



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

This is a repository copy of *At the nation-state's edge: Centre-periphery relations in post-1947 South Asia*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
<http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/105862/>

Version: Accepted Version

Article:

Leake, E orcid.org/0000-0003-1277-580X (2016) *At the nation-state's edge: Centre-periphery relations in post-1947 South Asia*. *The Historical Journal*, 59 (02). pp. 509-539. ISSN 0018-246X

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X15000394>

© Cambridge University Press 2016. This is an author produced version of a paper published in *The Historical Journal*. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.

Reuse

Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website.

Takedown

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.



eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>

AT THE NATION-STATE'S EDGE:
CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN POST-1947 SOUTH ASIA *

ELISABETH LEAKE

Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London

Abstract. This article examines centre-periphery relations in postcolonial India and Pakistan, providing a specific comparative history of autonomy movements in Nagaland (1947-63) and Baluchistan (1973-7). It highlights the key role played by the central government – particularly by Jawaharlal Nehru and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – in quelling both insurgencies and in taking further steps to integrate these regions. It argues that a shared colonial history of political autonomy shaped local actors' resistance to integration into the independent nation-states of India and Pakistan. This article also reveals that Indian and Pakistani officials used their shared colonial past in very different ways to mould their borderlands policies. India's central government under Nehru agreed to a modified Naga State within the Indian Union that allowed the Nagas a large degree of autonomy, continuing a colonial method of semi-integration. In contrast, Bhutto's government actively sought to abandon longstanding Baluch political and social structures to reaffirm the sovereignty of the Pakistani state. The article explains this divergence in terms of the different governing exigencies facing each country at the time of the insurgencies. It ultimately calls for an expansion in local histories and subnational comparisons to extend understanding of post-1947 South Asia, and the decolonizing world more broadly.

From 1947, the newly independent states of India and Pakistan grappled with many of the same problems of nation-building, even if the two followed different trajectories. While the Indian government under Jawaharlal Nehru succeeded in establishing a constitution and democratic form of government, Pakistan underwent a series of regimes, each of which increasingly placed autocratic power in a central figurehead. Yet leaders in both states struggled to assert sovereignty, their right to govern, to their own citizens (and neighbouring governments), whether by maintaining law and order or extending their influence over political and economic development. Resistance to such integration into a nation-state was particularly evident in both countries' borderlands, where various performances of sovereignty converged: whether along the Radcliffe Line separating India and Pakistan, the McMahon Line between India and China, or the Durand Line between Pakistan and

Afghanistan, the Indian or Pakistani state had to assert its power and legitimacy both to its own citizens and the international community. In India and Pakistan's sparsely populated peripheries, which had a history of limited interaction with the state, local resistance movements emerged.

Scholars have done remarkably little work on the comparative histories of post-independence India and Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal's *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia* looms over this small field, while the few other studies that do take a comparative approach largely address the similarities and differences between India and Pakistan's governing systems at large, for example the opportunities and limitations of the two countries' federal structures.¹ In her macro-level study, Jalal emphasizes the importance of South Asia's colonial inheritance in post-1947 India, Pakistan, and (post-1971) Bangladesh, particularly each country's adherence to a strong central government. She highlights the many ways that this emphasis on a strong centre has created similarities in the ways each state has approached national governance and issues of regional, religious, linguistic, or cultural difference. Looking at the issue of Indian and Pakistani federalism and centre-state/province relations, Jalal argues

just how inappropriate the existing state structures have proven to be in accommodating multiple social identities in a context shaped by regional diversities and inequities. The interplay of culture as process with structures of state and political economy in both countries has accentuated the lines of difference as disenfranchised social groups have met with little success in redressing their grievances in the formal arenas of politics.²

While with this statement Jalal highlights the difficulties the Indian and Pakistani states have faced in integrating their peripheries, the question remains what might be revealed

if a different framework is taken. How might a narrower comparison influence our perspectives on centre-periphery relations in India and Pakistan? This article specifically compares the histories of two peripheral regions of India and Pakistan: Nagaland, in India's northeast, and Baluchistan, in western Pakistan. Ethno-nationalist movements in these regions have demanded autonomy, either as independent nation-states or as largely self-governing States/provinces within India and Pakistan's governing systems. This has resulted in difficult centre-periphery regions. In the aftermath of Indian independence in 1947, some Nagas demanded their own independent nation, resulting in a violent insurgency that was only temporarily quelled by Nehru's agreement in 1960 to create the State of Nagaland within the Indian Union. In Baluchistan, resistance to central rule by Pakistan emerged briefly in the 1950s and 1960s, but really came to the fore from 1973 to 1977, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to extend any provincial autonomy. The subsequent resistance by many Baluch led him to send in the Pakistan Army and brutally quash the movement for autonomy.³

So why compare Nagaland and Baluchistan? Firstly, these two regions share a common colonial legacy as so-called 'tribal' areas on the peripheries of the subcontinent that were never fully incorporated into British rule. Both thus have posed a common challenge to the postcolonial state: their ambiguous governing relationships with the colonial state have complicated their incorporation into the Indian and Pakistani nation-states. Nevertheless, Indian and Pakistani leaders have approached their inherited colonial policy towards tribes in different ways: Nehru's government largely proved willing to accept colonial practices by which ethnic, cultural, and social difference was maintained, despite rhetoric rejecting colonial policy. Meanwhile, Bhutto entirely opposed difference, emphatically affirming the dominance of the nation-state and national identities.

Secondly, decisions made by the Indian and Pakistani central governments about Nagaland and Baluchistan have largely revolved around issues of state sovereignty and

territoriality. South Asian leaders have not only had to assert their countries' right to govern to their neighbours or the international community: they have had to cement governing relationships within their states. This has led to compromise - the creation of Nagaland out of portions of Assam and the Northeast Frontier Agency - as well as conflict - the (ultimately violent) replacement of the provincial government in Baluchistan. While both countries have strong central governments, Pakistan historically has done far more to reduce the powers of its provinces. But the central governments in India and Pakistan have both been anxious to enact their rule within their territorial boundaries - from drafting and enforcing constitutions and laws, to introducing administrators, to building economic and political infrastructures - but with differing success. In Nagaland and Baluchistan, the state also has turned to coercive measures - armed force - to assert its rule.

Studying borderland regions is an effective way of assessing a state's assertion of its sovereignty. In these zones, the performance of sovereignty is twofold, for both internal and external observers. Baluchistan and Nagaland separate Pakistan and India from their western and eastern neighbours, respectively. (Perhaps equally notable is that these are two borderlands where Indian and Pakistani leaders do not face each other, providing a different comparative history than those relating to the Radcliffe Line or Kashmiri Line of Control separating the two states.) The borders that separate Nagaland from Burma and Baluchistan from Afghanistan and Iran do not match local realities: the self-identifying Naga and Baluch populations spill across these regions, regardless of state lines. The mobility of these populations has threatened Indian and Pakistani rule in these border zones, as local Nagas and Baluch have resisted national 'Indian' and 'Pakistani' (or 'Burmese', 'Afghan', and 'Iranian') identities. More importantly in the context of this article, Naga and Baluch resistance actively sought foreign aid in their autonomy struggles, leading these intra-national conflicts to become increasingly international. For Indian and Pakistani leaders, manifesting nation-state

power in these regions has been made even more crucial because of their countries' regional relations in the twentieth century. As a consequence of various conflicts, Indian officials have worried about Chinese and Pakistani support for a Naga independence movement, while Pakistani leaders have clashed with Afghan, Iranian, and even perceived Soviet interests in Baluchistan. These fears have had a direct impact on the policy choices made in Delhi and Islamabad regarding Nagaland and Baluchistan.

These two movements are worth comparing despite - or perhaps because of - the temporal divide separating them. The resistance in either region relates to a crucial crisis in each country's history of state-building. The Naga autonomy movement escalated soon after Indian independence during the period when India's governing structures only just were being confirmed; subsequent state policy towards the Nagas coincided with and was influenced by the larger movement for States reorganization within the Indian Union. While the Baluch insurgency occurred later in the history of Pakistan, it crucially erupted soon after the division of Pakistan in 1971 and the emergence of independent Bangladesh. Following this - effectively its own partition - post-1971 Pakistan did not differ greatly from post-1947 India: the central government had to (re)assert its right to rule over the remaining provinces and (re)assess its modes of governance. In the 'new' Pakistan, Bhutto was determined that no other province would follow Bangladesh's suit, and his consequently repressive policies towards Baluchistan reflected a broader desire to cement the power of the central government. Moreover, Nehru and Bhutto shared a particular interest in their tribal populations; as both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, which governed the tribal northeast, Nehru led the decision-making that resulted in the creation of Nagaland, much as autocratic Bhutto directed Pakistan's tribal policies.

India and Pakistan have confronted similar challenges in Nagaland and Baluchistan: they have faced resistance to national integration, and their policies towards these regions

have been complicated because of their borderlands locations. Nevertheless, insurgencies in these two areas have had differing impacts on India and Pakistan. While Jalal cautions against using geography as a causative, in this case, size does matter. Baluchistan is by far the geographically largest province in Pakistan, though one of the least populated; while the province was sidelined under central policies that focused largely on East Bengal and Punjab, after 1971, it gained new importance. Not only did it matter to the remaining Pakistani landmass and offer potential for economic growth, it had new symbolic importance as belonging to Pakistan: for Bhutto, it could not be lost. Bhutto's government consequently perceived local demands for political autonomy as a threat to the nation's very survival. In contrast, the Naga State that emerged in 1963, following negotiations in 1957 and 1960, was unique in its small size, power-sharing arrangements, and economic weakness. It nevertheless still fit into a broader moment of States reorganization and the integration of linguistic and ethnic minorities into the Indian Union. Moreover, as a small region in the peripheral northeast, Nagaland did not deeply threaten India's territorial integrity, though policymakers had to ensure that granting Naga Statehood did not set a precedent for other potential secessionist movements (particularly the Sikhs in Punjab). The difference in Indian and Pakistani central policies towards Nagaland and Baluchistan therefore has been one of national integration and reaffirmation versus avoidance of national disintegration.

