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Abstract

Building on multiple archival sources, the chapter traces how the Community institutions legitimized the expansion and continuation of the process of European integration through the discursive construction of democracy. It will focus on the entangled exchanges and debates elicited by the attempts of Southern European countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960-70s: the rebuttal of Spain’s initial overtures in 1962, the challenge of Greece – the Community’s first Associate member – being taken over by a military dictatorship in 1967, and finally the democratizing of Greece, Spain and Portugal after the fall of their respective dictatorships in the 1970s.

The financial crises lasting from 2008, the immigration crises caused by the Syrian Civil War, and the Brexit referendum have brought controversy in European politics about the ultimate meaning and goals of the European Union (EU). Throughout the twenty-eight Member States, politicians on every point of the political spectrum, from the staunchly Eurosceptic to the fiercely pro-European, have engaged in conversations about the nature and identity of the European beast, no matter the specifics of the domestic problems that in most cases framed the national debates. They scrutinize the political principles that sit at the heart of the EU: the Union’s democratic credentials, its legitimacy, and its ability to serve the citizens’ interests and respond to their demands in a more effective way than the nation-states alone.

At such critical junctures, it is vital to ensure that the debate does not lose sight of the wider historical context, which reveals that questions of democracy, legitimacy, and shared values have existed ever since the genesis of the European Community (EC) – they are far from novel. The questions have been particularly acute every time a new aspiring Member State lodged its application to enter ‘Europe’. Ever since Britain’s ill-fated application in 1961, the question of enlargement has been intrinsically linked to the question of European identity: deciding which countries had the right to become members of the EC/EU, and on what basis, played a crucial role in the
emergence and evolution of the existing organization’s identity.\textsuperscript{5}

This chapter seeks to unravel a specific – and crucial – aspect of this process, as it asks how key political and institutional actors involved in the enlargement of the Community to Southern European countries in the 1980s defined the democratic elements underpinning the EU’s political values in the 1960-70s, and how EC actors – the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament (EP) – defined a general concept of ‘being European’ for the specific purposes of joining the Community. It does so by focusing in particular on how and when democracy entered the discursive politics of the Community to finally become one of the fundamental tenets of the European self-image - and in the process influenced how decision-makers approached the question of enlargement. It will focus on the debates elicited by the attempts of Southern European countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s: the rebuttal of Spain’s initial overtures in 1962, the challenge of Greece – the Community’s first Associate member – being taken over by a military dictatorship in 1967, and the difficulties of dealing with the democratizing of Greece, Spain, and Portugal after the fall of their respective dictatorships in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{6} Finally, it will analyse how these ideas were formalised in the Declaration on Democracy issued in 1978.\textsuperscript{7}

The analysis of newly released documents of major Member States and EC institutions and of the untapped source of the public debates of the European Parliament shows how the EC actors slowly – and at times grudgingly – used the idea of democracy to legitimize the expansion and continuation of European integration. From being discussed in the EP in the 1960s, the idea slowly percolated through to the policy-makers, influencing their response to the requests presented by newly democratic Southern European states in the 1970s. At the same times, the analysis shows that the construction of a European identity centred around the concept of ‘democracy’ was something that emerged both from internal processes within the Community and in the meeting with new applicants in a specific historical setting – applicants that demanded and envisioned membership in the EC as a path to democratic restoration. It is in the dynamics of these ‘entangled exchanges’ that a more nuanced, fuller understanding of how enlargement processes and the EC/EU’s political identity fed on each other emerges.
Political scientists have already claimed that the debates articulated around the question of enlargement gradually shaped a political identity based on the idea of democracy, which had not originally been part of the EC’s self-image. For instance, Daniel Thomas’s analysis of the reaction to Spain’s bid for association in 1962 suggests that the identification of Europe as a promoter of fundamental democratic principles did not start with the ‘drafting of a treaty or the crafting of a court opinion’ but was gradually and commonly articulated through the enlargement process. Frank Schimmelfennig uses the idea of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ to describe the way in which the norms, values and collective identity constructed through discourse can be used strategically by political actors to advance their interest. Ulrich Sedelmeier reprised this analysis in his work on the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement. Thomas Diez goes even further, arguing in his analysis of language in the construction of the European Union that the terms used to describe the EU by politicians and academics alike are not merely descriptive, but influenced the way in which the EU developed in the first place. There is therefore a general consensus in political science and European studies on the relevance of discourse in understanding ideas of Europe and European identity that exist within the European political arena. However, so far no thorough historical examination of this claim based on the scrutiny of primary sources has been put forward. It is only through a historical approach that it is possible to understand how this discourse emerged, was articulated, and adapted over time as the EC’s political and institutional actors sought to shape their policy towards applicant states. Full access to archival material for this period means that it is now possible to trace the nuances of how the discourse was initiated and shaped in the meeting between the EC and potential southern Member States, different public and private fora, in open discussions in the EP and closed-door meetings at Commission and Council level, and in the public practice of each institution and the Community as a whole.

