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If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.
This article argues that Critical IR theory’s (CIRT) claims to reflexivity, its engagement with “difference,” and its emancipatory stance are compromised by its enduringly Eurocentric gaze. While CIRT is certainly critical of the West, nevertheless its tendency toward “Eurofetishism”—by which Western agency is reified at the expense of non-Western agency—leads it into a “critical Eurocentrism.” While this Eurofetishism plays out differently across the spectrum of CIRT, nevertheless all too often the West is treated as distinct from the non-West such that a fully relational conception of the West—one in which the non-West shapes, tracks, and inflects the West as much as vice versa—is either downplayed or dismissed altogether. Our antidote to this problem is to advance such a relational approach that brings non-Western agency back in while simultaneously recognizing that such agency is usually subjected to structural constraints. This gives rise to two core objectives: first, that non-Western agency needs to be taken seriously as an ontologically significant process in world politics, and second, that it needs to be explored in its complex, manifold dimensions. Here we seek to move beyond the colonial binaries of non-Western “silence vs. defiance” and an “all-powerful West vs. powerless non-West.” For between these polarities lies a spectrum of instantiations of non-Western agency, running from the refusal...
to be known and categorized by colonial epistemes to mundane moments of everyday agency to the embrace of indigenous cosmologies through to modes of developmental and global agency. Sometimes these speak back to the West, and at other times they occur for reasons Otherwise. Ultimately we call for a relational sociology of global interconnectivities that problematizes CIRT’s Eurofetishization of the West as a separate, self-generating, self-directed, and hyper-autonomous entity.

**Keywords**: eurocentrism, critical IR theory, non-Western agency

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**Introduction**

The arrival of critical theory has changed the theoretical landscape of the discipline of International Relations (IR) not least by challenging the mainstream and advancing a proliferation of engagements with difference and otherness within Western worlds and beyond. Critical IR theory (CIRT) has contributed greatly toward an intellectually democratic and more complex understanding of world politics. Coupled with its mandate of reflexivity, the promise to transcend the Eurocentrism of mainstream IR appears *prima facie* to be compelling and intuitive. But on deeper inspection we find that much of CIRT’s socio-political horizons are marked by what we call *Eurofetishism* which, though clearly critical of the West, nevertheless reproduces Eurocentrism because it fetishizes Western agency and marginalizes or dismisses non-Western agency. In the process, CIRT compromises both its reflexivity and its promise to furnish a genuinely intellectual global-democratic and emancipatory pool of knowledge. This is despite the many claims made by critical theorists to make space for difference to express itself (e.g., George 1995) or to engage non-Western worlds (e.g., Jabri 2013). But such space-clearing gestures and engagements with non-Western perspectives, actors, and worlds either frequently deprive of agency and voice those for whom space is cleared or, when agency is assigned and difference is engaged, such engagement often tends to strip (non-Western) agents of their complexity (see Sajed 2012, 2013), while marginalizing their impacts both on the West and on global politics.

In essence, the problem of conceptualizing non-Western agency within CIRT speaks to the following conundrum. Most CIRT scholars, quite rightly, want to reveal the unequal relationship between the West and non-West to highlight the power asymmetries and ongoing domination by Western structures. But, in so doing, this often leads them to construct two complementary, entwined binary conceptions of non-Western and Western agency. Either the non-West is portrayed as a silent victim, unable to escape the overwhelming hyper-agential power of the West, or it is portrayed in terms of enacting grandiose and sometimes heroic or romantic forms of open defiance-resistance that are frequently viewed as having little or no impact upon global politics. These images are not so much wrong, for there surely is silence and open defiance-resistance in evidence in the non-Western world. But, in the first instance they are problematic because they become mere caricatures of what is otherwise a far more complicated set of subjectivities. Second, one of the major problems here is that CIRT in general raises the non-Western agential bar so high that it becomes virtually impossible for non-Western agency to appear on CIRT’s radar screen in any meaningful or consequential way. This is partly a function of *Eurofetishism* and its embrace of a substantialist conception of the West, but it also emerges in part because so much of CIRT’s framing of agency is through a “winner/loser lens” whereby the non-West is effectively denied agency because it is always seen as the losing party (i.e., as the victim).

We acknowledge the significant and indeed excellent contributions made by a number of critical analyses that take the discipline to task for its enduring
Eurocentrism, which include but are not confined to: Krishna (1993, 2014); Crawford (1994); Paolini (1999); Persaud (2001, 2016); Ling (2002, 2014); Chekuri and Muppidi (2003); Inayatullah and Blaney (2004); Slater (2004); Beier (2005); Grovogui (1996, 2006); Pasha (2005); Barkawi and Laffey (2006); Gruffydd Jones (2006); Shani (2008, 2015); Tickner (2003, 2008); Bilgin (2008); Agathangelou and Ling (2009); Rao (2010); Qin (2010); Acharya (2011); Vasilaki (2012); Muppidi (2012, 2016); Sabaratnam (2013); Seth (2013); Biswas (2014); Shilliam (2015); and Vitalis (2015). These have all influenced our own thinking insofar as they speak, albeit to varying extents, of the need to create a space for non-Western views and voices. However, the purpose of our intervention is to focus much more directly on the issue of non-Western agency, specifically by exploring its multiple sites and expressions as well as bringing its roles into our understanding of world politics, which, for the most part, CIRT tends to ignore or downplay. Of course, if the impact of non-Western agency were deemed by so much of CIRT to be largely inconsequential, then ultimately our exploration would comprise merely an exotic journey into an academic cul-de-sac. But we argue that the exercise of non-Western agency can have major impacts on the West and global politics/economics as well as within and between non-Western societies, even if this is often the unintended consequence of non-Western actions in the first place. This in turn begs the questions as to what the limits of non-Western agency are on the one hand, and if the very term “agency” is perhaps another instance of Eurocentric logic permeating our critical epistemological vocabulary on the other (though we shall address this second question later).

To clarify, we do not embrace an understanding of agency according to a liberal, individualist, and voluntarist conception, in which agents choose freely among various courses of actions in the absence of hierarchies of power in order to change the course of events as a consequence of their directly intended actions. Rather, our notion of “agency” explores the layered interactions between individuals/communities/societies and structures of domination and oppression (whether Western or non-Western). We do not claim that non-Western agents can do whatever they like, or that non-Western agency matches the levels that are held by the West. Clearly, there is an unequal relationship here and non-Western agency often, though certainly not always, works within the structural confines of Western power. But the performance of non-Western agency often has “interstitial” properties (Ling 2002), and its performance can be guided by the invisible hand of what has been called, albeit in a different context, “interstitial surprise” or “interstitial emergence” (Mann 1986).

In our context, many instances of non-Western agency occur on an individual, everyday level, sometimes performed merely as a means of navigating oppressive structures as well as simply coping and surviving. Much of this cannot be captured by romantic, dramatic, and heroic notions of defiance-resistance, but are located or enacted in the shadowy space of humdrum, everyday practices in which compromise, ambivalence, and ambiguity supersede direct head-on conflict but which are all too often read (or dismissed) as “silence.” Nevertheless, the moment of interstitial surprise can sometimes eventuate wherein the aggregation of such individual acts can have transformative impacts on the structures of power within which such actors reside, thereby leading to changes and transformations. Precisely because of the interstitial properties of such individual acts, it is not possible to assign in advance their impacts, and therefore allocate the precise degree of ontological weighting that they may have in terms of shaping the international system, the global economy, and the national realm. Moreover, non-Western agency can be performed through drawing on alternative non-Western cosmologies, which operate in what Robbie Shilliam (2015) usefully refers to as the “hinterlands” or what James C. Scott (1990) refers to as the private space of the “hidden transcript,” that exist in the background beyond the Eurocentric frontier where the Western imperial gaze loses much of its
transformative and disciplinary power. It is also the case that some forms of non-Western agency have had very significant impacts, most notably the nationalist movements that eventually managed to overthrow formal colonialism; or the actions of myriad non-Western agents that were crucial to the rise of modern capitalism in Europe. Indeed, what we refer to here as “interstitial surprise” can happen at multiple scales, whether micro (e.g., everyday strategies, cosmologies) or macro (e.g., nationalist movements and even states). The ultimate upshot of this is that if we understate, dismiss, or marginalize not just the complex presences of non-Western agency but also their constitutive-impact propensity, then we are in considerable danger of lapsing back into Eurofetishist-Eurocentrism.

