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**Article:**

https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12265

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Abstract

Bitter personal experience and meta-analysis converge on the conclusion that people do not always do the things that they intend to do. This paper synthesizes research on intention-behavior relations to address questions such as: How big is the intention-behavior gap? When are intentions more or less likely to get translated into action? What kinds of problems prevent people from realizing their intentions? And what strategies show promise in closing the intention-behavior gap and helping people do the things that they intend to do?

Word count: 87 words

KEYWORDS: Intention, goal, behavior, if-then plans, progress
The Intention-Behavior Gap

Goal intentions are people’s self-instructions to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., “I intend to finish this paper before I die!”; Triandis, 1980) and behavioral intentions are self-instructions to perform particular actions directed towards attaining these outcomes (e.g., “I intend to spend Monday morning working on this paper!”). Intentions capture both the level of the set goal or behavior (e.g., the number of hours that the person intends to spend working on their paper), and the person’s level of commitment (e.g., how determined they are to devote that number of hours to working on the paper). Although most behavior is habitual or involves responses that are triggered automatically by situational cues (e.g., Bargh, 2006; Wood & Neal, 2007), forming intentions can be crucial for securing long-term goals (Baumeister & Bargh, 2014; Kuhl & Quirin, 2011). The concept of intention has thus proved invaluable for researchers concerned with behavior change, and interventions designed to promote public health, energy conservation, and educational and organizational outcomes generally rely on frameworks that construe intentions as a key determinant of behavior change (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1996; Locke & Latham, 1992; Rogers, 1983).

Numerous correlational studies indicate that intentions predict behavior. For instance, Sheeran (2002) meta-analyzed 10 previous meta-analysis (422 studies in total) and found a ‘large’ sample-weighted average correlation between intentions measured at one time-point and measures of behavior taken at a subsequent time-point ($r_+ = 0.53$). Moreover, intention offers superior prediction of behavior in correlational tests compared to other cognitions including (explicit and implicit) attitudes, norms, self-efficacy, and perceptions of risk and severity (e.g., McEachan et al., 2011; Sheeran, Harris, & Epton, 2014; Sheeran et al., in press) as well as personality factors (e.g., Chiaburu et al., 2011; Poropat, 2009; Rhodes & Smith, 2006). These
findings would seem to suggest that forming an intention to change is vital if people are to initiate new behaviors or to alter courses of action that are no longer seen as desirable.

**The Intention-Behavior Gap: The Proverbial ‘Road to Hell’ is Well Paved**

How well a variable predicts behavior in correlational studies does not indicate how much change in behavior accrues from manipulating that variable, however (Sheeran, Klein, & Rothman, in press). A meta-analysis of experiments that manipulated intention showed that a medium-to-large-sized change in intentions led to only a small-to-medium-sized change in behavior ($d_+ = .36$; Webb & Sheeran, 2006; see also Rhodes & Dickau, 2012). Findings from statistical simulations also converge on the conclusion that changing intentions does not guarantee behavior change (Fife-Schaw, Sheeran, & Norman, 2007). To identify the source of the discrepancy between intentions and behavior, Sheeran (2002; Orbell & Sheeran, 1998), decomposed the intention-behavior relation into a 2 (intend to act vs. do not intend to act) by 2 (subsequently act vs. do not act) matrix. This analysis revealed that it is people who intend to change their behavior but do not (“inclined abstainers”) who are mainly responsible for the intention-behavior gap (see Godin & Conner, 2008; Rhodes & de Bruijn, 2013, for equivalent findings).

Despite the considerable research on goals, motivation, and self-regulation during the past 15 years (see, e.g., Aarts & Elliot, 2011; Moskowitz & Grant, 2009; Shah & Gardner, 2008, Vohs & Baumeister, 2016, for summaries), much of this work does not explicitly test the relationship between intention and behavior. The present review therefore focuses squarely on the intention-behavior gap – on research relevant to understanding the predicament of inclined abstainers, and how the translation of intentions into action can be improved. Adopting this perspective means that three strands of research can be delineated that concern (a) the qualities
of the focal intention that make subsequent action more or less likely, (b) the challenges that need to be met as people strive to enact their intentions, and (c) the self-regulatory tools that can help people to realize their intentions. We discuss each of these issues in turn.

**Qualities of Intention: Not All Intentions Take the Road to Hell**

The nature of the focal goal, the basis of intention, and properties of intention each influence the quality of the respective intention and its likelihood of enactment.