While agreeing with Jalal's emphasis on the importance of the centre, this article thus diverges, to some extent, from her perspective that 'The longer history of India's formal democracy has enabled its regional political economies and electoral processes to maintain greater resilience against central interference. Pakistan's regional social and economic formations by contrast have been more amenable to political manipulation by a military-bureaucratic dominated centre'.⁴ In the context of Nagaland and Baluchistan, overt interference from the centre has been key. Nehru's decision to create the State of Nagaland,

despite resistance from Assam, epitomized ‘central interference’ (and not just ‘outright coercion followed by political concessions’).⁵ Bhutto's policies in Baluchistan extended past ‘political manipulation’, as he used a coterie of violent and developmental methods to ensure that resistance was suppressed; and far beyond using regional social and economic formations, he did his best to replace local Baluch structures that came into conflict with his governing initiatives. The policies pursued by each central government towards Nagaland and Baluchistan instead highlight an alternative difference between India and Pakistan. With the creation of a Naga State, Nehru paradoxically acted towards the northeast much as colonial officials had done, accepting a compromised political relationship whereby local Nagas were not fully included in national politics. In contrast, Bhutto jettisoned colonial precedence in Baluchistan, rejecting local tribal political, social, and economic structures and forcibly replacing them with the government trappings of the modern nation-state.

This article affirms Jalal's points that democracy and authoritarianism cannot be easily separated, but by providing a unique history of these two regions, it re-emphasizes local specificity. This article thus first turns to British policy towards India's frontiers, highlighting the shared modes of colonial rule that played out in the subcontinent's northwest and northeast peripheries. In particular, it emphasizes the ambiguous governing relationships British officials maintained with local ‘tribal’ leaders. The article then moves into the era of independence, turning first to the history of the independence struggle in Nagaland and then to the demand for provincial autonomy in Baluchistan. Finally, in its concluding section, it compares the Indian and Pakistani approaches to Nagaland and Baluchistan. This micro-level study complicates our understandings of post-1947 Indian and Pakistani history by demonstrating that local developments often belie assertions made about nations as a whole. It highlights the complicated relationships that postcolonial nations can have with their

colonial pasts - and in this case, how two countries with the same colonial past can understand and use history in very different ways.

I

Indian and Pakistani borderlands policy after independence did not appear in a vacuum. Despite the geographical divide between Nagaland and Baluchistan, these regions crucially share a common colonial genealogy. The imperial legacy shaped these regions' populations and their relationship with the colonial state up to independence in 1947; it lingered after as well, as the postcolonial governments wrestled with establishing the independent Indian and Pakistani states, and thereby the integration of their borderlands. Neither Nagaland nor Baluchistan has really formed 'natural' frontiers, or areas where the perimeters of political power follow geographical divides such as rivers or mountain ranges.⁶ Instead, they emerged as a result of imperial competition, economic aspirations, and strategic calculations. In the northwest, nineteenth-century Russian competition overshadowed British policy towards Iran and Afghanistan and the assumption of British colonial rule over what came to be known as Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). British policy in the northeast focused more on securing natural resources and market commodities.⁷

British rule in both regions brought officials into encounter with the local populations, which colonial administrators approached and reified as largely 'tribal'. Generations of British colonial officials differentiated between the 'civilized' people of the plains - Assam in the northeast or the Peshawar river valley in the northwest - and the 'savage' people of the hills - the Nagas, the Baluch Marris and Mengals, or the Pashtuns. Officials wrote anthropological studies that accepted static understandings of 'tribal' society, politics, and identity to justify and expand colonial governance. The differentiation between hills and

plains people, in particular, influenced British approaches to the tribal zones of colonial India's northwest and northeast. British officials, led by Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan in the 1870s, adopted a system of limited interaction with the semi-autonomous borderlands populations. Applying a rigid understanding of tribality to these regions, officials worked on the assumption that local tribes had natural leaders and councils with whom the colonial state could negotiate (or whom they could punish). As such, the tribes of Baluchistan, the northwest, and the northeast were left largely alone by colonial officials - except when they undermined the colonial state, when prompt punishment ensued. Tribes remained autonomous even as independence loomed.⁸ One crucial difference between the tribal areas of the northeast and northwest, however, lay in their ruling structures. The Pashtuns and Baluch of the northwest were divided between British India, autonomous areas whose populations had treaty relationships with the Raj, and princely states such as Kalat. The tribal areas of the northeast officially comprised part of the province of Assam; however, they were never integrated into provincial governing structures and instead were overseen separately by the Ministry of External Affairs.

Importantly for future relations with central postcolonial governments, neither region was directly involved in the nationalist struggle for independence. While the Indian National Congress organized some activities in Assam, these did not stretch into the northeast frontier areas, including Nagaland. There, colonial officials actively restricted nationalist access to the local populations, refusing to allow them to cross the 'inner line' that separated Assam provincial rule from the tribal zone. In the northwest, the independence struggle similarly was limited by British restrictions on travel into the tribal areas, despite the existence of the Congress-allied, Pashtun-majority Khudai Khidmatgar party. Independence discourses in Baluchistan necessarily involved the princely state of Kalat as well as British-ruled Baluchistan. The 3 June plan of 1947, which outlined the subcontinent's decolonization, made

special arrangements for the end of treaty relationships between the princely states and the British Government, as well as between northwest frontier Pashtun tribes and the government. The transfer of power did not guarantee that this autonomous tribal area or princely states had to join newly independent India or Pakistan, though British, Indian, and Pakistani officials favoured this approach. The Khan of Kalat attempted to declare his state independent, but the Pakistan Army quickly intervened in 1948, as will be described in further detail below. In British Baluchistan, tribal leaders in the Shahi Jirga, alongside municipal authorities, were allowed to decide whether to join India or Pakistan. In contrast to the northwest, the tribal areas of the northeast, as part of Assam despite their different governing arrangements, were joined to India with little choice, despite voiced resistance, particularly from some Nagas, as the next section will show.

British strategic concerns about the northwest transferred to the new Pakistani government. For colonial officials, the tribal regions of India's northwest had been more significant in policy and strategic choices than the northeast. Colonial officials had agonized over the future of the northwest, seen as a crucial gateway between South Asia, the Soviet Union, and the Middle Eastern oilfields. Pakistan also looked to secure its western borderlands, despite an ongoing dispute with Afghanistan over the legality of the Durand Line.⁹ Meanwhile, post-independence Indian officials needed to confirm their ties with the northeast, which was tenuously linked to the rest of India by a narrow strip of land running between East Bengal (later Bangladesh) and Bhutan. Unlike in Pakistan, Indian policymakers were determined to avoid the historical pitfalls of colonial policy towards the northwest. Instead, they sought a fresh relationship with the post-independence northeast. As Prime Minister Nehru wrote to Bisnuram Medhi, Chief Minister of Assam, in 1951 regarding the Nagas,

They are very different from the people of the old North West Frontier of India. But, to some extent, they offer the same problems. You will remember that the North West Frontier tribes have, for hundreds of years, given trouble to whatever Government controlled in India. The British, in spite of every effort, could not wholly suppress them and ultimately agreed to a more or less independent belt between what was called the British India and the Durand Line. ... We have therefore to be rather careful in our dealings with these people, lest we produce a problem which may pursue us for long years later.¹⁰

The Indian government under Nehru desired the ultimate integration of the northeast frontier (known as the Northeast Frontier Agency, or NEFA, from 1951, and which included the bulk of the Naga population that did not live in Assam or Burma) into the Indian Union, much as Pakistani leaders envisioned Baluchistan and the northwest frontier as part of Pakistan. Despite this shared desire, the central governments in both states faced difficulties in bringing integration to fruition. This article will now turn first to the creation of the Naga State within the Indian Union, before looking at Pakistani policy towards Baluchistan.

II

The demand for Naga independence and the subsequent creation of Nagaland highlighted a number of tensions within the Indian Union, as well as the willingness of the central government to overrule member States. While the move towards giving the Nagas their own State fit into the broader context of States reorganization across the country, locally it was mended by longer-standing ethnic tensions between the dominant ethnic group, the Assamese, and the hills people, including the Nagas. Although the (Congress) Assam State government resisted a political solution that would result in Naga Statehood, Nehru

ultimately chose to override the Assamese and create a unique, semi-sovereign Naga State, which was different from the rest of the Union as partial State, partial centre responsibility.

The movement by some Nagas in Assam and the neighbouring tribal area for an independent Naga State became critical in the early 1950s, though its roots lay in the pre-independence period. Some scholars have identified a Naga 'nation' from an earlier stage, while others have argued that unity among the tribes that became identified as 'Nagas' resulted from British colonial influence.¹¹ The Naga population was largely divided between NEFA, particularly the Tuensang Frontier Division, and the Naga Hills District, part of the State of Assam, though it spread into Manipur and across the international border into Burma. While some Nagas integrated into colonial governing systems, particularly around Kohima and directly ruled regions, others in the hill areas where the British exercised fewer controls remained largely isolated from colonial (and subsequent) governing structures.¹²

As the transfer of power became imminent, a self-constituted body of Naga government officials and leaders around the city of Kohima named the Naga National Council (NNC), which, according to British officials, was 'as representative a body as can be found of the more educated Nagas', sent a request to the British government asking for a ten-year interim government, at the end of which Nagas could either choose to join the Indian Union or pursue independence.¹³ While colonial officials ignored this request and consigned the Nagas to Assam under the 3 June plan, local support for Naga autonomy grew. A meeting between the governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, and members of the NNC in mid-1947 led to a nine-point agreement, which gave the NNC rights of taxation and expenditure and provided the Naga Hills District with a large degree of autonomy. The Indian government and the NNC, however, diverged in their interpretation of the final, ninth point, which allowed for a new agreement in ten years: Hydari took this to mean agreements regarding the Nagas' place within the Indian Union, while members of the NNC interpreted it as the right to

choose complete independence.¹⁴ This difference in interpretation, as well as the fragmented nature of the Naga autonomy movement, meant that while some agreed to uphold the agreement, others rejected it for not providing the choice of full independence. The more uncompromising Nagas, led by Zaphu Angami Phizo, turned increasingly militant, and in 1953, Nehru's government chose to send in the Indian Army to suppress a Naga insurgency, ironically echoing British policy from colonial times. The subsequent conflict was dogged by reports of atrocities perpetrated by both sides. As resistance to Indian integration efforts mounted and violence continued, further political steps had to be taken. Despite sending in Indian troops to intervene, Nehru and the Assam State government maintained that ultimately a political solution was needed.

