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Sticking to the Union? Nationalism, Inequality and Political Disaffection and the Geography of Scotland’s 2014 Independence Referendum

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Sticking to the Union? Nationalism, Inequality and Political Disaffection and the Geography of Scotland’s 2014 Independence Referendum

Abstract

Scotland’s 2014 Independence Referendum affords a rare opportunity to examine public support for the break-up of a long-established, stable democracy. Analyses of support for Scottish independence reveal that while issues of national identity loomed large in the vote, they were not the only factors involved. Questions around the economic and political direction of the state, and around uneven development, ideology and trust in established politicians also influenced voters’ decisions. Partisanship also mattered, as voters were more likely than not to follow the lead of their party in what had become a highly partisan contest. But some parties – especially Labour – saw large minorities of their supporters vote against the party’s line to support independence.
Introduction

The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom was perhaps the most dramatic moment so far in a long debate on how Scotland should be governed. It generated very high levels of public engagement: at 85%, turnout was much higher than at any UK vote, including general elections, since the early 1950s. That 55 per cent of voters supported the status quo was a considerable surprise to many commentators and politicians since until only a few months before the vote most opinion polls were suggesting a much larger majority for remaining in the UK. Support for independence increased substantially in the final weeks of the campaign (and two polls in the last fortnight – one from YouGov and the other from ICM – suggested a narrow majority in favour of independence). Why by September 2014 did such a substantial proportion of the Scottish electorate support separation?

This paper analyses three sets of factors which were widely discussed before and during the referendum campaign as likely influences on both attitudes to independence and individual choices in the referendum vote: national identity; concern over the direction in which society, economy and politics in the UK were heading; and attitudes towards risk (Tijmstra, 2009).

Theorising support for independence

National identity

One explanation claims that support for independence has its roots in national identity (Smith, 1986). Previous empirical research (for instance in Scotland and Quebec) has shown that self-identification with particular national groups is associated with support for those groups’ greater political autonomy (Clarke and Kornberg, 1996; Turcotte, 1996; Lublin and
Voss, 2002; Denver et al., 2000). The more intensely Scottish individuals feel, and the less British, therefore the more likely they would have been to support independence in 2014.

Politics and the changing direction of society

A second argument reflects perceived differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK regarding public policy preferences (Tijmstra, 2009). Since at least the 1980s, Scottish voters have on average been more left-wing and social democratic in their views than English voters (Johnston and Pattie, 1990; Pattie and Johnston, 1990). That ideological gap, while real, is much narrower in reality than often assumed (Curtice and Ormston, 2012). But the perception of a substantial gap persists, as does the widespread belief in a distinctive left-leaning Scottish political culture at odds with an assumed Conservative (with large and small ‘c’) English majority that has a powerful hold on many Scots’ self-image. Higher support for independence should therefore characterise those who lean to the left.

Throughout the referendum campaign, the relative economic consequences of remaining in the UK or of becoming independent were intensely debated against the wider backdrop of the UK economy’s recovery from the 2008 economic crash; the weak recovery created problems for the Remain camp’s core argument that staying in the UK would provide more economic security than would independence. In February 2014, only 9% of Scottish respondents to the British Election Study (BES) internet panel survey felt that the Scottish government bore any responsibility for the economy; 84% felt responsibility lay with Westminster. Hence those who were most troubled by economic performance should have been more in favour of independence.

A further area of debate was how well Scotland had been served by being part of the UK: we expect those who felt that Scotland does not get a fair deal would lean towards independence.
The post-2008 ‘austerity’ agenda followed by Conservative-led UK governments since 2010 was also became an issue. Remaining in the UK, independence campaigners argued, would expose Scottish public services (and hence many Scottish voters) to unpopular austerity measures foisted on them by the UK government: independence, it was implied, would prevent this and protect those services.\footnote{See, for instance, speeches by the SNP leader Alex Salmond and his deputy (and successor) Nicola Sturgeon at the 2013 SNP annual conference.}

Finally, there is a widespread sense of disconnection between voters and mainstream politics in the UK, fuelled by (among other things): mainstream parties’ convergence on neoliberal policies since the 1980s, reducing the range of political debate; perceptions that social and economic change has left significant groups of voters behind; disagreements over military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan; and anger over the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal (Pattie and Johnston, 2012). We hypothesize, therefore, that support for independence was higher among those most disenchanted with the conventional political parties and systems of the UK, with independence offering replacement of the existing system by a new, less compromised, one. Those who distrusted the UK political class should have been more prepared to vote for independence.