**Goal dimensions.** The contents or structural features of the specified goal can have an important bearing on the likelihood that the intention to achieve that goal is realized (for reviews, see Fujita & MacGregor, 2012; Grant & Gelety, 2009). In general, evidence suggests that goals that are framed in terms of promotion (vs. prevention; Higgins, 1997), autonomy (vs. control; Ryan and Deci 2000) and learning or mastery (vs. performance; Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Elliot & Church, 1997) are more likely to be attained. Similarly, concrete or specific goals (e.g., “gain an A grade”) engender better performance than general or ‘do your best’ goals (for a review, see Locke & Latham, 2013).

Set goals often are over-optimistic which can reduce the likelihood that they are achieved. For instance, research on the ‘planning fallacy’ indicates that undergraduates underestimate the amount of time that it will take them to complete coursework (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994) and research on the ‘cold-to-hot empathy gap’ indicates that setting goals in a cold (e.g., calm or satiated) state can reduce goal attainment because the impact of visceral states (e.g., arousal, hunger) are not taken into account (e.g., Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2008). On the other hand, Zhang and Fishbach (2010) found that optimistic goal setting can constitute a self-control strategy that helps people to deal with obstacles during goal pursuit. People allocate more effort to the pursuit of optimistic goals than more realistic goal
setting and as a result perform better. Thus, optimistic goals may contribute to the intention-behavior gap but can, at the same time, lead to greater overall performance.

Not surprisingly, evidence also suggests that intentions are more likely to be translated into action when respective behaviors are easier to perform (Sheeran, Trafimow, & Armitage, 2003). Goal difficulty is a function of the resources, ability, skills, co-operation, opportunities, and time and effort needed to realize the goal. Consistent with this idea, socioeconomic status (SES) appears to moderate the intention-behavior relation (SES; Conner, McEachan, et al., 2013). Interestingly, however, people’s beliefs about the difficulty of performing the behavior or the extent to which they have control over behavioral performance (self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control, respectively) do not consistently moderate the intention-behavior relationship (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002), perhaps because people generally over-estimate the difficulty of performing behaviors (DiBonaventura & Chapman, 2008; Sheeran et al., 2003).

**Basis of the intention.** Several factors that guide intention formation (i.e., form the basis of the intention) also influence whether those intentions are realized. Consistent with self-determination theory (SDT; e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000), evidence suggests that intentions based on personal beliefs about the outcomes of acting (attitudes) better predict behavior than intentions based on social pressure to act (norms) (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999). Intentions based more on feelings about performing the behavior (affective attitudes) than on thoughts about the likely consequences of acting (cognitive attitudes) are also associated with improved prediction of behavior (Conner et al., 2016; Keer et al., Conner, Putte, & Neijens, 2014). Findings also indicate that greater feelings of moral obligation and anticipated regret about failing to act increase the likelihood that intentions are enacted (Abraham & Sheeran, 2004; Conner et al., 2006; Godin, Conner, & Sheeran, 2005; Godin et al., 2014; Sheeran & Abraham, 2003; Sheeran
Finally, many intentions present a conflict between what people want to do and what they feel they should do (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008). At the present moment, for instance, I should continue working on this paper but I want to take a break. Taylor, Webb, and Sheeran (2014) found that such conflicts can give rise to justifications for indulgence that can undermine the realization of intentions. Taken together with research on self-licensing (e.g., De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012; 2014a, b), it seems that there are times when people willingly undermine their own intentions by justifying so doing to themselves.

The extent to which intentions are relevant to the persons’ identity can also influence the likelihood that they are achieved. For example, Sheeran and Orbell (2000a) found that people for whom exercising was an important part of their self-concept (“exerciser schematics”) better translated their intentions to exercise into action compared to participants who did not think of themselves as ‘an exerciser.’ On the other hand, when behavioral intentions serve an identity goal and other people take notice of the person’s intention, intention realization is compromised – because the person feels they possess the identity and no longer needs to act on their intention (Gollwitzer et al., 2009).

Experience with a behavior, or how often a person has performed the relevant behavior in the past, appears to have paradoxical effects on intention-behavior relations. On the one hand, several studies indicate that greater experience serves to stabilize intentions, meaning that they are more likely to be enacted (e.g., Doll & Ajzen, 1992; Kashima, Gallois, & McCamish, 1993; Sheeran & Abraham, 2003). On the other hand, research on habits indicates that greater experience reduces intention-behavior consistency because encountering the relevant contextual cues (e.g., a particular time, place, person) elicits the behavior automatically – habit performance bypasses intentional control (e.g., Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999; Wood &
Neal, 2007). Sheeran et al. (in press) proposed that this paradox could be resolved by hypothesizing that the impact of experience on the relationship between intentions and behavior is captured by an inverted U-shaped curve. Findings supported the hypothesis: Greater experience initially enhanced the predictive validity of intention (because experience stabilizes intentions); after a certain point, however, greater experience merely reflects increased automatization of behavior and so the predictive validity of intention declined. Thus, experience with a behavior can serve both to strengthen and weaken intention-behavior consistency.

