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Constructions of Identity, Belonging and Exclusion in the Democratic Welfare State

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Forthcoming in National Identities

Abstract
This article investigates the conflict between a shared national identity and immigration, posed by liberal, instrumental nationalists. They worry that immigration will undermine a shared national identity that is needed to generate trust and solidarity within the democratic welfare state. The article consists of a qualitative study of Swedish and British respondents. The main conclusion is that people experience and interpret their shared identity, ideas of belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state differently, with different consequences for the proposed conflict. When identity and belonging was tied to contributions or to institutions, rather than a nation, the conflict between a shared identity and immigration was cushioned.

Keywords
National identity; nationalism; immigration; welfare state; patriotism

Introduction
Defenders of so called instrumental nationalism, a core part of liberal nationalism, hold that immigration might undermine the shared identity that acts as a basis for cooperation in the democratic welfare state. It acts in this way by creating bonds of trust and solidarity between co-nationals. On this view, neither nationalism nor restrictions on immigration are intrinsically favoured, but are claimed to be desirable in order to achieve democratic deliberation and distributive justice. A national identity, the argument goes, can provide the solidarity ties that large scale redistribution require, but that an impersonal bureaucracy is unable to sustain on its own. The worry expressed by contemporary liberal nationalists is that immigration, as it has increased substantially during the last two decades, is threatening the
stability of a national identity able to undergird the democratic welfare state. In this way, immigration has become seen as a threat to the democratic welfare state.

Surprisingly, there is very little evidence that these assumptions about the effects of national identity hold up empirical scrutiny (Uberoi, 2015, p. 520). Many studies have looked at the effect of diversity on trust, solidarity and similar measures, yet only few studies have investigated the mediating effect of national identity, and with no consistent results (e.g. Shayo, 2009; Wright & Reeskens, 2013; Johnston et al. 2010; see also Stolle and Harell, 2015). These studies have relied on pre-determined conceptualisations of national identity based on the criteria people perceive as important for someone to belong to a certain nation, classifying national identity as either ethnic, cultural or civic. A recent experimental study has shown that increasing the salience of a shared national identity may reduce ethnic bias and increase solidarity across ethnic boundaries (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015). However, this study cannot vindicate the instrumental nationalist thesis unless it also differentiates the effect of different kinds of national, or shared identity, which is did not do. For not all forms of interpretations of shared identities are necessarily nationalist or liberal nationalist. And, importantly, depending on how a shared identity is interpreted, it may link to very different views on immigration. Some shared identities may be constructed in ways that reduce the proposed conflict between trust, solidarity and identity. As Will Kymlicka and Will Banting (2015, p. 9) point out, different stories about peoplehood and forms of national identity, which can be sources of solidarity, may be ‘more or less open to diversity’ and ‘the tension between diversity and solidarity is mediated by the nature of national identities’.

What are those forms of national identities that mediate the tension in different ways? What are the alternatives to ethnic or cultural identities that tend not to be very open to diversity?

By investigating people’s subjective understandings of national identity, belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state, this study develops such a framework. In the normative debate, these understandings are all too often assumed rather than scrutinised (e.g. Collier, 2014; Miller, 1995). In the empirical literature, they are reduced to a few criteria of ‘what it takes’ to be of a certain nationality (e.g. Wright & Reeskens, 2013). By using qualitative inquiry to address this gap, the present study contributes with important pathways for future research by suggesting alternative forms of shared identity that may reduce the tension between immigration and solidarity, if such identity is based on contributions or shared institutions.
The article is structured as follows. It begins by outlining the instrumental nationalist case for limiting immigration and argues that it relies too heavily on particular, yet unsubstantiated, empirical assumptions about the relation between national identity and attitudes to immigration. In the second section I describe the present study and the methodology. In the third section, the findings of the qualitative interviews, the three themes of identity, belonging and exclusion, are discussed. The article concludes with a short discussion about possible implications for research of how different political and institutional context may construct different narratives on identity and immigration.

**Instrumental Nationalism**

So called instrumental nationalism maintains that in order for the democratic welfare state to function it needs the sense of solidarity, loyalty and mutual commitment that can come about through sharing a common national identity (Miller, 1995; Miller & Ali 2013, pp. 1-2; Barry, 1999; Goodhart, 2013; Collier, 2013; see also Freeman, 1986). Most scholars, in particular Margaret Moore (2001), express a weak version of instrumental nationalism. The weak version holds that a shared national identity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the democratic welfare state, but that it is very likely to create good conditions. The strong version holds that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the democratic welfare state. In either case, instrumental nationalism often does not make up the entire defense of nationalism by nationalist scholars, but it is a key part of liberal nationalism. National identity, on this account, has instrumental value in realising the normative goals of many liberals, such as redistributive justice and democratic deliberation. To the extent that immigration is seen as a threat to a cohesive and stable national identity able to perform its instrumental role, it can, on the instrumental nationalist view, be restricted. Immigration is thus conditioned on its ability to conform to a national identity: ‘On this view, egalitarian liberals cannot have their cake and eat it too; instead, they must choose which commitment – increased immigration or redistributive programs – takes precedence and accept that they will have to abandon the other’ (Pevnick, 2009, p. 148). I will argue below that this may indeed be a false choice, which depends on whether the shared identity constructs immigration as a threat.