For the purposes of this article, we are focusing on three strands of critical IR theory: Marxist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial. We understand that some readers may see our grouping together these apparently incommensurable strands of critical theory within IR as problematic. Our defense of this grouping is twofold. First, we feel their incommensurability is unfairly emphasized, given that there are postcolonial scholars who are inspired by both poststructuralist and Marxist approaches (e.g., Inayatullah and Blaney 2004), or those who combine Marxism and postcolonialism (e.g., Pasha 2005; Persaud 2001, 2016; Matin 2013; Gruffydd Jones 2006; Seth 2013; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015), or those who combine postcolonial and poststructuralist/Foucauldian perspectives (e.g., Grovogui 2006; Jabri 2013). This in itself suggests that the “boundaries” between these critical approaches are fluid and shifting rather than being fixed and impermeable. Second, by grouping these three strands together, we do not imply that they are theoretically and politically equivalent. Rather, we are interested in dealing with two common overarching tendencies that link them up under the loosely defined umbrella of CIRT. First, they launch vehement critiques against the mainstream of the discipline, one of the core critiques being its enduring Western-centric gaze and its omission of relations of inequality and domination between Western and non-Western worlds. Second, and related to the former, they indicate (in various forms, some more explicit than others) an interest in the agency or condition of the marginalized in world politics. We therefore attend here to the implications of their critiques insofar as they attempt to locate marginalized voices in world politics while also pointing to power asymmetries and relations of inequality between Western and non-Western actors.

We argue that much of Marxist IR frames its critique within a structuralist ontology, which invokes a substantialist conception of the West. As Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) points out, substantialism focuses on objects—for example, societies, nation-states, or civilizations—that are conceived as “preformed self-subsistent entities. While subsequent relations with other such objects are sometimes considered, nevertheless such interactions do not modify the preformed object and therefore do not affect its inner essential nature” (Emirbayer 1997, 282–83; and Jackson 1999; Qin 2010). In the “self-action” variant, objects are understood “as acting under their own powers” (Dewey and Bentley 1949, 108) independently of all other entities, thereby implying self-generating, self-motivating, and self-directed activity. Specifically, a substantialist ontology underpins the top-down structuralist frameworks that large parts of Marxist CIRT deploy. In general, it speaks of Western structuralist logics of power: of men over women under capitalist patriarchy; capital over labor under global capitalism; White over non-White under imperialism/neo-imperialism. While revealing such global hierarchies must indeed constitute part of the antidote to Eurocentrism, nevertheless, when these are reified into ontological absolutes, the space for non-Western agency is necessarily squeezed out or evacuated.

Our argument is that the particular slice of CIRT on which we focus here operates within a highly limited vision of non-Western agency. While it has made important strides toward developing a relational ontology (especially poststructuralist and postcolonial IR), nevertheless we feel that only a fully relational
conception that does not lapse into substantialism can promote the more complex understanding of non-Western subjectivities that we are interested in revealing and exploring. We suggest here that in a fully relational ontology, non-Western agents often engage and entwine with the West interstitially in network-type formations, sometimes dialectically and sometimes dialogically. Or, as various postcolonialists in IR and Sociology have argued, we need to move beyond substantialist conceptions of the West toward an IR of international or global interconnectedness and co-constitutivities between the Western and non-Western worlds—that is, the very language or grammar of non-Eurocentric relationalism (see Vasilaki 2012, 20–21; Bhambra 2010; Go 2013; Hobson 2004, 2011, 2012; Sajed 2015). Such a conception rejects the notion that the West is absolutely autonomous because it is, in so many ways, shaped and reshaped through its interactions with the non-Western world. In this way, we aim to puncture the twin Eurocentric optical illusions of a hyper-autonomous West alongside that of Western Empire’s representation of its Self as permanently omnipotent and universal, unified and self-directed.

At this point, however, two issues need to be dealt with, the first being that it would be problematic for readers to assume that our use of the terms “West” and “non-West” smacks of a substantialist, binary ontology in which these exist as autonomous and self-constituting entities and, therefore, leads our analysis back into the logocentric meta-geography of Eurocentrism. But our objective is precisely to show that West and non-West are not autonomous and separate but are mutually embedded and co-constitutive. That is, as a result of their constant interactions and relational interconnectivities, neither “West” nor “non-West” exist in pure form but are amalgams that comprise Western and non-Western elements. We separate them out only for heuristic purposes in order to pinpoint moments of agency, even if in the final analysis they are fundamentally relational in nature. All in all, therefore, while we retain a certain unease about deploying the bald categories of West and non-West, we ask readers to appreciate the wider non-Eurocentric theoretical and empirical context within which they are embedded.

Second, we should clarify the point that we are not arguing that all non-Western perspectives are alike or that all non-Western ontologies are inherently relational. When we are distinguishing between substantialist and relational ontologies, we are referring to two different (methodological) approaches to the problem of power differentials between Western and non-Western actors and the dynamics they engender, not to mention the implications for theorizing such power differentials. Ultimately, our concern is with how to theorize power differentials and relations of domination without falling into reductionist-Manichean binaries of silence vs. resistance or an all-powerful West vs. a powerless non-West. Or, as Frederick Cooper (1994, 1517) puts it, concerning the colonial ideology of the civilized colonizer versus the primitive colonized, the “risk is that by exploring the colonial binarism one reproduces it, either by new [liberal] variations of the dichotomy (modern versus traditional) or by [critical] inversion (the destructive imperialist versus the sustaining community of the victims).”

Our project is guided by the spirit of E.P. Thompson’s ([1978] 1995) famous critique of Althusserian structuralism, which seeks to retrieve the agency of subordinate groups, thereby moving beyond seeing them as but mereträger—that is, as passive victims or bearers of exterior (Western) structures of power. For if we squeeze out the manifold conceptions of non-Western agency then, accordingly, these aforementioned hierarchies become reified, permanent, and intractable, such that all hope for emancipation becomes lost. We also draw inspiration from the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and the Subaltern Studies collective (see especially Guha 1982), by seeking to reinstate the agency and subjectivity of subaltern actors in their own terms rather than squeezing them into a prioristic Western categories. Overall, the key paradoxical problem is that CIRT’s pessimism and
despair vis-à-vis the inevitability of the (tragic) triumph of the West risks mirroring the "celebratory Western triumphalism" of mainstream IR theory and its Eurocentric mantra that the Western telos marks the "end of history." We thus invite critical IR scholars to consider the implications of our alternative critical emancipatory strategy: that rather than only revealing non-Western agents as overdetermined and repressed by exterior Western structures of power, we seek to highlight the multiple expressions of non-Western agency, albeit under structurally confined conditions.

Our aim, therefore, is to open up a debate or dialogue with critical theorists both in terms of our reading of their approaches as well as our proposed agenda to bring a more complex and consequential constitutive conception of non-Western agency into the fold of CIRT. For it remains deeply perplexing to us that while the critique of Eurocentrism in IR is well under way, nevertheless CIRT has remained, most surprisingly, somewhat aloof from, if not largely indifferent to, this critique that has occasionally been levied at it (Sajed 2012; Pasha 2005; Shani 2008; Hobson 2012; Persaud 2016). One reason for this lack of engagement may be that many such scholars presume axiomatically that CIRT is anything but Eurocentric (for reasons that we explain in the next section). In addition, a key inter-linked debate that we think needs resolving is one that we begin in this piece, one that effectively contests both what Eurocentrism is and what the antidote to it comprises.

Our analysis unfolds in four stages. The first section adumbrates our conception of Eurofetishism. We illustrate this by considering Marxist IR. The second section homes in on the problem of non-Western agency in some of the more recent poststructuralist works; the third does the same vis-à-vis some notable postcolonial works, while the fourth outlines our alternative non-Eurocentric approach for locating non-Western agency.

Revealing the Trap of Eurofetishism: “Western Supremacism” and the Re-Inscription of Western Universal History

The nature of Eurocentrism that we identify within CIRT is rather different in some respects from that which underpins conventional IR. While orthodox/conventional IR theory advances various imperialist and anti-imperialist normative postures (Hobson 2012), nevertheless all of its variants converge on the propositions that the West exclusively made modern world politics and that the West is the civilized universal to which all inferior non-Western states should, or will in time, conform. By contrast, CIRT clearly provides robust critiques of the West and of Western imperialism/neo-imperialism. A further crucial difference is that conventional Eurocentric IR blames the current predicament of Third World “backwardness” on the internal nature of its constituent societies, focusing on their “internal blockages” and “regressive irrational” institutions. By contrast, many CIRT analyses assign the Third World’s current predicament largely to the effects of Western imperialism and neo-imperialism (see Wallerstein 1974; Cox 1987; Grovogui 1996; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Gruffydd Jones 2006; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Sajed 2013). In that vein, the wealth of the West today is attributed not to its inherently virtuous and exceptional properties but rather to its neo-imperialist exploitation of the Third World. Not surprisingly, the upshot of all of this is that most CIRT scholars presume that their approach is anything but Eurocentric.