**Properties of intention.** Properties of intentions also influence intention-behavior consistency. Studies of properties of intentions measure not only the direction and intensity of an intention (e.g., “I intend to finish this paper before I die!”), but also other features such as accessibility (indexed by response latencies to questions about intention), certainty (e.g., “I am certain that my intention will not change!”), and temporal stability (e.g., the within-participants correlation between measures of intention taken at two time-points) (Cooke & Sheeran, 2013). Several lines of research indicate that intention stability is a better indicator of the strength of the respective intention than accessibility or certainty. First, intention stability is a more powerful moderator of the intention-behavior relation than the other indicators (Conner & Godin, 2007; Cooke & Sheeran, 2013; Sheeran & Abraham, 2003; see Cooke & Sheeran, 2004, for a meta-analysis). Second, temporal stability is associated with improved processing of goal-relevant information and increased resistance to attacks on intention (Cooke & Sheeran, 2013). Finally, evidence indicates that intention stability mediates the influence of other moderators of the intention-behavior relationship such as attitudinal versus normative control, anticipated regret, self-schemas, experience with the behavior, and intention certainty (Keer et al., 2014; Sheeran & Abraham, 2003; Turchik & Gidycz, 2012).
The evidence outlined in this section indicates that not all intentions take the road to hell, and that it is possible to predict whether or not intentions will be enacted. Although research on goal dimensions has not yet been integrated with research on the basis of intention or studies of intention properties, accumulated evidence suggests that intention stability is the best indicator of the likelihood that an intention will be realized. Factors that form the basis of intention appear to influence rates of intention realization precisely because they lead to stable intentions, and stable intentions have powerful effects, even moderating the consistency between measures of intentions and behavior measured taken 6 years apart (Conner, Norman, & Bell, 2002).

The Tasks of Realizing Intentions and Goals (TRIALS): Negotiating the Paving on the Road to Hell

Although forming intentions instigates psychological processes that support the realization of those intentions (e.g., improved processing of goal-related information; see Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006, for a review), research on the intention-behavior gap makes it clear that these processes alone do not guarantee intention realization. As people strive to enact their intentions, they can face various self-regulatory challenges in aligning their thoughts, feelings, and actions with their intentions (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, 2009). Self-regulatory problems may be encountered during different phases of goal pursuit, and include problems (a) getting started, (b) keeping ongoing goal pursuit on track, and (c) bringing goal pursuit to a successful close (see Figure 1). Below, we use this temporal dimension to identify some key problems and link them to the tasks involved in successfully realizing intentions.

Key problems encountered in getting started include forgetting to act, missing opportunities to act, and failing to engage in preparatory behaviors. For example, Einstein et al. (2003) observed that after a delay of just 5 seconds, 8% of their (young, healthy) participants
forgot to enact an intended behavior, and this proportion increased to 24% when participants’ attention was divided. Forgetting to act is commonplace and has been implicated in failures to take medication as planned (e.g., O’Carroll et al., 2014; Zogg et al., 2012) and failure to perform intended energy-saving behaviors (Corradi et al., 2013). Even if people do remember their intention, good opportunities to act may be missed. Failing to capitalize on favorable conditions for acting seems especially likely when such opportunities are brief or infrequent (Dholakia & Bagozzi, 2006), involve deadlines, or when multiple ways to achieve the intention are available and the person is undecided about how best to attain their goal. Experiencing ‘second thoughts’ at the moment of acting (goal revision in situ) and procrastination can also cause people to miss opportunities to act. Goal revision in situ may occur when people have failed to anticipate the visceral drives present at the moment of acting (Nordgren et al., 2008), are ambivalent about acting, or when the presence of tempting alternative courses of action leads to people to justify indulgence to themselves (Taylor et al., 2014). Procrastination appears to be both dispositionally and situationally determined (e.g., by low conscientiousness and task aversiveness, respectively) and is reliably associated both with the likelihood that people will form intentions (Sirois, 2004) and difficulties in enacting intentions (Steel, 2007). Closely related to the problem of missing opportunities to act is the failure to engage in preparatory behaviors. Many goals involve a series of actions that need to be completed in sequence. For instance, achieving the intention to use a condom during sex demands preparatory behaviors to ensure that condoms are available and that there is agreement with one’s partner to use them (e.g., Sheeran, Abraham, & Orbell, 1999). Even strongly intending to use a condom does not ensure that the necessary preparatory behaviors are undertaken (Carvalho et al., 2015; van Empelen & Kok, 2008).
Having successfully initiated goal pursuit, the next self-regulatory problem that people face is how to keep goal pursuit on track. One reason that goal pursuit can be derailed is because people fail to monitor their progress. Evidence suggests that keeping track of progress (e.g., using a diary) increases the likelihood that intentions are achieved (see Harkin et al., 2016 for a review), perhaps because monitoring progress serves to identify discrepancies between current and desired states (i.e., it signals the need to act, Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009), and maintains attention on the focal goal (Liberman & Dar, 2009). However, few people monitor their household energy consumption (Webb, Benn, & Chang, 2014), check their bank balances regularly, or keep track of what they are eating (for a review, see Webb, Chang, & Benn, 2013). This motivated avoidance of progress monitoring is termed “The Ostrich Problem” and appears to be rooted in people’s desire to maintain favorable views of themselves and their standing with respect to the goal (Webb et al., 2013).

