Steward, H. (2009) The Truth in Compatibilism and the truth of Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations, 12 (2). pp. 167-179. ISSN 1386-9795Full text available as:
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The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion is that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute merely the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents, nor required in order that those agents should act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the ‘can’ and ‘could have’ statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, should be based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation ‘free’) is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be.
|Keywords:||libertarianism, free will, compatibilism, agency, chance, luck.|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Dr Helen Steward|
|Date Deposited:||16 Mar 2010 10:15|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:06|
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