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1 I am indebted to David Owen for the distinction between weak and strong instrumental nationalism.
On the instrumental nationalist account, a shared national identity increases the trust and understanding that is necessary for deliberative democracy. ‘Democratic politics’, argues Kymlicka (2001, p. 213), ‘is politics in the vernacular’. In addition to facilitating deliberative democracy national identity is thought to support the advancement of social redistribution by instilling mutual trust and solidarity. Thus Miller (1995, p. 97) argues that: ‘A shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will reciprocate one’s co-operative behaviour’. The kind of social solidarity that is necessary for large-scale redistribution to take place can develop within a nation state, it is argued, because people who otherwise would have very little in common feel connected and will therefore be more willing to make the kind of sacrifices social solidarity involves (Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 609). Often the national identity is a cultural one; it is the culture that acts as a social glue in the democratic welfare state. Most instrumental nationalists hold nations and national identities to be cultural in nature. Even if this is sometimes argued to be mainly a public culture, the notion is “thicker” than a purely political public identity (Miller, 1995, p. 189; Uberoi, 2015, p. 517; Moore, 2015, p. 79). Often it encompasses private culture as well (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76).

In sum, for instrumental nationalism the nation does not have independent value, only instrumental value in realising democracy and redistributive justice. This conditional commitment to nationalism is an important presumption when discussing the issue of immigration. Instrumental nationalism is not committed to wider notions of obligations between co-nationals that are not grounded in the instrumental role of a specifically nationalist shared identity in securing cooperation through trust and solidarity in the democratic, redistributive state. Alternative identities that can serve the same function would thus have the same value.

**Immigration as a Threat**

Why might there be a conflict between instrumental nationalism and immigration? Miller argues that a nation-state can legitimately decide to restrict immigration in order to protect its national identity, as citizens have an interest in preserving it for the reasons laid out above

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2 Although, of course, many advocates of instrumental nationalism are also committed to these wider notions of the value of national identity.
(Miller 2007, pp. 217 and 223). The worry is that an influx of immigrants would change the culture of the receiving society with such speed that national identity ends up fragmented and thus no longer can provide the shared identity deliberative democracy and the welfare state require. These claims are problematic. They rely on the subjective experience of immigration as a threat, without recognising that such experiences, or attitudes, are to a large extent affected by different constructions of national identity itself. In the vast literature on public attitudes to immigration, symbolic threats and perceived threats to national identity stand out as a clear explanatory factor to negative attitudes to immigration (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). At the same time, not all kinds of national identities correlate with similar attitudes to immigration. Because national identity is a subjective and inter-subjective socially constructed concept, ‘imagined’ and experienced in people’s minds, perceived threats are indeed ‘real’. Yet since different kinds of identities correlate with different attitudes to immigration, it is not necessarily immigration that needs to be restricted in order for the threat to diminish. National identity may also be re-constructed.

Let me explain. National identity constructs beliefs about what ‘ties that bind’ members of a political community. In modern states, this translates into beliefs about who belongs to the democratic redistribute community. On the basis of these beliefs immigration will be seen as more or less problematic for the stability of the shared identity. In this way, national identity establishes the parameters by which immigration is judged. If the ‘ties that bind’ are perceived to be based on shared values, for example, it is likely that the shared identity will be perceived as less threatened by the entry of newcomers than if it is based on ancestry. This is why those individuals who understand their national identity as foremost civic are more positive to admitting immigrants than those with an ethnic identity: whether one has an ethnic or civic national identity is, for example, a good indicator of one’s attitudes to immigration (Heath & Tilley, 2005; Janmaat, 2006; Pehrsson & Green, 2010).

It is important to stress that national identity is a constructed and ‘imagined’ identity. Thus Miller (1995, p. 128) asks ‘[why] should immigrants pose a threat to national identity once it is recognized that that identity is always in flux, and is moulded by the various sub-cultures that exist within the national society?’ (1995, p. 128). The implication is that national identity can be re-constructed to adapt to immigration, since the content and the historical elements of national identity are to an extent imagined (Miller, 1995, p. 35; see also Spinner-Halev, 2008, p. 609 and 620; Yack, 2001, p. 526; Renan, 1882). For example, Miller (1995, p. 92) claims
that it would be self-defeating for a nation to have just one characteristic as its defining feature, as this is likely to exclude those who are in minority with regards to that specific feature, such as religious minorities. Hence in the case of religious pluralism, it would be better for the nation to ‘de-emphasize’ this particular part of national identity and instead find other mutual characteristics around which to base a shared identity. The further implication is that immigration may have different consequences for the possibility of a stable shared identity depending on how the understanding of national identity relates to the real and perceived characteristics of immigrants.