The situation in the northeast borderlands was exacerbated by ethnic tensions between the region's Assamese majority and the peripheral hills people. Beyond the stance that they always had comprised an independent nation, Naga leaders resented Assamese rule. The attempted imposition of Assamese as an official governing language caused widespread opposition among Assam's hills people, including the Nagas. (This position, in itself, resulted from Assamese antipathy towards Bengali encroachments into the State from the west, particularly as a result of post-partition - and later post-1971 war - migration.)¹⁵ As a key advocate of 'Assamization', Assam's Chief Minister, Medhi, though recognizing resistance in NEFA, maintained that 'Assamese being the language of a very substantial majority of the total population of the State, a knowledge of that language will only help in the development of common traditions and common interests'.¹⁶ In a memorandum to the States Reorganization Commission in 1954, one official tried to emphasize the inclusivity of Assamese. Referring specifically to the Nagas, he explained,

The Naga tribes are used to speak dialects each of which is intelligible only to the members of the tribe speaking it. It is clear that Assamese or at least a jargon, half Assamese and half tribal dialect, has been the medium of communication between the people of the hills and the people of the plains in Assam.¹⁷

State officials like Medhi saw linguistic 'Assamization' as a method of preserving Assam's culture and identity and a means to justify unity and cooperation across the hills-plains divide. Nevertheless, it did not advance Assam's (or the Indian Union's) cause in encouraging tribal integration, and it certainly did not appeal to the Nagas, appearing as an imposition rather than inclusive. As a consequence of Medhi's Assamization efforts, local Nagas from 1952 boycotted the State government, leaving official positions and refusing to pay taxes.¹⁸

As Naga leaders continued to express resentment towards the Assam State government and its attempts to Assamize the northeast, Nehru, in correspondence with Assam State, Home Department, and Ministry of External Affairs officials, increasingly recognized that any local self-government would need to be separated from Assam. This entailed turning over governance of the Naga-majority areas of the Naga Hills District and Tuensang Division to the central government. By 1957, ending the violent conflict between Indian armed forces and Naga insurgents was the key focus, and as part of talks with the Naga People's Convention (NPC), which represented a segment of Nagas interested in ending fighting and willing to accept membership in the Indian Union, Nehru agreed to NPC demands for the central administration of the Naga Hills. He justified this to Medhi, writing, 'There has to be a break from the past before we can even fashion the future. To imagine that the situation will gradually improve and without our taking some such step is, I think, not reasonable or wise'.¹⁹

Throughout the 1950s, the movement for Nagaland increasingly highlighted the tensions in Union-State relations in the northeast - and ultimately the centre's overarching powers. Nehru's focus remained the integrity of the Indian Union, which necessitated a refusal to allow any region, whether Nagaland or elsewhere, to secede. His approach to Naga independence demands in some respects reflected his broader national policies. India had survived the first five years of independence intact, despite some pockets of resistance (like Nagaland and the princely state of Hyderabad), but Nehru's government also had given into pressure from Telegu speakers in south India to form the new State of Andhra Pradesh in 1953; the Union government subsequently agreed to the formation of a States Reorganization Commission to appease demands from other linguistic groups for their own States, resulting in 1955 in further recommendations for reorganization. Nehru demonstrated reluctant willingness to change governing structures within the Indian Union.²⁰ However, as Paul Brass has shown, State reorganization could only occur when communal issues were not at stake and when a new or reorganized State would be economically and financially viable.²¹ In the immediate aftermath of the commission, Nehru rejected the idea of an autonomous Naga State (like Assam or Punjab) within the Union; he explained to Jairamdas Doulatram, Governor of Assam, 'While I was not in favour of a separate state which I do not think can function satisfactorily and which would be a risk in the frontier region, I still thought that the largest measure of local self-government should be given to these people'.²²

The Naga resistance's location on India's international border with Burma, its proximity to Pakistan and China, and its potential impact on other borderlands communities in the northeast shaped the central government's approach to the conflict. At an incident in Kohima on 30 March 1953, Naga civilians walked out of an open meeting at which Nehru and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu were speaking (further reports indicated that some Nagas bared their bottoms as a further sign of disrespect).²³ Through this action, Nagas flouted

Indian state sovereignty, as embodied by Nehru, to both local and foreign authorities. As resistance spread, Naga rebels also increasingly sought aid from abroad, particularly from Pakistan and later China, and travelled into Burma and China to evade Indian armed forces: they openly flouted Indian governance within the Naga hills. Thus India's military presence in the Naga areas represented Indian efforts to reaffirm the state's sovereignty, not only to locals but also to foreigners.

Union and State officials also shared the view that the conflict's proximity to India's other international borders necessitated urgent action; the fear that Pakistani (and later Chinese) forces might encourage further resistance not only among the Nagas but also in the neighbouring hills particularly drove officials to seek a solution. Nehru noted, 'We are living in difficult times with international situations always on the verge of crisis and the possibility of wars etc. Border areas and border tribes have always to be remembered in this connection'.²⁴ Medhi also emphasized that 'The situation in the Naga Hills has brought to the forefront the grave dangers which lie to the security and integrity of India as a result of troubles which can be started by trained and armed guerilla bands in a small area'.²⁵ However, while Nehru argued for compromise and potentially changing the relationship between Assam and the Nagas, the Assam State government resisted.

While members of the Assam State government also promoted a political settlement to the Naga problem, they vehemently protested the Union government's choice to assume control of Nagaland, also because of its borderlands location. They perceived that Union policy towards Nagaland had the potential to disrupt relations in the northeast more generally. While the potential for linguistic, ethnic, and communal movements to disrupt both Union and State politics extended across the subcontinent, it posed a particular threat in India's border zones, where local unrest could ripple out to affect both regional and international relations. The Assam government repeatedly made this argument, pointing out

that the Nagas were specifically a border population - and not the only north-eastern border population that had suggested separation from Assam. As Medhi repeatedly emphasized, alongside the Nagas, the Kharos and other populations in Assam's hills districts bordering Pakistan had expressed a desire for their own States within the Indian Union during discussions with the States Reorganization Commission. While the commission had not recommended the creation of further States in the northeast - citing their small size and inability to raise self-sufficient revenues - the changing relationship between the Nagas and the Indian Union could spark new demands from other hills regions for further autonomy and separation from Assam. (Union decision-making towards the Nagas equally could impact the way border communities in India's northwest, in Punjab, framed their demands for their own State as well.) As Medhi pointed out to Nehru,

The feeling of isolation and not being part of India of the Nagas you refer to is unfortunately a conception which is not confined to the Nagas alone. ... I am afraid, we might be led to further complications with the hill people in some other hill districts of the State as a result. The only difference so far as the Nagas are concerned is that they have a much greater martial tradition than other hill people of our State.²⁶

Nehru tried to assure Medhi that this would not occur; he explained in 1957, 'It is my view that ultimately all the areas of the North-East India should come under one State of Assam'; however, he warned, 'But we cannot put them there now. In fact every attempt to do so would probably make this even more difficult and arouse opposition'.²⁷

After negotiations in 1957 and 1960, when Naga representatives who met with S. M. Shrinagesh, Governor of Assam, stated they would accept nothing less than full statehood

within the Indian Union, the central government chose to compromise. Nehru was arguably swayed by Shrinagesh, who noted,

Tribal consciousness - one might even say tribal pride - is growing rapidly throughout this frontier, and I should not be at all surprised if we are later faced with similar problems in some of our other tribal areas as well. ... We have to satisfy tribal aspirations, but not at the cost of a strong and united frontier.²⁸

The correspondent for The Times of London also suspected that 'this concession to moderate political sentiment among the Nagas will help to isolate those hostile elements who are still fighting a guerrilla campaign in the name of national independence for the Nagas'.²⁹ In this reading, a Naga State, no matter how weak, would strengthen, rather than undermine Indian authority in what was a strategically important borderland. The central government, with the support of the Lok Sabha, acquiesced to the Naga demand for their own State within the Indian Union. Nehru acknowledged that

The Naga area is of course not comparable at all to these States in area, population or resources. The broad principle which is followed by us even in regard to these States is that they must shoulder their own financial burden for the administration and indeed for part of their development.³⁰

Officials nevertheless justified a Naga State because of its unique history as a borderlands region. At a press conference on 11 August 1960,

Mr. Nehru said the creation of a new Naga state should give no encouragement to the protagonists of Punjabi Suba because the Naga areas had been treated as a separate entity for many years. Under the new set-up these areas were not being separated from another entity: they were simply being given a higher status.³¹

Nehru could justify the Naga State because of Nagaland's unique history whereby first the colonial and then the Indian state had never treated it as fully integrated into the Union-State system (despite the Assam State government's attempts). This contrasted to State creation in India's heartland, where new States would distinctly change the political geography of the subcontinent. Nevertheless, officials proposed a compromised Statehood, partly because of Nagaland's uniqueness and partly because it was not self-sustaining, by which Nagaland shared its governor and judicial systems with Assam (thereby setting a precedent for the further reorganization of the northeast in the late 1960s) and depended on the central government for economic aid. In effect, Nehru used Naga Statehood to determine a relationship between the region and the central government that differed little from the colonial era; local autonomy could largely continue, while State mechanisms could regulate (or at least try to, as we shall see) the interactions between the Nagas, other Indian States, and foreign powers. In this form the State of Nagaland officially emerged in 1963.

