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Sexual Citizenship in Postcolonial Zambia: From Zambian Humanism to Christian Nationalism

Adriaan van Klinken

‘All citizenship is sexual citizenship.’ This claim made by David Bell and Jon Binnie (2000, 10) foregrounds the sexual nature of citizenship; it expresses, as they put it, that ‘the foundational tenets of being a citizen are all inflected by sexualities’. The relationship between sexuality and citizenship has become subject of historical and social science scholarship especially from the late 1990s, complementing the already existing work on the gendered as well as racialised nature of ideas and discourses around citizenship (Lister 2002; Richardson 2000). However, as Basile Ndjio observes, the mainstream literature on African sexuality pays little attention to nationalism and citizenship, while literature on citizenship in Africa pays little attention to sexuality. This is all the more surprising, he argues, because,

across the continent, the refoundational aspirations of pan-Africanist thought and Afrocentrist philosophies sustained the nationalist ambition to constitute an exclusive African sexual identity. They also provided an ideological justification for the exclusion by many African post-colonial states of a variety of sexual experiences, expressions, and desires from the realm of respectable citizenship. (Ndjio 2013, 120)

Only recently, links between sexuality, citizenship and ideologies of nationalism have begun to be explored, especially in the emerging body of literature addressing the current politics of homosexuality in Africa (Nyeck and Epprecht 2013; Nyanzi 2011). However, these accounts tend to focus on contemporary contexts and do not provide in-depth insight in the longue durée of sexual citizenship in African societies. As Ndjio (2013) demonstrates in his work on Cameroon, contemporary politics of homosexuality, and the promotion of a strictly heterosexual notion of ‘African’ citizenship, stand in a long tradition of politicising sexuality in postcolonial African states.

This chapter gives an account on the continuity and change of sexual citizenship in postcolonial Zambia. Given the limitations of space, the chapter cannot provide a full historical account. It broadly focuses on the discursive politics of sexual citizenship in Zambia in two periods: first, the post-independence period dominated by President Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) in which Zambian Humanism was promoted as the official state philosophy, and second, the period after the 1991 multi-party elections, in which Zambia was officially declared a Christian nation by President Frederick Chiluba and in which Christianity, especially in its Pentecostal form, became a major factor in public and political life.

Humanism and Christian Nationalism represent two narratives of nationhood that have dominated the history of Zambia as a postcolonial state. This chapter introduces, contextualises and examines these narratives, highlighting some crucial differences but also some striking continuities, particularly with regard to the politics of sexual citizenship. Doing
so, the chapter hopefully resists and overcomes ‘the lure of a simplistic binary’ between Kaunda’s humanism and Chiluba’s Christianity that occurs in some accounts (Hinfelaar 2011, 129).

UNIP, Kaunda and the Philosophy of Zambian Humanism

Zambia’s colonial and postcolonial history reveals a continuous contestation over the nature of nationhood. In fact, the country’s nationalist movement emerged in 1953 in opposition to the plans for creating a settler-dominated Central African Federation uniting Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). This opposition was organised in the African National Congress under the leadership of Harry Nkumbula. One of the younger, emerging voices in the nationalist movement was Kenneth Kaunda, the son of a Protestant missionary and teacher. After his break with Nkumbula over the political future of Northern Rhodesia, Kaunda in January 1960 was elected as President of the newly established United National Independence Party (UNIP). He became Prime Minister in the government leading Northern Rhodesia into independence, and once that stage had been reached he became the first President of the independent Republic of Zambia in October 1964.

There is an ongoing academic debate about the UNIP and Kaunda-centeredness of Zambian historiography (Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008; Englund 2013). Yet one cannot deny that the construction of Zambian nationhood, even though contested and challenged from both within and outside, was dominated by UNIP, ‘which sought to imprint its ideas of what a Zambian nation should be on a diverse territory and its peoples’ (Larmer et al. 2014, 896). An important means to this was the development of a new philosophy, created by Kaunda and called ‘Zambian Humanism’, which in 1967 was adopted by UNIP as the official national ideology. Some scholars have been sceptical about the impact that Zambian humanism has had. According to Vaughan, the structural features which characterised the politics of the Kaunda administration ‘had nothing to do with “Humanism” or socialism, except when represented rhetorically by the leadership’ (Vaughan 1998, 178). Gordon does not deny the strongly rhetorical dimension of Humanism, yet he suggests that the philosophy should be considered ‘a serious moral and ideological intervention that guided the interactions between individuals and the postcolonial state’ (Gordon 2012, 160).