The EP introduces the idea: the Birkelbach Report

Democracy was not always a dominant feature of European political discourse. The preamble of the Treaties of Rome makes general references to ‘liberty’ and article 237 states that any European nation ‘may apply to become a member of the Community’, but nowhere in the original Treaties did the Six make democracy a prerequisite for
membership or even quote it as one of the fundamental values underpinning the movement towards ‘closer union’. In fact, Daniel Thomas has claimed that the omission of democracy and human rights from the Treaties was a deliberate shift away from the ‘constitutionalisation of democracy and human rights’ found in previous treaties such as the 1948 Brussels Treaty or the 1949 Statute of the CoE. Rather than being an original tenet of the European construction, democracy was slowly introduced and built into the core political value of European identity over more than two decades.

The initial impetus for what would become the Community’s political identity discourse came in 1962 with the European Parliament’s response to Spain’s overtures towards, and open interest in associating itself with the EC in order to become a member. In fact, when the UK first applied the previous year, nobody would have thought to question its democratic credentials, any other objections notwithstanding. Spain, on the other hand, was still in the grips of the Francoist regime and was not even a member of the CoE. The possibility of an application led German MEP Willy Birkelbach, a member of the socialist group, to draft a Report on the political and institutional aspects of accession (‘adhésion’) or association with the Community. Based on the work undertaken by the Political Affairs Committee between November and December 1961, the now well-known Birkelbach Report formed the basis of the first general debate on the principles of enlargement held by the European Parliament.

The report put forward an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome according to which states wishing to join would have to fulfil certain conditions, and affirmed the EP’s intention to engage in the definition of the political and institutional aspects of accession in general terms: the stated aim was not to pass judgment on the specificities on any particular membership application, but to establish the general principles under which an accession should take place. In addressing the political conditions for eligibility, the report asserted that the political regime of an applicant state should ensure that the new state would not be a ‘corps étranger’ among the existing states, which the document explained as the ‘guarantee of the existence of a form of democratic state’ as a condition for accession.

It defined this democratic state as a state in which governments enjoy democratic legitimation and the people take part in decision-making either directly or through directly elected representatives. It also stated that applicant states should be
required to recognise the principles indicated by the CoE as a condition for membership, especially the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms (art. 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe).  

In presenting the report to the EP, Birkelbach affirmed the desire to establish guidelines (‘lignes directrices’) for accession and association. He highlighted the fact that democracy, in the form of the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, was to be considered an essential requirement for Community membership. The same ideas were expressed by his colleagues in the ensuing parliamentary debate. In January 1962, the EP was a largely symbolic institution and would have had no formal role in any enlargement process. Its members, however, were seeking ways to carve out a role for their institution within the Community framework. The prospect of a membership request from a country that did not share the democratic make-up of the EC’s existing Member States proved the ideal opportunity for the EP to both define the EC as a political actor and to highlight the concept of democracy as its fundamental value. The debate surrounding the Birkelbach report, albeit hypothetical at this stage, was thus significant for introducing three concepts: that the EC had a political identity; that this identity was based on the democratic principle, as respected by its existing Member States; and that any state wishing to join should adhere to the same principle in order to be eligible. Over the following two decades, these ideas would be honed by the European Parliament and, increasingly, the Commission and the Council, as they defined the terms of the expansion of the EC to new Member States.

A scant month after the EP’s approval of the Birkelbach report, in February 1962, the Spanish government made a formal request for talks, with the clear intention of negotiating association and eventual integration into the Community. Birkelbach’s reaction was immediate. On behalf of the socialist group in the EP, he posed the first oral question to the Council ever asked by a representative of the parliament, asking whether the Council and the Commission would find it appropriate to consider such an application, coming from a country whose ‘political philosophy’ was in complete opposition to the ‘conceptions and structures’ of the EC. He then quoted the reference to ‘freedom’ in the Preamble of the Rome Treaties and linked it directly with human rights and fundamental democratic liberties, giving an interpretation based on the values shared by the Six and that it would be hard for them to reject. He was explicitly
espousing the interpretation of these words that had already been given by trade unions across the Six, who emphasised the ‘caractère non-démocratique’ of the Spanish government as ‘en contradiction avec les principes fondamentaux de la Communauté’.  