Miller consequently argues that immigration can be restricted if it undermines the possibility of a shared national identity. It is current members’ subjective perceptions of the impact on the shared identity that matters in this instance (thus their attitudes); when a community feels threatened and group conflict occurs, further immigration should be halted. The rate of immigration should be limited ‘according to the absorptive capacities of the society in question’ (Miller, 1995, p. 129). However, according to the argument that I have put forward here these ‘absorptive capacities’ depend to some extent on the kind of national identity that is prevalent in a society. Certain kinds of shared identities may have greater ‘absorptive capacities’; they will be less likely to elicit sentiments viewing immigration as a threat. Social identity research on in- and out-group behaviour also demonstrates that such group boundaries are malleable, indeed possible to manipulate into arbitrary categories, and that depending on how they are constructed, they can have significant on intergroup and intragroup relations (Tajfel et al. 1971). Thus it is too quick a conclusion to take the subjective preferences, the attitudes, of current members as a benchmark for further immigration. One needs to first understand why these preferences occur and an important clue is likely to be found in the shared identity of current members.

National identity on the instrumental account is defined not just by its characteristics, such as a shared culture, but by its function, its construction of symbolic ‘ties that bind’. The question is, how do people actually experience and interpret this identity? Is it as a cultural nation, bound together by ties of solidarity between people, or do some people experience it differently? And when people think of their redistributive democratic community, how do they interpret identity and immigration? The present study employs a qualitative approach to investigate these questions in order to open doors for thinking empirically about the relation between identity, belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state. This relation relies
on complex subjective interpretations of identity, the basis of one’s redistributive democratic community and immigration, which go far beyond the conceptualisations of national identity employed in quantitative studies. The aim is not to vindicate the case against instrumental nationalism, but rather to try to make sense of the empirical claims underpinning it using subjective interpretations by ordinary people.

Constructing National Identity in Sweden and Britain

The present study focuses on the alleged conflict between a shared, trust and solidarity generating national identity and immigration, by asking how people actually think about the basis of their redistributive democratic community in relation to identity and immigration. To this end, the study conducted interviews in two countries; Sweden and Britain. These are cases of liberal-multiculturalist citizenship and integration regimes, with universal and selective welfare states, as well as consensus and majoritarian democracies, respectively (Wright, 2011, p. 610; Esping-Anderson, 1990). These are generally classified as liberal-multiculturalist citizenship and integration regimes, with universal and selective welfare states, consensus and majoritarian democracies, respectively (Wright, 2011, p. 610; Esping-Anderson, 1990). The countries were selected mainly due to the differences in welfare state design. In surveying the literature and comparing classifications using seven different typologies, Wil Arts and John Gelissen find that in all but one, the UK falls under the liberal regime type while Sweden always falls under the social-democratic one (Arts and Gelissen 2002, pp. 149-150).3 Whilst the National Health System in the UK makes it a slightly less clear-cut case of a selective or liberal welfare state, it is nonetheless much closer that that regime type than it is to a universal welfare state. Therefore, in terms of providing clearly different institutional contexts in regards to the welfare state, Sweden and the UK are good cases.

Institutional design has generally been shown to impact levels of trust and solidarity (Rothstein and Stolle 2008), with some studies showing that welfare regime types in particular influence out-group solidarity (Crepaz 2008). A study that looked at how policy regimes, including welfare regimes, construct national identity found that such regimes seem

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3 However, in comparing tests of the empirical robustness of Esping-Anderson’s typology, the UK emerges as a less clear-cut liberal regime type, though Sweden is still stably social-democratic (Arts and Gelissen 2002, p. 152). In none of the tests, however, does the UK emerge as social-democratic, thus the rationale for comparing two distinctly different welfare regimes by choosing Britain and Sweden still remains even if this specific critique against the classification holds.
to not only impact how national identity is understood, but also that the strength of this impact changed over a relatively short period of time (less than a decade) (Wright 2011, p. 615). It is not clear what determines the relative impact policy regimes have on the construction of national identity, but it suggests that in order to understand variation in national identity one needs to include a variety of policy regimes, and thus interviewing in only one country would have restricted the research. Because integration regimes, which are much more extensively explored in the literature, are more similar in the two countries, this study is also able to contextualise the analysis with the specific focus of the welfare state. Thus the study strategically uses the two countries to sample in order to record a broad variety of interpretations of identity and belonging in the welfare state, but it also lays the ground for exploring how institutional design may affect national identification and thus also the possibilities for re-constructing shared identities.

In total, 47 respondents from the two countries were interviewed (26 British and 21 Swedish), using a strategic sampling method. The aim was to get a good spread of respondents on two key variables: level of education and skill level in current occupation, as these variables may have a significant impact on attitudes to immigration (see e.g. Kessler & Freeman, 2005; Wilkes, et al. 2008; McLaren & Johnson, 2007). Level of education was dichotomised into degree/no degree and skill level in current occupation was categories using the International Labour Organization’s ISCO-88 (ILO, International Standard Classification of Occupations) classification (Elias, 1997). Whilst the sample was slightly biased towards those with a high skill level in their current occupation, there was a good balance of the variable level of education. In addition, respondents were sampled from several different regions in both countries and there was a fairly even spread of age, though more men than woman were interviewed.