Historian David Gordon traces the development of Humanism back to 1964, when Kaunda gave a speech at the annual UNIP conference taking place just a month before independence and shortly after the violent confrontation between UNIP and the Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina. According to Gordon, the latter conflict strengthened Kaunda in his idea that UNIP ‘should be a sovereign instrument of morality and guidance for his sometimes confused Zambian flock’ (Gordon 2012, 161). In his speech Kaunda portrayed Lenshina and her followers as ‘not only fanatics but lunatics’ and as ‘anti-society’ (quoted in Gordon 2012, 162) – they represented savagery while what Zambia needed was civilisation. His initial ideas were further developed in subsequent speeches and writings, such as in a

1 Alice Mulenga (1920-1978) in 1953 had a radical conversion experience, and subsequently started the revivalist Lumpa Church movement. The church’s rejection of earthly authority resulted in a violent conflict between church followers, members of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and state security forces in 1964, after which the church was banned.
series of letters published as A Humanist in Zambia (1966) and in a pamphlet submitted to the UNIP national conference, entitled Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation (1967, complemented by Part II in 1974). The philosophy has been described as a mixture of ‘Fabian socialism, nineteenth-century liberalism, Christian morality and idealisation of the communal values of Zambia’s pre-capitalist past’ ( Vaughan 1998, 178).

The introduction of humanism did spark debate and interest in Zambia. One of the controversies was about the presumed secular and Marxist orientation of the state philosophy and the way it was implemented. Yet as much as Zambian humanism had secular undertones, it was not anti-religious and in fact was inspired by Christian vocabulary. According to Gordon, it was ‘a state religion with its own secular invisible world: a modern nation that would resemble heaven’ (Gordon 2012, 158). Helped by economic growth, the UNIP government initially was well able to meet the expectations of development. Yet with the collapse of the copper price (of which the Zambian economy was, and still is, largely dependent) in the early 1970s, the nationalised economy was deeply ravaged. In response to increased opposition, UNIP in December 1972 introduced a system of ‘one-party participatory democracy’. In the subsequent years, the philosophy of Zambian humanism was applied more and more in the area of morality, individually and publicly, including in relation to issues of sexuality.

**Sexual Citizenship under Zambian Humanism**

Of particular interest here is a booklet published by UNIP in 1975, entitled The Zambian Moral Code – A Programmatic Approach. Addressing the question, ‘Why do we need a code?’, the introduction refers to Kaunda’s publicly expressed concern that he could not watch TV in presence of his children because of the ‘considerable immorality carried on the Screen of the Television [in] Zambia’ (Research Bureau 1975, 1). Reference is also made to the party’s concern about mini-skirts, tight trousers, jeans, un-accompanied girls in the streets at night, and to the ‘indiscipline in schools’ manifested in the intake of alcohol and drugs. All these expressions of ‘indiscipline’ and ‘immorality’, according to the booklet, demonstrate the need for a moral code.

Referring to ‘all the prophets of God’ – and the booklet is religiously inclusive here, as it refers to key figures in a wide range of traditions: Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, Judaism, Islam, Baha’i Faith, and Christianity – who have ‘sung hymns against immorality’, the Moral Code argues that moralising individuals in society cannot be left to religion but is a task of all sectors of society, including the state:

> We have left the Clergy to try to live moral and spiritual lives on our behalf. We only join them for worship on the holy day of the religion concerned. … One-day a week morality cannot cleanse the nation … [and therefore] every individual and each institution of the state must become part of the struggle. It is in pursuit of this humanist tenet that the party and President Kaunda have enjoined political solution as the guiding star against national perversion (sic) and immorality. (Research Bureau 1975, 2)
In the remainder of the booklet, the moral code is introduced and applied to various spheres, such as politics, economics, labour, education, art and entertainment, and it further has sections on ‘love and sex’, ‘marriage’, ‘cosmetics and dress’, and even ‘nudes’. Thus, it presents an example of the politics of sexual citizenship under Zambian humanism. Yet what are these politics?

