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The External Struggle against Apartheid: New Perspectives

Simon Stevens

**Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order**
Ryan M. Irwin

**The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, c. 1919–64**
Rob Skinner

It has become a cliché to observe that the global anti-apartheid movement was one of the largest, most widely supported, longest sustained, most significant, and most successful transnational movements of the twentieth century. The movement was surprisingly little researched while apartheid in South Africa continued, but since South Africa’s first nonracial democratic elections in 1994, there has been a steady trickle of studies on the struggle against apartheid outside South Africa itself. That trickle is rapidly becoming a flood: in particular, doctoral dissertations on the subject are proliferating, though many of those already completed have not—or not yet—been published. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid by Rob Skinner and Gordian Knot by Ryan Irwin are two of the first of these recent dissertations to have been published as monographs.

Whereas a high proportion of earlier studies of external anti-apartheid activism were written by former participants, Irwin and Skinner are from a generation of scholars who did not themselves participate in the events and movements they analyze. Both books are representative of an emerging stream of more detached and more critical scholarship on the global anti-apartheid movement. Moreover, whereas earlier studies of the external anti-apartheid movement usually adopted a national frame of analysis, studying action against apartheid by or within a single state, Irwin’s and Skinner’s studies reflect the recent “international turn”: both are based on multi-archival research on three continents—Africa, Europe, and North America—and are focused on the international and/or transnational connections and activities of those who sought to contribute to ending apartheid from outside South Africa.
Beyond these similarities, *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid* and *Gordian Knot* differ in their chronological focus, their analyses of the strategy and ideology of the external anti-apartheid movement, and the actors they choose to study. Each of these issues is ripe for reexamination: this essay addresses each in turn, highlighting the ways in which Irwin’s and Skinner’s groundbreaking studies advance the study of the external anti-apartheid movement and the avenues for future research that they suggest.

Strikingly, *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid* and *Gordian Knot* are both centrally concerned with periodization. Indeed, Irwin has represented his project as “a plea for historical specificity—an attempt to read the past forwards rather than backwards and return attention to how political pathways opened and closed in real-time for historical actors.”² In their concern for historical specificity, both analyses contrast with much of the existing literature on the external anti-apartheid movement, which has generally been characterized either by narrative descriptions or by thematic or topical approaches that tend to obscure the significance of change over time.

Skinner’s primary thesis is that the “foundations of anti-apartheid” of his title were laid in the 1950s, the period that was the focus of his doctoral dissertation and that remains at the heart of the published monograph, even as the chronological frame has been extended back to the early twentieth century. “The ideological and tactical framework of anti-apartheid,” Skinner argues, “was established in the late 1950s and early 1960s” (11, see also 117, 201).

In contrast, Irwin’s work, tightly focused on “the postcolonial decade” after 1960, represents a direct riposte to Skinner’s thesis of ideological, organizational, tactical, and strategic continuity from the early years of the decade onward. *Gordian Knot* pivots on the “watershed” of 1965–66, the moment when it became clear that the United Nations General Assembly would be unable to pressure the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, and when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its ruling that Ethiopia and Liberia had insufficient “legal right or interest” to challenge South Africa’s administration of South West Africa under a League of Nations Mandate. The UN and the ICJ were, Irwin suggests, core elements of the “international system based . . . on legal structure and multilateralism” that the United States had constructed after the Second World War to underpin its global hegemony. This system “opened a range of pathways for Third World activists in the years surrounding decolonization,” as the entry of newly independent African states transformed the membership of the United Nations (107).

The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either at the UN or at the ICJ, however, represented the effective closure of two of the primary political pathways through which opponents of apartheid outside South Africa had sought to pursue their struggle in the first half of the 1960s. Out of that watershed moment, Irwin has suggested, “emerged a much different sort of [anti-]apartheid movement—the one we associate with the 1980s.”³ For Irwin, that difference manifested itself in shifts in the strategy, ideology, and composition of the movement—all elements that Skinner implies remained largely constant from the early 1960s. Like Skinner, Irwin thus tends to flatten the period following that on which he focuses his
own research. Political pathways, however, continued to open and close over the next two decades: the external struggle against apartheid in the 1970s and the 1980s—the latter the decade in which the scope, diversity, and complexity of anti-apartheid activity reached its zenith—represents fertile ground for future research animated by the same concern for historical specificity that motivates Irwin and Skinner.

These complexities are evident in the two authors’ respective analyses of anti-apartheid strategy. One of the core “foundations of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s study is the advocacy of the isolation of South Africa from international contact of various kinds. From the early 1960s, support for such isolation became one of the primary means by which the self-defined “anti-apartheid movement” defined and demarcated itself. Indeed, advocacy of isolation became such a defining feature of the anti-apartheid movement that it has largely become naturalized in existing understandings of the international struggle against apartheid. In both the popular and the scholarly imagination, the specific forms in which external opposition to apartheid were manifested (and which subsequently other international campaigns have often sought to reproduce) are frequently treated as if they were self-evident, natural, and obvious reactions to apartheid—and therefore not requiring explanation. Thus, for example, although Gordian Knot is focused on the implementation—and eventual defeat—of the “distinct strategy” of attempting to use the General Assembly and the ICJ to push the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, Irwin never explains precisely why the newly independent African states adopted this strategy, nor why they believed it represented the best way of confronting apartheid. One of Skinner’s most significant contributions is to initiate the process of denaturalizing the forms that external opposition to apartheid came to take and to show instead the contingent and contested way they emerged.