For the UK, only respondents living in England were sampled, in order to avoid an array of problems related to minority nationalism and debates of Scottish independence.

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4 The respondents were recruited using a variety of methods in order to reach a broad spectrum of respondents. Some were recruited through their employer or, for the job-seeking respondents, via job centers. Others were recruited via mutual acquaintances of the researcher, albeit these were not close. No one who knew the researcher prior to the interview was interviewed and only in the odd case did they even know of the researcher. The different methods employed to recruit respondents ensured that the sample was varied and unbiased. The main aim was to avoid selection bias, in other words that the respondents would only represent an interested minority of the population. The risk of this was especially high as no compensation was offered and participation therefore came down to interest and goodwill. To minimise the number participating solely because of interest, it was preferable to recruit through some kind of mutual acquaintance as these respondents participated mainly as a favour (though not a favour to the researcher, who they did not know) rather than out of interest. Three respondents, namely the job-seeking ones, were offered a small compensation, as this subgroup proved especially hard to recruit through either of the mentioned methods. See Appendix for respondent characteristics.

5 List of interview locations: Rotherham, Sheffield, Nottingham, Middlesbrough, Stevenage, Wolverhampton, Dronfield, Göteborg, Södertälje, Malmö, Halmstad and Gnosjö.
(for discussions of English versus British identity, see e.g. Aughey, 2010; Kumar, 2010). Nonetheless, the focus was still on British national identity, to make it clear that the “out-group” was international migrants rather than the Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish.\footnote{A further worry was the influence of ‘political correctness’ in potentially biasing the interviews. The interviewer was aware of this throughout the interviews, but found that while some respondents may have ‘toned down’ their responses, they did nevertheless appear to speak freely. Evidence of this is the high frequency of anti-immigration, and at times racist, comments made by respondents in the interviews. In some instances, respondents reflected on this themselves, by disclaiming that they did not want to come across as discriminatory, but then went on to nonetheless state their view.}

Interviews were semi-structured and covered the following topics: Identity and National Identity, Democracy, Welfare, and Immigration. The interviews were transcribed and manually coded. The coding focused on themes around democratic deliberation and redistribution and how these may be facilitated by a shared identity. While a nationalist theme was easily identified focusing on trust, mutual understanding and solidarity between co-nationals, two new themes emerged very much as a response to such nationalist understanding of belonging. At an early stage, observations were made that some respondents talked about identity, democracy, redistribution and immigration in ways that could not be seen as stemming from understanding belonging to the political community as based on a particular nation. These respondents did not engage with ideas of particular ties between co-nationals and sometimes rejected this outright in favour of other ties, such as contributions or common institutions. In addition, respondents were coded according to what factors they understood their national identity to be based on, such as kinship or values and principles, and whether or not they identified strongly or weakly with their nation. Lastly, respondents’ views on immigration were coupled with their understanding of what it means to have a certain shared identity and “the ties that bind” in the democratic welfare state. In the end, three forms of comprehensive understandings on identity, belonging and exclusion emerged from the analysis: nationalism, institutionalism and contribution. These themes of shared identities will be discussed in detail below. Two of these emerged as alternatives to nationalism, for which ‘the ties that bind’ – which undergird cooperation in the democratic welfare state – present less of a potential conflict with immigration.\footnote{These three themes were not the only ways of thinking about these questions that emerged from the interviews, yet after coding the data and clustering codes into themes, they were by far the clearest themes to be found. There were observations of more cosmopolitan thoughts, for example, yet these observations were too few and too inconsistent to form a comprehensive theme of how to think about identity, belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state.}
Identity, Belonging and Exclusion in the Democratic Welfare State

The three types of shared identity discussed below all represent distinct answers to questions of what it means to be British or Swedish, what ‘ties that bind’ in the democratic welfare state and how this relates to welcoming newcomers. The discussion below present respondents’ subjective interpretations of these questions and their answers and as such provide a valuable insight to how shared identities, belonging and exclusion are negotiated and understood amongst ordinary people. It is important to note that for the respondents, the categories were not always mutually exclusive. One respondent may express versions of two or even all of the three types of identity. Therefore, the discussion will feature quotes from respondents who may belong to more than one theme. When describing the research results below, respondents have been anonymised apart from their nationality, which is indicated by an ‘S’ for Swedish and a ‘B’ for British.  