III

In some ways, events in Baluchistan followed a similar trajectory to those in Nagaland, but with far wider ramifications.³² Questions of political autonomy also were at the centre of the conflict, but the Baluch resistance initially spawned from national, rather than local, political developments. The 1971 secession of Bangladesh shaped Bhutto's approach to

the movement for provincial autonomy, and his suppression of opposition parties like the National Awami Party influenced the resistance. In Bhutto's eyes, events in Baluchistan were critically important to the security and shape of the Pakistani state. Baluchistan's location along the borders with Afghanistan and Iran, however, complicated Bhutto's efforts to suppress local resistance. Even more than in Nagaland, Baluchistan's situation as a borderland undermined Bhutto's efforts to exert total Pakistani sovereignty.

During the first twenty years of independence, Baluchistan was largely sidelined by government focus on the more populous, prosperous provinces of East Bengal, Punjab, and, to an extent, Sindh. Baluchistan's relationship with the centre was further complicated by its mixture of governments (part princely states, part centrally administered) and local resistance to Pakistani governance. Initially, the Khan of Kalat claimed that the princely state's treaty relationship with Britain was akin to that of Nepal, and he declared Kalat independent. Pakistani leaders responded with armed force in 1948 and compelled the Khan to sign a treaty of accession (the Khan's brother tried to continue the rebellion but was arrested).³³ Kalat remained largely autonomous during the first years of independence, as did former British Baluchistan, which continued to be governed through local jirgas, or tribal meetings, despite increasingly coming into conflict with the Muslim League.³⁴ As in the case of Nagaland, Baluch suspicions concerned the imposition of cultural values from one province to another; in particular, Indian high commission officials reported local fears that Urdu was to be imposed on Baluchistan as its official language after the unpopular forced merger of Kalat, Kharam, Las Bela, and Makran in the Baluchistan States Union.³⁵ The creation of the states union was the first of several steps towards the political integration of Baluchistan, and it created concerns for Baluch leaders, particularly among the semi-autonomous tribes who feared government interference. Unrest continued from the late 1950s, as both the Khan of Kalat and Baluch sardars - tribal leaders, and frequently influential landowners - resisted the

imposition of One Unit, the 1955 amalgamation of Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP into the single administration of West Pakistan. The subsequent crackdown by the Pakistan Army against the sardars and resisting Baluch exacerbated matters. The conflict between many Baluch and the Pakistani state in the 1960s similarly revolved around President Mohammad Ayub Khan's attempts to replace longstanding social and political structures in Baluchistan. Resistance in Baluchistan was brutally suppressed in the 1960s, but it remained fairly small-scale, and did not appear unduly to concern the central government.

The 1971 war and the independence of Bangladesh, however, drastically changed Pakistan's political landscape. The fall of Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military dictator, and his replacement by General Yahya Khan also resulted in the dissolution of West Pakistan as a political unit and the reconstitution of Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP. The abolition of One Unit also resulted, for the first time, in a united Baluchistan province, with an accompanying promise of provincial elections to follow. The loss of Bangladesh interrupted any potential normalization of province-centre relations, however, and reshaped political dynamics within Pakistan. Regions like Baluchistan and the NWFP, which previously had been comparatively peripheral to central politics, became far more important to the shape and security of Pakistan. Pakistani central leaders no longer faced a balancing act between east and west Pakistan, and instead needed to focus on maintaining Pakistan's remaining provinces. While historically marginalized by Punjab, and to a lesser extent Sindh, in economic and political processes, Baluchistan formed a central part of Pakistan's land mass: its loss could mean the country's complete destruction. An ongoing belief that Baluchistan contained untold natural resource reserves, particularly gas and oil, following the discovery of coal in the 1950s, also motivated further integration of the province.³⁶ This was the stance taken by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when he came to power in the aftermath of the 1971 war.

The period of Bhutto's reign provides a particularly interesting comparison with Nehru's government. As an ostensibly populist leader who vowed to restore representative politics, his rise seemed to signal a new era of Pakistani leadership, one which initially promised to resemble 1950s India. He pledged nationwide elections and allowed governments to form based on the results of the 1970 elections. Political parties such as the National Awami Party (NAP), which formed provincial coalition governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP, sought to use the end of army rule to accrue support for increased provincial autonomy.

In contrast to the demand for Nagaland, which was largely localized and concerned political circumstances in the northeast, conflict in Baluchistan had a broader correlation with provincial and national politics in Pakistan. In particular, violence in Baluchistan to a large extent corresponded with the clash between the NAP and Bhutto's central government. Bhutto and the leaders of the NAP diverged in their perspectives on the future governing structures of Pakistan. While Bhutto, much like Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan before him, favoured a strong centre responsible for much of the country's governance (despite his ostensibly populist credentials), the NAP advocated an extension of provincial autonomy, particularly to protect local minorities from (what was after East Pakistan's departure) Pakistan's Punjabi majority. A particular sticking point for Bhutto, as with Pakistani leaders both before and after him, was the description of Pakistan, by two prominent Baluch and Pashtun NAP leaders, as comprising four Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluch, and Pashtun 'nations' or 'nationalities' rather than one composite whole.³⁷ (This conception of nationhood differed little from the idea of a Naga 'nation', which, as in the NAP definition, could be subsumed within a national structure or be fully independent, depending on the interpretation.) The two leaders, Abdul Wali Khan and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, maintained that these four nations could live together within Pakistan (though Bizenjo's position shifted towards secessionism by the

time of his release from prison in 1977). Yet Bhutto and others saw this concept as a threat to Pakistani sovereignty and, as Bhutto told reporters, ‘a medium to oppose the integrity of Pakistan’.³⁸

This perspective, largely based on fears of a second Bangladesh crisis - the province of East Bengal's large ethnic majority similarly had demanded increased autonomy - underpinned Bhutto's actions towards Baluchistan. As he told the Constituent Assembly on 22 February 1973, in one of many pronouncements about the need to keep Pakistan united and whole in the aftermath of 1971, ‘if you think that the story of East Pakistan will be allowed to be repeated here [in the west] you are sadly mistaken’.³⁹ Bhutto consequently used the discovery of a cache of armaments at the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad as pretence to unseat the NAP government in Baluchistan. The central government claimed that the arms were intended for a resistance movement in Baluchistan that sought to break away from Pakistan.⁴⁰ Bhutto's abrupt dismissal of the provincial Baluchistan government and the subsequent incarceration of its three key leaders, Khair Bux Marri, Bizenjo, and Ataullah Mengal, sparked the insurgency that gripped Baluchistan from 1973 to 1977. Notably, the NAP government in the NWFP was dismissed at the same time. Bhutto then appointed new, sympathetic governments in both Baluchistan and the NWFP. In a government white paper on Baluchistan, published in Dawn on 20 October 1974, Bhutto justified these actions by accusing Baluch officials of promoting ‘lawless’ behaviour among Marri tribesmen, creating their own police force, and more broadly supporting Baluch and Pashtun secessionist movements.⁴¹

Marri, Bizenjo, and Mengal's stature and influence drew on their position within Baluch society as well as their government positions. They all came from well-known families from several of the largest Baluch tribes, as indicated in their names. Marri and Mengal tribesmen took the lead in protesting the incarceration of their leaders; their

resistance was further fuelled by Bhutto's attempts to bring Baluchistan more firmly into the national fold. Tribal and nation-state politics overlapped and clashed. Local Baluch fought for a variety of reasons, not only to release their leaders, but for the restoration of an elected government, and for greater Baluch autonomy.⁴² Irrespective of continuing violence, Bhutto declared the insurgency over in October 1974 and issued a general amnesty to any insurgents who were willing to surrender themselves and their weapons. According to both Indian and Afghan observers, the amnesty did not attract many, and the insurgency instead continued. The next section will outline more of Bhutto's policies towards Baluchistan that were intended to stamp out tribal customs and political and social institutions.

Baluchistan's shared border with Afghanistan shaped the conflict's trajectory. As a border zone, its place in regional relations, particularly between Pakistan and Afghanistan, had long been a source of controversy. In the 1970s, insurgents were able to use the porous border to evade Pakistani counterinsurgency measures, while Afghan leaders actively protested Bhutto's policies. (In contrast, Iran's Shah sympathized with and supported Bhutto, as he, too, sought the domination and integration of Iran's Baluch.)⁴³ Afghan-Pakistan political tensions directly impacted - and were influenced by - Pakistan's governing crisis in Baluchistan. Historically, Afghan leaders, particularly Mohammad Daoud Khan, Afghanistan's Prime Minister from 1953 to 1963 and President from 1973 to 1978, had included Baluchistan in their demands for an autonomous 'Pashtunistan' largely carved out of Pakistan's NWFP and Baluchistan. Afghan leaders spoke of their Pashtun and Baluch 'brethren' across the border and frequently pronounced on perceived mistreatments of Pakistan's borderland population. This led to diplomatic ruptures between the two countries throughout the 1950s, which only subsided after Daoud was forced to resign as Prime Minister in 1963 after Afghanistan's economy had suffered a government-imposed blockade for two years because of regional tensions. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan

subsequently normalized, as the Afghan King, Zahir Shah, took over the country's governance. The 1973 coup d'état that unseated the king and brought his cousin, Daoud, back to power coincided with the outbreak of insurgency in Baluchistan.