Goal pursuit can also be derailed by competing goals, bad habits, and disruptive thoughts and feelings. Perhaps the most common competing goals involve distractions (activities that consume time or effort needed to realize the focal intention) and temptations (enticing stimuli that afford the opportunity to engage in behavior that is antithetical to the focal intention; see Hofman et al., 2012). It is particularly challenging that competing goals can be activated automatically by situational features (i.e., without participants being aware that a competing goal has been activated or may impact on behavior). For instance, Gollwitzer, et al. (2011) found that priming the goal of moving fast undermined the realization of participants’ intentions to drive safely. Situational features can also activate habits and it is well established that the intention-behavior relation is weaker for habitual as compared to non-habitual behaviors (e.g., Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Unwanted thoughts and feelings can also disrupt efforts
to enact intentions. Social anxiety (Webb et al., 2010) and test anxiety (Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010) both hamper performance. Similarly, worry about an upcoming psychotherapy appointment predicted non-attendance, despite participants’ holding strong intentions to keep the appointment (Sheeran, Aubrey, & Kellett, 2007). In other studies, negative mood and high levels of arousal led to unintended risk behavior (Webb et al., 2010).

Low willpower can also derail goal pursuit. Several studies have shown that participants with low levels of executive function (assessed by Go/No-Go or Stroop task performance) are less successful at translating their intentions into action (Allan, Johnston, & Campbell, 2011; Hall et al., 2008; Wong & Mullan, 2009). Equivalent findings were observed for personality factors relevant to willpower including (low) conscientiousness (Conner, Rodgers, & Murray, 2007), future time orientation (Kovač & Rise, 2007), volitional control (Orbell & Hagger, 2006), and mindfulness (Chatzisarantis & Hagger, 2007). Low willpower is also a state, termed ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998), and is apparent in poorer performance on a second self-control task following the exertion of self-control on an initial task. Although there is much debate about the magnitude of the ego depletion effect and its interpretation (e.g., Carter et al., 2015; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014), ego-depletion appears to moderate the intention-behavior relation. For example, intentions to curb food (Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007) and alcohol intake (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008) did not predict subsequent consumption when participants were depleted by an initial self-control task.

The third key problem that people may encounter when striving to achieve their intentions is failing to bring goal pursuit to a successful close. This embraces three issues: Withdrawing effort before completing the goal, continuing to engage in a futile course of action,
and becoming over-extended. Making good progress towards one’s goal can lead to coasting (Carver, 2003) and people may withdraw effort from goal striving prematurely especially if they expect to be successful (Louro et al., 2007). Disengaging from goals becomes necessary when it has become clear that the desired outcome is unattainable, or the costs of continued striving outweigh the benefits. The difficulty lies in recognizing that these circumstances have arisen, overcoming self-image or accountability concerns, and effectively calling a halt. Research on escalation of commitment makes it clear that merely intending to disengage from futile goal striving does not suffice to cease striving (Henderson, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007). The phenomenon of becoming over-extended is exemplified by John Henry, who worked so hard while competing with a steam-powered hammer that he died of heart failure shortly after his victory. Such over-extension is especially problematic given that people likely have multiple goals that they wish to pursue (e.g., Fitzsimons & Shah, 2012) and that striving for one goal can compromise the pursuit of subsequent goals (Baumeister et al., 1998). In sum, it is clear that forming an intention is merely the starting point for the willful control of action (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996), and people may face a series of problems in striving to realize their intentions.