The EP directly questioned the position of the Commission and the Council on the place of democracy within the EC – and both were caught wrong-footed by this move. The Council’s written reply simply stated that it was, for the time being, unable to provide an answer. Commissioner Jean Rey, responsible for external relations, provided a rather vague reply during the debate of 29 March: while stating that the preoccupations of Parliament were important and that the Commission had debated the Birkelbach report with interest and aimed to devise some ‘general principles’ on association and enlargement that would enjoy Parliament’s consent, he would not go any further in his assessment of Spain’s political eligibility. At the same time, EC Member States were also grappling with the request: while Germany and France seemed more open to the possibility, the reaction of the Benelux countries was a more ‘frosty’ one. Spain’s request did, indeed, raise some fundamental political questions about the identity of the Community and its values. Such concerns were not limited to Community actors and the governments of the Member States, but were also considered pressing by trade unions and transnational political movements. In fact, the EP served as the main conduit into the European Community’s institutional system of concerns that existed quite widely within European society. Eventually, this first Spanish attempt came to naught, but the ripples caused by this initial debate on political values continued to reverberate.

**Greece’s 1967 coup and the reaffirmation of the EC’s democratic principle**

The debate on the role of democracy within the political identity of the Community came back to the fore in 1967 when the Colonels’ coup in Greece gave rise to a new problem: how was the Community to react to such a crisis in the first European state to have signed an Association agreement with the EEC, which was uniquely privileged in comparison with later agreements as it had been specifically designed to lead to full membership.

A military coup in Greece, the first associate member and the perceived cradle
of democracy, rekindled the debate on the Community’s stance on issues of democracy. On 8 May 1967, Edoardo Martino, chairman of the EP’s Political Affairs Committee, addressed an oral question to the Council expressing the committee’s anxiety about the suspension of civil and political rights in Greece and its incompatibility with the principles at the basis of the Community, which also formed the basis of the Association agreement. He also affirmed that Parliament considered itself the ‘democratic guarantor’ of freedom in Europe, and that it would do everything in its power to facilitate the return of democratic legality in Greece. In the ensuing debate, Dutch Christian Democrat Wilhelmus Schuijt explicitly asked for the freezing of the association agreement with Greece until parliamentary democracy was restored. He justified this request by referring to the political nature of the Association agreement with Greece, claiming that the joint parliamentary commission between the European Parliament and the Greek Parliament represented the embodiment of this political relationship. Based on this understanding of the Association agreement as a political one, Schuijt argued that the suspension of the powers of the Greek parliament by the military regime and the consequent suspension of the joint commission denied the nature of the agreement: depriving the Greek parliament of its crucial role as the representative of the people also deprived the Association agreement of its ‘most important political element’. Fellow speakers from the Socialist and Liberal groups echoed these sentiments. While Spain’s potential accession was only a hypothetical possibility in 1962, the EC-Greece Association agreement established clear institutional and legal links, which the dictatorial regime now threatened. It also was a clear precursor to full membership for Greece, and the EP asking for the Agreement to be suspended showed once again the cross-party consensus on the idea of democracy as a condition for membership.

Initially, the Commission and the Council both gave cautious responses to the Parliament’s pressures. The differences likely reflected the diverse nature of the three institutions involved – as the EP took an immediate and clear stance against the regime in public, behind closed doors the debates in the Commission and Council showed the warring opinions and concerns harboured by the Member States. There was immense pressure within the circles of the Commission, as many worried that a failure to take a clear stance on the question would be interpreted as support for the new regime.
Meanwhile, on 5 June 1967, the Council could not even reach a consensus on issuing a declaration on the establishment of the Greek dictatorship, deciding that a prudent stance of wait and see was the most suitable course of action. However, France and West Germany opposed any open condemnation of the Colonels’ regime. They underlined the strategic importance of Greece for NATO following the Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean – thus highlighting the wider geopolitical repercussions on the Cold War chessboard.\(^{36}\)

