Did Weimar fail? The Weimar complex has served generations of scholars as a metal puzzle with a fiddly and predictable solution. In the last ten years, however, 'Weimar' has experienced a new lease of life, particularly in American historiography. A common concern for democracy in political theory of the twenty-first century, along with trends towards transnational intellectual history, has opened more rooms of the ivory tower towards each other. Historians of Weimar culture trained in the spirit of Peter Gay now listen to the ‘grandstudents’ of émigré scholars of the Renaissance in Princeton, and even those trained in the spirit of the Frankfurt School can chime in.

Joining this growing conversation, which tends to circle around questions of democratic stability, Udi Greenberg raises the question how much of Weimar is still in us. No longer an emblem of democratic crisis, in this book, Weimar has been rebranded as a marker of democratic reconstruction. Greenberg argues that 'Weimar' ideas of democracy and internationalism, developed in the 1920s and 1930s and then taken to the United States by émigrés were revived in the early Cold War culture of US-sponsored postwar world order. But he also shows the failure of Weimar democracy in a new light, analysing how US-led campaigns to secure democracy in Germany had started much earlier than the Cold War. This common unity against threats such as Bolshevism united the allies with their former enemies years before the Nazis’ rise to power, whose own contribution to anti-communist thought was quickly forgotten in the Cold War. In the interwar years, the Rockefeller foundation had invested heavily in funding democratic think tanks in Germany, as well as the DAAD, the academic exchange programmes. Greenberg demonstrates how the failure of democracy in Germany could also be seen as an American failure to use soft power diplomacy and financing effectively in the interwar years, two strategies which we commonly with the Cold War.

The major continuity this book identifies is the importance of the elites, both as a social formation and as an idea, in the continuity between Weimar and Europe’s second Postwar. Of five intellectual trajectories in focus in the book, each had something to contribute to elite education before and after 1945. Carl J. Friedrich, an educational reformer, and Waldemar Gurian, a Jewish Catholic who turned his particularly potent critique of Bolshevism into a critique of Nazi totalitarianism, stand out as particularly pertinent case studies; a final chapter on Hans Morgenthau also adds nuance to previous readings of his doctrine of international law. They championed the idea of a controlled democracy driven by the cultivation of appropriate elites, something which Alfred Weber, the younger brother of Max Weber, had continued teaching after his brother’s death. (p. 128). I would have liked to hear a little more of Carl J. Friedrich’s activism that yielded the publication of American Policy Toward Palestine (1944). His otherwise technocratic notion of an elite obtained clearly colonial inflections, which could have given the analysis even more depth.
Granted, to see Leipzig-born Carl J. Friedrich, a core thinker for this book, as a 'Weimar' thinker, might require goodwill and imagination. As Greenberg himself was well aware, Friedrich not only spent some years of the First World War in the United States, a stay that had inspired him to found the German Academic Exchange Programme in the 1920s. He also assumed a lectureship at Harvard in 1926. But the point of the book was precisely that: to demonstrate that Weimar was not the isolated experimental society that it was sometimes made out to be, but that Germans of the Weimar era had a global influence even before their involuntary emigration from Nazi Germany.

Some of the slogans often mentioned in the context of Weimar Germany had been questioned deserve to be explored with more historical acumen. For instance, while the phrase 'democracy without democrats' does indeed get used in Jan-Werner Müller’s *Constitutional Patriotism* (p. 14n19), it was of much older provenance, dating back to the critiques of France’s Third Republic. Another issue I had concerns the book’s title. German thinkers may have ‘internationalised’ the way the US thought about international affairs as well as some US policy doctrines. Yet what is meant by the a ‘Weimar Century’ remains to be debated. I see much of the discussion as pointing to a much more transnational story to which the model of a Weimar culture in exile does not seem to apply.

Taking the history of Weimar out of the history of Germany's political deviance and into the most normative outposts Western democracy is a bold step. Greenberg takes it masterfully, in a way that is both enlightening and challenging. This fits well with the current revival in the cultural and intellectual history of the Cold War. It turns out that modern forms of democracy owe more debts to Weimar Germany than has been previously accounted for. The good news is: when the creditor goes bankrupt, sometimes we still get to keep the funds.