Skinner shows, for instance, that one of the earliest proposals calling for the United Nations to coordinate the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa was made in 1953 by Trevor Huddleston, a British priest then serving in Johannesburg. Although India had broken off trade relations with South Africa in 1946—the same year the Indian government had formally complained to the UN about South Africa’s treatment of its Indian minority—India does not appear to have attempted to persuade other states to follow suit and did not call for the UN to recommend or impose economic sanctions. Huddleston’s private proposal for UN-coordinated multilateral sanctions thus broke new ground. But as Skinner shows, “a coherent and unified call for sanctions” emerged only gradually. Huddleston’s suggestion was rejected by its recipients, the executive of the Africa Bureau, the London-based body founded in 1952 and directed by Michael Scott, another British Anglican priest who had served in South Africa in the 1940s. Many of the Bureau’s executive members were “taken aback” by Huddleston’s proposal and were strongly critical of it (156–58).

However, Scott himself—as well as Canon John Collins of St Paul’s Cathedral in London, the founder of what would become the Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa—were more sympathetic to Huddleston’s ideas for isolating South Africa through UN sanctions and/or nongovernmental consumer and cultural boycotts.
Initially, their sporadic advocacy of economic isolation had little impact. Only in 1959–60 did discussion of and advocacy for an international economic boycott of South Africa begin to become a significant feature of the international apartheid debate. The analysis of how and why this occurred in *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid* is groundbreaking but narrow in focus. Skinner’s doctoral dissertation was an analysis of “the emergence in Britain during the 1950s of Christian opposition to apartheid” and though in the published monograph the scope of his analysis has been significantly widened, Skinner’s focus remains above all on the “small group of [British] Anglican priests” who were his original objects of study. How did the early advocacy for boycotts and/or sanctions by Huddleston, Scott, and Collins that Skinner’s research has revealed relate to the simultaneous discussions of using economic pressure such as trade sanctions or denying loan credit to South Africa that were taking place in the 1950s in the Caribbean and in the United States? Or to the various boycott initiatives taken by others around the world between 1958 and 1960: the 1958 All-African People’s Conference in Ghana; the Committee of African Organisations, an umbrella group of Africans in Britain; the prominent Kenyan labor leader Tom Mboya; the Jamaican government; and—perhaps most important of all for the internationalization of the boycott—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the noncommunist labor international? Skinner mentions these various initiatives in passing, but their relationship to the earlier advocacy by his British “liberal humanitarians” remains unclear.

Most strikingly, the call for an external boycott campaign by the African National Congress (ANC) itself in 1959 seems almost to come out of nowhere in Skinner’s final chapter (161–62). This was a crucial moment, for it encouraged and gave legitimacy to the various boycott initiatives already being taken outside South Africa and ensured that isolation would become established as one of the “foundations” of anti-apartheid activism for the subsequent three decades. But how did such action fit into the ANC leaders’ strategies for ending apartheid at the end of the 1950s, and what role and degree of significance did they assign to it? Skinner’s account suggests that the answers to such questions are likely to be considerably more complex than has often been assumed. *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid* hints at a process of dynamic interaction between the ideas and strategies of Skinner’s foreign liberal humanitarians and those of the ANC leadership. Although, as Skinner shows, those liberal humanitarians increasingly came to understand opposition to apartheid in terms of support the ANC in the 1950s, it is also evident from his account that they were at the same time engaged in a process of experimentation and innovation with regard to how that support could best be expressed abroad. Contrary to most popular and academic assumptions about the nature of anti-apartheid solidarity, Skinner’s anti-apartheid pioneers were not simply responding to requests made by the ANC; the flow of strategic influence was not unidirectional. Indeed, Skinner’s account suggests that it was precisely Huddleston’s pessimism about the likelihood of success of the ANC’s strategy in South Africa that caused him to place increasing emphasis on the need for international action: he concluded in the wake of the government’s legislative clampdown on civil disobedience in 1953 that South Africa was becoming a totalitarian
state where internal criticism would become increasingly difficult and that, consequently, “the only thing which might shake our Government is determined hostility from the rest of the world” (132–34, 137–38). This was not a perception shared at the time by the ANC leadership, which continued for the rest of the decade to focus on internal campaigns.