Risk

The potential consequences of the referendum were inevitably couched in considerable uncertainty. Even policy experts disagreed on the possible long term consequences of either outcome (McLean et al. 2014; Bell, 2014). When faced with uncertainty and risk, much previous research has shown that, when faced with a choice between the status quo and change, more will opt for the former than the latter (Kahneman et al., 1991; Fernandez and
Rodrik, 1991; Renwick, 2014), especially among those individuals who are relatively risk averse in their general orientations (Kam and Simas, 2010; Ehrlich and Maestas, 2010). In the 1995 Quebec referendum, for instance, risk averse individuals were more reluctant to vote for independence (Nadeau et al., 1999; though see Clarke et al., 2004).

We therefore look at how support for independence was shaped by attitudes towards risk as well as by national identity and political opinions.

Control variables
Support for Scottish independence was also likely to be affected by a range of other factors, and to take them into account and hence minimise risks of model mis-specification, our models control for age, class, education and prior party identification.

Older voters, (especially those with memories of unifying events such as World War Two) have stronger attachments to the UK than the young (Tilley and Heath, 2007); we expect older generations to be least likely to support Scottish independence. Controls for class and education take into account potential status effects. Finally, prior partisanship is likely to have exerted an influence on referendum vote because of the extent to which parties were unified or divided on the referendum issue. In some previous British referendums (e.g. the 1975 EEC referendum, the 1979 Scottish and Welsh devolution referendums, and the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum on electoral reform) some major parties were internally divided, and hence provided their partisans with no clear guidance on how to vote (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976; Balsom and MacAllister, 1979; Dardanelli, 2005; Whiteley et al., 2011, 2013). In others (e.g. the 1997 Scottish referendum), their positions were much clearer, helping voters to decide along partisan lines (Pattie et al. 1999; Denver et al. 2000). The 2014 situation was more akin to the 1997 than to the 1979 (or 1975 Europe) referendums, with the
SNP (and several minor parties) strongly backing independence, and Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats just as strongly favouring maintaining the Union. Under such circumstances, partisanship provides a powerful potential heuristic for voters; individuals’ underlying partisanship should be a good guide to their referendum vote.

**Explaining voting in the independence referendum**

To examine how individuals voted in the independence referendum, we use the 2015 British Election Study’s Internet Panel Survey, a multi-wave panel, interviewing people in the run-up to, and immediate aftermath of, the May 2015 UK General Election. Usefully for our purposes, the very large sample size (Wave 1 unweighted n=30,239) ensures a large number of Scottish respondents, further enhanced by a substantial Scottish oversample (Wave 1 unweighted n = 5866). The first three waves of the panel were conducted before and immediately after the 2014 referendum (wave 1 in February and March 2014, wave 2 in May and June, and Wave 3 in September and October). Scottish respondents to the first three waves were asked a range of questions about the referendum, including (in the third wave) how they had actually voted: the latter provides our dependent variable. We exploit the panel design to minimise endogeneity risks by taking most of our independent variables from wave 1 rather than from wave 3 (self-reported national identity in wave 3, for instance, could have been affected by how people voted in the referendum, whereas this is less likely for self-reported identity at wave 1).

The analyses reported below are weighted to take into account the biases introduced by internet polling and the effects of panel attrition between waves 1 and 3; because of the Scottish oversample, the weighted sample size for Scotland is considerably smaller than the
achieved sample. All analyses used weighted data (though our key findings are robust, whether or not weighting is applied).

The referendum result was slightly closer for BES respondents than it was in reality: 48% of BES respondents reported voting for independence, compared to 45% in the actual vote.

Referendum vote, the dependent variable, is coded 1 if the respondent voted for independence, 0 if against: models are estimated using logistic regression. The models (reported in table 1) are built in several stages. The first, baseline, model uses only the control variables; the second adds measures for Scottish and British national identity; the third adds in political beliefs, trust in MPs, and economic evaluations; and the final model adds respondents’ risk orientations.

Model I: Control variables

The first model concentrates on the control variables: age as a proxy for generation, (self-reported) class\(^2\), education\(^3\) and partisanship\(^4\). All are taken from Wave 1 of the survey (conducted in February 2014, and thus minimising the risk of reverse causation: for instance, the referendum campaign itself contributed to some voters shifting their partisan loyalties from Labour to the SNP).