The gendered nature of sexual citizenship becomes immediately clear in the section on love and sex. The section first addresses the topic of ‘the position of women’, recognising the rights of women and stating that ‘one of the tasks of the moral revolution [is] to eliminate cruelty to women’ (Research Bureau 1975, 14–15). The suggestion here is that women are full citizens. The apparent concern about gender inequality is, however, directly undermined in the next paragraph. Here it is argued that when it comes to ‘soliciting for love’, a woman ‘shall at all times wait until she is loved or approached by a man to engage her in a decent love affair’ (Research Bureau 1975, 15). This argument is made with reference to ‘the Zambian traditional customs and indeed the African customs in general’ (ibid) which would not allow women taking initiative in love making. The patriarchal view of love-making that is reflected here and supported with a reference to so-called Zambian and African traditions fits in one of the strategies distinguished by Ndjio – of the essentialisation and racialisation of Africans’ sexuality – through which sexuality in postcolonial African contexts has been made a site ‘where the myth about African cultural unity is enacted’ (Ndjio 2013, 126).

Interestingly, in the same section the booklet has a rather peculiar statement saying: ‘It is befitting for a humanist whether male or female to engage in a decent free love affair in accordance with Zambian Customary law or according to new style law’ (Research Bureau 1975, 15). It is not explained what is meant by such a ‘decent free love affair’, but the next section on marriage might throw light on this. It discusses the practice of the ‘exchange of wives’, which refers to a situation where a married woman by arrangement of her husband is involved in sexual relations with another man. This is presented as a morally acceptable arrangement, with the implicit underlying notion that a woman’s body and sexuality belong to her husband and that he can decide, for various reasons, to share her.

Another concern in the moral code is with cosmetics and dress. Any form of ‘defacing’ – the painting of finger and toe nails, lips, eye-lids, etcetera – as well as the use of cosmetics that bleach the skin are labelled as immoral here, because they are ‘copied from foreign standards’ (Research Bureau 1975, 17). Also very precise prescriptions are given regarding appearance and dress: afro-wigs, bell-bottom jeans, tight trousers and mini-skirts are all considered as immoral. Even though some of the prescriptions are directed to men, most of them concern women’s dress and appearance, making the female body in particular the site of morality. Similar concerns had been expressed earlier by Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe who in 1969 had called for a ‘Cultural Revolution’ – ‘in a bid to rid the nation of alien cultures’ (Mwangilwa 1986, 111) –, as part of which he particularly denounced the use of lipstick, stretching of hair and wearing of mini-skirts, among other things.

Last but not least, the moral code addresses the issue of ‘nude and love exposures in public’. It refers to the publication of nude pictures and the showing of ‘indecent love affairs’

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2 The booklet suggests that in case a couple’s marriage is childless, a husband might arrange for his wife to sleep with another man; also, a husband can share his with a friend as a ‘gesture of friendliness’.
on television or in cinemas as ‘uncalled for and immoral’ (Research Bureau 1975, 18).

Kaunda himself, in his ‘Watershed speech’, which he delivered at a UNIP national council meeting in 1975, had also argued that the moral standards in Zambian society are a matter of concern for the party, and had particularly raised the issue of nude pictures. Referring to a Zambian newspaper that had recently published such a picture, Kaunda stated:

Now when you publicise such things, you are appealing to the instinct of men. You are sabotaging their morality – that is what you do in a permissive society. ... You are promoting prostitution in the nation. You are appealing to the most base instincts in man, destroying him morally. ... The capitalist society is permissive. Whatever money can be raised will be raised, even if it means destroying man morally, spiritually, materially and physically ... (Kaunda 1975, 31)

In the speech Kaunda announced a concrete measure to prevent things like this happening again: the newspaper concerned will be taken over by, and brought under control of UNIP.