Undoubtedly, however, members of the ANC leadership became much more interested in the potentialities of forms of external pressure from 1960, especially after the Sharpeville Massacre and the subsequent banning of both the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had broken away from the ANC the previous year. Indeed, Skinner and Irwin both imply that from 1960 onward both South African liberation movements came to believe that change in South Africa could only be achieved through international action (Skinner, 155, 185; Irwin, 42, 130, 154, 173). Like most scholars of external anti-apartheid activism, both authors thus overemphasize the significance of international action in the strategies of leading South African opponents of apartheid, and both underplay the centrality of violence to those strategies after 1961. In terms of anti-apartheid strategy, the most important development in the period after Sharpeville was the “turn to violence” by the PAC, the ANC, the ANC’s increasingly close ally the South African Communist Party (SACP), and other smaller groups. In his early and influential study of ANC strategy, Howard Barrell argued that it was in this period that within the ANC “armed activity came to be viewed not only as the primary means by which eventually to overthrow the South African state but also as the major means by which to advance in each phase of escalation towards that goal.”

A vibrant and rapidly expanding literature now exists in South African historiography on the subject of the ANC’s “armed struggle.” In declining to engage with this literature, Skinner and Irwin not only give an incomplete impression of the nature of strategy of the liberation movements in the 1960s but also miss an opportunity to bring international history and South African history into productive dialogue. International historians have much to contribute. Historians of South Africa have generally followed Barrell in exhibiting “limited interest in the ANC’s broad range of strategies” after 1961, and in focusing on their violent dimension. To a significant extent, therefore, the question of the precise role and significance attributed to various forms of international action by ANC and PAC leaders—themselves by no means united on strategic questions—remains largely unanswered.

The significance of the turn to violence after 1960 qualifies Skinner’s thesis of strategic continuity from the late 1950s (117). While some elements of the tactical repertoire of the external anti-apartheid movement were developed then, the strategies into which those tactics were fitted shifted dramatically and repeatedly over time. Ideas about the relative significance of, on the one hand, various modes of external anti-apartheid activity, and, on the other, various forms of action inside South Africa did not remain static. Within leading component bodies of the global anti-apartheid movement—such as the exiled ANC, the American Committee on Africa, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in Britain, or the governments of leading African states—there were significant shifts over time in ideas about precisely how apartheid might ultimately end, and about the relationship of various modes of external anti-apartheid activity to various forms of nonviolent internal resistance (such as strikes,
civil disobedience, or domestic boycotts) and various strategies of sabotage or guerrilla warfare in bringing about that end.

One of Skinner’s most striking insights is that for two of the earliest advocates of the economic and cultural isolation of South Africa, the British priests Huddleston and Collins, that advocacy was based on the long-standing belief of white liberal Christians in South Africa that social change would come about through a “change of heart” on the part of white South Africans. Even as Huddleston and Collins broke decisively with white liberals and the Anglican Church establishment over the means by which such a change of heart could be brought about, Huddleston’s 1935 call for “the Christian conscience” abroad to be “so aroused as to find expression in the isolation of South Africa—until she repents” was thus still ultimately, Skinner argues, “an intensified version of the liberal Christian faith in the transformative potential of Christianity.” This important insight begs the question of the extent to which this “narrative of white redemption as the pathway to social justice”—based on a psychological or spiritual understanding of racism as a problem of individual conscience rather than, say, as a systemic problem of political economy—continued to underpin subsequent efforts by anti-apartheid activists to isolate South Africa.¹¹

Skinner and Irwin both suggest that by the early 1960s those who advocated economic sanctions did so because they believed that sanctions were “a means to exert pressure on the South African government” or to “modulate Pretoria’s approach and eventually bring black Africans to power” (Skinner, 185; Irwin, 43, emphasis added). The idea that the global struggle against apartheid was always driven by this model of change has gained considerable traction in recent years from the fact that it roughly approximates to the process that did occur in South Africa between 1990 and 1994, when the National Party government did indeed open negotiations with the opponents of apartheid, abolished apartheid laws, and ultimately agreed to a transition to nonracial democracy.¹² To assume that such a model of change had always been pursued by the global anti-apartheid movement, however, is to lose sight of the contested and shifting strategies of an amorphous and multipolar movement, presenting instead a retrospective picture of imagined coherence and homogeneity across time. Boycotts and sanctions were conceived by different advocates at different times as operating in a multiplicity of ways, from, for instance, causing economic hardship that would lead white voters to elect a more liberal alternative to the National Party, to weakening the state’s capability to resist a guerrilla onslaught.¹³ One of the most striking things about the emergence of economic isolation as a foundational characteristic of anti-apartheid activism was that it subsequently proved attractive to such an extraordinary range of opponents of apartheid with diverse ideas on how apartheid might be ended and on the role that isolation might play.