Regional relations arguably affected the conflict in Baluchistan more than they did Nagaland, despite shared fears of foreign interference in both cases. While Indian officials dealt with fairly small-scale Pakistani and Chinese aid to the Naga insurgents or manifesting Indian sovereignty to their Burmese neighbours, Pakistani leaders faced a crisis in its relations with Afghanistan as a result of their Baluchistan policy. Bhutto's decision to use armed force to subdue the Baluch resistance had widespread ramifications for regional relations. Daoud resumed criticism of Pakistan's policies in 'occupied Pashtunistan', particularly in relation to Baluchistan. In a November 1974 letter to Kurt Waldheim, General-Secretary of the United Nations, Daoud expressed his concern about 'the systematic use of force, including air-bombardment, against the Baloochi freedom-fighters who continue to resist the suppression, through the use of force, of their legitimate political demands and their rightful aspirations'.⁴⁴ (The NAP also spoke of Baluchs' 'legitimate rights', a similarity that likely did not go unnoticed by Bhutto's regime.) Bhutto unsurprisingly resented Daoud's continued interest in Pashtunistan - the Afghan Government's repeated reference to 'freedom fighters' was particularly irksome - and he caustically informed Waldheim that in Baluchistan, 'a handful of tribesmen who, like the bulk of the Afghan population, have not yet emerged from the feudal stage, have been beguiled and misled by their chiefs into resisting the socio-economic measures to which my government is committed to end feudalism in Baluchistan'.⁴⁵ Bhutto instead hinted that Afghan machinations were behind the resistance in Baluchistan.⁴⁶ Throughout 1974 and 1975, a propaganda war surged between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and representatives from both complained to the United Nations of interference by one country in the other.⁴⁷ Daoud's regime demanded that an international

commission look into reported atrocities in Baluchistan, while Bhutto accused the Afghans of irredentist interests in both Baluchistan and the NWFP.

The presence of Baluch refugees near Kandahar, in Afghanistan, only exacerbated tensions. Afghanistan's permanent representative to the United Nations reported several times on the passage of Baluch into Kandahar province, and he sought international support for food and shelter. Indian consulate officials in Kandahar reported the opening of two refugee camps in Kandahar, within 100 miles of the border, during 1975, one in Kokran, the other at Kalat.⁴⁸ By May 1975, S. K. Pradhan, the Indian Consul, reported 2,200 inhabitants in the Kokran camp.⁴⁹ The refugees' presence in Kandahar led to another war of words between Pakistan and Afghanistan; Bhutto refused to recognize the refugees as such, instead calling them 'fugitives from justice'. Daoud rejected this description, questioning how Baluch women and children could be described as fugitives. He instead acerbically noted, 'the continued arrival of the Baluchi refugees in Afghanistan amply demonstrates the fact that the situation in Baluchistan has not improved and it remains as bad as before'.⁵⁰

Perhaps even more irritating for Pakistan's leadership was the presence of exiled NAP leaders in Afghanistan, among them Ajmal Khattak, the former Secretary General of the NAP who had fled in March 1973. NAP members in Pakistan and abroad vigorously protested the incarceration of their colleagues and the army action taking place in Baluchistan. While the central government maintained that any military force in Baluchistan resulted from requests from the provincial government and was limited in nature, the NAP openly questioned this. Bhutto was not the only politician to cite the 1971 precedent: Wali Khan, decrying violence and the removal of Bizenjo's government, warned, 'If they [Bhutto's government] will repeat the mistakes their predecessors committed in Bangladesh, they will produce the same results surely because fire will burn just as well in Quetta or Karachi as it did at Dacca'.⁵¹ From the safety of Kabul and Kandahar, Khattak and others used their Afghanistan bases to propound

upon the situation in Baluchistan and the subsequent outlaw of the NAP in 1975. Indian embassy officials reported of tribal jirgas from across the Durand Line travelling to Kabul to seek Khattak's advice on resisting Pakistani rule.⁵² This unsurprisingly fed accusations that the NAP had outside help and desired the break-up of Pakistan. As early as the 1974 white paper, Bhutto had begun making the case that the NAP was working against the interests of the country, claiming that the NAP actively supported the armed resistance in Baluchistan; as tensions rose between Pakistan and Afghanistan, numerous reports emerged in Dawn accusing the NAP of allying with Daoud. (Khattak's presence at Afghan 'Pashtunistan Day' celebrations in Kabul did not help allay these concerns.) Finally, after the assassination of Hayat Sherpao, Governor of the NWFP and an ally of Bhutto, Bhutto detained Wali Khan and other NAP officials and banned the party in early February 1975, accusing them of trying to undermine national sovereignty.⁵³ Violence continued unabated in Baluchistan, only coming close to a halt in 1977 when Bhutto was ousted by the army and replaced by General Zia al-Haq.

IV

In both Baluchistan and Nagaland, as the previous two sections have shown, the central governments of India and Pakistan played a crucial role in defining relationships between these two regions' peripheral, 'tribal' populations and the nation-state, frequently over, or in opposition to, provincial interests and demands. This section now delves further into the similarities and differences between the two scenarios, first looking at the coercive measures shared by Indian and Pakistani officials in their efforts to counter local insurgency before considering how Nehru and Bhutto's very different approaches to 'tribal' populations reflected different governing imperatives and conflicting relationships with the colonial past.

Resistance in Nagaland and Baluchistan led Indian and Pakistani officers to choose armed force as a key means for suppressing local dissidents. Bhutto and Nehru both publicly affirmed time and again that political solutions ultimately were needed to ensure the integration of the two regions, but the army proved the quickest means of introducing the state to the borderlands. While members of the Assam Government recognized the need to ‘mitigate the harshness of the operations and to associate civil officials with requisite experience with these operations’ so as ‘not leave any scope for supporters and possible supporters of Government to swing over to the side of the hostiles’, the realization that Phizo's independence movement had widespread support in the Naga Hills and reports from local administrators that ‘It is the definite public opinion that the Naga rebellion is due to the inertia, callousness, indifference, and progressive deterioration of efficiency the Central and State Govts.’ meant that the Indian government needed to take action to reinforce its presence in the region.⁵⁴ The army provided such a mechanism. While Nehru repeatedly cautioned for the need to limit force, Bhutto demonstrated fewer qualms with sending the Pakistan Army into Baluchistan, though he also maintained that it undertook only limited action (in the 1974 white paper, he even claimed that aerial strafing never occurred, a widely disputed claim). Bhutto instead relied on the assertion that the interference of foreign powers, particularly Afghanistan, and their support for resistance in Baluchistan necessitated the army to protect the local population.

The use of force in both cases rested on the need to preserve national integrity and affirm central government rule in the borderlands. Bhutto told Pakistan's Constituent Assembly in December 1974 that ‘the Federal Government had acted in Baluchistan in fulfilment of its constitutional duty to protect every province of the country from external aggression and internal disturbance’.⁵⁵ Nehru similarly reconciled the use of military force in Nagaland:

These Naga troubles and revolts have a large significance for us in the international sphere and they give a handle to our opponents everywhere. More particularly, of course, Pakistan takes advantage of them. In view of our tense situation in regard to Pakistan, we have to be wary always and it is unfortunate that we should be tied up in the Naga Hills etc., when some other emergency might have to be faced by us.⁵⁶

Even after granting Naga Statehood, Indian security forces remained in Nagaland as a result of continued resistance by Nagas, led by Phizo, who still demanded independence. As late as 1972, M. C. Pant, Deputy Director of the Cabinet Secretariat, noted, 'Phizo is reported to have disclosed to some of his friends that he was satisfied with the assistance he was getting from China both in terms of financial and material aid extended to the rebel Naga Government'.⁵⁷ Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s (and beyond), armed forces hunted insurgents, arresting them and confiscating weapons, leading to flare-ups in violence in the region despite an official ceasefire.

The fact that these regions were also important borderlands only made their integration that much more important: interventions, real and imagined, by outside forces concerned officials in both countries. But because these regions were geographically peripheral to major centres of power in either state - and because the McMahon and Durand Lines were so porous - implementing these assertions proved more difficult. The flight of Baluch refugees to Afghanistan to escape Pakistani bombing demonstrated that armed force was not particularly successful, as it displaced rather than quelled the local population. Naga rebel groups continued to pass through Burma to China, particularly after the rupture of Sino-Indian relations and the 1963 war, to train in Chinese-organized military camps and acquire Pakistani and Chinese funding and weapons.⁵⁸ Thus, armed force was not particularly

effective as a performance of state sovereignty in these frontier regions; while it punished the local populations and brought them into direct contact with state forces, it did not subdue the most anti-state actors, who continued to seek aid from abroad, thanks, in large part, to the ease with which they could cross into, and through, neighbouring countries. The presence of poorly managed borders only complicated governing and integration attempts.

In one historical irony, the creation of the State of Nagaland within the Indian Union actually complicated the central government's attempts to demarcate its borders. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Indian government strove to confirm the Indo-Burma border, the Chief Minister of Nagaland intervened,

pointing out that a number of representations from the local public in Nagaland had been received opposing the erection of any permanent boundary pillars in the Nagaland sector. The main reasons given were that (1) many Naga villagers living on Indian side had their fields on the other side; (2) in some cases a portion of a village fell on Indian side and the other portion on the Burmese side; (3) the Chiefs who were entitled to certain customary tributes either in form of cash or in kind, or even in the form of a free labour, lived on Indian side, but his subjects lived on the Burmese side.⁵⁹

The subsequent exchange between the Chief Minister and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi highlighted the difficulties of imposing national boundaries that did not match lived realities - and furthermore, that the presence of an interested State government could complicate rather than alleviate border-building. Gandhi tried to emphasize that the newest agreement between India and Burma 'merely formalised the traditional boundary delineated on the maps', and promised that the agreement had little real impact on the ground; the Chief Minister, however, refused to be quelled and hinted, 'if the Government of India were to give away any

portion of the land belonging to the Nagas on our side to Burma then the situation would become more disturbing on this important international border'.⁶⁰ The Union government nevertheless proceeded to demarcate the border and erect boundary pillars.