But we believe that the problem emerges when CIRT reifies or fetishizes the West as the hyper-agential actor in world politics while simultaneously eclipsing the existence or role of non-Western agency, hence our designation of it as Eurofetishism. And it is important to appreciate the paradox that Eurofetishism is a modus operandi evoked by many CIRT scholars, implicitly and occasionally explicitly, as they seek to provide a critique of the West and which they conceive,
problematically in our view, as the antidote to conventional Eurocentric IR theory. This discussion enters the terrain of the aforementioned debate that we believe CIRT needs to engage.

Immanuel Wallerstein provides the most significant reflection on this issue in his seminal 1997 article, “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars.” There, Wallerstein upbraids the “anti-Eurocentrics” who seek to bring non-Western agency back in because, he insists, only by viewing the West as entirely autonomous and having in effect “hyper-agency” can its crimes against global humanity be properly indicted. In essence, he insists that ascribing agency to the non-West is problematic because it dilutes the picture of a hyper-agential and imperial West that he is so anxious to construct and normatively prosecute. Put simply, he insists that we must not compromise the ontological absolutism of the West in the world with “fuzzy” and what can only be “weakly consequential” conceptions of non-Western agency. To do so is, in effect, to fall back into a moribund liberal pluralism wherein all peoples are imagined as having an effect on the world, thereby undermining the centrality accorded to the rapacious hyper-agential actions and crimes of the West in world politics. “If we insist too much on non-European agency as a theme, we end up whitewashing all of Europe’s sins, or at least most of them” (Wallerstein 1997, 102); and “[b]y denying Europe credit [for the creation of the modern world], we deny European blame [for crimes committed against non-Western peoples]” (1997, 104; see also Dirlik 2007). Thus, for Wallerstein (and Dirlik), only by placing the autonomous West at the center can we properly advance a genuinely anti-Eurocentric conception of world politics.

Wallerstein concludes that the anti-Eurocentrics who focus on non-Western agency, as we seek to do in this piece, are in reality “anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrics.” While we recognize that Eurofetishism is an “anti-Eurocentric” metanarrative of choice for Wallerstein and Dirlik, and no doubt implicitly for many other CIRT scholars, we view this reification of Western agency as returning us back into the Eurocentric cul-de-sac, albeit one of “critical Eurocentrism.” For we argue that we do not have to throw out the agential West with the Eurofetishist/Eurocentric bathwater in order to bring non-Western agency into our explanations and analyses of world politics, as we explain in the final section. So what is Eurofetishism?

Karl Marx spoke famously of “bourgeois fetishism,” of which “commodity fetishism” is the best-known example (Marx [1867] 1959). Commodity fetishism occurs when the liberal political economist reifies or fetishizes the commodity as having an absolute power (or value) and thereby fails to recognize that its value is inscribed only through the exploitation of labor-power within the mode of production. Because bourgeois fetishism effects the erasure of class struggle, so capitalism is effectively eternalized and naturalized as the harmonious laws of supply and demand are thought to operate unimpeded for evermore. Only by factoring in class struggle can capitalism be denaturalized as an inherently unjust and conflictual process, which thereby de- eternalizes it, given that class struggle culminates in the eventual socialist revolution that terminates capitalism (Marx [1867] 1959, 45–48, 168, 392–99, 827, 829–31).

By analogy, Eurofetishism occurs when the analyst reifies or fetishizes the West as having absolute power and agency such that it obscures or elides the co- constitutive social relations between Western and non-Western agents, the upshot of which is the tendency to eternalize and naturalize the “all-powerful West” in world politics and the global political economy. This Eurofetishism, albeit inadvertently, renders much of CIRT complicit with “Western supremacism,” while simultaneously re-inscribing that most fundamental of Eurocentric tropes—“global history as-the-Western universal” (see also Chakrabarty 2000). Of course, in contemporary CIRT this dominant West is viewed unequivocally as a regressive global bad such that there is clearly an important political (i.e., critical) context that
differentiates this approach to the celebratory Eurocentrism of mainstream IR theory (as was noted earlier). Accordingly, CIRT’s structuralist Eurofetishism becomes a counsel of despair, suggesting that all we can do as IR scholars is to reveal the absolute, totalizing power of the West in the critical “interests of emancipation.” In this context, though, it becomes difficult to see how such an intellectual strategy is emancipatory since this Eurofetishist vision cannot recognize agency beyond the all-encompassing, eternal empire of Western civilization.

CIRT’s Eurofetishism reproduces Eurocentrism in its analysis of the rise and development of the modern capitalist interstate system. Here we focus on how significant parts of CIRT operationalize what one of us calls the Eurocentric Big Bang Theory (BBT) of world politics and the global political economy (Hobson 2012). This is a two-step narrative of the creation of the modern world, where the first step narrates the hyper-agential West’s single-handed creation of capitalist modernity. Here, scholars assume that the West is exceptional and that this in turn enabled it to break through into modernity all by itself. In this imaginary, Europe’s rise and development into capitalism can be explained through the Eurocentric “logic of immanence” whereby Europe’s ability to create modern capitalism is deemed to be immanent within its exceptional social and cultural structure from the historical outset; that from Ancient Greece onward, Europe’s breakthrough into modernity was preordained or foretold—that it was but a fait accompli. Accordingly, the transition to capitalism within Western Europe is portrayed, in effect, as a “European miracle” or as a miraculous virgin birth. This approach finds its clearest expression in much of Marxism and Marxist IR, to a brief discussion of which we now turn by way of illustration.

The first step of the BBT concerning the endogenous, intra-European creation of capitalist modernity is a staple of the majority of neo-Marxist IR, particularly of the early neo-Gramscians (e.g., Cox 1987, 105–267; Arrighi 1994), as well as Wallerstein’s (1974, 1984) world-systems theory (see Hobson 2012, 236–42), as much as it is of those neo-Gramscians who explain the origins of the European sovereign state system (e.g., Arrighi 1994; Morton 2007). The same conclusion applies to the leading Political Marxist IR analyses of the causal origins of capitalism and the European sovereign states system (e.g., Teschke 2003; Lacher 2006; Dimmock 2015), though this is perhaps unsurprising given that such Eurocentrism underpins the framework of this variant’s founders, Ellen Wood and Robert Brenner (on this see Blaut 2000, 45–72; Bhambra 2007, ch. 6; Tansel 2015; Anievas and Nisancio 2015, ch. 2). Last but not least, many neo-Trotskyists in IR (e.g., Ashman 2009; Davidson 2009; Callinicos 2009, 123–36) subscribe to the first step of the BBT by assuming that modern capitalism originated as an intra-European process and that industrialization emerged spontaneously within Britain, with no discussion of the non-Western involvement in the making of capitalist modernity on show (see Hobson 2011; Bhambra 2011). Nevertheless, a significant minority of neo-Trotskyists has effectively dispensed with the Eurocentric logic of immanence, thereby advancing what we view as a genuinely non-Eurocentric approach (Matin 2013; Anievas and Nisancio 2015; Tansel 2015; cf. Selwyn 2015). These clear exceptions aside, the overarching neo-Marxist framework is, we believe, inherently Eurocentric because it reifies the West as an exceptional, self-constituting, and all-powerful entity that made the breakthrough into capitalism all by itself. For, as we explain in the final section, this approach excludes the non-Western involvement that made Europe’s breakthrough into capitalism possible.

This lacuna of non-Western agency also becomes evident in the second step of the Eurocentric BBT, which flows in ineluctably from the first, wherein the totalizing power of the West enables it to expand outward through imperialism and later neo-imperialism—US hegemony, globalization, and global governance—so as to gut the “Rest” and recalibrate it to suit the manifold imperialist interests of
the West, whether they be capitalist, gendered/Eurocentric, or biopolitical. Accordingly, in this construct, the West initializes the genesis effect wherein it effortlessly remakes the world to its own ends such that the West conceives the non-West as but a passive and helpless victim of Western domination, imprisoned within an iron cage of Western power. An early neo-Marxist formulation of this conception is advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein: “[i]n the sixteenth century, in Europe, a capitalist world-economy [spontaneously] came into existence which eventually expanded to cover the entire globe, eliminating in the process all remaining redistributive world-empires and reciprocal mini-systems” (Wallerstein 1984, 153, also 6, 29, 37, and ch. 8). In this Eurofetishist vision, we receive an image of a Western vampire preying off, and sucking the life-blood out of, its entrapped non-Western victim, thereby rendering the latter as all but a passive and withered victim of Western exploitation.