Of particular interest here is how his argument against nude pictures led Kaunda into an argument against capitalism. The same move is made in the moral code, which states: ‘In Capitalist Countries, all morals are orientated to Capitalist system, outlook and the whole army of morals are designed to protect capitalism’ (Research Bureau 1975, 3). Humanism is presented as an ideology that, different from capitalism, is able to protect the moral foundations of the nation. Related to this anti-capitalist argument is a strong anti-Western stance. According to Kaunda, the moral purity of Zambia is under threat because,

There has been a successful invasion of our cultural values by those of the west. Any erosion, countrymen, of our cultural values is a threat to Zambian personality. While we are free to borrow positive aspects of foreign culture to enrich our own, we must defend ourselves against undermining our nationhood through cultural conquest. The whole issue, therefore, becomes one of ... rejection and indeed fighting those cultural activities from other lands which may destroy our cultural values, thereby not only dehumanising us, but also making us faint carbon copies of themselves. (Kaunda 1975, 28)

There is clearly an echo here of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ that had been initiated by Vice-President Kapwepwe a few years earlier. The explicitly anti-Western rhetoric evoked by Kaunda in his quest to defend the moral purity of the Zambian nation is even more explicitly reflected when he states: ‘This is Zambia with its own way of life and not Europe. This is Zambia and not the United States of America. We take our cultural values very seriously’ (Kaunda 1975, 31).

The rather extensive discourse of Zambian humanism covers many different social, political and public issues, and sexuality is certainly not the most prominent theme. However, it does receive substantial attention, especially in speeches and publications in the mid 1970s. No systematic concept of sexual citizenship is being developed, but it is clear that citizenship under Zambian Humanism certainly is sexualised – the state inflicts upon its citizens its notions of what it considers as moral and appropriate in the areas of both public and private
sexuality. These notions are presented as being inspired by and derived from ‘Zambian culture’ and as opposed to the foreign influences from Western capitalist cultures. Yet Gordon’s (2012, 160) comment on Zambian Humanism in general certainly does apply to the humanist discourse on sexuality in particular: that it is a consolidation of ‘the moral reformism of the missionary civilizing mission in which the Kaunda family had been so involved’.

From Kaunda’s Humanism to Chiluba’s Christian Nationalism

In the 1980s – a period of deepening economic problems and misuse of political power –, Kaunda and his UNIP government became increasingly subject of criticism, among others of the churches and the trade unions. In 1990, Kaunda gave in to the pressure for democratisation and he signed a new constitution putting an end to the system of one-party democracy. In the 1991 elections, UNIP was defeated by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under the leadership of Frederick J.T. Chiluba, a former trade union leader who succeeded Kaunda and became Zambia’s second President.

The Christian churches, united in the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC, Catholic Church), the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ, mainline Protestant churches), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ, evangelical and Pentecostal churches), had played an important role, both in bringing about the democratic change that made the elections possible and in promoting Chiluba as the preferred candidate (Gifford 1998, 190–197). Chiluba himself was a member of the United Church of Zambia (UCZ) who had undergone a ‘born-again’ experience in 1981 while being imprisoned by Kaunda for his trade union activities, and who had received the gift of speaking in tongues at a crusade with German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. Thus, in the words of Gifford, ‘as Kaunda came to be increasingly regarded as a renegade Christian, presiding over a corrupt and oppressive government, Chiluba stressed (and his supporters stressed even more) his impeccable credentials as a true spirit-filled believer’ (Gifford 1998, 193). As a born-again Christian with strong Pentecostal-charismatic sympathies, Chiluba was particularly close to leaders of the Pentecostal forms of Christianity that had grown rapidly in Zambia since the 1970s (Cheyeka 2008). Prominent Pentecostal leaders supported him publicly in his campaign and continued to have a strong influence on him once elected.

Only two months after being voted into office (a period in which State House had been ceremonially cleansed by charismatic pastors from ‘evil spirits’, and in which an ‘anointing ceremony’ had been held in the Anglican cathedral in Lusaka), on 29 December 1991 President Chiluba declared Zambia to be a Christian nation. He did so in a ceremony broadcasted on national television, surrounded by several Pentecostal leaders. His own government ministers had not been invited because Chiluba did not consider it a ‘political’ function. Chiluba’s speech at this occasion, however, demonstrates the fluid boundaries between ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ and can be read as an example of Pentecostal political theology:

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Footnote 3: According to Phiri (2008, 101), he was involved in charismatic fellowships within the UCZ and was also attached to Northmead Assembly of God, which is a prominent Pentecostal church in Lusaka.
On behalf of the people of Zambia, I repent of our wicked ways of idolatry, witchcraft, immorality, injustice and corruption. I pray for the healing, restoration, revival, blessing and prosperity of Zambia. On behalf of the nation, I have now entered a covenant with the living God. ... I submit the Government and the entire nation of Zambia to the Lordship of Jesus Christ. I further declare that Zambia is a Christian nation that will seek to be governed by the righteous principles of the Word of God. Righteousness and justice must prevail in all levels of authority, and then we shall see the righteousness of God exalting Zambia. (Quoted in Koschorke et al 2007, 273)