As military intervention failed to bring peace to Nagaland and Baluchistan, and as Nehru and Bhutto publicly called for political solutions, both governments increasingly turned to alternative means of coercion and integration. The Indian and Pakistani armies stationed in these regions increasingly served as forces to implement development as well as law and order. As one official wrote to Medhi, 'Good road communications are vital, not only for the speedy restoration of law and order now, but for subsequent efficient administration of the area. Construction of new roads and maintenance of the existing ones should be, I therefore, suggest, accorded a very high priority'.⁶¹ Development in Nagaland was in line with Nehru's broader focus on building up India's economic and natural resource infrastructures.⁶² It also served as a means of 'rehabilitating', in the words of Indian officials, Naga insurgents. In response to a question put forward in the Lok Sabha, after the 1957 agreement between the Naga National Convention and the government had led to an official ceasefire, Nehru revealed a program of road, bridge, and house construction; training in handicrafts and technical subjects; student stipends; and housing and business loans intended to bring local Nagas into contact with the Indian government.⁶³ Bhutto also valued development and justified the army's continued presence in Baluchistan for its capacity to build roads, school, and hospitals, though for largely political means. As Shahid Javed Burki has demonstrated, Bhutto's development projects were predominantly intended to shore up his Pakistan's Peoples Party and to wean supporters from the NAP. Thus, he undertook spectacular rather than necessary projects such as the Lowari Pass tunnel project connecting the former northern princely states to the NWFP. Bhutto sanctioned 300 development projects in Baluchistan alone, but because they could not be implemented through existing

governing structures, he created 'Prime Minister's Directives' by which he could order such projects to move forward.⁶⁴ Bhutto thus used development projects to reaffirm his rule over the federal and provincial governments, arguably more than for the benefit of Pakistan's citizens.

These different approaches to development reflected Nehru and Bhutto's contrasting approaches to their borderlands 'tribal' policies. As mentioned earlier, Nehru's approach to Nagaland, as with much of NEFA, was moulded by an intention to undo and actively reverse colonial policies (at least in theory, as his use of violence had overt colonial overtones). Referring to historic colonial recourse to violence against the Nagas, he explained to Union Minister of Revenue and Expenditure that 'these frontier tribal people are tough. They have been mis-handled somewhat in the past; hence our difficulties'.⁶⁵ Nehru's envisioned policies towards the northeastern tribes, including the Nagas, entailed the slow political, administrative, and economic integration of the region, though his government also emphasized preserving local culture, history, and 'tribality', as Bérénice Guyot-Récharad has shown.⁶⁶ In effect, Nehru anticipated winning local loyalty by providing economic support while preserving cultural autonomy - a policy that differed little from the British system under Sandeman, where cultural and social difference was also maintained. To bridge further the gap between Union and frontier, Nehru's government considered various power-sharing relationships to bring a state presence into the frontier region - not merely to maintain law and order but ultimately to introduce federal and State laws and practices. These failed to take root in Nagaland. To draw the local populations into political dialogue with the Union government, Nehru first pursued representative 'autonomous district councils' in 1952, which had powers such as taxation and expenditure and were effectively meant to introduce Indian democracy at a local scale.⁶⁷ The majority of Nagas in the Naga Hills District, however, refused to cooperate; Nehru reported, 'They are so well disciplined that they have prevented

any elections being held there for the District Councils'.⁶⁸ Instead, through the negotiations of the 1950s, Nehru agreed for the Indian state to be represented by Ministry of External Affairs officials in the Naga areas, while local Nagas were left to organize themselves. The compromised sovereignty agreements through which Nagaland emerged as a State further indicated that political, cultural, and social difference would remain.

Bhutto took a noticeably different approach to 'tribal' life from Nehru. He saw tribal culture as a threat to Pakistan's modernity, and took immediate, active steps to integrate both tribal Baluch and Pashtuns into Pakistan's economic, social, and political structures. In his 1974 white paper on Baluchistan, he outlined the development needs of the province and indicated the measures that his government was and would be taking in the region. Bhutto's prescriptions followed the trajectory established by colonial officials, who similarly had emphasized the importance of road-building, the development of local natural resources, and the opening of schools and hospitals, but he went much further in pursuing his aims. Justifying state-sponsored development initiatives, the white paper revealed,

It would be unrealistic to expect immediate changes and instant adaptation on the part of the neglected people of Baluchistan to the new social realities. In a population the illiteracy rate of which exceeds the 84 per cent national average, traditional life styles take time in adjusting to newer conditions. There is an inevitable strain in development, a disruption of set values. But there is no escaping the compulsions of modernity. As the tribal mould begins to break, the people's mental horizons broaden and mass communication becomes a need.⁶⁹

In essence, Baluchistan's 'backward tribes' needed to be forced to conform to new nation-state realities and become responsible, involved citizens. This logic similarly underpinned Bhutto's drive to abolish the sardari system of tribal leadership. At one public meeting at

Maiwand, a village east of Quetta, Bhutto justified the outlaw of sardari, declaring, ‘We are against such elements who are trying to halt the progress like construction of roads and other developmental activities in this area’. He thus justified the continued presence of the Pakistan Army in Baluchistan, arguing it was intended to implement and preserve development work, such as road-building, as well as to ‘save them from those who had gone to the mountains and are operating from there against the country’.⁷⁰ When Bhutto finally announced the abolition of sardari on 8 April 1976, he declared that all Baluch were now ‘masters of their destiny’. He also caustically warned that ‘if anyone still craved for the sardars he could go either to Afghanistan or India’.⁷¹

Where Nehru worked for the slow integration of the northeast tribes into the Indian union through gradual policies and power-sharing arrangements, Bhutto eliminated outright the traditional base of Baluch social, economic, and political structures. Both political leaders envisioned the eventual incorporation of the tribal regions into their country's federal system, but where Nehru spoke of protecting tribal social structures and culture, Bhutto saw them as a threat. In contrast to Nehru's rhetoric criticizing colonial tribal policy, his local policies paradoxically carried the colonial model forward. While couched in terms of cultural preservation and heritage, his policies towards the Nagas and NEFA's other hill populations effectively preserved the region's isolation from the rest of the subcontinent. Bhutto, in contrast, saw local social, cultural, and political customs, like sardari, as a threat to the nation that had to be destroyed, not preserved. The works of two officials deployed to Nagaland and Baluchistan represent this difference. In Nagaland in transition, V. K. Anand, an engineer with the Indian Army who served in Nagaland, recounts the Indian Army's road-building and development feats as bringing technology and enlightenment to the ‘savage’, ‘backward’ tribes.⁷² His narrative is remarkably similar in style and word choice to that of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British officer's memoir-cum-anthropological study, many of

which similarly spoke of bringing the state to the northwest frontier. In contrast, Akbar Ahmed, the later anthropologist who served as a political agent in Waziristan in the 1970s, describes Bhutto's reign as a watershed moment for Pakistan's tribal policy. Ahmed predicted that 'The knowledge, policies and involvement of the one man [Bhutto] ultimately responsible for the Tribal Areas may trigger changes that will permanently affect tribal social life'.⁷³ His study, while not directly concerned with Baluchistan, reflects Bhutto's emphasis on a rupture with the colonial (and earlier Pakistani) past. Bhutto's policies focused more on the exigencies of a modern nation-state and the need to reaffirm national ideologies and identities.

This stark difference in Indian and Pakistani approaches to tribal policy resulted at least in part from the different crises facing each country and Nehru and Bhutto's different governing agendas. The Naga movement for independence undoubtedly was an irritant for the Indian Union and posed questions as to how the central government would address and incorporate recalcitrant populations, but its greater impacts on the Union were actively limited. The creation of a Naga State did not set a precedent for how the Union government dealt with autonomy movements - Nehru actively discouraged people from looking to Nagaland by citing its unique colonial history as an outlying, semiautonomous region - nor did it have a huge impact on the Indian Union outside the northeast. Following the States Reorganization Commission and the first wave of new linguistic States within India, as it did, the creation of Nagaland arguably fit into Nehru's policies for integrating India's States and populations more fully into the Union.⁷⁴ Thus as he told John Bosco Jasokie, one of the lead Naga negotiators in 1957, 'You are independent, as independent as others in India and have the same individual freedom. But this is within the Union of India'.⁷⁵ For Nehru, the issue was not subsuming Naga into Indian identity or changing the nature of local governing structures. (As scholars have pointed out, the Indian constitution celebrated 'unity in

diversity'.⁷⁶) But he required that the local population, as in other States, accept the suzerainty of the Indian Union: belonging in the Union of States, acceptance of membership in a united India, and recognition, then, of India's territoriality and borders. While Nehru indicated he could accept local autonomy - and ultimately the creation of a semi-sufficient Naga State - he also made clear that 'There is no question of anything happening there [in the northeast] which is beyond the control of Government'.⁷⁷ The creation of Nagaland was a necessary compromise to ensure that India retained the same territorial space it had inherited in 1947 and did not succumb to 'Balkanization'. The creation of Nagaland, then, further cemented the perimeters of Indian sovereignty.