Nationalism

Many of the respondents expressed a cultural nationalist identity akin to the one favoured by instrumental nationalists. On this view, the shared identity of the political community is based on the idea of a nation, understood in terms of a shared culture, kinship, shared values and a sense of mutual solidarity. It involves a sense of entitlement based on a shared national identity and an idea of effortless belonging to the nation (Margalit & Raz, 1990). The latter point entails that natives simply share a national identity without having to prove worthy, whereas immigrants have to achieve belonging. Many of the respondents in this category...
regard belonging in ascribed criteria such as being born in the country (in contrast to acquired criteria, such as citizenship). For example, this respondent insists that nationality cannot be acquired:

Respondent S19

I think that you’re really Swedish if you’re born in Sweden and you have a Swedish background. I don’t really think that it’s enough to speak Swedish to be Swedish. You should be, parents and grandparents, then I think you’re really Swedish. You don’t really have to have the mind-set, but if you’re grown up, the foundation, the background, I do think, then you can’t be anything other than Swedish whether you like it or not.

These respondents further emphasise that belonging ought to be qualified for immigrants:

Respondent B24

No rubbish, you come here, and read my documents about coming to my country. And wherever you come from, if you commit a crime mate, you’re out. If you’re unsociable in my pub, you’re out aren’t you.

Respondent B3

I think it’s better for someone who’s been given residency for their progress to be monitored. And if they’re obviously going to be out of place, then they should return to their country.

Often, the idea that immigrants’ right to belong is conditioned on their integration has a cultural element to it;

Respondent S2

Of course they should have the right to be Muslim and have the Islamic faith, but perhaps they have to accept that we have our Christian background, by tradition 400, 500 years. They have to understand that we won’t become a Muslim country.

These understandings are also based on a sense of shared solidarity between co-nationals, which is reflected both in how the democratic redistributive community is perceived, and the content of national identity. Only respondents in the nationalist category view their identity as being based on ties similar to those in a family and this particular kind of identification relationship was connected to the most negative attitudes to immigration amongst the respondents, at least in terms of admission; those identifying along nationalist lines mostly
wanted reductions in the number of immigrants entering the country. Thus from these respondents’ interpretations of identity, belonging and exclusion, the shared identity is based on close yet effortless ties and on certain cultural characteristics that make up a bond between co-nationals that may be threatened by immigration.

For example, this respondent in the nationalist theme thinks that being British entails sharing certain values, but he or she also thinks that democratic institutions need a common outlook (in an extensive sense including their personal life) in order to work.

Respondent B9 Very difficult [for democracy to work] with such a diverse cultural society. It’s very easy for those New Zealanders with five million population to say ‘right let’s go this way’ and everybody is doing the same thing. With a diverse society everybody’s got their own morals, religion you know their own sort of ideas of how they want to live their life and their society should be. It’s basically, how do you merge those and integrate society? I think it’s probably impossible.

In a different passage of the interview, the same respondent believed that immigration had diluted British culture and at yet another time he/she thought that people cared less about the country due to immigration. Hence in this case, there is a clear pattern of the nationalist category replying to questions of what it means to be British, what “ties that bind” that are necessary to uphold the democratic welfare state and how this may be threatened by immigration. Nationalists, in this respect, are thus worried that immigrants will undermine their particular way of life, culturally as well as politically;

Respondent B3 Well there are people who come here and it seems that some who want to change the whole way of living, the way we govern, the way we do things. They come with ideas, so they haven’t come to integrate, they’ve come to pursue their own strange principles.

The nationalist identity is also based on entitlement and solidarity-bonds between co-nationals, to which immigrants do not immediately qualify and might in fact threaten. It relates to the idea of family-like ties between people sharing a national identity, as for example expressed by these respondents:

Respondent S3 I heard about this incident, we’ve got a neighbour whose son has ADHD and they’d been to a meeting, she, the mum, has told me
herself, they went to a meeting with the school and now they’re getting family migration children from Somalia who apparently are in Kenya at the moment. They are going to come here now, about 70 to 100 of them who’re coming this autumn or spring. And this boy has some special teaching, they get that those kinds of children. Then they’d said that if these children come this autumn he won’t get his teaching, because they can’t afford it. And then you might start thinking that if they’re going to cut down on what’s ours, though I have to say, I’m sure I’m not properly informed about it all.

Respondent B16
There aren’t any jobs going around. I’m not against other cultures or anything, but Britain lets in a lot of immigrants and stuff like that. They swamped in here and took work, and all sorts. I guess a lot of Britain at heart feels it’s left itself down. I do feel like it’s let itself down. I wouldn’t say I’m 100% proud to be British, but like most Britain, no matter how down they are they always try to help others.

The latter respondent, B16, thus expresses the idea that being British is about showing solidarity, yet this does not include, and is in fact undermined, by immigrants. This is in line with the notion that there is a conflict between a solidarity generating national identity and immigration. These observations are somewhat in accordance with some recent studies on the function of national identity. Wright and Reeskens (2013) find that only ethnic forms of nationalism increase the willingness to redistribute, and it is also this kind of identification that is associated with the most negative attitudes to immigration. They conclude that ‘[while] it is true that NI can undergird support for redistribution, the only kind that does so is exclusive to immigrants by definition […]’ (Wright & Reeskens, 2013, p. 1458). However, the two alternative kinds of shared identity that emerged from the interviews present a case for a shared identity to which immigration is seen as less of a threat. When respondents expressed these alternative identities, they seemed to draw on different ‘ties that bind’ to explain trust and solidarity in the democratic welfare state.