According to Amos Yong (2010, 9), the declaration reveals a sense of ‘Pentecostal nationalism’, with born-again ideology being applied not just to individuals but to the nation as a whole. In other words, the declaration made Zambia into ‘a nation reborn’ (Gordon 2012, 178), although this does not mean that Zambian Christianity as a whole has been Pentecostalised as other denominations remain strong (Cheyeka, Hinfelaar and Udellhoven 2014).

Welcomed enthusiastically by many born-again Christians as well as Pentecostal leaders and EFZ officials, the reactions of the two other main Christian bodies, ZEC and CCZ, to the declaration were more reserved (see Gifford 1998, 198–199; Hinfelaar 2011; Phiri 2008). A couple of years later, in 1995, when Chiluba proposed to include the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation in the preamble of the country’s new Constitution, CCZ and ZEC publicly opposed this, expressing their belief in a plural society. This opposition appeared to be futile, and since 1996 the Zambian Constitution opens with the statement that ‘We, the people of Zambia ... declare the Republic a Christian nation’. The debate about the declaration re-emerged in 2003, with the installation of a constitutional review commission (Hinfelaar 2011, 60) and has continued to date. As recent as April 2013, the delegates at the national constitution making convention, where a new draft constitution was discussed, voted in favour of upholding the declaration as part of the preamble. This indicates that the idea of Zambia as a Christian nation has become rather popular and has remained so many years after Chiluba – who had lost popularity because of corruption and political machinations – left office.

Isabel Phiri (2008, 105) points at several tangible consequences of the Christian nation declaration. Under Chiluba’s government, diplomatic links with Israel were being re-established, while the ties with Iran and Iraq were cut; several pastors were appointed as members of the cabinet, and a Department of Christian Affairs was opened in the President’s office; the relations between Christians and Muslims soured, with the small Muslim minority in Zambia feeling increasingly marginalised; there was an influx of Christian missionaries (mainly from the US) in Zambia and many new churches were established with ‘discretionary support’ from the President. Regardless of these policies and results, Chiluba himself has hardly articulated the meaning of the Christian nation declaration in official documents and speeches. Subsequent political leaders have either supported the declaration (especially those with Pentecostal sympathies) or have paid lip service to it, probably realising that there is little electoral gain in opposing it. Prominent Pentecostal figures, as well as the influential Evangelical Fellowship, have continued to express and mobilise support for the declaration.
until to date, and successfully so. But different from Zambian Humanism, Zambian Christian nationalism has never been systematically developed into a political ideology. How, then, does it shape sexual citizenship?

**Sexual Citizenship in a ‘Christian Nation’**

The notion of Zambia as a Christian nation has become central in public and political discourse. It shapes debates on matters of public morality and is also used to legitimise certain actions policing public morality, in particular relating to sexuality.

One example is the issue of pornography, which was strictly controlled under Kaunda. Surprisingly, in 1993 the Chiluba government announced that it was lifting the ban on the sale and possession of pornographic material. This was much to the dismay of Christian leaders such as EFZ General Secretary Joseph Imakando who stated that ‘we do not believe that democracy means that you should have loose morals’ (quoted in Third Way 1993). Thus after a massive outcry Chiluba re-imposed the ban, and it has been in tact till to date. In 2014 there was a prominent case when a popular Zambian musician and his girl friend where fined for producing an ‘obscene video’. In its commentary, government-owned newspaper Times of Zambia expressed its concern that ‘such videos are now becoming a norm’, and it stated:

> This not only shows the moral degradation levels in our society but brings shame not only to the affected persons and their families but the nation at large. Zambia is a Christian Nation and filming and circulating of such materials is against the Christian values. Such conduct should therefore be curbed at all costs and culprits punished to preserve our good Christian values. (Kabaila 2014)

A similar use of the Christian nation argument can be found in debates on prostitution – another practice that was prohibited under Kaunda and has remained so to date. Under the current laws, sex workers are frequently arrested by the police and are at risk of harassment and abuse, illustrating their status as secondary citizens. In recent years, sex workers have become more self-organised and are campaigning for decriminalisation. Yet in the media this generally receives a negative response, and again references to the Christian character of the country prevail. The formulation of the question with which a Zambian radio station opened a discussion on the topic is typical and telling: ‘Commercial sex workers want prostitution to be legalized. What’s your say on this topic bearing in mind that Zambia is a Christian nation?’ (Flavafm 2012).