\(^2\) Respondents are placed into four groups depending on their response to a question asking them which class they identify with: middle class; working class; other class; and (the comparison group for our analyses) no social class.

\(^3\) Education is coded here as the highest reported formal qualification obtained by each respondent: degree holders serve as our comparison group, and the other categories are those with no formal qualifications; those with school level qualifications such as GCSEs and A-levels, and those with post-school qualifications below degree level.

\(^4\) Partisanship is based on wave 1 responses to two questions. All respondents were asked the conventional partisanship question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, or what’. Respondents who said they did not think of themselves as supporting a particular party were asked the follow-up question ‘Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others? If yes, which party?’ Responses are coded into: Labour (our comparison group); SNP; Conservative; Liberal Democrats; Other party (there were insufficient supports of other parties in the sample to justify treating them separately); and the non-partisan.
Consistent with Tilley and Heath (2007), older generations were less likely than younger to vote for independence.

Not surprisingly, partisanship is strongly related to referendum vote. Given the clarity with which the mainstream parties presented their positions, those who at the start of the year identified with the SNP were 25 times more likely to vote Yes in September than were Labour supporters (who form the comparison group in our analyses); the Conservatives were strongly opposed to independence, and their supporters followed suit – the odds of a Conservative partisan voting for independence were less than a fifth as large as those for a Labour supporter. But, controlling for other factors, supporters of other parties and of none were just as likely to vote Yes as Labour supporters.

None of the parties was able to deliver all of its nominal supporters to the referendum ‘camp’ to which it subscribed; indeed, only the SNP and Conservatives came close (92% of SNP supporters voting Yes, and 92% of Conservatives No). The other parties’ supporters were much more split, with around a third of Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters voting against their party’s position. As in previous referendums in which the parties had clearly articulated views, party allegiance was a guide for voters. But, despite the clarity of the parties’ own positions, it was (for Labour and the Liberal Democrats at least) much less of a guide than had been the case in the 1997 devolution vote.

Controlling for age and partisanship, neither individuals’ subjective class identities nor their formal educational qualifications had an independent effect on their referendum vote. Age and partisanship were linked to support for independence, but socio-economic class was not.
Taken together, the control variables account for a substantial proportion of who voted for independence; pseudo-$R^2$ statistics are in the range of 36% to 48%.\textsuperscript{5} Much of that explanatory work is done by prior partisanship, however: age, class and education alone account for only between 3% and 4% of the variation in vote.

Model II: National identity

BES respondents were asked to rate how strongly Scottish and British they felt. Both were measured on a seven point scale, where 1 meant the individual did not feel at all Scottish or British, while a score of 7 meant they felt very strongly Scottish or British. By including both in the equation, we take into account the extent to which individuals have multiple national identities.

We measure national identity here based on respondents’ self-reported positions in February 2014, and are implicitly assuming that causation here runs from national identity to referendum vote. However, identities can be fluid and, as a result of the referendum campaign itself, some voters reassessed how they thought of themselves. We can assess how big an issue this might have been by looking at how the same individuals described their national identities in both wave 1 of the survey, and in wave 3, immediately after the referendum. Over the eight-month period, there were signs of strengthening Scottish and weakening British identities. But the effects were not large. The average ‘Scottishness’ score rose from 5.75 (out of 7) to 5.91, while the average ‘Britishness’ score fell from 4.84 to 4.52.\textsuperscript{6}

Just over two-thirds of respondents gave exactly the same answer on the ‘Scottishness’ scale.

\textsuperscript{5} Unlike conventional linear regression, there is no simple means of calculating an $R^2$ statistic for a logit model. Rather, there are a number of alternative approximations, none of which is a perfect measure. We therefore report two commonly used estimates of $R^2$ in logit models, the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke $R^2$. The former tends to be more conservative than the latter, and together they therefore give a sense of the likely range within which a true $R^2$ value might sit.

\textsuperscript{6} Both changes are statistically significant. For ‘Scottishness’, the paired t-test value is 5.924, and for ‘Britishness’ it is 9.910. Both are significant at $p=0.000$. 

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on both occasions (in part an artefact of the high proportions who on both occasions rated themselves as 7 on this scale – 53% at wave 1 and 60% at wave 2), and a further 22% moved by just one point up or down the scale. Movements that small are within the margin of measurement error: in effect, 88% of respondents gave the same or a very similar answer on both occasions. Fewer respondents (48%) gave exactly the same answer for the Britishness scale on both occasions, but more (30%) were within one point either side of their original answer: three quarters of respondents therefore gave a similar response on Britishness. In neither case was there wholesale change, therefore, though there was some movement, suggesting that the campaign process itself may have contributed to some individuals reassessing their identities.