The key point here is that the majority of Marxist analyses, right down to the present day, reiterate this basic formulation, which embodies a substantialist conception of the West (e.g., Arrighi 1994; Van der Pijl 1998, 2014; Robinson 2004; Panitch and Gindin 2012). Critically, scholars all too often reify the expansion of Western capitalist forces into a Eurofetishized conception of hyper-structural power that dictates the destiny of non-Western states and societies, which are thereby stripped of agency. Typically, Cox tells us that:

peripheral countries [receive the impact of Western hegemony] in a passive way [such that the impetus to change] is instead the reflection of [external] international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery [and that] … the economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemon become patterns for emulation abroad. (Cox 1996, 134, 137, our emphasis; also Gill 1990, 76)

This argument is tied in with the claim about how Western expansion serves to culturally convert non-Western states and societies to a neoliberal standard of civilization, often referred to as the “hollowing out of the state” or the “internationalization of the state” (Cox 1987, 253–65, 1996, 193, 302; cf. Gill 1990, 94), all the while viewing globalization through the Western “transmission belt metaphor” (Cox 1996, 193, also 30; Robinson 2004; but see Morton 2007, ch. 6). Moreover, the dominant approach views modern capitalism as constituting a disciplinary “global panopticon,” which serves to constrain the agency of non-Western actors by erecting a New (Western) Constitutionalism that constructs the global empire of Western capitalism (Gill 1995). This approach finds its equivalent expression in various neo-Trotskyist IR works wherein Western industrial capitalism constitutes the global “whip of external necessity” to which all non-Western states must conform (e.g., Ashman 2009; Davidson 2009). While these imperialist arguments are undoubtedly important, nevertheless, when reified into a Eurofetish, they render CIRT blind both to the many different forms of non-Western agency enacted in world politics and to their constitutive consequentialism.

One of the very rare exceptions within the Marxist IR canon is Adam Morton’s (2007) analysis of the Zapatista resistance to neoliberalism, something which is also very usefully discussed by the postcolonial Gramscian, David Slater (2004). Deploying a combination of armed resistance and a counter-hegemonic ideological war of position, the focus on the Zapatistas succeeds in bringing a degree of non-Western agency into the neo-Gramscian approach. But, our claim is that such open collective-defiance agency is merely one among many other forms that need to be considered given that such moments of defiance-agency are necessarily only sporadic. Ultimately, what remains still underdeveloped in much of CIRT, especially in its Marxist guise, is a fully relational ontology that reveals the co-constitutive, hybrid, polymorphous, and interstitial properties that underpin the manifold relationships between the Western and non-Western worlds, and how
each makes and remakes, shapes and reshapes the other. Nevertheless, here we concur with the postcolonial-Gramscian approach advanced by Randolph Persaud. Taking on standard Gramscianism, he argues that:

resistance and counter-hegemony are too often seen as responses to ... interests already formed, rather than theorized as dialectically defining the conditions which make hegemonic practices historically “necessary” in the first place. As such, counter-hegemonic practices must be seen as a fluid and unstable engagement, rather than a settled response to hegemony. The point that needs to be considered seriously here is that counter-hegemonic practices, in part, shape the hegemonic practices. (Persaud 2001, 49, his emphasis)

However, to those readers who feel that all we have done is construct a straw man, we suggest that the litmus test for our argument boils down to the question that they need to ask: where is the analysis of non-Western agency in the bulk of neo-Marxist IR scholarship?

Poststructuralist IR and the Persistent Absence of the Non-Western Other: Between Silence and Recontainment

At first sight poststructuralist IR (PSIR) appears to overcome the lacuna of non-Western agency found in much of Marxist IR. In an inventory of the merits of poststructuralism, Richard Ashley (1996, 245) asserts that PSIR promises to “[take] seriously the manifold subaltern voices of modern political life.” And, as a challenge to orthodox Eurocentrism, many have sought admirably to reveal the deeply unequal relationship between Western and non-Western worlds (e.g., Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; Jabri 2013). Poststructuralism’s robust anti-imperialist normative credentials notwithstanding, our argument here hones in on the question of the place of non-Western agency. We should clarify here that we are taking into consideration a particular type of poststructuralist analysis. We are not so much concerned with the first wave of poststructuralist/postmodern analyses in IR, which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, since this focused on an internal critique of the discipline and not so much on non-Western perspectives or voices (e.g., Walker 1993; George 1995, Ashley 1996). Rather, we specifically engage those (recently published) poststructuralist perspectives that reflect explicitly on the issues of non-Western voice/subjectivity-agency (such as Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004b; Jabri 2013; Doty 2011). We argue that despite the general promise of PSIR, the theory tends to leave intact the Eurofetishist tendencies of CIRT and thereby inadvertently perpetuates the erasure of non-Western worlds and voices. This point emerges in two ways: first, the non-Western other becomes visible, if she becomes visible at all, only insofar as she is relevant to Western (critical) theory; and second, the agency of the non-Western other is reduced either to victimization and silence or to (futile) resistance against the system, while the fragmented West is treated as insulated from non-Western agential influences.

By way of background to PSIR, it is important to note that various scholars in the humanities and social sciences have launched a powerful critique of PS over the past two decades (e.g., Krishna 1993; Varadharajan 1995; Chow 2006; Shih and Lionnet 2011; Shilliam 2011). One of the charges is not simply that PS fails to live up to its tenet of reflexivity but that its practice of reflexivity per se is “inextricable from the cultural logic of the imperium” (Shih and Lionnet 2011, 7). The latter entails not simply an indication that PS should be more reflexive but rather that its translation of reflexivity is problematic, not least because the move to reflexivity turns out to banish the Other-as-a-universal undistinguished category to the margins of critical discourse. Our aim is to consider the ways in which the tenet of reflexivity behind PSIR works to re-colonize the non-Western other and deprive it of, or compromise, its agency.
A highly significant consequence of decentering the sovereign subject has been, paradoxically, a continued objectification of the non-Western other. Indeed, “[t]he object . . . continues to function as a dark continent of sorts, a species of otherness whose point of reference remains the Eurocentric and masculine self” (Varadharajan 1995, xi). So the question becomes, how is it possible that a project that purports to challenge and destabilize the Western logos, and to expose its violence against the “racial, ethnic, and feminine object,” continues to push to the margins this racialized and feminized object? Important here is the enduring claim made by PSIR, which is to clear space so that the other can narrate her story (George 1995). However, because the PSIR critic thus refuses to speak on behalf of the other for fear of doing violence to her narrative (e.g., George 1995; Ashley 1996), this refusal is problematic because it assumes that the critic’s responsibility in the violence of the system is somehow expunged. Put differently, the PS critics’ refusal to speak on behalf of the non-Western other translates into a refusal “to expose the exteriority (imperial domination) that is the condition of possibility for interiority (poststructuralist theory)” (Shih and Lionnet 2011, 7), all of which has the perverse effect of reorienting attention to the self, namely the Western subject. If, prior to the linguistic turn, we dealt with a sovereign and self-sufficient Western subject, after the linguistic turn we are now witnessing a fragmented and deconstructed Western self, wherein focus continues to lie squarely on the Western subject, albeit in a fashionably mournful and melancholic posture (see Chow 2006, 13).

Robbie Shilliam (2011) states that this strategy—an exploration of the “internal relationality of the European self” so as to “re-interpret and re-narrate the substantive processes of modernization internal to Europe as well as European traditions of thought”—“runs the risk of re-affirming the narcissism of Europe, i.e. the assumption that the European self is so richly contradictory that there is no need to look anywhere else.” Such a strategy produces a double mystification: first, that the rich and contradictory character of Europe makes it more than sufficient for the PS critic who no longer needs to take the extra step and meet/know non-Western difference such that non-Western others are (re)presented either as absent/silent or simply as “the backdrop to the European drama” (Shilliam 2011). We see this move replicated in a number of PSIR analyses in which the non-Western agential other is largely absent (see, for example, Doty 1996, 2011; Edkins 2003, 2005). Second, when the non-Western other is engaged, she is made visible only insofar as her subjectivity can be made intelligible through Western categories. Her role is thus to provide the case study and the illustration that fills “the European ‘self’ with greater clarity” (Shilliam 2011). So, while PSIR does embrace a relational ontology, such relationality is almost exclusively internal to the Western self (as mentioned earlier). What we have, then, is not so much a co-constitution of Western/non-Western subjectivities and worlds but a more sophisticated picture of the Western self, where the non-Western Other is either absent or is reified as “otherness” and “difference.” To illustrate these claims, we now turn to a couple of PSIR analyses that we feel exemplify this particular approach.