In the case of the Greek junta, the Council had manifested the innate contradiction which characterized the EC’s dealings with third parties: its rhetoric on human rights and democratization was repeatedly undermined by the strategic and economic interests of its Member States, thereby providing the Greek regime some – albeit limited – room for manoeuvre.\(^{37}\) In their authoritative works on French and German policies towards the Greek dictatorship, Plassmann and Pelt respectively have documented the close relationships that both countries maintained with the dictatorial regime, in supply of military equipment and financial assistance.\(^{38}\) There was no coordination of bilateral and multilateral relations towards Greece. At the same time as the EC was moving to freeze the association, France was furnishing the junta with arms in its effort to create a third pole in the Mediterranean while West Germany, Greece’s second largest supplier of arms, and the US’s closest ally vis-à-vis Athens, adopted a very lenient policy.\(^{39}\)

While the Council grappled with these difficulties, new Commission President Jean Rey was pressed by German Socialist Ludwig Metzger to clarify the Commission’s position during a parliamentary debate in September 1967. Rey stated that, while it would maintain the daily management of the agreement, the Community would not negotiate on new issues (agricultural harmonisation and a new financial agreement) as originally envisaged,\(^{40}\) ‘until the democratic and parliamentary structures are restored in Greece’.\(^{41}\) The Community’s financial aid was also suspended. Only 69 of the 125 million dollars worth of credit made available to Greece under the first financial protocol had been used up.

Thus, while the initial reactions to the Greek developments of the EP, Commission, and Council were very different, the three did to some extent converge toward a similar stance on the issue. In fact, a Commission paper stated that three
factors made it necessary to take a clear position: firstly, the worsening of the domestic situation in Greece; secondly, the totalitarian tendencies of the new regime; thirdly, the stances taken by the different European governments and the unequivocal position of the Council’s consultative assembly, which reinforced the thesis put forward by the EP.42

Most studies so far have reached a negative verdict in term of concrete impact of the freezing of the Association agreement.43 Nonetheless, its symbolic impact combined could not be ignored: even the dictators were troubled by the blow dealt by the EEC decision to the regime’s legitimacy, and tried to lift the freeze by threatening the European Commission with legal action while, at the same time, trying to dispel perceptions that they were diplomatically isolated. In refusing to reconsider the suspension of the Association, the EC was demonstrating that a lack of democracy was, and would be, the principal hurdle to any further integration.44 This also contrasted with the position of the US and NATO, widely perceived to be indifferent or even tolerant of the new Greek regime.45 As Greece emerged from the dictatorship years later, this perceived contrast would play an important role in the transition strategy of the country’s political elite. A parallel response from the CoE led the Greeks to withdraw before a vote could sanction their exclusion in 1969. Thus, in the eyes of the Greeks, the EC and the CoE were the two organisations that had, at least symbolically, denounced the dictatorship - unlike the transatlantic allies.46 Similarly, taking this stance proved important for the EC itself: the debates and even disagreements in the EP, the Commission and the Council over Greece’s Association enhanced the idea of the European Community as a community of values with both the right and the duty to uphold democracy within the European continent – no matter that this may have been an unintended consequence.

**The EC as the promoter and guarantor of European democracy**
In the 1970s, as the dictatorships of Greece, Spain and Portugal collapsed and the three countries set their sights on EC membership, the Community no longer merely intended democracy as a requirement prior to accession: in addition, it set itself up as a ‘guarantor of democracy’. In the discourse of the applicants and in that of the EC, enlargement was identified as a way of anchoring the new Mediterranean democracies to democratic
Western Europe.\textsuperscript{47} Many historical studies of the applicant states show that they themselves interpreted accession to the EC as a confirmation of their successful transition to democracy and an official acceptance back into the fold of the ‘true’ Europe.\textsuperscript{48} Tsoukalis shows how there was a widespread consensus among the Spanish political elites and the population at large, on EC membership as a way of stabilising the volatile political situation\textsuperscript{49} while in Greece the pro-membership elite saw membership as a way to consolidate democracy, referring to the freezing of the Association agreement and the EC’s denunciation of Greece’s military regime to support this argument.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, the Community’s focus on democracy stood in marked contrast with the attitude of NATO and the US, who had not denounced the dictatorship in the same way.\textsuperscript{51} This strengthened the claim that by joining the Community, Greece would be joining a pole of democracy. Historian Ricardo Martín De la Guardia also identifies Spanish motivations for entry with the consensus between Spanish political and social forces on the necessity of European integration to engineer the socio-economic modernisation and full democratisation of the country after the collapse of Franco’s dictatorship.\textsuperscript{52}