In contrast, Bhutto's actions in Baluchistan were much weightier; his policies were directed not so much at integration and reaffirming national sovereignty, but at preventing disintegration and the collapse of the Pakistani state. Circumstances in Pakistan differed from those in India. Whereas Nehru's policies towards Nagaland formed in light of other moves towards State reorganization within the Indian Union and a large degree of political autonomy within the Naga State did not threaten Indian national sovereignty, Pakistan was far more fragile. Although the resistance in Baluchistan reached its apex much later than in Nagaland - about twenty-six, rather than five, years after independence - it posed a far greater threat to Pakistan's survival, at least in Bhutto's eyes. Territorially, Baluchistan comprised a much larger area of Pakistan than Nagaland of India: Baluchistan was by far the largest province within Pakistan, and its breakaway, after the independence of Bangladesh, would leave Pakistan as a sliver on a map. The insurgency there consequently had much larger ramifications for Pakistan. The links between resistance in Baluchistan and the NAP ensured that the movement had the potential to seep into Pakistan's other provinces (Indian officials in Kabul and Kandahar reported that Pashtun jirgas in the northwest frontier tribal area kept a close eye on Baluch conflict and protested both Pakistan Army action there, as well as the

incarceration of various NAP leaders).⁷⁸ By sending in the army, Bhutto reaffirmed the Pakistani state's control over its provinces; he reasserted the central government's dominance over the province. By complaining about Afghan interference to the United Nations, he expressed - and performed - Pakistan's national sovereignty within an international arena. This was not merely Pakistani rule within its borders - demarcated, in this instance, as the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan - but also over its citizens. Bhutto's continued assertions that the Baluch in Afghanistan were 'fugitives from justice' made clear a distinct link between the Pakistan state - the administrator of justice - and its Baluch citizens in Afghanistan - those actively, illegally resisting the state's rule. For Bhutto's government, 'unity in diversity' was not an option in the aftermath of Bangladesh's independence. Instead, a strong centre took precedence, and any resistance to this, perceived (belief that the NAP promoted secessionism) or real (the armed Baluch resistance), had to be addressed quickly and with force. More than just reaffirming the centre's control of the provinces, Bhutto's actions were intended to prevent the disintegration of Pakistan.

V

Returning to the points made in the introduction about Pakistani and Indian approaches to regionalism, this article demonstrates that in the case studies of Nagaland and Baluchistan, central governments' reactions to local movements overwhelmingly determined how these peripheral regions would relate to the rest of the nation-state. The governing crises in Nagaland and Baluchistan stemmed from similar causes and a shared colonial past - local demands for a continuation of the social and political autonomy that had been allowed under the British - and in both, the interests of the central governments outweighed provincial or regional concerns. But while the central government played a key role in both conflicts, India

and Pakistan's leaders acted based on different approaches to the two countries' shared colonial past and different contemporary circumstances. While Nehru and Bhutto both promoted the overarching powers of the central government, they differed in how they managed centre-periphery relationships. Nehru accommodated a system in the northeast that differed little from colonial practice: Naga interactions with Indian representatives were actively limited and channelled through key actors, whether the Assam-Nagaland governor, locally stationed Ministry of External Affairs officials, or members of the armed forces. Bhutto's understanding of Pakistan's national integrity and sovereignty lacked the capacity for internal difference. Longstanding Baluch political and social structures could not stand and instead needed replacing with a more coherent system that extended across Pakistan's remaining provinces.

Neither India nor Pakistan was fully successful in its borderland policies. While this article has reflected on specific moments in the histories of Nagaland and Baluchistan, it recognises that these instances are more broadly emblematic of continued troubles in the relationship between the South Asian state and its borderlands. The formation of Nagaland did not stop resistance by Nagas who still sought full independence. As a consequence, security forces remained a key mode for Indian officials to reassert both the State and Union governments' sovereignty. As B. K. Nehru, Governor of Assam, wrote to the Minister of External Affairs in 1970 regarding continued resistance in the 1960s,

The Government of India was certainly not prepared to acquiesce in a situation in which the writ of the legitimate Government did not run. As the Ministers in Nagaland had failed to establish their own authority, there was no option but to get the Army to do so. This hard line had been adopted two years ago and it had the effect of restoring the authority of the

Government of Nagaland so that its writ did now run throughout the length and breadth of the State.⁷⁹

Even now, a pass system remains in place to decide who can and cannot enter Nagaland, an overt expression of Indian sovereign power over the State. Access to Nagaland is still restricted depending on perceived levels of local resistance to state controls.

In Baluchistan, Bhutto initially announced that the counterinsurgency was officially over in 1974, but Pakistani armed forces continued to act in the region long after this. The immediate counterinsurgency really only 'ended' when Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia al-Haq, who subsequently released most of the NAP leaders. However, the general's refusal to renegotiate the relationship between Baluchistan and the centre meant that resistance continued, though largely based abroad in Afghanistan and Europe among the Baluch exile community. Bizenjo, the former Baluchistan governor who remained in Quetta after his release from prison in 1977, warned,

if people persist in remaining unconcerned about situations like those which developed in East Pakistan and later in Baluchistan, then every four or five years the nation will go through a period of utter confusion and chaos, frustration and despair, and as a natural consequence, martial law will come in.⁸⁰

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the subsequent resistance largely based on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, allowed Baluch resistance to continue, as the war in Afghanistan and the potential Soviet threat to Pakistan took precedence. At the turn of the century, General Pervez Musharraf followed in Bhutto's footsteps, pursuing large-scale development in Baluchistan despite resistance from the local population. Baluch nationalists

have remained active, and have turned to militant tactics to resist state control; in turn, the Pakistan Army continues its own activities in the province.⁸¹ Thus the fact that neither region's relations with the central government have completely normalized indicates that both Pakistan and India have failed to achieve completely successful policies in Baluchistan or Nagaland. Centre-state relations remain fraught and incomplete.

This article thus complicates our understanding of India and Pakistan's relationship with their shared colonial past and emphasizes that regionalism and local conflict impacted the way that leaders wrestled with historical precedence in post-independence political crises. While Pakistan has widely been accused of continuing colonial practice in its borderlands, particularly with the prolonged use of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation laws in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Bhutto's actions towards Baluchistan demonstrate that Pakistan's relationship with colonial borderlands policy has been far more complex. In terms of state-building, in the Westphalian sense, Bhutto's actions towards Baluchistan, the outlaw of sardari, was far more radical than the policies undertaken by Nehru towards Nagaland. There, different political and social relationships have been allowed to persist, rather than forced to conform. Nehru's choice effectively to reaffirm colonial-style governing relations, rather than the push and pull of centre-State relations, has been the decisive factor in Nagaland's creation and subsequent trajectory. These case studies emphasize the nuances and complexities of local political developments that must be recognized alongside all-India or all-Pakistan - or all-South Asia - historical narratives. More localized histories can belie the national histories that so frequently dominate scholarship on decolonization and the decolonizing world. Instead by studying and comparing subnational historical trajectories, we can nuance our understanding of a state's postcolonial trajectory, the varying impacts of colonial legacies, and shifting power relationships across time and space.

Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX

elisabeth.leake@aya.yale.edu

* The author wishes to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as Sarah Ansari, Daniel Haines, and Sunil Purushotham for their comments. The Leverhulme Trust generously supported research for this article.

¹ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: a comparative and historical perspective* (Cambridge, 1995). For particular consideration of broader structural differences between India and Pakistan, see Katharine Adeney, *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan* (Basingstoke, 2007); Jai Prakash Sharma, *Federal systems of India and Pakistan: a comparative perspective* (Jaipur, 1987).

² Jalal, *Democracy and authoritarianism*, p. 199.

³ This work differentiates between the capitalized ‘States’ that comprised the Indian Union and were part of its federal system and the de-capitalized ‘state’ of broader political discourse.

⁴ Jalal, *Democracy and authoritarianism*, p. 200.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁶ Using geography as border logic can be equally problematic, particularly as states expand. Peter Sahlins has demonstrated this in the case of French borders. Peter Sahlins, ‘Natural frontiers revisited: France's boundaries since the seventeenth century’, *The American Historical Review*, 95 (December 1990), pp. 1423-51.

⁷ See Alastair Lamb, *Asian frontiers: studies in a continuing problem* (London, 1968), pp. 54-75; Marcus Franke, *War and nationalism in South Asia: the Indian state and the Nagas* (London, 2009), ch. 1.

⁸ Benjamin D. Hopkins and Magnus Marsden, *Fragments of the Afghan frontier* (London, 2011), pp. 56-7; Peter Robb, ‘The colonial state and constructions of Indian identity: an

example on the northeast frontier in the 1880s', *Modern Asian Studies*, 31 (May 1997), pp. 245-83, at p. 258.

⁹ See Elisabeth Leake, *The defiant border: the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands in the era of decolonization, 1936-1965* (New York, forthcoming).

¹⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 2 Feb. 1951, in *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. S. Gopal, second series, vol. 15, part 2 (New Delhi, 1993), p. 184.

¹¹ For a range of works on Nagaland, see Franke, *War and nationalism in South Asia*; Udayon Misra, *India's north-east: identity movements, state, and civil society* (New Delhi, 2014), section B; Chandrika Singh, *Political evolution of Nagaland* (New Delhi, 1981); R. Vashum, *Indo-Naga conflict: problem and resolution* (New Delhi, 2001).

¹² Franke, *War and nationalism in South Asia*, ch. 3.

¹³ Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 24 April 1947, in *The transfer of power, 1942-7: constitutional relations between Britain and India*, eds. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, vol. 10 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1981), no. 210.

¹⁴ V. K. Anand, *Conflict in Nagaland: a study of insurgency and counter-insurgency* (Delhi, 1980), pp. 64-5.

¹⁵ In one scathing attack on local Bengalis, Medhi wrote, 'The fact is that after the British occupation the natives of the soil were not inclined to co-operate with the British imperialists and accept any job under them to help in the administration. Taking advantage of this attitude of mind of the local people, a large number of Bengalis who came with the imperialists occupied all offices of trust and responsibility. The Bengali "Amolahs", without having a permanent interest in the soil but forming the only link between the foreign Government and the governed, naturally felt tempted to exploit the situation to their best advantage'. Bisnuram

Medhi to Balvantray Mehta, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, 29 Oct. 1954, CM Secretariat, CMS 257/B/54, Assam State Archives, Guwahati (ASA).