Contribution
The first of these, found predominantly amongst the British respondents, is ‘contribution’. Those who share the contribution view understand their shared identity to be based less on family-like ties and more on an evaluative reciprocity; belonging to the community depends
on whether one is contributing to it or not. Contributions can be economic, social, cultural or political, thus if one is unable to contribute economically there are still pathways for belonging. Economic contributions are, however, stressed more than other forms of contribution by the respondents. The contribution theme is also connected to ideas of shared values and shared culture, though these notions are less important than for the nationalist theme and, regarding shared values, than for the institutionalist theme. Importantly, contribution itself is held as the sole criteria for belonging by many respondents in this theme and it is sometimes seen as more important than citizenship itself:

Respondent B15  Citizenship and that kind of identity doesn’t really mean much to me, as long as you’re acting, contributing to society then it doesn’t matter to me whether you’re a citizen or otherwise.

As an example of how contribution as the basis of belonging may construct fewer barriers to immigration, this respondent emphasises the importance of people contributing for democratic and welfare institutions to function and also has a distinct understanding of identity and belonging:

Respondent B15  Just because I’m white and because I was born in a mining family, who cares about that? If you’ve lived here a certain amount of time and you’ve contributed to society, speak English may help you contribute to society more, but why should we assume that everyone should speak in English?

While introducing a timeframe, the respondent nevertheless rejects the nationalist understanding of identity as based on nativism, culture or even language. This is a unique and comprehensive view on who belongs, and what it means to be British or Swedish;

Respondent B5  I think for British people I don’t mind which country they come from, but they need to contribute to the economy and the culture and be helpful to others in the country, which is often the way British people are anyway.

The key difference between the contribution and the nationalist identity is that, in theory, for the former, no differentiation is being made between natives and immigrants. No one belongs effortlessly, everyone needs to contribute, as this respondent expresses when discussing immigrants’ right to vote;
Respondent B14: I genuinely think that after a certain number of years, even if you don’t have residency status, if you’ve contributed, if you’re working and you’re part of society, why not? Why not vote? I don’t understand. In fact, if we had a limited number of votes, I would rather take a vote from somebody who has no intention of using it, who doesn’t contribute to society the slightest, and give it to somebody who does contribute to society. It doesn’t matter where someone is from, if they’re adding value to their local community, whether they’re volunteering or they’re working or whatever they’re doing, if it’s adding value to their community and they’re influencing the community, then why can’t they vote? It’s seems ridiculous to me.

We recognise the contribution theme from the emphasis in UK debates on immigration on the issue of benefits to EU-migrants and the notion that immigrants should be contributing before receiving in-work and child benefits (Kirkup, 2016). An abandoned citizenship policy by the former Labour government also championed this idea of contribution as a belonging, or of ‘earned citizenship’ (Home Office 2008). The policy was based in large part on qualitative research showing that the idea of contribution was indeed very strong amongst the British public. It suggested that the British public has ‘[support] for a system which requires newcomers to demonstrate commitment to the community before they can become British citizens, balanced with a strong sense that it would be unfair to ask them to do more than we do ourselves” (Home Office 2008, p. 12).

Now, as far as attitudes to immigration are concerned, the contribution-based version of the shared identity undergirding the redistributive community still carries some potential for conflict. It relies on public information of others’ contributions and such information is notoriously incomplete or even false. This is perhaps most clearly seen in precisely the immigration case, where immigrants are constantly viewed as an economic burden despite economic research (in the UK case) showing that they are in fact (as a group) net contributors (Dustmann & Frattini, 2013). Even when simply estimating the number of immigrants in the country, people mostly get it quite wrong, and UK citizens seem to get it wrong more than others (Duffy & Frere-Smith, 2014, p. 23).

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can be identified in this study as a British alternative to a nationalist identity, this is particularly problematic. In other words, those whose sense of belonging is most based on estimating the contributions of others seem to also get such estimations wrong more than others. To avoid this problem, the third shared identity found amongst the respondents through the inductive analysis, institutionalism, may be more compatible with inclusive attitudes to immigration. This form of shared identity moves issues of trust and solidarity away from discussions of various groups’ or individuals’ right to belong, their cultural characteristics or their economic capacities. Instead, on this view, institutions can be scrutinised without comparing the contributions or cultural characteristics of any of the members of the reciprocal scheme and in this way cooperation is ensured.

**Institutionalism**

Contrary to nationalism and contribution, those expressing institutionalism as the basis of belonging are not primarily concerned with the characteristics or behaviour of fellow citizens. Instead, they understand the shared identity of the political community to be mediated by its social and political institutional framework. ‘The ties that bind’ are the institutional framework of the community. Within this theme we can observe a greater stress on shared values than in the other two themes. Moreover, a large proportion of the institutionalists hold citizenship as the criteria for belonging to the political community. Understanding ones community as being based on a set of institutions is thus linked to seeing one’s identity as shared by those who respect the basic values embedded in those institutions and by those who are formally included via citizenship. This theme is therefore distinctly a form of identity that is situated in the institutions of the political community and the values they sustain and it is linked to the most positive attitudes towards immigration amongst the respondents. It is also most commonly found amongst the Swedish respondent.