Such perceptions of the EC as a champion of democracy in the eyes of the applicants makes it all the more compelling to ask why this also became a crucial concept for the Community actors themselves. After all, the practical functioning of the EC was hardly a model of democratic practice: at the time of the Southern European applications, the European Parliament was not yet directly elected and talk of the democratic deficit was beginning to emerge. In 1973, the established democracies of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC and introduced new voices with strong national democratic traditions in the Community arena, but few questions with regards to democratic practice within Community discussions were raised.\textsuperscript{53} However, the self-image of the EC as a champion of democracy became a way of finding a new raison d’être at a time of crisis:\textsuperscript{54} in the early 1970s, the international economic structures established after the Second World War were in crisis with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the repeated Oil crises, while the geopolitical order was also being called into question by the Vietnam War, the multiple crises in the Middle East and the changing dynamics of superpower relations linked to detente. Within this unclear situation, the political developments in Southern Europe presented the EC a potentially
highly destabilising change on its immediate periphery. The general sense of international crisis was compounded by the Community’s own sense of internal crisis, as initiatives such as the European Economic and Monetary Union unravelled and disagreements persisted about the economic and even institutional shortcomings of the EC. A new catalyst was needed if the EC itself was to find a new common direction. Ongoing discussions about the political nature of European integration and its democratic character presented an opportunity to find just such a rallying cry. At the same time, this internal quest took place as human rights emerged as a vital new element of the international political discourse, of which the Helsinki Act in 1975 was but one example.\textsuperscript{55}

At the late-1973 Copenhagen Summit, there had been an attempt to give European integration a more explicitly political dimension with the Document on European Identity, presented by the Heads of State or Government of the nine Member States of the newly enlarged European Community:

‘sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity’.\textsuperscript{56}

The Southern European applications for membership, and in particular the first, lodged by Greece in June 1975, presented the ideal opportunity to refine the EC’s identity beyond the rhetoric articulated in the previous decade, and the challenge of translating it into policy when faced with hard-edged economic and political considerations.

\textbf{The Greek Case: Converging Rhetoric}

The suspension of the Association agreement to the status of ‘current administration’ after the coup, coupled with the forced withdrawal of Greece from the CoE in 1969 had contributed to the erosion of domestic approval for the junta and frustrated the attempts of the dictators to gain support from important European political elites.\textsuperscript{57} In Greek eyes, the Community became associated with liberal democratic values, after the decision to freeze the Association created ‘an interesting phenomenon where the
process of European integration was identified with the defence of democratic values'. This helped Greece’s leader during the transition, Konstantinos Karamanlis, to use the EC link to positively influence Greece’s political trajectory and its international positioning by reintroducing Greece into the Western family of democracies.

The positive view of the EC was important when confronted with the strong anti-Americanism that permeated Greek public opinion during and after the dictatorship, derived from the perceived US failure to oppose, or even silent support of, the junta. This sentiment reached its height with the double Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the perceived lack of reaction from the US and NATO, which led to Greece’s withdrawal from the military wing of the transatlantic alliance. Karamanlis would later comment that ‘the withdrawal from NATO was not only justified but necessary. The fury of the Greek and Cypriot people was so great at that time that the only alternative would have been war’. In this climate of volatile and heightened public sentiment, the Greek perception of the Community as the symbol of liberal democratic values presented a vital option to Greek policy-makers during transition - compounding the longstanding choice to move closer to the EC already made with the Association agreement in 1958.

The EC’s response to Greece’s application was mixed, if not in public, then certainly behind closed doors. The Commission and the Member States were fully aware of the largely political reasons that had guided the Greek request; although positive in their official response, they were much less enthusiastic in private, given the serious political and economic implications of a possible accession. The Commission’s Opinion, published on 28 January 1976, understood fully the political importance of supporting the Greek application, but at the same time, it considered that enlargement called for speeding up the process of integration. The suggestion made of having a pre-accession period stemmed from several considerations. It presented an opportunity for the Community to reform its institutions and at the same time to develop a substantial programme for economic aid that would enable Greece to overcome its structural weaknesses and adapt more easily to the Community’s obligations and mechanisms. Moreover, a preparatory period seemed to reflect the desire of some Member States to delay Greece’s accession without causing a political rebuff.
Despite the problems it had raised, the Commission’s Opinion concluded that ‘it is clear that the consolidation of Greece’s democracy which is a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, is intimately related to the evolution of Greece’s relationship with the Community. It is in the light of these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request’. Therefore, notwithstanding serious misgivings about the challenges of a Greek accession, the Commission concluded that democratic concerns overshadowed all others when it came to providing a rationale in favour of accepting the Greek application. Two weeks after it had been submitted, the Council unanimously rejected the Commission’s Opinion - an unprecedented and unexpected decision. At a press conference following the Council meeting, Gaston Thorn – Luxembourg’s prime minister, speaking on behalf of the Council – stated that ‘for the nine delegations there could be no trial period or political considerations attached to Greece’s accession’. Finally, after eight months of deliberations, the Community had decided to open negotiations for Greece’s potential membership.