¹⁶ B. R. Medhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 Sept. 1954, file 1, Bisnuram Medhi papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML).

¹⁷ K. N. Dutt, 'Draft memorandum on the State of Assam for submission to the States Reorganisation Commission', 1954, CM Secretariat, CMS 257/B/54, ASA.

¹⁸ Franke, *War and nationalism in South Asia*, p. 91.

¹⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 16 May 1957, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, second series, vol. 38 (New Delhi, 2006), p. 255.

²⁰ Ramachandra Guha, *India after Gandhi: the history of the world's largest democracy* (London, 2007), ch. 9.

²¹ Paul R. Brass, *Language, religion and politics in north India* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 17.

²² Jawaharlal Nehru to Jairamdas Doulatram, 3 April 1955, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. S. Gopal, second series, vol. 28 (New Delhi, 2001), p. 487.

²³ See Sajal Nag, 'Nehru and the Nagas: minority nationalism and the post-colonial state', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44 (5-11 December 2009), pp. 48-55, at p. 50.

²⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 19 March 1954, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. S. Gopal, second series, vol. 25 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 211.

²⁵ B. R. Medhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 26 May 1956, file 1, Bisnuram Medhi papers, NMML.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 16 May 1957, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 38, p. 256.

²⁸ S. M. Shrinagesh to Jawaharlal Nehru, 12 April 1960, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, ed. Madhavan K. Palat, second series, vol. 59 (New Delhi, 2014), pp. 455-6.

²⁹ 'India expected to give Nagas own state', *The Times*, 1 Aug. 1960, p. 5.

³⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru to S. M. Shrinagesh, 2 April 1960, Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 38, p. 209.

³¹ 'Increased autonomy for hill people: reforms promised by Mr. Nehru', The Times of India, 12 Aug. 1960, p. 1.

³² While the Naga struggle for independence has been a subject of acute interest among Indian scholars, the development of Baluchistan within Pakistan has received far less attention. This is due in part to scholars' focus on the larger, more influential provinces of Punjab and East Bengal or those that were more immediately impacted by partition, such as Sindh, as well as to a dearth of archival sources.

³³ Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's shadow: Baluch nationalism and Soviet temptations (New York, 1981), pp. 26-7.

³⁴ Paul Titus and Nina Swidler, 'Knights, not pawns: ethno-nationalism and regional dynamics in post-colonial Balochistan', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32 (February 2002), pp. 47-69, at pp. 50-1.

³⁵ K. L. S. Pandit, Indian Consul, Kandahar, Political report for 1954, 4 Feb. 1955, EA 3/14/R&I/55-II, National Archives of India, New Delhi (NAI).

³⁶ Harrison, In Afghanistan's shadow, pp. 162-3.

³⁷ Anwar H. Syed, 'The idea of a Pakistani nationhood', Polity, 12 (Summer 1980), pp. 575-97, at pp. 591-2.

³⁸ 'Bhutto rejects pleas to lift emergency, points to plots at home, abroad', Dawn, 4 March 1973, p. 1.

³⁹ 'Bhutto urges constituent assembly members to keep tryst with destiny', Dawn, 23 Feb. 1973, p. 1.

-
- ⁴⁰ While scholars have reported various theories on the provenance and likely destination of the Iraqi guns, few indicate much belief in the idea that they were meant for a Baluch insurgency. See Harrison, *In Afghanistan's shadow*, p. 35.
- ⁴¹ Titus and Swidler, 'Knights, not pawns', p. 60.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 62.
- ⁴³ See Harrison, *In Afghanistan's shadow*, particularly ch. 6.
- ⁴⁴ Mohammad Daoud to Kurt Waldheim, 27 Nov. 1974, S-0442-0331-1, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section, New York City (UN ARMS).
- ⁴⁵ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Kurt Waldheim, 1 Oct. 1974, S-0442-0331-1, UN ARMS.
- ⁴⁶ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Kurt Waldheim, 20 Jan. 1975, S-0442-0331-1, UN ARMS.
- ⁴⁷ Indian Embassy, Kabul, 'Note on Pakhtoon activities for the month of March 1975', 4 June 1975, EA HI/1012/1/75, NAI.
- ⁴⁸ S. K. Pradhan, 'Political report for November, 1974', 3 Dec. 1974, EA HI/1012/3/74, NAI; *ibid.*, 'Political report for June, 1975', 1 July 1975, EA HI/1012/3/75, NAI.
- ⁴⁹ S. K. Pradhan, 'Political report for May, 1975', 3 June 1975, EA HI/1012/3/75, NAI.
- ⁵⁰ Mohammad Daoud to Kurt Waldheim, 30 Sept. 1975, S-0360-0014-10, UN ARMS.
- ⁵¹ 'Wali alleges plot to push Baluchistan, NWFP out of Pakistan', *Dawn*, 23 May 1973, p. 1.
- ⁵² See, for example, S. K. Pradhan, 'Political report for June, 1974', 2 July 1974, EA HI/1012/3/74, NAI.
- ⁵³ 'Action against NAP not arbitrary – Pirzada', *Dawn*, 15 Feb. 1975, p. 1.
- ⁵⁴ 'Note from J.S. on Naga Hills', undated 1956, CM Secretariat, CMS 136/56, ASA; Lila Gogoi to Home Minister, 27 June 1956, CM Secretariat, CMS 130/56, ASA.
- ⁵⁵ 'Bhutto wants political solution in Baluchistan', *Dawn*, 17 Dec. 1974, p. 8.
- ⁵⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 13 May 1956, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, eds. H. Y. Prasad et al., second series, vol. 33 (New Delhi, 2004), p. 172.

-
- ⁵⁷ M. C. Pant, 'Activities of A.Z. Phizo', 23 Dec. 1972, HA NII/102/63/72, NAI.
- ⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence D(GS.I) draft white paper, 'Foreign involvement in insurgency in north eastern India', 1 June 1972, HA NII/102/33/72, NAI.
- ⁵⁹ Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 'The question of Naga traditional rights - a review of discussions with the governments of Nagaland and Burma', 11 Oct. 1976, EA HI/102/36/76, NAI.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Sant Singh to Bisnuram Medhi, 30 June 1956, CM Secretariat, CMS 130/56, ASA.
- ⁶² See Srirupa Roy, *Beyond belief: India and the politics of postcolonial nationalism* (Durham, 2007).
- ⁶³ Reply to a question in the Lok Sabha, 29 April 1958, Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, eds. Aditya Mukherjee and Mridula Mukherjee, second series, vol. 42 (New Delhi, 2010), p. 412.
- ⁶⁴ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (London, 1980), pp. 146-51.
- ⁶⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru to Mahavir Tyagi, 2 Dec. 1952, in Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, ed. S. Gopal, second series, vol. 20 (New Delhi, 1997), p. 178.
- ⁶⁶ Bérénice Guyot-Réchar, 'Nation-building or state-making? India's north-east frontier and the ambiguities of Nehruvian developmentalism, 1950-1959', *Contemporary South Asia*, 21 (2013), pp. 22-37.
- ⁶⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru to U Nu, 25 Oct. 1952, Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 20, p. 154.
- ⁶⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru to Mahavir Tyagi, 2 December 1952, in *ibid.*, p. 178.
- ⁶⁹ 'White paper', *Dawn*, 20 Oct. 1974, pp. 7, 14-16.
- ⁷⁰ 'Army's service in Baluchistan helpful, people tell Bhutto', *Dawn*, 29 July 1974, p. 1.

⁷¹ ‘Sardari system abolished’, *Dawn*, 9 April 1976, p. 1. How Bhutto pursued the abolition of sardari or whether he actually succeeded in doing so remains unclear due to a lack of archival sources. Nevertheless, the continued importance of sardars like Marri, Mengal, and Bizenjo through the 1980s and into the twenty-first century indicates that social structures likely did not change as drastically as Bhutto intended. See Imtiaz Ali, ‘The Balochistan problem’, *Pakistan Horizon*, 58 (April 2005), pp. 41-62.

⁷² V. K. Anand, *Nagaland in transition* (New Delhi, 1967).

⁷³ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Social and economic change in the tribal areas 1972-1976* (Karachi, 1977), p. 3.

⁷⁴ The integration of French colonial India in the late 1950s also arguably fit into this trend, and, as with Nagaland, Nehru allowed the local governments in the former French colonies to retain certain political powers that had devolved to the union government in the British Indian States. See Akhila Yechury, ‘Imagining India, decolonising l'Inde Francaise, c. 1947-1954’, *Historical Journal* (forthcoming).

⁷⁵ Talks with Naga leaders, 15 Sept. 1956, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, eds. H. Y. Sharada Prasad et. al, second series, vol. 35 (New Delhi, 2005), p. 149.

⁷⁶ See Subas Chandra Hazary, ‘Politics of regionalism: implications for political development in India’, *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 52 (April-June 1991), pp. 208-24.

⁷⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru to Bisnuram Medhi, 9 March 1955, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 28, p. 480.

⁷⁸ See, for example, S. S. Pradhan, Consul, Indian Consulate, Jalalabad, ‘Political report for the month of March 1975’, 5 April 1975, EA HI/1012/2/75, NAI.

⁷⁹ B. K. Nehru to Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs, 12 April 1970, File 21, Subject files, B. K. Nehru papers, NMML.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Harrison, *In Afghanistan's shadow*, p. 55.

⁸¹ See Adeel Khan, 'Renewed ethnonationalist insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: the militarized state and continuing economic deprivation', *Asian Survey*, 49 (November/December 2009), pp. 1071-91.