Just as ideas about the relationship of external anti-apartheid activity to internal action changed over time, ideas about the significance of various modes of external anti-apartheid activity relative to each other likewise did not remain static. Skinner suggests, for example, that “the anti-apartheid movement was perpetually pulled in two directions simultaneously: towards interaction with political institutions [such as lobbying for governmental economic sanctions] and popular mobilisation [such as consumer boycotts]” (202). But rather than the two being in “perpetual” tension,
Irwin demonstrates convincingly that the balance in the significance attached by leading actors to external anti-apartheid activity at state and nonstate levels shifted crucially over time. The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either in the General Assembly or at the ICJ by the mid-1960s brought about a “strategic change,” Irwin shows, premised on a widely held “more restrictive vision” of the UN, as “efforts at the United Nations began to shift from the sanctions fight to propaganda activities” and to encouraging and legitimizing anti-apartheid action by nongovernmental actors. In contrast to the optimism of the early sixties—when policymakers in the newly independent African states had placed much faith in the UN and other international institutions as means of achieving their goals—African diplomats by the end of the decade “were publicly renouncing the [UN’s] capacity to deliver post-colonial justice” (143, 128, 146). As Irwin has noted, his account thus complicates Matthew Connelly’s influential argument that the 1954–62 Algerian war of independence was a harbinger of “the post-Cold War era.” Algeria’s independence may, as Connelly argues, have been “a diplomatic revolution” because “its most decisive struggles occurred in the international arena.” But only a handful of years later revolutionaries at the other end of the African continent had recognized that the potential of the UN was much more limited than they had initially believed or than the Algerian precedent might have suggested.

The effective defeat in 1965–66 of the African states’ campaign for UN sanctions, Irwin argues, led the ANC to adopt an approach “based on fighting South Africa not at the United Nations but through the pathways that existed around, between, and within the nation-state system.” In Irwin’s account, the ANC believed that it would overcome apartheid, “not because [it] possessed conventional military and economic strength, but because it possessed people power, or the ability to shape how individuals outside the corridors of government discussed and debated the apartheid issue. If the organization embraced these information tactics and took the long view in its fight against Pretoria, victory would emerge organically from the imperatives of globalization” (179–80). That this was their strategy would have come as surprising news to the ANC’s leading strategists in the late 1960s, a period when their attention was focused—in the words of the strategy document the ANC formally adopted in 1969—on guerrilla warfare as “the special, and in our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched,” and on “the future all-out war which would eventually lead to the conquest of power.” But Irwin is nevertheless surely correct that as state-based political pathways at the UN and ICJ were closing, “post-colonial globalization” meant that “pathways beyond the purview of national power were proliferating rapidly, providing new outlets for non-state organizations” (172). It was in precisely this period, the late 1960s and early 1970s, that there was a proliferation of anti-apartheid campaigns focused on the role of nongovernmental bodies—especially multinational corporations and sports organizations. The addition or new emphasis on these modes of anti-apartheid activity within the repertoire of action of the global anti-apartheid movement offers much scope for further research.

Alongside their analyses of strategy, a second major issue that emerges from a comparison of Skinner’s and Irwin’s work is that of the identity and ideology of the
global anti-apartheid movement. Together with advocacy of isolation, a second core “foundation of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s study is “solidarity” with African nationalist resistance to apartheid, as embodied by the ANC and later also the PAC. It was in the 1950s, Skinner argues, that such solidarity was established as “the key component of the movement’s identity” (109, 201). The early chapters of The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid show how earlier in the twentieth century metropolitan white humanitarians’ paternalistic concern with the protection of “native welfare” in South Africa manifested itself in support for the system of territorial segregation through the creation of “native reserves.” And throughout the first half of the century, these British “friends of Africa” continued to follow the lead of white South African liberals and missionaries, with their emphases on promoting the social welfare (rather than the political power) of Africans, on gradual reform, and on improving race relations through white-led interracial “cooperation” with moderate African leaders.

Some external groups and individuals did, of course, align themselves more explicitly with black South African opponents of apartheid in the period before the 1950s. Indeed, Skinner devotes significant attention in his earlier chapters to the radicalization of the African American activist Max Yergan and to the anticolonial and anti-apartheid activism of the New York–based Council on African Affairs (CAA) that Yergan founded with Paul Robeson in 1937. But, in line with a long-established trend in the historiography of this topic, Skinner emphasizes the suppression and marginalization in the red scares of the 1950s of such earlier manifestations of radical anticolonialism among African Americans. It was in this context, he argues, that “a new generation of liberal activists . . . came to the forefront of anti-apartheid activity” (103).

Skinner emphasizes how in the 1950s liberal white Christians such as Scott, Huddleston, Collins, and the American Methodist minister George Houser—the founder and executive director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA)—came gradually (and at different speeds) to challenge the previous alignment with white South African liberals that had initially shaped their own approaches and those of many other external critics of apartheid. Instead they aligned themselves in support of the ANC. In so doing, they helped lay the groundwork for the subsequent alignment of many other white liberals in Britain and the United States with African nationalism in South Africa, despite the prevailing Cold War atmosphere of anticommunism and the widespread suspicion in the West of the liberation movements.