In her important book The Postcolonial Subject, Vivienne Jabri (2013) seeks to illuminate some aspects of postcolonial agency and resistance in the contemporary context of the social, economic, and political upheavals in the Middle East. Jabri’s project is extremely promising in its intent to treat the postcolonial subject as subject (i.e., as an actor exercising agency), and in its claim to take seriously voices from the postcolonial world. She also sets out to draw from Homi Bhabha (1994) and Frantz Fanon (2004) in order to derive a notion of postcolonial agency (Jabri 2013). Nevertheless, we would like to highlight two aspects of her analysis that we deem problematic in their implications. First, Jabri’s postcolonial subject seems to function only as the aftereffect of panoptical technologies of governance. Second, it is almost impossible to understand (or even see) the postcolonial subject through the parameters and categories of her own world. This is because her
subjectivity and form of action is set against an extremely restrictive background such that the postcolonial subject is inaccessible beyond her role in “the nexus between modernity and late modernity” (see Jabri 2013, 26).

Jabri (2013, 4) begins with a set of questions: “[w]hat does this shift from the panoptical (formal-imperial) to the post-panoptical (informal neo-imperial) mean for the postcolonial world? How is this global terrain of the late modern viewed when the lens is held by the postcolonial subject?” These are undoubtedly important questions insofar as they promise to place such phenomena in the context of the postcolonial world and to provide some conceptual, poststructuralist-postcolonial lenses through which we can understand such a shift. The questions appear to interrogate the suitability of these categories (post-panoptical, late modern) for the condition of the postcolonial world. But we are troubled by the following assertions: “[w]e might say that where the colony in modernity was subjected to conquest, the postcolony is subjected to the post-panoptic governmentalizing manifestation of power, where populations, and not simply individuals, are shaped and regulated into governable, manageable entities” (Jabri 2013, 4). We are troubled because the so-called postcolonial subject turns out to be a non-distinct mass of entities to manage and/or made manageable. This strategy is replicated throughout the analysis, where the notion of the “postcolonial subject” is mentioned repeatedly (and claims are being made on behalf of this subject), but it is rarely accompanied by a voice or a narrative that attempts to retrieve and draw the contours of a complex set of subjectivities.

Moreover, we are concerned with the unexamined assumption that concepts such as “(post)panoptic,” “late modern,” and “governmentality” are terms whose application to this faceless undistinguished space, the “postcolony,” require no further justification or problematizing. Indeed, rarely do we see such terms problematized in PSIR and rarely do we see a reflexive engagement with the limits that such terms hold in a non-Western context (or in themselves tout court). Rather, these categories have come to function as traveling universals; their applicability to any site and context is (almost never) interrogated (but see especially Joseph 2012). This means that the postcolonial subject, in its complex multifaceted manifestations, is in fact irretrievable except as an aftereffect of panoptical technologies of governance. Curiously, this practice of taking Western(centric) categories and stretching them to other regions of the world goes largely unquestioned. Of course, we are not objecting to the use of these categories per se, nor do we engage in a nativistic claim according to which only non-Western categories can accurately capture non-Western worlds. We do draw attention, however, to the surprisingly unreflective deployment of such categories within PSIR without sufficient contextualization or discussion as to their suitability and limits. We echo here Robbie Shilliam’s (2011) concern with such a limiting range of theoretical tools by which:

[A] disservice is done to the potential of Foucault’s thought if he is used to make sense of the colonial world on terms already given by the European experience and which valorize said experience. And this raises the question: why start with Foucault and not Fanon?

Meera Sabaratnam’s incisive analysis of the enduring Eurocentrism of critiques of the liberal peace literature in IR chastises them for the manner in which their use of Foucauldian paradigms results in “the analytic bypassing of [non-Western] subjects in frameworks of governmentality” (2013, 263). One can think of the highly influential and undeniably important works of David Chandler (2010) and Mark Duffield (2007) as exemplars, wherein the exclusive focus on the West as an imperial and all-powerful actor excludes any analysis of the agency of those on the receiving end of humanitarian civilizing missions, thereby inadvertently (re)presenting non-Western agency as passive or non-existent.
A complementary move can be found in the (otherwise excellent) seminal edited volume by Jenny Edkins, Véronique Pin-Fat, and Michael J. Shapiro, which outlines the global contours of practices of sovereignty through a conceptualization of “certain grammars of power and resistance, irrespective of the site or sites in which they are located” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004a, 3). Such grammars are those which are conceptualized by critical European theorists of power and resistance such as Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben—where the latter produces a reified and totalizing narrative of sovereign power in which the “objects” are reduced to “bare life” that is reminiscent of the Jews in the Nazi concentration camp (see Zanotti 2013). Again, the critical idiom of Europe functions as a traveling universal, able to illuminate any and every political context. According to such grammars, subjectivities—whether collective or individual—are always produced through relations of power in which “there is no ‘escape’ or ‘emancipation’ from power relations” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004a, 8, 11). We would like to ask: what does it mean, for the postcolonial subject, that an impersonal working of (Western) power over which she has little influence “always already” (Jabri 2013) produces her political subjection?

Edkins and Pin-Fat provide an interesting example to illustrate the kinds of political strategies available to the postcolonial subject within the grammar of sovereign power. In 2003, Abbas Amini, an Iranian asylum seeker in the UK, “went on a hunger strike in protest against the U.K. government’s treatment of asylum seekers and proceeded to sew his eyes, ears, and mouth with coarse thread” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004a, 15–16). The interpretation of his action provided here is illuminating: “Amini’s political act of resistance, using his own body, can be read as an act where, with all hope lost, the only site left for resistance is in complete embrace of bare life” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004a, 17). Such an interpretation holds the following implications: first, that the power with which he contended is so totalizing in its reach that the only strategy available to him is “bare life” (understood here as biological life stripped of its political character). And second, the range of modalities through which one can express political agency is extremely limited: either “resistance”—understood as direct challenge of the system and in fact deemed impossible under a regime of sovereign power—or “drowning” (see Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004a, 8–9). The latter makes direct reference to those prisoners of the Nazi concentration camps (referred to as the “drowned” by Primo Levi and Giorgio Agamben) who had lost the will to live and whose awareness extended only to the satisfaction of basic biological needs, having become nothing more than walking, breathing corpses, that is, “bare life.” As we discuss in the following section, this rigid conceptualization of the agency of the postcolonial/non-Western subject moves within a limited range between defiance agency (deemed futile here) and total abjection. The idea that Amini’s “complete embrace of bare life” is somehow the only site left for resistance is both disabling and disconcerting in its implications.

Roxanne Lynn Doty (2011) advances a similar analysis, which applies to the case of Mexican migrants entering the United States. She chooses this case study on the grounds that the “borderlands of the world are particularly appropriate sites for examining contemporary instances of state(s) of exception and the creation of ‘bare life’” (Doty 2011, 600). Interestingly, one of the rationales for her article lies in countering the perception that analyses of bare life “seem to presume the absence of agency, thus precluding the possibilities for resistance” (Doty 2011, 600). But we have to await the conclusion before this is considered, and when it is discussed the conception of agency is itself bare. Resistance, it turns out, is often simply framed in terms of migrants entering the United States being able to survive as opposed to those who die. For, as she concedes, for those who do not die when entering, so they “exercise agency and resistance, though such resistance is admittedly often very fragile” (Doty 2011, 610).
One of the implications of this interpretation is its inadvertent acceptance of the status quo as a definitive situation in which escape, emancipation, or any other strategies that do not boil down to “co-optation” is virtually impossible and futile. This PS grammar of power and resistance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, working within a circular logic where even resistance can only happen within the extraordinarily narrow parameters set up by Sovereign power. Asha Varadharajan (1995, 20–21) is then right to note “how a potentially radical discourse [poststructuralism] took a conservative turn or, in current terminology, how subversion became recontainment.” Indeed, using Agamben’s reified conception of sovereign governmentality, which works within a totalizing, Sovereign power/bare life binary, returns us back into the cul-de-sac of Eurofetishism and all the problems that this entails concerning non-Western agency (cf. Zanotti 2013).

To summarize our key points in this section more generally, while PSIR provides critiques from within Eurocentric modernity, nevertheless more often than not it continues to objectify the Other as silent and trapped beyond escape within the grammar of sovereign, Western power. Moreover, squeezing the non-Western Other into Eurofetishized moulds (however genuinely subversive its intent) is problematic because it forecloses the possibility of viewing non-Western worlds/problems/actors on their own terms. This is because it is assumed that the only way to understand “other” worlds is always by reduction to Western theory (i.e., that understanding the specificity of non-Western worlds is always parasitical on an understanding of the West and Western categories). In the process, this reproduces the Eurocentric myth that the West supplies “the theory” and the Rest but the case studies and empirical data.