Another moral issue of public concern under Zambian Humanism, as mentioned above, was mini-skirts. This concern has also continued to exist and frequently emerges in public debates. For example, after Uganda in 2014 had passed a law prohibiting mini-skirts, the popular Zambian radio station Radio Phoenix asked on its Facebook page whether Zambia should follow that example. Several respondents referred to the status of Zambia as a Christian nation to argue that indeed, the Ugandan example should be followed (Radio Phoenix 2014). There have even been cases where people took matters in their own hand and publicly undressed and ashamed girls whom they considered to be dressed in ‘indecent’ ways, while appealing to the need of ‘preserving Christian and cultural values’ (Kudakwashe 2012). Both in the case of sex work and mini-skirts, the moral concern appears to be
primarily with women – it are female bodies, in particular, that are being policed both by the state and the general public.

All these are examples of policing sexual citizenship, and disciplining Zambians as sexual citizens, in the self-declared Christian nation. They illustrate the continuity between the discourses of Zambian Humanism and Christian nationalism in the area of public morality. The most prominent issue emerging in public debates about morality and sexuality in recent years, however, is homosexuality – an issue that was not explicitly discussed in the time under Kaunda. Homosexuality became subject of heated public debate for the first time in Zambia in 1998, after independent newspaper The Post on 14 July published an interview with the first Zambian to publicly identify himself as gay, Francis Chisambisha. Then 25 years old, Chisambisha also announced that he planned to launch an association. His public coming out sparked ‘a mammoth scandal’, and when a couple of weeks later the Lesbian, Gays, Bisexual and Transgender Persons Association (LEGATRA) was presented this caused even more public outrage (Long, Brown, and Cooper 2003, 34–46). Both political and church leaders expressed their disgust of Chisambisha’s actions, and doing so they also denied the place of same-sex sexuality in Zambian history, culture and society. In their response they would typically refer to the Christian character of the country which was under threat by ‘foreign influences’ – an idea that was only reinforced by the fact that several Western NGOs and governments expressed their support of Chisambisha and LEGATRA. Analysing this dynamic, Charlotte Cross (2007, 9-10) argues:

Although much of the nationalist rhetoric defined itself only by virtue of what was not Zambian or African, the claims of a minority for recognition forced the majority to consider its own self-identity. The strongest alternative to Western decadence, which resonated with the ‘moral’ aspects of the crisis, was the ‘Christian nation’ of Zambia, whereby God could act as benefactor and guide, replacing secular and corrupted donors.

Then President Chiluba contributed to the debates in a speech, symbolically delivered on the thirty-fourth anniversary of Zambia’s independence, where he stated: ‘Homosexuality is the deepest level of depravity. It is unbiblical and abnormal’ (quoted in Long, Brown, and Cooper 2003, 40). The opposition was so strong that LEGATRA was never able to register as an NGO and ceased to exist within a few months after its launch, with Chisambisha having left the country to apply for asylum in South Africa.