Skinner’s account of this development is one piece of a much larger puzzle—in this case the story of the radicalization of African nationalism throughout Africa in the 1940s and 1950s and how various groups throughout the world responded to that development. The response of influential individual white Christian liberals in aligning themselves with African nationalism undoubtedly played an important role in establishing “the foundations of anti-apartheid,” as Skinner shows. But so did the response of several other constituencies. The 1950s were also the period when, in Britain at least, radical anticolonialism, explicitly aligned with the demands of anti-colonial nationalists in the British Empire, grew rapidly in strength, influence, and organization. This development had its clearest manifestation in the formation of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) in 1954 by the left-wing Labour Party MP
Fenner Brockway, and in the MCF’s rapid eclipse of the more gradualist Fabian Colonial Bureau. In the United States, although the radical anticolonialism associated with the CAA may have been suppressed, recent research by Carol Anderson and others has emphasized the vitality of liberal anticolonialism among African Americans in this period, showing that the liberal leadership of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was more supportive of foreign anticolonial nationalists and less exclusively focused on domestic discrimination than many scholars had earlier assumed.

Finally, it was also in the course of the 1950s that the Soviet Union and the international communist movement decisively threw their support behind bourgeois-dominated nationalist movements in the colonial world—including the ANC in South Africa—on the basis of the theory that a “national democratic revolution” could establish the basis for a subsequent transition to socialism. This development made possible the increasingly close alliance in the 1950s of the ANC and the underground SACP and established the basis for the subsequent support the ANC in exile received both from Western communist parties and from the governments of the Eastern Bloc.

This widespread shift to solidarity with African nationalism in the 1950s had crucial consequences. For three decades after 1960, even as the two South African liberation movements’ fortunes waxed and waned, and as their ideologies and strategies shifted, the idea that opposition to apartheid was synonymous with support for the ANC and/or the PAC exerted a powerful hold over external opponents of apartheid. Though always contested by those opposed to the two liberation movements’ communist links and/or their violent strategies, that hold helps to explain the cautious, ambiguous, and in some cases hostile response of many foreign critics of apartheid to the emergence of new movements opposed to apartheid inside South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, including the black consciousness movement and the independent trade union movement. After the suppression of the ANC inside South Africa in the early 1960s the simple physical survival of the organization was by no means inevitable. The external support the ANC received from liberals, socialists, and communists around the world helped sustain it in exile and thus assisted its eventual reemergence inside South Africa in the 1980s and its subsequent ascendency over the internally based resistance movement and accession to power in 1994.

In the early sixties, the transnational linkages and networks of support that Skinner shows had developed in the 1950s outside Africa for the ANC specifically also helped ensure the organization was able to establish itself internationally and remain a significant player in external action against apartheid at a time when many newly independent states within Africa strongly favored the PAC. (Although most anti-apartheid bodies outside Africa officially followed the practice of the Organisation of African Unity and recognized both the ANC and the PAC, in practice many—including the AAM in Britain and ACOA in the United States—favored the ANC, in part because of the relationships established between ANC leaders and international supporters before the PAC’s formation in 1959.) Skinner’s research thus qualifies Irwin’s argument that “the ideology of [racially exclusive] African nationalism animated the anti-apartheid movement in the early 1960s.” For Irwin, the ANC was
“isolated ideologically” by its commitment to multiracialism and consequently “toiled at the periphery of the apartheid debate” in the first half of the postcolonial decade. The PAC’s brand of more racially exclusive African nationalism, in contrast, made it much more ideologically compatible with African nationalists elsewhere on the continent. Despite the PAC’s subsequent troubled exile history and decline, Irwin argues that initially this ideological affinity meant that “the PAC’s path abroad was much easier after the Sharpeville Massacre” than the ANC’s, as the PAC quickly found favor with the African states that also led the anti-apartheid campaign at the UN (44–46, 154). 24

Although Irwin is too quick to dismiss the support the ANC enjoyed beyond Africa in the early sixties, his emphasis on the international prominence of the PAC in this period is a necessary corrective to the teleological temptation to assume that the ANC’s leading role in the struggle against apartheid to have been constant over time, and the consequent tendency to devote less scholarly attention to other non–ANC-aligned South African anti-apartheid bodies, including the PAC. 25 The PAC’s international successes were, however, short lived. The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 deprived it of its leading external backer, and it ended the decade ideologically adrift, deprived of resources, and wracked by splits and internal dissension. For Irwin, these declining fortunes of the PAC were symptomatic of a major shift in the terms in which opposition to apartheid was expressed after the defeat of the campaign for UN sanctions in the mid-1960s and the discrediting of the African nationalist diplomats who had spearheaded it. After that watershed, “liberation organizations throughout southern Africa were building relationships with groups beyond Africa, supplanting the ideological bonds of postcolonial nationalism with broader discourses that emphasized human rights, Third Worldism, and Marxist internationalism.” Successfully pursuing this approach, the ANC was able by the end of the decade to “reposition itself at the vanguard” of what Irwin characterizes as “the postnationalist anti-apartheid movement” (8, 174–75).