**Between Defiant/Romantic Resistance and Silence in Postcolonial IR?**

Of course, the reader who has proceeded this far might well be wondering where the politics of non-Western agency understood as resistance and open defiance fits in. The focus on resistance is certainly an identifiable property of parts of CIRT, and it often finds its loudest expression in postcolonialism. It is here, within the debate surrounding the agency of the subaltern, that we would like to intervene, for the idea that the subaltern is not merely a marginalized person but also a “revolting” actor has had powerful implications on the manner in which many, though by no means all, postcolonial scholars conceptualize subaltern agency (Mendieta 2008, 300). Interesting here is Robbie Shilliam’s (2015, 5) rhetorical question as to whether “the notion of a ‘resisting subject’ itself [is not] a category born of European fantasies of their own mastery.” Insofar as the Western colonial gaze is the Archimedean center of reference, so the agency of the colonized is reduced either to resistance (direct challenge to hegemonic discourse) or to victimization/silence (whereby the subjectivity of the colonized is erased by the colonial gaze).

The bigger epistemological question that arises here, as was signaled in our introduction, concerns the issue as to whether the notion of non-Western agency is a fetishized Eurocentric concept, which emerged within a particular secularized cultural tradition and at a particular period of history. After all, many non-Western cosmologies assign only a limited space for agency within the structure of Dharma, Karma, or Ubuntu. Can the use of the term “agency” itself be seen as a form of disciplining mechanism, making the voice of the other audible to Western audiences and thus reinscribing the centrality of the West to IR?1 This provocation conjures up the classic critique of Subaltern Studies by Spivak.

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1 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for offering these insightful and excellent provocations.
(1988), where she argues that it is impossible to recover the subaltern’s voice/perspective. Such an uncompromising position attracted a lot of criticism, most notably from other feminist postcolonial scholars (e.g., Parry 1987; Loomba 1993, 2005). They claimed that as a “definitive statement,” it is dangerous and highly problematic to imply both that it is impossible to recover traces of the agency of the subaltern and that the system is absolutely and unambiguously hegemonic. Many postcolonial scholars argue that even if the colonized can speak, they can only do so in the language of the colonizer, thereby negating any notion of agency or voice. Ultimately, such a denial of agency (as mere silence) derives from a fetishization of Western colonial and discursive power that re-invokes the essential Eurocentric binary of an active West and a passive East. Ours is, therefore, a task to take seriously the issue of subaltern agency while simultaneously recognizing the repressive power of imperialism and neo-imperialism.

Just as large swathes of CIRT equate power with agency and end up by reifying the West, so postcolonialists sometimes reduce non-Western agency to resistance/heroic defiance within an oppositional posture vis-à-vis the West that can lead back into Eurocentrism. For this can have the unfortunate effect of reinstating the primacy of the colonial gaze where agency can be exercised only by directly engaging the West. Again, we do not seek to displace the importance of engaging the West when exploring non-Western agency, but what we countenance against is the reification of the Western colonial gaze such that it becomes the Archimedean center of reference in which agency is channeled into two modes—either to open defiance-resistance or to victimization/silence. Our point is, then, that we also need to consider how to conceptualize those types of agency that stand outside this binary.

By focusing on the issue of non-Western agency, we want to signal the following: first, that the promise of bringing non-Western agency into IR analyses has yet to be fully realized within the broad gamut of postcolonialism; and second, that our understanding of non-Western agency is a complex polymorphous one, with direct, collective modes of oppositional agency being only one of the agential strategies available. Moreover, this latter modality is often alighted upon by postcolonial and decolonial scholars and accorded a monolithic anti-Western rationale that is not always warranted. Pertinent here is the recent interest within postcolonial/decolonial IR concerning the Bandung Conference (see Tan and Acharya 2008; Pasha 2013; Shilliam 2016; Pham and Shilliam 2016; Muppidi 2016; Kumarakulansingam 2016; Opondo 2016).

The prominent decolonial theorist, Walter Mignolo (2011b), reifies Bandung by viewing it as a seminal decolonial moment, while Mustapha Pasha’s (2013, 154) analysis begins by similarly portraying the event as “a protest against Western arrogance.” Certainly, such a reading of Bandung is not without its merits and their analyses succeed in highlighting a commonality of anti-colonial sentiment among the conference members (see also Prashad 2007, 33). But Bandung was far more complex than this monolithic-decolonial reading suggests. For reading Bandung as an ideal-collective decolonial moment, which frames the conference within a profoundly oppositional orientation, obscures not only the deep ideological divisions among the congregated leaders but also the more nuanced hierarchies that underpinned their interactions. Moreover, it is highly debatable as to whether Bandung’s architects sought to create an anti-Western or even an anti-white bloc in the first place (Tan and Acharya 2008, 9; Vitalis 2013; Shilliam 2016). The danger here, then, is the tendency among some postcolonial and decolonial scholars to mythicize an event that is far more contested and complex than the monolithic conception of the decolonial “revolt against the West” would allow.

Instructive here is Robert Vitalis’s (2013) incisive critique of the postcolonial literature on Bandung, which challenges what he views as the myth of Third World
solidarity and an emerging global racial consciousness that, he argues, has been repeatedly superimposed on the event. He exposes the complex racial politics and hierarchies that structured interactions among the non-Western delegates and their ambivalent stances toward the West. Contra the reading of Bandung as the birth of non-alignment, both Vitalis (2013) and Prashad (2007, 38) note that some of the countries represented were in fact aligned, having entered into various security and economic pacts with Western powers. Critically, Vitalis (2013, 270) argues that the rhetoric of racialization and of impending global race wars was much more the product of an anxious American perception of a meeting that congregated representatives of former colonies. For the reality was that far from creating a movement of the non-aligned countries, “Nehru and others acted instead to prevent the creation of any permanent structure or organization, and various would-be conveners of a follow-up meeting [including Nasser and Sukarno] failed repeatedly over the next ten years to bring Asian and African states together once more” (Vitalis 2013, 267).

Mustapha Pasha’s postcolonial reading of Bandung is interesting because of its ambivalent position. For, while Pasha begins by reinforcing Mignolo’s reading of it as a decolonial moment par excellence, he claims subsequently that

Bandung was initially a protest against Western arrogance, but its aspirations could only materialize in the idiom of modernity. [Thus the] subaltern climbs to the surface as protest, yet often articulated in the language of modernity. Marginality acquires speech, but only by adopting the rituals and syntax of hegemony. The subaltern does speak, but only in the idiom of hegemony. Outside hegemony, it has silence; no existence. (Pasha 2013, 154; our emphasis)

Here, Pasha’s reading slips back into reiterating Spivak’s negation of the possibility of recovering the voice of the subaltern—in this case, with a twist: the subaltern can speak, but only in the syntax of Western modernity. What does such a reading reveal about our fantasies and the limits of our intellectual vocabularies regarding non-Western agency? What would a more complicated reading of Bandung reveal, by shifting the focus from an insistence on Third World solidarity to an examination of the limits and the precarious character of such solidarity? Put differently, what is at stake in rescuing the “Memory of Bandung” (Shilliam 2015) and re-fashioning it as a “decolonial moment” (see Mignolo 2011b; Pasha 2013; Shilliam 2015)? Not only does such a type of agency reify and fetishize the power of the West, but it also confines the possible agential tactics of those marginalized to an extremely limited spectrum of action (between grandiose revolt and silence).

By way of a bridge to the next section, we shall close here by producing our own take on open moments of defiance-resistance by reflecting on the Suez Crisis and the actions of Gamal Abdel Nasser. This case is relevant here because, like Bandung, it involves the actions of non-Western political elites. But it is also relevant because we do not confine expressions of non-Western agency solely to everyday actors and subaltern groups. Nasser’s decision in 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal to fund the Aswan Dam project was extremely bold, given that an international regime governed the Canal, which made it accessible to all nations under the control of the Suez Canal Company (owned by British shareholders). As Prashad (2007, 99–100) observes, Nasser had tried to play the Soviets off against the Americans to secure funding for the Aswan Dam—a project seen as crucial to revitalizing Egyptian agriculture. When the Americans took offense at Nasser’s rapprochement with the Soviet regime and withdrew their pledge, Nasser then moved to nationalize the Suez Canal to supplement the much-needed funding. What ensued was an international crisis that culminated with the tripartite invasion of Egypt by a British/French/Israeli coalition and with the latter’s diplomatic defeat.
The Suez Crisis illustrates the complexities of non-Western agency more generally: the Cold War provided both constraints to and opportunities for Third World actors, with Nasser deftly navigating Cold War geopolitics to secure Egyptian interests. We cannot notch up Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal merely to the register of anti-imperial resistance, since this would be a gross oversimplification of this episode. What the Suez Crisis as a postcolonial episode illuminates is a complex interaction between sovereignty as a norm that presupposes autonomy and (relative) independence, and the international division of labor engendered by global processes of capitalist expansion through colonialism that imparted constraints on Nasser’s choices (see Inayatullah 1996). A steady focus on this interaction renders Nasser neither the valiant anti-imperialist nor the silent victim of twentieth-century imperialist world politics. Certainly, this is not to discount elements of both open defiance-resistance and victimization that run through the story of the Suez Crisis, but we are looking for a new/old language that speaks about the simultaneity of both “structures” and “agency,” complicity and resistance, and thus pays attention to the complex tactics deployed by the marginalized and to the types of constraints and limits within which they seek to implement them.