The pattern emerging from this controversy – of the constitutional Christian status of Zambia being used as a key argument against any public expression of homosexuality and public advocacy for lesbian and gay (or LGBT) human rights – has repeated itself several times since then. Thus, when in February 2012 United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in an address to the Zambian parliament called upon the country to recognise and protect the rights of all citizens ‘regardless of ... sexual orientation’, political and religious leaders rejected his call. For diplomatic reasons the government did not respond directly, but Member of Parliament and President of the opposition party MMD, Felix Mutati, preemptively ruled out his support for any possible legislation decriminalising homosexuality, arguing that ‘Zambia is a Christian nation and Christianity is against homosexuality’
In the public debate following Ban’s visit, his call was even linked to the Devil who would have set his mind on Zambia because of it being a Christian nation, and participants on online Zambian discussion forums called upon their fellow Zambians ‘to be strong, to resist the international pressure to recognise gay rights, to protect Zambia’s status as a Christian nation and to oppose this demonic attack’ (Van Klinken 2013, 529). A year later, when another controversy about homosexuality emerged following a European Union advert in a Zambian newspaper announcing a call for funding scheme, ministers of the Patriotic Front (PF) government fuelled public debate with strong statements. Then Minister of Home Affairs (and current Zambian President), Edgar Lungu, undiplomatically stated that the EU should ‘take the fight for gay rights to Europe’ because homosexuality ‘is not part of our culture’ (Zambian Watchdog 2013) – a statement that reads like an echo of Kaunda’s anti-western rhetoric quoted above: ‘This is Zambia with its own way of life and not Europe. … We take our cultural values very seriously’ (Kaunda 1975, 31). In addition to Lungu, then Minister of Justice, Wynter Kabimba, argued that there is ‘No room for gays in Zambia’. Explaining this, he said: ‘As Zambians, we declared that we are a Christian nation and there is no way we can allow this un-Zambian culture’ (Namaiko 2013). In other words, he literally denied gay Zambians their legitimate status as citizens and defined Zambian citizenship as exclusively and normatively heterosexual. Shortly after these statements were made, indeed a gay rights activist and some alleged gay coupled were arrested by the police and prosecuted, leading Amnesty International (2014) to express its deep concern about the ‘systematic persecution’ of individuals based on their perceived sexual orientation in Zambia (for a more detailed account see Van Klinken forthcoming).

In these public debates on homosexuality a similar concern about foreign ‘immoral’ influences, and a defence of ‘Zambian culture’, can be observed as in the discourse of Zambian Humanism, however with two notable differences. First, in the recent debates on homosexuality there is a much more direct and explicit appeal to Christianity, with ‘Christian values’ being presented as more or less coinciding with ‘Zambian values’, which illustrates the impact of the Christian nation declaration in shaping the perception of national identity. For many people – both religious and political leaders and ordinary Zambians – homosexuality appears to be the litmus paper for the Christian character of the country as well as for its independence and sovereignty. Second, where the Zambian humanist discourse rejected Western cultural influences because of their capitalist nature, in the post-Kaunda era Zambia has more or less adopted neo-liberal capitalist principles; Western influences are now (very selectively) being rejected, not because of the capitalist but the secular nature of Western societies. As I have argued elsewhere, the framing of homosexuality – and of gay rights and human rights in general – as a ‘secular thing’ in popular Zambian discourses is informed by a dualist worldview in which Zambia has the divine mission to defend truly Christian values and principles in a world that is believed to have become ‘secular, immoral and humanistic; a world of shifting norms’ (Van Klinken 2014, 267–268).

Conclusion
Accounts of Zambia’s political and nationalist history sometimes present a somewhat simplistic binary between Kaunda’s Humanism and Chiluba’s Christian nationalism as two different, if not opposite, narratives underlying the project of nation building in postcolonial
Zambia. This chapter does not deny that there are significant differences in the content and tone of both nationalist narratives. Yet it has highlighted the striking continuities, especially in the area of public and private morality such as relating to matters of sexuality. Both the humanist and the Christian narratives of nation building demonstrate an explicit concern with respectable citizenship and inflict upon Zambians more or less similar notions of what is considered morally appropriate in the area of sexuality. This is not surprising given the fact that Zambian Humanism, especially its moral reformist agenda, was a continuation of the civilising mission of missionary Christianity—a mission that in recent decades has been taken up with new energies by Pentecostal churches. Throughout the fifty years of independence, Victorian notions of decency and morality have shaped the discursive politics of sexual citizenship in Zambia and have defined the boundaries of legitimate sexual expressions and practices. These boundaries, as has become clear above, are implicitly or explicitly heteronormative and patriarchal—with female bodies, in particular, being scrutinised, and non-heterosexual sexualities being marginalised and excluded from the realm of citizenship.

What is particularly striking is how sexuality, in both narratives of nationhood, has been used as a key site to define Zambia’s identity status as an independent nation vis-à-vis the West. In a further analysis such moral identity politics of ‘Zambianness’ need to be interpreted through a wider political economy analysis of Zambia’s position in the global neoliberal political and economic order. As James Ferguson (2006, 144) suggests, the moral concern with sexuality in Zambia might have to be understood from a context ‘where what is endangered is less biological reproduction than [reproduction of] the cultural and social sort’.

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References