These respondents stress the importance of being committed to democratic and redistributive institutions, as well as the values they embed, but also the formative power these institutions have. This is reflective of views on immigration too, as it is not the cultural or economic characteristics of immigrants as such that matter, but they institutional framework they come from and to.

*Respondent S10 It depends on what values you have deep down and what kind of background you have. If you’re used to living under a dictatorship, it*
might be a completely different thing. How do you deal with a democracy then? To us it’s so natural.

Another example from the institutionalism theme is respondent S18, who is adamant that democratic institutions shape the behaviour of people, so that it is the institutions themselves that establish the conditions for democratic cooperation.

Respondent S18  It’s obvious that you can’t expect as much of people from Somalia or perhaps those who come directly from Afghanistan, that they should get our democratic society. It won’t work. Perhaps they’re moving 200 miles, but they’re also moving 200 years in development in some respects. They do one journey and end up in the society that has taken us 200 years to get to. To think that they are going to get and understand how it works at once, it won’t work. And I think that we’ve been bad at explaining how our society works. And to be very clear that there are a lot of rights here, but there are also a hell of a lot of duties that you need to accept.

When asked about what it takes to be Swedish, the same respondent replies:

Respondent S18  To me it is all those who want to be in this society and who agree with the rules and the possibilities that we have built here.

The respondent emphasises that this is true both of natives and of immigrants, hence there is a distinct understanding of identity and belonging as foundation for cooperation within the political community, which does not construct immigration as a threat to the same extent as nationalism.

Yet even though the emphasis on institutions for these reasons would reduce the potential threat of immigration to a shared identity undergirding the democratic welfare state, conflict may still occur, as is clear from some of the quotes above. This is because democratic and redistributive institutions foster a certain set of values and behaviours; a political culture. The institutionalist identification relationship can in this way be seen as a form of constitutional patriotism, as put forward by Jürgen Habermas (1994). Habermas holds that the political culture is the ‘common denominator for a constitutional patriotism’ and that ‘the democratic right of self-determination includes, of course, the right to preserve one’s own political culture, which includes the concrete context of citizen’s rights, though it does not include the
self-assertion of a privileged cultural life form’ (Habermas, 2003, pp. 162 and 173). Contained in this notion is thus an arbitrator of belonging based on the preservation of a political culture, an issue that I return to below.

Though the institutionalist category resembles constitutional patriotism in this way, it is perhaps better understood as institutional patriotism. This shifts the focus from attachment to a constitution to attachment to particular democratic and social institutions. Hence, rather than locating universal values in a specific constitution, and yielding loyalty to it that way, these values may be better supported when they are part of an institutional framework, akin to John Rawls’s ‘basic structure’ (Rawls, 1993). According to Rawls (1993, pp. 141 and 160), just institutions are self-sustaining as they generate their own support (see also Hibbert, 2008, p. 169). This comes about in two ways; citizens growing up under just institutions ‘acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions sufficient to render them stable’ and the institutions are regarded as legitimate as they are based on an ‘overlapping consensus’, which is a political conception of justice based on reasonable comprehensive doctrines of the good (Rawls, 1993, p. 142). This is very similar to the experience of institutions as bearers and transmitters of universal values, as expressed by the respondents in the institutionalism theme.

Respondents such as respondents S1 and S18 above emphasise how institutions shape the behaviour and commitment of citizens. Many respondents held that, in theory, immigrants would have no problem becoming Swedish/British, but if they had lived and grown up under illiberal institutions it might be difficult for them to embrace the liberal values that underpin the Swedish/British identity. It is in this sense we may talk about institutional rather than constitutional patriotism, as there was a strong recognition of how universal values are embedded in the democratic institutional framework. But respondents also stress that institutions need to be fair in order to generate support, thus lending support to Rawls’s claim that it is just institutions in particular that are able to generate their own support.

There are consequently two features about what I have described as institutional patriotism that create a sense of belonging to the democratic welfare state. First, identification with institutions comes about through a certain familiarisation with the institutions and, second, in order for such familiarisation to generate support for the institutions they need to be fair and also effective. The latter entails that respondents would like to see that they stand to benefit from democratic and welfare institutions. These features together create a certain sense of
identity and the ‘ties that bind’ that, at least with regards to the experiences of the respondents in this study, construct immigration as less of a threat than a nationalist identity.

The idea of self-sustaining institutions is expressed for example by these respondents:

Respondent B3 The vast majority of people just want to live a reasonable life and will follow the democratic rules, if they are fair.

Respondent B12 [People have to show loyalty] … but it relies on society showing loyalty to the citizens, on the existence of some justice in a system at least.