Even if Irwin’s portrayal of this transition is overly stark, he nevertheless reveals an important shift in the struggle against apartheid in the course of the decade from the dominance of anticolonial discourses (whether or not animated by racially defined African nationalism) to that of anti-imperialist ones that privileged emphasis on apartheid’s relationship to capitalism and thus portrayed the “apartheid crisis [as] bigger than Africa.” By the late 1960s the struggle against apartheid was increasingly understood by the liberation movements and many of their Western supporters as part of “a shared Third World Struggle” against American imperialism, characterized in one ANC discussion paper Irwin quotes as the “main enemy” of the South African people (178, 131, 176). 26

The relationship of human rights ideas to this shift is perhaps more complex than Irwin suggests, however. Irwin convincingly demonstrates that, following the impasse on sanctions at the UN, E. S. Reddy, head of the UN Special Unit on Apartheid and the leading UN official concerned with the issue, adopted a classic venue-shopping approach in which his unit sought to bring more nonstate organizations into the struggle against apartheid by encouraging them “to engage in great activity at their own level and according to their own policies,” whether such efforts were “purely
humanitarian” or “pacifist or limited to specific aspects, etc.” From the mid-1960s, humanitarian and human rights questions thus came to be foregrounded in the UN bureaucracy’s proliferating propaganda initiatives against apartheid (145).27 Whether the ANC itself really “seamlessly married multiracial solidarity and human rights with labor unity and Leninist anti-imperialism,” as Irwin suggests, is less clear. ANC propagandists undoubtedly recognized the power of humanitarian appeals to mobilize moral and material support in the West, but the ANC’s self-conception as a revolutionary moment rather than a “civil rights movement content with superficial changes and cosmetic reform” tended to lead the organization to avoid framing opposition to apartheid in humanitarian or human rights terms (154, 176). Overall, Irwin’s evidence does little to undermine the thesis recently advanced by Saul Dubow that the ANC’s “embrace of human rights” did not occur until the mid-to late 1980s—and even then was a gradual and contested process.28

The differences in Skinner and Irwin’s analyses of the ideologies animating the anti-apartheid struggle are attributable in large part to the different actors on which they focus. A third major issue that arises from their accounts is thus the question of what the anti-apartheid movement was. Addressing this issue, E. S. Reddy, the UN official who was a central nodal figure in the global anti-apartheid movement, has commented:

I think of the “anti-apartheid movement” as a coalition of anti-apartheid organisations and individuals, as well as a growing number of governments, which in the 1960s was able to secure the active involvement of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and many other international organisations. This was a coalition which encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local bodies.29

In practice, most scholars have adopted a much less capacious approach. Because previous studies of anti-apartheid campaigning in the West have tended to focus on anti-apartheid activity within a single country, they have usually analyzed the anti-apartheid movement as a nonstate phenomenon. Even as Skinner seeks to expand his analytical frame to encompass the anti-apartheid movement beyond a single state, he sticks closely to this approach. His emphasis on the anti-apartheid movement as consisting of “transnational networks” appears by definition to exclude the possibility that states could be part of that movement.30

Irwin has been justly praised for adopting a more encompassing approach to defining the anti-apartheid movement. As another reviewer puts it, “The interests of activists, archivists, and writers have resulted in a skewed focus on the antiapartheid activities of American and British activists . . . Gordian Knot thus provides an important analysis of the crucial role of African states and actors.”31 In an explicit riposte to previous scholars of this topic, Irwin argues trenchantly that in the first half of the 1960s the anti-apartheid movement was “defined not by Western liberals, church leaders, or civil rights groups in the United States but by African nationalists.
from the Third World” (106). For Irwin, the watershed ICJ decision in 1966 subsequently had the effect of "redefining" the anti-apartheid movement, as "political momentum within southern Africa . . . shifted definitively to leaders in the nongovernmental realm," creating “a less discrete and more pervasive anti-apartheid movement” (104, 13, 146).

In his account of the first half of the sixties, Irwin’s positioning of the newly independent African states at the center of his analysis provides a necessary corrective. But his portrayal of a shift from a state-based to a nonstate anti-apartheid movement is again overly stark: while undoubtedly the global anti-apartheid alliance was never again as singly fixated on state action against apartheid as it was in the early 1960s, African states continued to play a variety of significant roles in external anti-apartheid campaigning, from the African boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics to the confrontations between African states and the British government of Margaret Thatcher at Commonwealth summits in the 1980s. Even in the early 1960s, moreover, as Skinner shows, nongovernmental actors played an influential role in shaping the framework within which the struggle against apartheid occurred. Indeed, the period of years during which African decolonization occurred—and on which Irwin focuses—offered opportunities for nonstate actors to exert an unusual degree of influence. Many of those anticolonial nationalist movements that had already taken control of new states continued to cooperate closely both with nationalist groups that had not yet achieved that objective in their own territories and with other nongovernmental organizations that had assisted them in their own earlier struggle for statehood. These alliances with nonstate actors took on particular significance at a time when many new states lacked extensive foreign affairs apparatuses of their own.

