Divers, J (2014) An Inconvenient Modal Truth. Analysis, 74 (4). pp. 575-577. ISSN 0003-2638
Abstract
There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related.
Metadata
| Authors/Creators: |
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| Keywords: | Antinomy, counterpart theory, genuine modal realism, Lewis, modality de re, spatiotemporal relations |
| Dates: |
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| Institution: | The University of Leeds |
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2017 16:41 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2017 16:42 |
| Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu082 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu082 |
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