**Tools for Intention Realization: Repaving the ‘Road to Hell’**

The various problems that create a gap between intentions and behavior are neither inevitable nor irresolvable, however. Understanding these problems serves to identify the tasks that must be undertaken in order to ensure the effective translation of intentions into action (see Figure 1). For instance, if forgetting to act poses a problem, then the person’s task is to remember to initiate action. If goal striving is likely to get sent off track, then the task is to maintain goal pursuit by monitoring progress or managing unwanted influences. And, if the
problem involves failing to bring goal pursuit to a successful close, then the self-regulatory tasks are to disengage from futile goal striving and conserve capability for acting on one’s other intentions. A variety of tools to tackle these self-regulatory tasks have been developed, and are outlined next.

**If-then plans.** One of the most widely researched and best-validated tools for improving the translation of intentions into action is forming if-then plans or implementation intentions (see Gollwitzer, 1999, 2014; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, 2009, for reviews). If-then planning involves identifying relevant opportunities (e.g., to initiate goal pursuit, to prevent an unwanted influence from occurring) and obstacles (e.g., the particular unwanted thought or feeling that must be dealt with in order to maintain goal pursuit). Having identified good opportunities to act and key obstacles to manage, it is then necessary to: (a) select an effective way to respond to each opportunity and obstacle, and (b) link the opportunity/obstacle and response using the following, if-then, format: If (opportunity/obstacle) arises, then I will (respond in this way)!

Forming if-then plans is a highly effective means of accomplishing self-regulatory tasks and reducing the intention-behavior gap. A meta-analysis of 94 studies observed a medium-to-large improvement in rates of goal attainment and behavioral performance compared to merely forming behavioral or goal intentions ($d_+ = 0.65$; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; see also Adriaanse et al., 2011; Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & Amireault, 2013). There is evidence that forming if-then plans can promote the initiation, maintenance, and successful closure of goal pursuit. For example, studies suggest that people better remembered to take their prescribed medication (Brown, Sheeran, & Reuber, 2009; O’Carroll et al., 2013), seized opportunities to act (e.g., Webb & Sheeran, 2004; Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2012), overcame procrastination (Wieber & Gollwitzer, 2010), and engaged in preparatory behaviors (Arden & Armitage, 2008)
when they furnished their intentions with if-then plans. Forming implementation intentions has also been shown to help to overcome a variety of unwanted influences including distractions (Wieber et al., 2015), temptations (e.g., Armitage & Arden, 2012), unwelcome social influence (e.g., Rivis & Sheeran, 2013; Wieber et al., 2014), habits (Adriaanse et al., 2011; Armitage, 2008; Webb, Sheeran, & Luszczynska, 2010), and emotions (Sheeran et al., 2007; Varley, Webb & Sheeran, 2011; Webb et al., 2010; for a review, see Webb, Schweiger Gallo et al., 2012). People also better disengage from futile goal striving when they form if-then plans (Henderson et al., 2007).

If-then plans help people to act on their intentions because the mental representation of opportunities or obstacles become highly accessible (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Webb & Sheeran, 2004, 2007, 2008) – people are thus able to identify the moment to act when they encounter it. Moreover, strong associations are forged between the opportunity/obstacle and the specified response, meaning that people are in a good position to seize that moment and respond as they had spelled out in advance (Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2007, 2008). Indeed, evidence indicates that forming if-then plans endows responses with features of automaticity (see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006, for a review). Whereas action control by intentions operates in a ‘top-down’, deliberative manner, neurophysiological studies indicate that if-then plans operate in ‘bottom-up’, cue-driven fashion (Gilbert et al., 2009; Hallam et al., 2015), akin to the operation of habits (Gollwitzer, 1999; Wood & Neal, 2007).