To take just one example, the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa in London in April 1964, with which Skinner closes his account, exerted a significant influence on the debates at the United Nations on which Irwin focuses. The papers from the conference were widely circulated among UN delegations and were quoted extensively in Security Council debates and in the April 1964 report of the “Group of Experts” that had been appointed by the Security Council “to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa.”32 The conference was a striking example of the fluidity of relations between state and nonstate actors in this period. It was organized under the auspices of the nongovernmental British AAM, funded by several African states, and attended by a mix of South African exiles, “official” delegations of state representatives from independent African and Asian states and some Communist states, and “unofficial” delegations of nongovernmental organizations from Western states, all of whom interacted on a basis of formal equality (Skinner, 188–92).33

Just as they focus on different anti-apartheid actors, Skinner and Irwin likewise differ in the targets of anti-apartheid activity whose responses they study. That both authors include such targets in the analyses at all is relatively unusual. The impact of the actions of the global anti-apartheid movement either within South Africa or on the intermediate bodies through which it sought to exert influence—Western governments, multinational corporations, sports organizations, and so on—has so far been
the subject of surprisingly little scholarly research. Most studies of the global anti-apartheid movement have kept their focus firmly on the activist opponents of apartheid and have little concrete to say about the impact of anti-apartheid activities, which is often assumed or implied rather than analyzed.

In contrast, Skinner and Irwin devote considerable attention to the impact of anti-apartheid campaigns on, respectively, British and American government policy in the 1960s. For most of The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid the UK government is not a significant actor, but in his final chapter, on the period from 1960 to 1964, Skinner incorporates a detailed analysis of British government policy toward South Africa, and in particular of the government’s attitude toward the anti-apartheid movement’s emerging sanctions campaign. That policy has received remarkably little scholarly attention in the past, and Skinner’s account is among the first archivally based studies of this specific issue. Similarly, although there is a much richer literature on U.S. foreign relations with South Africa, there has traditionally been a clear historical separation of studies of the anti-apartheid movement on the one hand, and of U.S. governmental policy on the other. Irwin’s work represents one of the first attempts to focus explicitly on the question of how that policy was influenced by the international campaign against apartheid.

As Irwin suggests, in the 1960s both the South African government and its opponents “accepted that the great powers, with their military strength, economic influence, and Security Council authority, were the arbiters of South Africa’s fate, with the power either to punish the Union for its policies or insulate it from international criticism” (42). Skinner and Irwin’s differing choices on which of the “great powers” to focus on reflect their strikingly different analyses of who in the international system wielded greatest power over South Africa in this period. For Irwin, the early 1960s “marked the highpoint of America’s geopolitical predominance in the world”: the United States was an “unquestioned hegemon” (72). In contrast, Skinner’s focus on the “imperial networks” that had long linked Britain and South Africa—and on the British government’s ongoing determination not to allow those networks to be disrupted—leads him to attribute primary external influence over South Africa to Britain. For Skinner therefore, “The determination of the British government to preserve relations with South Africa . . . appeared to show that there was little that the international community could do that would have an influence over the direction of apartheid policy” during the 1960s (194).

These two accounts, counterposing post-1945 American Cold War dominance with the ongoing legacies of British imperial authority in parts of the world formerly under British control are complementary, more convincing when read in conjunction than either is alone. Skinner shows that the anti-apartheid movement’s campaign for sanctions had minimal effect on UK government policy (though British officials “paid close attention” to the 1964 International Conference on Economic Sanctions and prepared detailed refutations of the papers presented). Cognizant of the United Kingdom’s significant economic interests in South Africa, British policymakers were prepared to veto any Security Council resolution on sanctions. But it is clear from Skinner’s account that British officials were nevertheless deeply concerned that the U.S. government might waver in its opposition to sanctions, and that they devoted
considerable energy to trying to prevent this. Irwin’s research suggests that they were right to be worried. Sensitive to pressure from the African states demanding Western action against apartheid, the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, led by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, came to “embrace” sanctions, Irwin argues. Although the Bureau was always opposed by the Pentagon, the CIA, and other elements within the Department of State—all of which continued to place more emphasis on avoiding any risk to U.S. Cold War strategic interests in South Africa—the Bureau’s arguments gained increasing traction in the early years of Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Before the 1966 ruling by the ICJ, State Department officials anticipated that the Court would rule against South Africa, and—under pressure from the African states demanding Western action against apartheid—“many felt that sanctions against Pretoria would eventually become unavoidable” if the United States wanted to avoid destroying the legitimacy of the Americentric liberal world order built on institutions such as the Court and the United Nations (Irwin, 148, 118).