The promises that the Community had made to Greece when the Association agreement had been frozen and then when the dictatorship collapsed gave Karamanlis the opportunity to push for the argument that democratic obligations should trump economic concerns. In the face of this, the Community could do little else but be persuaded by the combined force of its own rhetoric and the Greek claims that only by being accepted into the EC fold would their transition succeed and avoid the potential destabilisation that a relapse into authoritarianism - or a detachment from the Western camp - would bring.

Underlying strategic imperatives lay at the root of the second enlargement: as the Southern European states emerged from the dictatorships and turned to the EC with the aim to become full members, the Community found itself in the position of having to respond to two interconnected problems. The first was to ensure that the transition to democracy remained on course; the second, that the international alignments on the Cold War game board remained at the very least unaltered by the regime changes. In formulating their response to these demands, the Community actors found that the principles voiced over the previous decade would provide them with the ideal means to bring Greece, and then Spain and Portugal into the Western European institutional fold.
In order to meet these twin goals, the Community used the democratic norms it had been building up as its core political identity to justify enlargement: in doing so, it could reinforce its internal evolving self-perception, maintain the Southern European countries on the course of democracy and, crucially for the wider Cold War context, their alignment with Western Europe through participation in its political and economic institutions at a time when NATO was unable to bind them together.

**Democracy as the new binding principle of European integration**

Greece’s approach proved all the more successful because it resonated with the Community’s perception of itself and how this had evolved during the 1970s. Internal talk focused not only on how to tackle the Community’s economic and institutional problems, but also on its future trajectory and on ‘defining Europe’. This led to the attempt to give European integration a more explicitly political dimension with the December 1973 Document on European Identity followed in January 1976 by the Tindemans Report, which appeared just a few days before the Commission’s Opinion on Greece. In this document, Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans sought to compile an overview of the EEC with the aim of setting out a common concept of a European Union. His report stated that the Community ‘had lost its guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking the joint task’. The Community had to find a new raison d’être in order to push European integration forward, Tindemans argued. What had once been the key appeal - the pursuit of economic interdependence - was no longer sufficient, and in any case the general economic crisis did not make it likely that the Community would be able to make any significant economic advance. The other driving motive behind the Treaties of Rome, namely the pursuit of peace and stability in Western Europe, was considered attained by the 1970s.

However, the advancement of democracy could offer the Community a new way forward. Thus, enlargement potentially offered the opportunity to shape the Community’s political dimension. In the words of West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher the decision to welcome the poor southern countries showed that ‘Europe had emerged from the stage of an economic community, today being a political community’. Such sentiments were echoed in the communiqués of the
recently formed European Council, which identified the process of European integration with the defence of democratic values.\textsuperscript{74}

Thus the central legitimating strategy that had originally moved the project of European integration forward, that of promoting peace, found its complement in the Community’s new obligation to promote democratic ideals.\textsuperscript{75} Thus Greece’s request to enter the EC as a means of strengthening its own nascent democracy resonated with the Community’s efforts to promote itself as a protector of democracy. In the Greek case, the discussions over enlargement affected the EEC’s self-image while, in turn, this evolving self-image positively influenced the attitudes of the existing Member States towards Greece. This created a sort of reciprocal relationship which meant that the manner in which the Nine responded to the Greek application would be the test-case for the Community’s own credibility in formulating a policy that was consistent with its newly self-proclaimed identity. The Community’s discussions over Greek accession gave concrete form to the internal discussions over the norms of liberal democracy.

The fact that Greece was widely perceived to be the ‘cradle of democracy’ only served to strengthen the process. The French President, for instance, eventually described Greece’s entry as a ‘return to the roots’,\textsuperscript{76} and wrote in his memoirs that ‘it was impossible to exclude Greece, the mother of all democracies, from Europe’.\textsuperscript{77} The discourse on the Greek application thus played a direct part in the contemporary debate within the Community on identity.\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, accepting Greece’s application made it all the more difficult for the EC to deny the same request from Spain and Portugal in 1977, provided they also continued along the path of democratization.