As expected, national identification substantially boosts the model’s explanatory power (Table 1, Model II). The pseudo-$R^2$ statistics increase by over 10 points, to 0.44-0.46; both national identity measures are strongly significant, and work in the predicted directions. The more strongly Scottish respondents felt, other things being equal, the more likely they were to vote Yes. And the more British they felt, the less likely this was. The negative effect of a sense of Britishness on the chances of voting Yes were larger than the positive effects of a sense of Scottishness; every one point increase in a person’s identification with being British roughly halved the odds of voting Yes, while an equivalent one unit increase in feeling Scottish increased the odds by just under 1.4.

Model III: Political and economic judgements

Model III adds economic judgements and political ideology (Table 1). Four different questions are used here. Perceptions of voters’ concerns about the state of the British political system are captured by their trust in MPs in general (a 7-point scale running from 1 for ‘no
trust’ to 7 for ‘a great deal of trust’). Concerns about the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Westminster government’s austerity agenda are captured by whether respondents thought cuts to public spending had gone too far or not far enough. Individuals’ evaluations of their own economic circumstances are captured using their perceptions of whether their household had become more or less prosperous over the preceding year. We also measure whether respondents think Scotland gets more or less than its fair share from the Union.

Our measure of voters’ ideological positions was constructed from responses to five political attitude questions to build a left-right attitude scale. Individuals were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each of five claims: governments should redistribute incomes; big business takes advantage of ordinary people; ordinary working people do not get their fair share; there is one law for the rich and one for the poor; and management will always try to get the better of employees. Each was coded on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 indicating the most left-wing response. The questions were highly inter-correlated, and in a principal components analysis (details are available from the lead author) all loaded strongly on just one component. Individuals’ answers to the five questions were therefore added together, and the sum divided by 5, creating a composite scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.849) which ran from a theoretical minimum of 1 (most right-wing) to a maximum of 5 (most left-wing).

Adding these variables to the model further boosts its explanatory power, by around 3 percentage points, based on the psuedo-$R^2$ measures. In part, this modest improvement only occurs because much of the effect of these ‘political’ indicators is already captured by individuals’ partisanship. If we compare versions of models II and III which omit partisanship, the increases in the pseudo-$R^2$ measures are larger. But they remain relatively modest, from 0.322 to 0.386 for the Cox and Snell $R^2$, and from 0.430 to 0.515 for the Nagelkerke measure.
Two of the ‘political attitude’ variables, trust in MPs and views on how far austerity measures had gone, were not related to referendum vote, once the control variables and national identity were taken into account. Examined with no control variables included, both had the predicted (and significant) effect on referendum voting: support for independence rose with declining trust in MPs, and was higher among those who felt austerity measures had cut too deeply into public spending than among those who felt they had not cut far enough. But any effects were indirect, almost certainly working through respondents’ partisanship.

Three political attitude variables were significantly related to support for independence, even when partisanship and national identity were controlled for. Whether Scotland was perceived as benefitting from membership of the UK had a bearing on individuals’ referendum decisions; the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the likelihood of voting for independence. For instance, the odds of voting for independence among those who felt Scotland received ‘a little more than its fair share’ from the Union were only a quarter as large as the equivalent odds for those who felt Scotland received ‘much less than its fair share’.

Economic judgments also played a part, but in a somewhat unexpected way. Those who felt their household had become ‘a little more prosperous’ over the preceding year were marginally significantly more likely to vote for independence than were those who felt they had become much less prosperous. This seems to imply that support for independence was associated with feeling of greater personal security. However, although significant, the effect is only just so (p=0.032), so some caution is in order.
Finally, voters’ ideological positions influenced their referendum votes. The more left-wing individuals’ views, the more likely it was that they voted Yes. Other things being equal, each one-unit movement to the left along the 5-point scale raised the odds of voting for independence by a factor of 1.45. Moving from the most right-wing to the most left-wing position on the scale would therefore raise the average respondent’s odds of voting for independence by a factor of 6.5 – and this even after controlling for party identification. Support for independence was clearly associated most strongly with those on the left of the political spectrum.