Irwin may be exaggerating when he suggests that, on the eve of the ICJ’s judgment in the South West Africa case in mid-1966, “Having just passed legislation that ended Jim Crow in the American South, [Johnson] appeared poised to implement symmetrical action against apartheid” through Security Council enforcement of the anticipated ruling against South Africa. Certainly, as British officials quoted by Irwin observed, it seemed “almost inconceivable that the Americans would be prepared to cast their first [Security Council] veto in favour of the White man in southern Africa, let alone veto an attempt to uphold the rule of law which had been flouted by the White minority.” But Johnson’s comment in a meeting immediately before the ruling that “even a blind hog may find an acorn” highlighted that American policy continued to rest on the hope that the United States could avoid ever being presented with such a stark choice. (U.S. policymakers’ first hope was that through quiet diplomatic pressure they would be able to convince the South African government to comply sufficiently with an ICJ ruling concerning the status and administration of South West Africa as to render irrelevant the question of enforcement measures.) Moreover, Irwin’s claim that “Western inaction” if enforcement of an ICJ ruling against South Africa became necessary “was almost unthinkable” ignores the British government’s ongoing willingness to veto a Security Council sanctions resolution, as emphasized by Skinner (Irwin, 123, 93).

Even if the likelihood of Western-backed mandatory UN economic sanctions was not as great as Irwin implies, he convincingly demonstrates how desperately concerned the South African government was throughout the first half of the 1960s that the African states’ campaign for sanctions at the UN and ICJ might ultimately threaten the survival of the apartheid regime. Indeed, Gordian Knot represents one of the first archivally based attempts to analyze how the South African government perceived and responded to external campaigns against apartheid. 

As South Africa became increasingly isolated within the UN, Irwin shows, the South African government responded to the African states’ sanctions campaign not only directly, at the UN itself, but also by launching a propaganda “counteroffensive” in the West intended to influence both
political decision makers and influential nongovernmental actors such as foreign investors (7, 69).

That one element stressed in South Africa's propaganda campaign was "multinationalism" (in 1962, in an effort to align apartheid with the new prevailing norm of self-determination, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced plans for the "independence" of the Transkei bantustan) highlights that apartheid itself was a moving target over its four-decade duration. Irwin's relatively brief analysis of this phenomenon, and Skinner's decision not to investigate how the South African government perceived and responded to the emergence in the 1950s of the transnational anti-apartheid networks that are the focus of his study, in part reflect the different frames of analysis through which the international struggle against apartheid can be viewed. Scholars have assessed the significance and impact of external action against apartheid on at least three interlinked but distinguishable levels. First and most obviously, there is the significance of such action to South Africa itself: the impact of that action on South Africa's political, economic, and social order, on the nature of the apartheid regime, and ultimately on the country's transition from apartheid and minority rule to nonracial democracy. Skinner and Irwin both make nods in this direction: The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid opens with a meditation on the end of apartheid, while the conclusion of Gordian Knot begins with a description of Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990. But although it is at this level that the significance of the global anti-apartheid movement is most commonly understood, both popularly and in the academy, scholarly research on the role of international factors in the end of apartheid is in its infancy.

Indeed, elsewhere Skinner has argued forthrightly that the significance of the British AAM "is not located in the birth of a democratic South Africa" and has criticized other scholarship whose assessment of the AAM's impact is overly "determined by the priorities of the movement itself." Skinner's work on external anti-apartheid activism tends to focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the second level at which that impact has been studied: the significance of external movements against apartheid for understanding the politics, society, and culture of the states within which they operated. In his work on the British AAM, Skinner has argued that the Movement's significance is located "in the various ways it embodied the shifting nature of political activism in Britain and the relationship between domestic and global political culture": "Anti-apartheid represents an emerging phenomenon of contemporary political activity: a movement operating simultaneously in both a national and global political space . . . [It] provides a key example of the ways in which post-war political participation has stretched the definition of organised political activity—in terms of both form, and the arena in which it operates." Even as Skinner widens his lens beyond Britain in The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid to incorporate anti-apartheid networks in the United States, it is this perspective that continues to underlie his work: "anti-apartheid was an integral part of a shift in British civil society," he argues in the final chapter.

Skinner's argument that one element of that shift was the integration of national civil society with an emerging "global civil society" points to the third level at which
external action against apartheid has been understood: its significance for understanding international or global politics. This is Irwin’s primary concern. For Irwin, though the “apartheid debate” was not the most important issue of the 1960s, its history is a means to analyze the “unmaking” after the watershed in the middle of the postcolonial decade of the “liberal world order,” as actors on all sides of the apartheid debate disengaged from the international institutions on which that order had been established by the United States after the Second World War, and in which newly independent states had initially invested their hopes.

The relative importance to be assigned to these three levels for assessing the significance of the anti-apartheid movement depends entirely on perspective. As heuristic devices, the levels are, moreover, interlinked in complex and fascinating ways, as the work of both Skinner and Irwin suggests. Gordian Knot and The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid represent significant and complementary advances in our understanding of the external struggle against apartheid. In their differing approaches to periodization, strategy, and ideology, and in the different actors on which they focus, they make major contributions with which all future analyses of this topic—at whichever level they focus—will engage.

NOTES

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30. Skinner distinguishes, for example, between “the anti-apartheid movement” on one hand and “sympathetic governments” on the other: Skinner, Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 197, see also 189.


35. The fullest studies of British governmental policy in this period are Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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