The discussions of enlargement to the Southern European countries provided the essential context for the Nine’s idea of subscribing to a Declaration on Democracy in 1978. Since all three southern Mediterranean applicants contended that Community membership would help them to consolidate their infant democracies, it seemed reasonable to seize the opportunity to make a declaration on the fundamental principles on which the Community was based. Moreover, the decision to hold the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 increased pressure on the need to find a way to ‘establish a link between the practice of pluralistic parliamentary democracy and membership of the Community’.\textsuperscript{79}

The aim was to put clearly on the record the Community’s commitment to
democratic principles which could then be echoed in the Acts of Accession of each new Member State. The European Council meeting of December 1977, however, rejected the idea of incorporating such a declaration in the preamble of the eventual accession treaties\textsuperscript{80} and concluded that the Declaration would be sufficient in itself, as it would form part of the acquis to which acceding states would have to subscribe.\textsuperscript{81} The most important thing was to find an appropriate moment to implement it without raising suspicions.\textsuperscript{82}

In the end, the Declaration on Democracy was adopted at the European Council of 7–8 April 1978 and coincided with the announcement of the date for the first direct elections of the European Parliament. The text of the declaration drew heavily on the 1973 Declaration on the European Identity and it also included references to the Community’s Joint Declaration on Fundamental Rights adopted under the UK Presidency on 5 April 1977. The most important breakthrough was the inclusion of a final paragraph where the Nine declared ‘that respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are indispensable for membership of the European Communities’.\textsuperscript{83} Ultimately, the Nine had little desire to give more specific definitions of democracy: democratic practice varied considerably amongst the Nine and any attempt to define a set of clear democratic norms was likely to encounter strongly divergent opinions and lead to disagreement. The Declaration on Democracy was thus an effective way of formally tying the ideas that had been developed over the previous two decades with the process of enlargement to southern Europe: it formally set democratic principles as the basis for a shared political identity, which the new members would have to accept as part of the acquis.

The 1980s would see the EC focus on other issues, as the Single European Act was dedicated to institutional reform and moving forward towards a common market. Yet the idea of democracy remained at the heart of the EC’s identity, and by the end of the decade the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the unravelling of the Cold War framework brought it back into the limelight in full force. The breakdown of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and these countries’ demand to ‘rejoin Europe’ via Community membership, coupled with German re-unification, presented the EU with the need to institutionalise the key tenets of its political identity, which were formalised into the Copenhagen criteria in 1993.\textsuperscript{84} The biggest challenge
of the 1990s was to apply these criteria to the EU’s relationship with the Central and Eastern European countries which, following more or less successful transitions to democracy, were queuing up for membership.

**Conclusion**

The evolution of the EC’s democratic tradition was hardly linear, and it would be inaccurate to suggest that the course followed – uneven as it was – would inescapably lead to the formal constitutionalisation of democratic values in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, the different institutions of the Community developed a discourse of political identity in the 1960s and 1970s, introducing the idea of the Community as a political entity based on shared values, and then articulating these values around the concept of democracy in a way that became significant not merely as a means of self-identification, but also as a framework within which policies had to be formulated. The prospect of enlargement served as a catalyst for the identification of the Community’s mission and goals. As Spain, Greece, and Portugal underwent momentous political change, their leaders turned expectant eyes to the EC, clearly demanding a political response. This, in turn, called for a definition of the shared political values binding the Community together. In this way, ‘entangled exchanges’ between the EC and the Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese states in the early southern enlargement process provided the original impetus for enhancing the idea of the EC as a community of values with both the right and the duty to uphold democracy within the European continent. On this basis, different actors within the EC came to identify democracy as a fundamental requirement for membership of the Community – starting with MEPs, who managed to turn the existence of their at the time near-powerless institution into a symbol of the Community’s commitment to democracy. Once the idea had been introduced into the public discourse, it became very difficult for the Council and the Commission to escape it.

Through subsequent re-interpretations of the Treaties of Rome, and in particular its Preamble, adherence to democratic principles in a country’s governing institutions was first introduced as a requirement for any country seeking Community membership, as a means to preserve the allegiance to the fundamental political values shared by all Member States. This criterion, even if not formally enshrined in law, bestowed upon
the Community the role of guarantor of the democratic commitment and practice of its Member States – thus providing an anchor for the democratic transitions of Greece, Spain, and Portugal away from dictatorship. Finally, the 1978 Declaration on Democracy made the commitment to democratic values part of the acquis, and the ideas of political identity of the Community that had developed in the meeting between the EC and its southern neighbours as a part of an enlargement process were formalised.85

1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Contemporary European History, see Emma de Angelis and Eirini Karamouzi, ‘Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961–1978’, Contemporary European History, 25 (2016), 439-458. For a discussion of how today’s European Union has progressively appropriated the discursive space of ‘Europe’ see Richard Hermann, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Marilynn Brewer, Transnational Identities– becoming European in the EU, (New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2004). Although this is not the focus of this chapter, it is possible to trace how EEC actors slowly started to build the equation of ‘Europe’ with their own institutions over the course of the first two decades of its existence.