Opening a Space for Exploring the Polymorphous Expressions of Non-Western Agency on the Other Side of the Eurocentric Frontier

Here we seek to navigate beyond the Eurofetishist/Eurocentric frontier in order to explore new vistas wherein we begin to chart the complex landscape of non-Western agency in its multiple and polymorphous forms. We do not pretend to have uncovered all the manifold forms of non-Western agency; what follows is merely a first-cut exploration into these multiple worlds. Nor do we claim that non-Western agency is always on a par with the levels enjoyed by Western actors. Our point is merely that if we define agency solely in terms of holding and exercising predominant power, then non-Western agency becomes squeezed out (and even impossible to see or conceptualize), as much as the point that if we confine our analysis of non-Western agency only to moments of grandiose collective resistance, then we squeeze out the humdrum exercise of non-Western agency that occurs much more frequently. For a key problem that emerges from the deployment of an underdeveloped relational ontology in Eurofetishism is that only certain types of actors/actions count as performing agency—including the likes of the reformist strategies of the G77, Bandung/the Non-Aligned Movement, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order—and the more grassroots revolutionary instances such as the Zapatista Movement.

Saskia Sassen (2011) problematizes the idea of “powerlessness” by deploying a more layered and nuanced understanding of it: “[p]owerlessness is not simply an absolute condition that can be flattened into the absence of power . . . [for under] certain conditions, powerlessness can become complex” (Sassen 2011, 574); and, no less importantly, it can issue a certain political impact even if it remains marginal to networks of power. This conception of “powerlessness” layers our reading of the Suez Crisis and of the complex negotiations Nasser undertook; for while he was not a major international player, through interstitial surprise his bold decision to nationalize the Suez Canal triggered an international crisis whose ripples had potent long-term effects, decisively contributing to the demise of Britain as colonial power (Kyle 2003; Peden 2012) - hardly an inconsequential outcome! Nasser’s position was neither one of abject “powerlessness” nor that of defiant-resistant hero; rather his position may be understood, to work with Sassen’s notion, as one of “complex powerlessness” whereby the actions of an actor operating on the fringes of power impact the system in decisive ways. To reiterate an earlier
point: we do not suggest that there are no silenced or invisible voices, for surely there are. But we find problematic CIRT’s eviction from analytical scrutiny an entire spectrum of interstitial interactions that are situated between the polarities of powerlessness/silence and open defiance-resistance. For agency can take a variety of subtler and far less dramatic, if not mundane, everyday forms of expression, some of which are found in the hidden “hinterlands” (Shilliam 2015) that exist beyond the Eurocentric-imperial frontier.

Exploring these hinterlands, we come across indifference to the colonial gaze, a form of non-Western agency. In this context, John Beverley (1999) provides an apt illustration in an analysis of Rigoberta Menchú’s autobiographical text, *I, Rigoberta Menchú*. The autobiographical account of Guatemalan Indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú concludes her testimony with the following words: “I’m still keeping secret what I think no-one should know. Not even anthropologists or intellectuals, no matter how many books they have, can find out our secrets” (quoted in Beverley 1999, 30). Beverley aptly interprets her words as “resentment against being ‘known’” (Beverley 1999, 31). It would be very tempting, of course, to read Menchú’s words as a form of resistance against (Western) academic knowledge. And that may well be partially accurate. However, perhaps what her words also express is not so much resistance against the West, but that indigenous subjectivity is much more complex than can be captured through a monological lens. A fully relational ontology would prompt us to look at Rigoberta Menchú’s position not as perpetually locked into an over-determined relation where she is always already the “known,” the “exposed,” the “victim.” Instead, what emerges here is a more complex relation between her subjectivity as an Indigenous woman activist and the system of Western knowledge where she is never fully “known” or “exposed.” She too, it seems, has a certain control over how much she chooses to expose.

The discussion of Menchú brings to light the problem that one does not have to find instances of dramatic and direct public-collective confrontation by the non-Western “subaltern” against the West to find evidence of non-Western agency, nor is the absence of such moments indicative of hegemonic compliance—that is, silence. For, as James Scott (1990, 136) originally argued, “[m]ost of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance [i.e., silence], but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites.” Speaking of the Malay peasants who were forced to make changes to rice production that worked against their interests, he talks about how they resisted in covert ways. Critically, he argues that they “prudently avoided, with few exceptions, any irreducible acts of public defiance. [But] anyone who regarded the calm surface of political life in ‘Sedaka’ as evidence of harmony between classes would simply have been looking in the wrong place for political conflict” (Scott 1990, 17). Put differently, what appears to much of CIRT as silence under hegemony reappears as covert resistance as it plays out in the private sphere of the “hidden transcripts” of subaltern voice. In this space, the weapons of the weak we encounter take more subtle and oblique forms that comprise obscure, ambivalent, and opaque ways of communication. These include the use of rumor, gossip, disguises, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual gestures, anonymity, and double-speak, all of which are misread by CIRT as moments of silence and compliance (Scott 1990, chs. 6–7). This is the oblique and ambiguous sphere of “infrapolitics,” where the disciplinary arm of the colonial frontier has only a limited and clumsy reach. In this world of everyday agency, the intellectual challenge becomes one of recognizing “voice under domination,” which can be realized through an “everyday politics approach”
that focuses on everyday forms of non-Western agency (Scott 1990; Kerkvliet 2005; cf. Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007).

Benedict Kerkvliet (2005, 2010) provides one illustrative example in his work on the everyday politics of peasants in Vietnam. Here he takes his reader beyond the framework of power and open defiance-resistance by exploring the more nuanced everyday peasant practices of coping, survival, and subversion in the context of communist Vietnam, which is played out in the private sphere behind the backs of the authorities. Up to the 1980s, the Vietnamese government imposed upon the peasants the communist practice of collectivized agriculture. However, by 1988, this had formally broken down and a system of individual household production had taken its place. Critically, this occurred as a function of peasant-based everyday resistance. Kerkvliet argues that such resistance was unorganized and silent, in that it operated beyond the purview of the authorities. In place of a dramatic or even violent confrontation between peasants and the state came an “everyday politics,” a process he defines as involving

people embracing, complying with, adjusting, or Contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organised or direct. Everyday politics has little or no organisation, is usually low profile and private behaviour, and is done by people who probably do not regard their actions as political. It can occur in organisations, but everyday politics itself is not organized. (Kerkvliet 2010, 37)

Thus, a whole series of micro-based strategies in which individual peasants sought to enhance their own livelihoods behind the backs of the authorities eventuated in the collapse of collectivist farming and its replacement by individual household-based production.

A further dimension of everyday non-Western agency relates to the theme of indigenous voice/episteme. Notable is Rey Chow’s (1993) advocacy for a mode of conceptualizing “native” agency that “precedes the arrival of the colonizer,” which she understands as a mode that does not reduce the native’s subjectivity to that of a passive object perpetually ensnared by the West’s defiling gaze. Here, in the specific context of Western imperialism/neo-imperialism, Robbie Shilliam’s recent exploration of peripheral voices in the context of the Black Pacific (or the Black Oceania) becomes pertinent. In revealing what we shall call indigenous/epistemic non-Western agency, Shilliam rejects the “fatal impact” theory’s account of indigenous groups, which in its nineteenth-century (social Darwinian) incarnation implied the notion that “indigenous cultures could not withstand or compete with the sophistication of European civilization: they would have to die or transform into subordinate versions of the conquering culture” (Shilliam 2015, 7).

Reminiscent of Menchu’s refusal to be fully known, the various indigenous groups and voices/cosmologies that Shilliam uncovers exhibit a refusal to be transformed and disciplined by Western imperial power. Indigenous groups, not unlike Scott’s everyday actors, collect in the “hinterlands” that exist in a space where the colonial gaze reaches its weakest, outer-bound limits in order to carve out and maintain their own non-Western identity, indigenous episteme, and voice. In revealing everyday indigenous agency, he separates out the worlds of the material and spiritual, where the former is infected by Western colonialism but the Western gaze does not dominate the latter, which exists in the hinterlands. Indeed, like Scott’s discussion of the hidden transcripts of subordinate actors, Shilliam views the colonial logic in the indigenous hinterlands as an intrusion but not a foundation (Shilliam 2015, 20).