Model IV: Risk

Much debate during the campaign focussed on the perceived risks of voting Yes or No, especially over the implications for Scotland’s currency (could the pound be retained?), its place in the EU, and its future prosperity. When faced with uncertainty, a common reaction is to cleave to the status quo. The more risk-averse individuals are, therefore, the more we would expect them to vote against independence.

We use respondents’ self-assessments of how willing they were personally to take risks: they chose from four options, ‘very unwilling (coded 1) to ‘very willing’ (coded 4). Those who said they were very willing to take risks were about 3.5 times more likely to support independence than those least likely to embrace risk. Both choices on the ballot involved a gamble with an unknowable future. But the less comfortable people were with risk, the more they seem to have decided that staying with what they knew was the least risky option.

Adding risk tolerance to the model adds only slightly to its explanatory power, however. The pseudo-$R^2$ statistics rise only fractionally. Willingness to embrace risk was a factor in the referendum result, therefore, but only at the margins.
Conclusions

Support for Scottish independence in 2014 was not a simple function of national identity, therefore; many other factors were in play, not least political and policy preferences and personal attitudes to risk. Support for independence was higher among those who felt most intensively Scottish, therefore. But it was also higher among the young than the old, among those who felt more left- than right-wing, among those who felt Scotland was losing out from the Union than among those who felt the country gained from it, and among those who saw themselves as more willing to embrace risk than among those who were less willing to. What is more, unlike the 1997 devolution vote, party loyalty did not always provide a clear cue on how to vote: a significant minority of Labour (and Liberal Democrat) supporters rejected their party’s position and voted for independence.

The wider implications are intriguing. Although the pro-independence camp lost the referendum, the matter is unlikely to be settled by the result. Not only was the vote much closer than many initially expected (though not as close as the polls in the final weeks implied), but the level of support for independence was much higher than at almost any previous point in Scotland’s modern political history. That many Labour supporters especially opted for independence suggests that the cause no longer appeals just to the committed nationalist community but is moving into the Scottish mainstream (hence Labour’s rout in Scotland – where it previously returned two-thirds of the country’s MPs – at the subsequent UK general election in May 2015). And to the extent that economic judgements are involved in support for independence, how well or badly Scotland fares within the UK in the coming years will be important. There is no inevitable or inexorable
road to Scottish independence, therefore; how things play out will depend on where voters see the balance of advantage lying.

The immediate aftermath of the vote was, perhaps, telling. Having been rushed into making very public commitments, during the final week, to increase substantially the Scottish Parliament’s powers, the No campaign quickly unravelled. There was no clear agreement on quite what the new powers for the Parliament might be, the main UK parties were at odds on the issue, and yet the Scottish electorate had been given an apparently strong guarantee (a vow, no less). Far from being demoralised by defeat, the Yes camp was re-energised, and began to prepare the rhetorical ground for an expectation of betrayal by the Westminster parties (brought into play again in late January 2015, when the Smith Commission charged with devising a means of delivering ‘the vow’ reported: the almost instant SNP response was that the proposals fell seriously short of the promise). SNP membership surged, as did the party’s poll ratings, largely at Labour’s expense (Johns and Mitchell, 2016).

In the years immediately after the referendum, too, the economic and political situation changed in a number of ways, with implications for any future referendum. On the economic side, world crude oil prices fell steeply from over US$100 a barrel to a low of around US$30 a barrel early in 2016 (since when prices have staged a recovery – though they remain well below their 2014 levels). Given the still-important role of the North Sea oil industry in Scotland, both economically and psychologically (Harvie, 1994), this raised concerns over the economic viability (at least in the short term) of an independent Scotland, an issue almost certain to be raised endlessly in any future referendum. But political developments since 2014 have been more favourable for independence campaigners. The surprise election of a majority Conservative government in Westminster at the 2015 UK General Election and (much more so) the fallout from the UK’s 2016 EU referendum (when 62% of Scots voted to
remain in the EU, only to be outvoted by a 52% vote across the UK for exit) once again pit
the expressed preferences of Scottish voters against those of voters in England and –
particularly in the case of the EU vote – potentially provides exactly the sort of major shift in
conditions which both Nicola Sturgeon and Alex Salmond identified as grounds for another
referendum. The ground is being set for the next stage in the contest, and battle lines are
being drawn, not around national identity, but around perceptions of delivery and of who is
most likely to defend Scottish interests. The game is still afoot.
Acknowledgements