2 For ease of reference, the chapter will refer to the European Economic Community as the European Community (EC), the Council of General Affairs as the Council, and the European Parliamentary Assembly as the European Parliament (as the institution chose to call itself in 1962).


4 In a variety of disciplines ‘European identity’ is alternatively approached as an identity created by political leaders, one identified by scholars across centuries of historical and cultural developments or the identification with ‘Europe’ and/or the EU among specific communities. Some examples include Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Bo Stråth, Europe and the Other and Europe as Other (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2001); Jeffrey T Checkel and Peter J Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard Herrmann, Thomas Risse and Marilyn Brewer, (Eds.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995); Klaus Eder, ‘A Theory of Collective Identity. Making Sense of the Debate on a “European identity”’, European Journal of Social Theory, 12,4 (2009), 427–47.

5 Please see Helen Sjursen's chapter in this volume.

6 In spite of the obvious differences, the treatment of the political identity question was remarkably similar across the three countries – being the first country to go through the process, Greece was also the one that first gave rise to questions about the political dimensions of enlargement.

7 Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council (1975-1990), Copenhagen 7-8 April 1978, Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburg.


15 Willi Birkelbach, Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the political and institutional aspects of accession or association to the Community, European Parliamentary Assembly, Documents de Séance, Doc. 122, 15 Jan 1962. Rapporteur Willi Birkelbach was a member of the German SPD and hence of the Socialist Group within the EP.

16 Idem.

17 Birkelbach Report, 4.


26 Ibid.


28 The 1961 Athens Association agreement


30 Edoardo Martino, Christian Democrat, Italy, Débats, Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat relatif a l’association CEE-Grece, 8 May 1967. Martino, a former partisan and a member of the European Parliament since 1958, was Chair of the Political Committee between 1964 and 1967, and would then be Commission for external affairs in the Rey Commission.

31 Wilhelmus Schuijt, Christian Democrat, Netherlands, Débats, Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat relatif a l’association CEE-Grece, 8 May 1967. Schuijt was president of the Committee of Association with Greece.

Walter Faller was a German member of the Socialist group. Cornelis Berkhouver was a Dutch member of the European Parliament from 1964 to 1984. A member of the Dutch Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), he was chair of the Liberal and Democratic group from February 1970 to March 1973 and President of the EP between March 1973 and March 1975; Cornelis Berkhouver, Liberal and Democratic Group, Netherlands, Débats. Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat relative à l'association CEE- Grèce, 8 May 1967.

Résolution sur l'association entre la C.E.E. et la Grèce, Débats, 11 May 1967, Association C.E.E.- Grèce. The resolution was approved by all party groups.


See Jean Rey, Débats, 20 September 1967, Débat sur la déclaration de M. le President de la Commission des Communautés Européennes.

Bulletin Europe Information on Greece and the European Community, Brussels, 14/78, 3


Paul Preston & Denis Smyth, Spain, the EEC and NATO, Chatham House Papers 22 (Routledge: London, 1984), 66.


Tsoukalis, Ibid.


For instance, see the Conservative UK MEP Geoffrey Rippon’s contribution to the debate on Enlargement of the Community, 1 Oct 1977, on the relationship between democracy and security. See also Caroline Jackson, ‘The First British MEPs: Styles and Strategies’, Contemporary European History, 2, 2 (1993), 169-95.


Despite these efforts, no attempt was made to provide a definition of what democracy actually entailed. The term was ubiquitous but vague, and even the 1978 declaration stopped short of specificity. Democracy was articulated as a general value, forming part of a ‘triptych’ alongside the protection and respect of human rights and the rule of law. This vagueness may be understood as a general desire to converge on a broad common principle, providing a sense of belonging to a shared political community. in a group composed of states whose specific historical and political traditions of democratic practice differed. See for example: Kalypso Nicolaidis and Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Rethinking Europe’s Rule of Law and Enlargement Agenda: The Fundamental Dilemma’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12:12, 2012, 1-93.