Here, Shilliam focuses on the (epistemic) agency of indigenous peoples who range across not simply the Black Pacific but across Black Oceania and who seek to return in some way to their Black African origins as they initiate global
interconnectivities in their fight for indigenous self-determination. His desire to trace all this echoes our own emancipatory sensibility, for in revealing these non-Western sites of agency and their global interconnections he aims to "strengthen the confidence of peoples of African [though we would add all non-Western peoples'] heritage as to the global (and never marginal) importance of our anti-colonial struggle and ongoing decolonial projects" (Shilliam 2015, 12). In these hinterlands, indigenous agents anchor their identity and voice in ancient cosmologies—such as the Māoris who relate back to the ancient cosmological figures of Tāne, Māui, and Legba. In the process, in relating back to their ancient ancestors who existed before the colonial intrusion, they seek to overcome the logic of empire, which, having sequestered them, then proceeded to repress, exploit, segregate, and culturally convert them to the standard of Western civilization. The figure of Legba, in particular, serves to transcend this segregationist logic by re-rendering the ties that bind indigenous peoples together. This general process goes on within particular indigenous groups, including the New Zealand Māoris but also the Pasifika peoples and the Ras Tafari, all of whom actively link up into a larger global decolonial movement.

Shilliam’s focus can be expanded out much further to consider a whole range of alternative non-Western cosmologies that are embraced by indigenous, epistemic agents in the non-Western world, which include Ubuntu (Ngcora 2015), Islam and the Umma (Sheikh 2016), Sikhism and the Khalsa Panth (Shani 2008), Daoist Dialectics (Ling 2014), Dharmic critiques of Western universalism (Malhotra 2011), as well as a consideration of overlaps or links between them—for example, Confucianism and Ubuntu (Bell and Metz 2011) or Sikhism and Islam (Shani 2015)—in order to create a “Post-Western conception of human security” (Shani 2015) or decolonial conceptions of human sovereignty (Mignolo 2011a).

We now shift onto different terrain where non-Western agents often engage dialogically and entwine interstitially in network-type formations. Notable here are dialogical-developmental notions of non-Western agency, which can have, and indeed have had, various constitutive impacts on the West. Problematizing the Eurocentric BBT through a contrapuntal lens reveals this. Regarding the first step, the West did not break through into modernity all by itself through the endogenous “logic of immanence” but was heavily influenced by all manner of earlier exogenous non-Western developments and inventions—institutions, ideas, and technologies—that were pioneered in China, India, North Africa, and West Asia. Indeed, at every major turning point in the rise of the West, Europeans borrowed or appropriated key non-Western inventions, in the absence of which it is debatable as to whether Europe would have made the final breakthrough into industrial modernity (Hobson 2004). Various non-Eurocentric neo-Trotskyists add in the role of pre-modern uneven and combined development under conditions of non-Western state dominance—for example, the role of the Ottoman Empire prior to the rise of European capitalism (Anievas and Nisancıoğlu 2015; cf. Matin 2013). Not only does this problematize the notion of an exceptional self-generating West, but it also suggests that modern development is not something of which Europe can legitimately claim a pure monopoly.

It is also the case that so many of the practices of European modernity, which are singled out by Michel Foucault, emerged in the imperial non-Western context, whether these be the creation of modern methods of industrial organization that were pioneered not in the textile factories of Manchester but on the sugar plantations in the Caribbean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Mintz 1986; Quijano 2000; Mignolo 2000); or the emergence of “the population” as the primary object of governmental power that probably began in the colonization of the non-European regions. Indeed, “many forms of social organization and cultural production that, since Discipline and Punish, we have come to consider as important, such as wage-labour and the factory system, in the emergence of
European modernity were first developed well beyond the Northern Europe of Michel Foucault’s analyses” (Mitchell 2000, 3). And these developments then fed back to enable the British industrial revolution (Williams 1944; Rodney [1972] 2012; Inikori 2002; Hobson 2004; Bhambra 2007; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015).

Regarding the second step of the BBT, we argue that one non-Eurocentric avenue worth exploring is how the globalization that emerged after 1492 and the proto-globalization that preceded it from c. 600 CE onward were significantly promoted by non-Western actors, who included Chinese, Indians, Africans, Jews, Javanese, Armenians, North and East Africans, as well as West Asian Muslims (Hobson 2004; cf. Abu-Lughod 1989; Frank 1998). Moreover, it was precisely this global context, which enabled the diffusion and the appropriation of non-Western inventions, that in turn propelled the rise of the West in the first place. All of this problematizes the Eurocentric BBT—that the rise of the West came first and Western-led globalization followed—given that the story of global networks (of trade, ideas, technological inventions, institutions, and people), which were promoted by non-Western agents, preceded and were formative of “European” modernity. And, to return to our discussion of the Suez Crisis, this episode subverts the second step of the Eurocentric BBT because one of the unintended outcomes of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal was a delegitimation of the British Empire that accelerated ongoing processes of decolonization. All of this suggests that such dialogical non-Western agency can re-track and reconstitute the West in manifold ways, thereby offering a critique of Eurofetishism’s substantalist assumption that the West is purely autonomous, self-generating, and self-directed.

The West is not and never has been absolutely autonomous. Nor does it make itself and then remake the world as it deems fit, for if we deploy “contrapuntal history” (Said 1994), we can reimagine the West as constantly shaped and reshaped by its relational interactions and connections with the non-West, which then reconfigure the directions that the West undertakes in the world. This suggests that such non-Western agency has significantly constitutive and consequential outcomes, as through the invisible hand of interstitial surprise its developmental-dialogical actions aggregated up into enabling no less than the rise of Western capitalism. The overall upshot of this is twofold: first, the linear Eurocentric story of the rise of European capitalism and its subsequent unproblematic expansion that remade the global economy and international system according to Western requirements needs to be problematized such that we need to reconstruct a more contingent and discontinuous global story in which the determinative lines run from different parts of the globe, from the non-West to the West and vice versa, and in no particular order or telos. Indeed, to overlook these multiple relational interactions that constituted modernity “requires a constant represent[ation] of the homogenous unity of [Western] modernity’s space and time” (Mitchell 2000, 13; see also Hobson 2004; Bhambra 2007, 143–44). Accordingly, the West has always been a hybrid construct or amalgam, as non-Western instances of dialogical-developmental agency play their constitutive part.

The second main upshot is that “downplaying ambiguity [and relational, co-constitutive inter-connectivities between Western and non-Western worlds] is indeed itself a technique of [Eurocentric] power” (Zanotti 2013, 298). This, when coupled with Homi Bhabha’s (1994) point that colonial power seeks to represent itself as absolute “unity” while creating passive non-Western “mimic men,” renders Eurocentric CIRT, albeit entirely unwittingly, complicit in Empire’s self-representation as omnipotent, unified, self-made, and self-directed. For the problem is that neither the colonizers/neo-colonizers are as powerful nor the subalterns as weak and helpless as this imperialist discursive caricature suggests. Indeed, colonial power’s self-representation as absolute “unity” and as all powerful is a product not of empirical fact but of Eurofetishist construction, whose
cracks and fissures had and have to be constantly glossed over, worked up and reworked, manufactured and remanufactured, through an ongoing project of Western imperial/neo-imperial statecraft. Thus, the picture of a self-divided and fragmented West during the First World War revealed not merely the fissures in Western hegemonic unity that the non-Western nationalist movements sought to exploit to their own ends but also, simultaneously, fueled a range of deeply felt anxieties within the West that were articulated in various angst-ridden Eugenicist-racist “white supremacy” treatises that sought normatively to re-unify Europe (e.g., Stoddard 1920). Accordingly, the vision of a purely autonomous, self-generating and stable, self-confident West is merely a Eurofetishist optical illusion that is constructed by orthodox- as well as critical-IR theory. For ultimately there can be no West outside the non-West.

Conclusion

Two summary points are noteworthy by way of conclusion. First, while we have argued that the Eurofetishism of CIRT means that its constituent approaches revert into “critical-Eurocentrism,” Wallerstein and Dirlik view Eurofetishism as the antidote to Eurocentrism. We therefore find that there are at least two definitions of Eurocentrism and two potential antidotes, though both stand diametrically opposed to each other. Thus, this contested nature of what Eurocentrism and its antidote comprise requires further consideration by CIRT scholars, if not a debate as to the way forward. Second, as we have argued in this article, rejecting Eurofetishist conceptions of the West and lowering the impossibly high non-Western agential bar that these yield opens up a space for an expansive analysis of non-Western agency: specifically, how such agents act in their own right, sometimes as a response to Western power but sometimes for reasons Other-wise, and how, in turn, these can gain constitutive traction in shaping the international system as well as the West and non-West. Ultimately we believe that our focus on non-Western agency enables the charting of a genuinely more inclusive and democratic-intellectual global terrain, which in turn serves as a means of restoring emancipatory hope in the face of the implicit pessimism, if not fatalism, of much of CIRT.

References


