace requires ‘new spaces of hope [for greater social justice be offered] to a beleaguered underclass’.

Failures to address social injustice may undermine efforts to build peaceful citizens, as citizens (rightly or wrongly) perceive themselves unfairly subjected to various forms of state-backed violence or denied protection from non-state-backed forms of violence (see Hammett, 2008; Roberts, 2008; Zahar, 2012).

In contexts marked by division and injustice, the promotion of peace and of ‘peaceful’ citizens therefore requires greater attention to the need for states to hold greater legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens due to historically developed distrust arising from the suppression of dissent and (sometimes violent) exploitation of citizens and civil society by ruling (political) elites (Roberts 2008).

The rebuilding of trust, as necessary to underpin stability and peace, can be achieved through the appropriate use of and control over legitimate use of force, the delivery of social/public goods provision, and ensuring the improvement of living standards for all (Roberts 2008), and – the second issue – the use of discourses of ‘peace’ in inclusionary ways that continues to provide space for dissent and critical opposition. However, discourses of peace and peaceful citizenship can also be used in exclusionary and oppressive ways, stifling opposition or dissent and turning ‘peace-building’ in to ‘pacification’: peace as governmentality to produce self-disciplining citizen-subjects. In seeking to construct ideological consensus (or hegemony) such practices, either directly or indirectly conducted, contribute to the emergence of a post-political context within which political and philosophical disagreements are closed off and arenas of debate constrained, producing a form of liberal tolerance (Gill et al., 2012). Peace, therefore, can be deployed for progressive and regressive political purposes, either as a means towards greater social justice or as a tool of governmentality that protects the status quo and can result in a partial peace: peace for one group while entrenching violence and injustice for another (see Alatout, 2009; Baker, 2003).

Conclusions

The discussions above highlight the emergent tensions around how peace is defined, negotiated and practiced within a wider temporal processes and a specific political context. Although many
practitioners are aware of the deployment of peace as a ‘mechanism for the transmission of Western-specific ideas and practices’ (Mac Ginty, 2008: 144), they also often pursue their own goals for systemic change under a broader conceptualization of peace. Although the practices and interventions of these organisations are intended to foster trust and the institutionalisation of nonviolent conflict management (Zahar, 2012: 74), the demands these organizations make for meaningful democratic participation and accountability may also challenge the very institutions of governance that donors see them as maintaining. Within these efforts, a key problematic remains the reliance upon liberal peace as a universal concept and one applied without sensitivity to context, temporality of conflict, historic social injustices, and the presence or absence of a common sense of nationhood or belonging (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008). As Schierenbeck (2015) reminds us, local contextual understanding is vital for sustainable peace, but this must not be based upon pre-conceptions of who, what, where and when the ‘local’ is as this will undermine peacebuilding engagements.

Disentangling the complex interplay between and deployment of multiple (and contested) meanings of peace, democracy, and security are integral to understanding efforts to build peace through the terrain of citizenship. The intricacies of these negotiations highlight how the pedagogies of peaceful citizenship are continually challenged and adapted to fit local circumstances and demands. Key questions within these negotiations – ones we raise here but do not offer answers to – are what are the limits to peace? Whose version of peace is to be maintained? In the quest for ‘peace’ what kinds of peaceful citizens are imagined, desired and created? If it is only governments that are responsive to their citizens, efficient in service delivery, and equitable in protection of rights, that can maintain the necessary legitimacy and authority to secure peace, do pedagogies of peaceful citizenship potentially prevent the emergence of such a state by delegitimizing ways of holding the state accountable other than participation in the formal democratic process? In other words what kind of peace is being promoted, peace between citizens, or passive citizens who maintain their civil peace with the state?
References:


URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cspp


URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cspp


Firstly, our thanks to the reviewers for their careful and considered reading of our manuscript. We have endeavoured to respond constructively to the comments raised, while keeping within the length-limits of the journal. Our revisions are detailed below:

Reviewer: 1

A) At the moment it is not entirely clear what purchase or originality this approach brings, beyond arguing for a situated approach to peace vis-à-vis top down liberal peace projects, as others have done.

We have sought to draw the originality of the paper out further – namely, the engagement with peace as a tool of governmentality. To do this, we have rewritten the introduction to the paper to make this argument far clearer, and have sought to draw this through the entire paper in a more coherent and high-profile manner.

B) Much has been done to unpack ‘peace’ but similar (albeit briefer) treatment is required of your approach to citizenship.

We have added in a few brief comments on this, however the restrictions of word count etc mean this discussion is brief. We hope the new additions address this concern.

C) Justice - briefly and tantalisingly mention the relationship between citizenship, peace and justice but don’t take the opportunity to elaborate here in more detail

Again, a few further comments have been added but the restrictions of word length mitigate against developing this in great detail. Also, this specific discussion is something of a tangential aspect of the paper so to pursue in too much depth would, we feel, be something of a distraction.

D) I was surprised not to see Oliver Richmond’s work on ‘hybrid peace’ mentioned, and a look at Philippa Williams’ book on peace and citizenship might be worthwhile.

Thank you for highlighting these texts – they have been consulted and included in the revised submission, along with a further set of papers which we hope have helped us draw out some of the nuance of our argument further.

E) The paper is very well written, however it requires a thorough edit and double check of references where a number are omitted from the bibliography.

Much of the paper has been rewritten, and the rest has been proof-read. We have also double checked the reference list and (we hope!) picked up and added-in the missing sources from the reference list.

Reviewer: 2

F) The purpose of the paper is too broad and vague, and the larger part of the article reads like a general and somewhat unfocused review of peace studies

We hope that the revised introduction provides a clearer and more focused starting point for the paper. The reworking of the rest of the paper should also have provided a more active engagement with the key idea/argument being presented and ensured a more substantive
discussion of the key concepts utilised in this document – specifically around notions of peace as
governmentality and the efforts to manifest this in everyday life through the construction of
peaceful citizens.

G) The discussion of international peacebuilding is overgeneralized.

This is a valid point, and one we hope to have addressed with the rewriting of the paper which has
strengthened the engagement with the political aspects of peace(building) and the complex and
heterogeneous dimensions to this.

H) The case study is not sufficiently integrated with the overall agenda. I find that the article has two
big components, one theoretical and one contextual-empirical, with relatively weak links between
them.

We have tried to strengthen the links between the sections of the paper. However, as the
empirical component is intended as illustrative rather than substantive we have instead reduced
this section while bolstering the theoretical materials.

I) There is a striking absence of reflections on research methodology.

Some comments on methodology are included in the revised manuscript.