**Progress monitoring interventions.** Monitoring goal progress is a key step between intention formation and goal attainment (e.g., de Bruin et al., 2012; Wilkowski & Ferguson, 2016), and involves comparing the current state or rate of progress against the standard specified in the respective intention. Discrepancies from standards signal the need for self-regulation (e.g.,
the need to step up efforts). Accordingly, interventions that promote progress monitoring (e.g., via food or activity diaries) should improve the translation of intentions into action. In support of this idea, Harkin et al. (2016) meta-analyzed 138 interventions and observed that a large sized increase in the frequency of progress monitoring ($d = 1.98$) led to a small-to-medium sized change in behavior ($d = 0.40$). Interventions had larger effects when the focus of monitoring (performance of goal-directed behavior or outcomes) matched the desired outcome (a change in behavior or a change in outcomes), and when progress was physically recorded (e.g., in a diary) or made public (e.g., group weighing sessions). Evidence also suggests that interventions designed to promote progress monitoring may be especially effective when they are supported by techniques that facilitate other key self-regulatory processes (e.g., goal setting and goal operating, Michie et al., 2009).

**Other approaches.** In addition to if-then planning and monitoring progress, there is supportive evidence for other approaches to helping people to translate their intentions into action. Interventions based on the strength model of self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) such as glucose consumption (Gailliot et al., 2007) and self-control training (Muraven, 2010) have shown promise, although recent research offers more cautious assessments (Beadie & Lane, 2012; Inzlicht & Berkman, 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Miles et al., in press) or points to alternative mechanisms (Molden et al., 2012). Two kinds of training inspired by dual-process theories (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004) that target impulsive responding or intentional control, also show promise. For instance, stop-signal or go/no-go training\(^1\) improved diet and weight control (van Koningsbruggen et al., 2014; Veling et al., 2014) and approach/avoidance training

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\(^1\) Stop-signal or go/no-go training involves linking appetitive stimuli (e.g., images of candy) with behavioral stop signals (e.g., a symbol that indicates a response to the specified stimulus should be withheld) in a context where the participants have a prepotent “go” response to stimuli.
prevented relapse among patients with alcoholism (Eberl et al., 2013). Working memory training (WMT) has also been shown to reduce alcohol consumption (Houben, Wiers, & Jannsen, 2011), although there is debate about the magnitude and mechanisms underlying the effects (e.g., Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012; von Bastian & Oberauer, 2014). Mindfulness interventions (Harper, Webb, & Raynor, 2013; Papies et al., 2014; Witkiewitz et al., 2013) and embodiment strategies (Sherman, Gangi, & White, 2010) have also demonstrated potential. Finally, insights from research on habits is also proving valuable in identifying strategies that could help to maintain goal pursuit (e.g., repeating behavior in stable contexts, piggy-backing new behavior(s) onto existing habits, Rothman et al., 2015). Although formal tests of moderation of the intention-behavior relation remain to be undertaken for many of these interventions, findings to date would seem to be indicative of future success in closing the gap between intentions and behavior.

**Conclusion**

The intention-behavior gap is large – current evidence suggests that intentions get translated into action approximately one-half of the time. The quality of the intention matters, however, and the nature of the focal goal, the basis of intention, and properties of intention each influence rates of intention realization. An analysis of the problems that people encounter in striving to enact their intentions suggest that three tasks must be accomplished to secure intention realization – people need to initiate, maintain, and close goal pursuit. If-then plans, interventions that prompt progress monitoring, and more recent training approaches should each prove helpful in accomplishing these tasks. Finally, while we have emphasized the gap between intention and action, it is also important not to lose sight of the value that the intention construct holds for practitioners and policy makers concerned with promoting public health, energy conservation,
and educational and organizational outcomes. After all, the authors did realize their intention to finish this paper. And we are not dead (yet).

[4,645 words]
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466610X532192


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THE INTENTION-BEHAVIOR GAP

**Key problems**

- Fail to get started
- Fail to keep goal pursuit on track
- Fail to bring goal pursuit to a successful close

**Sub-problems**

- Forget to act
- Miss opportunities to act
  - Brief windows, deadlines
  - Indecision about means
  - 'Second thoughts'
  - Procrastination
- Fail to engage in preparatory behavior(s)
- Fail to monitor goal progress
- Unwanted influences send goal striving off track
  - Competing goals
  - 'Bad' habits
  - Disruptive thoughts and feelings
  - Unwelcome social influence
  - Low willpower
- Fall short of the desired outcome
- Fail to disengage from futile goal striving
- Become over-extended

**Key Tasks**

- Initiate goal pursuit
- Maintain goal pursuit
- Close goal pursuit

**Sub-tasks**

- Remember to act
- Seize opportunities
- Instigate preparatory behaviors
- Monitor goal progress
- Shield goal striving from unwanted influences
- Ensure that the desired outcome has been achieved
- Disengage from futile goal striving
  - Conserve capability for future goal striving