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References


Table 1: Modelling the Yes vote: logistic regressions (source: British Election Study 2015, Wave 3: standard errors in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.980 (0.267)**</td>
<td>1.360 (0.427)**</td>
<td>0.062 (0.762)</td>
<td>0.088 (0.773)</td>
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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-0.026 (0.004)**</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.005)**</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.006)*</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.006)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest educational qualification (comparison = degree holders)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>No qualifications</td>
<td>0.174 (0.275)</td>
<td>0.144 (0.299)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.332)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.335)</td>
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<td>School qualifications</td>
<td>-0.239 (0.165)</td>
<td>-0.198 (0.182)</td>
<td>-0.276 (0.196)</td>
<td>-0.259 (0.197)</td>
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<td>Post-school qualifications</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.176)</td>
<td>0.055 (0.194)</td>
<td>-0.072 (0.208)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.209)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjective class (comparison = no class identification)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Middle class</td>
<td>-0.156 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.089 (0.217)</td>
<td>0.201 (0.236)</td>
<td>0.176 (0.237)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>0.025 (0.167)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.183)</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.200)</td>
<td>-0.039 (0.201)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other class</td>
<td>0.377 (0.565)</td>
<td>0.115 (0.654)</td>
<td>-0.097 (0.706)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.714)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification (comparison = Labour)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>3.202 (0.201)**</td>
<td>2.611 (0.214)**</td>
<td>2.436 (0.226)**</td>
<td>2.412 (0.227)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-1.785 (0.261)**</td>
<td>-1.221 (0.275)**</td>
<td>-0.769 (0.317)*</td>
<td>-0.759 (0.318)*</td>
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<td>Lib Dem</td>
<td>-0.313 (0.255)</td>
<td>-0.124 (0.278)</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.317)</td>
<td>-0.081 (0.321)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.398 (0.222)</td>
<td>0.396 (0.260)</td>
<td>0.296 (0.286)</td>
<td>0.264 (0.288)</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>-0.118 (0.203)</td>
<td>-0.177 (0.229)</td>
<td>0.069 (0.259)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.260)</td>
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<td>Britishness</td>
<td>-0.516 (0.046)**</td>
<td>-0.496 (0.050)**</td>
<td>-0.503 (0.051)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottishness</td>
<td>0.304 (0.048)**</td>
<td>0.242 (0.052)**</td>
<td>0.241 (0.052)**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in MPs</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.058)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have cuts to public spending have gone too far (comparison = Not gone nearly far enough)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not gone far enough</td>
<td>-0.723 (0.800)</td>
<td>-0.650 (0.807)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>-0.306 (0.748)</td>
<td>-0.204 (0.756)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone too far</td>
<td>-0.376 (0.743)</td>
<td>-0.249 (0.751)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone much too far</td>
<td>-0.397 (0.755)</td>
<td>-0.300 (0.762)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>-0.092 (0.816)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.822)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Scotland get its fair share from the Union? (comparison = much less than its fair share)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little less than fair share</td>
<td>-0.336 (0.264)</td>
<td>-0.299 (0.266)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More or less fair share</td>
<td>-1.032 (0.269)**</td>
<td>-1.019 (0.271)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little more than fair share</td>
<td>-1.336 (0.366)**</td>
<td>-1.302 (0.369)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more than fair share</td>
<td>-0.562 (0.698)</td>
<td>-0.653 (0.711)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>-0.768 (0.343)</td>
<td>-0.677 (0.347)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective household prosperity (comparison = got a lot worse)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little worse</td>
<td>0.360 (0.240)</td>
<td>0.395 (0.242)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed same</td>
<td>0.078 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.104 (0.248)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little better</td>
<td>0.654 (0.304)*</td>
<td>0.647 (0.305)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot better</td>
<td>0.262 (0.639)</td>
<td>0.250 (0.638)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.063 (1.745)</td>
<td>0.153 (1.754)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right scale</td>
<td>0.373 (0.130)**</td>
<td>0.386 (0.130)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, how willing are you to take risks? (comparison = very unwilling)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unwilling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.152 (0.330)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat willing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.358 (0.324)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very willing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.229 (0.456)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>2216.206</td>
<td>2196.111</td>
<td>2058.975</td>
<td>2057.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>710.685</td>
<td>913.080</td>
<td>922.490</td>
<td>930.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% total correctly classified</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Yes vote correctly classified</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted N (unweighted N)</td>
<td>1599 (3549)</td>
<td>1585 (3522)</td>
<td>1486 (3350)</td>
<td>1485 (3347)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at p = 0.05; ** significant at p = 0.01