The importance of institutional fairness for generating support for the welfare state and reduce the threat perceived to be post by immigration is stressed in a study by Staffan Kumlin and Bo Rothstein (2010, p. 68):

Specifically, equal and impartial treatment is key in such an approach. The assumption is that if the state apparently treats one with equal concern and respect, it says something about the preferences and moral standing of the majority that has created, that support, and that is affected by those institutions. Institutional fairness, in other words, can have informational value beyond the immediate situation as institutions structure a myriad of relationships and behaviours - not only one’s own.

In their study, using Swedish survey data, they also show that institutional fairness does have cushioning effect on the perceived threat of immigration.

Likewise, this study suggest is that an institutional foundation of the identity bases for the democratic welfare state is more compatible with immigration, at least in terms of the views of current citizens. This is because such identity removes a sense of belonging from the nationalist idea of a people, a culture or certain family-like solidarity ties, and instead grounds trust in the institutions of the political community and the shared values embedded in them.

However, an identity on shared values is that it will yet again become exclusive and reintroduce the conflict between a trust generating shared identity and immigration. This study has indeed pointed out how an institutional identity can come to construct immigration as a threat, as it relies to some extent on a shared political culture generated by common
institutions and their embedded values. This is expressed, for example, by this respondent in the institutional category:

Respondent S1: I do think that us humans, we’re born as an empty shell and our way of growing up marks us 100 per cent. [...] So because we grow up and live under different conditions, it does affect us very, very much. For example if Sweden, it the Swedish people would become a very small minority and we’d just a load of, well have many immigrants who had very strong opinions and completely different democratic values than we have, then that would obviously impact on society.

It is clear that immigration may still been regarded as a threat under the idea of institutional patriotism. Any identity does by definition construct boundaries between members and non-members. The way in which values are incorporated in the shared identity did however matter for how the respondents in this study viewed immigration.

In the interviews, a commitment to universal values and procedures was sometimes expressed through an acknowledgment of shared values as national values; hence, they were not necessarily experienced as universal values, but rather as ‘British’ or ‘Swedish’ values. This is consistent with non-nationalist identification relationships, such as constitutional patriotism, as the universal principles should be interpreted in the ‘ethical-political’ understanding of the political community (Habermas, 1994, p. 137). Moreover, it is not necessarily inconsistent to hold universal values as particular to a certain political community and to make this part of one’s identity. Take for example this respondent who is reflecting on the question of whether s/he ever feels Swedish:

Respondent S10: Yes of course you do. You’re Swedish, it’s something you’re proud of. Of course.

Interviewer: In what way?

Respondent S10: Well you like being Swedish. Probably if you go back to the values, that you stand for the values that Sweden stands for.

Interviewer: Which values do you have in mind?

Respondent S10: Freedom and democracy, all those parts.
This respondent has a Swedish identity and feels an allegiance to Sweden on the basis of the universal values of freedom of democracy, which are clearly not particularly “Swedish”, but that are embodied in the idea of being Swedish, in the Swedish constitution and belonging to the Swedish political community. As Cecile Laborde (2002, p. 602) recognises, making certain values a matter of a common identity and thereby attaching to them sentiments of shame and pride does not strip these values of their universal value. Situating universal values in identity may make it easier to mobilise citizens around these values, but it may also turn them into a means of exclusion. Yet in terms of exclusion there is a crucial distinction between, on the one hand, being Swedish because it embodies universal democratic values and, on the other hand, endorsing the same values because one is Swedish. Compare the respondent above with this respondent from the nationalist theme, who is answering a question on how s/he would describe democracy and what it means to her/him:

Respondent B24: Even now in this country, some religions, still the woman walks ten steps behind the man. I don’t agree with that. If they’ve come to Britain, do what the British do. I respect what goes on where I go and I don’t agree with them trying to come here now, and still live in little ghettos and not integrate.

Even though, from the interview as a whole, it is somewhat unclear as to whether this respondent holds these values to be universal or not, here she/he implies that gender equality is an important value because it is a British value, not because it is universally valid. Other respondents expressed similar views by statements akin to ‘when in Rome, do as in Rome’ This cannot be compatible with institutional patriotism, as the allegiance is primarily to the nation and not to the values as embedded in the nation. In the nationalist theme we find what Sune Laegard (2007) has described as the nationalisation of liberal values. In borrowing a distinction from Oliver Zimmer, Laegard argues that it matters less what kind of symbols (or values) that are used as a ‘boundary mechanism’, but rather whether these are expressed as voluntary or organic. When values are seen as organic, they become part of someone’s identity in an irreversible way, with the implication that some people are seen as fundamentally unable to hold certain values. An example of this are current discourses on Muslims, who are often portrayed as incapable of adopting or holding liberal values.

The distinction made here is less about the irreversibility of liberal values as a boundary mechanism and more about how understandings of the very process of how values are
acquired, organically or voluntarily, bestows them with meaning. Thus in the nationalist theme, it is the nationalisation of liberal values that gives them meaning, whereas in the institutionalist theme it is liberal values that give the nation, or the political community, meaning in so far as they are embedded in a shared identity. This distinction is important, for it highlights how liberal values exclude in different ways. The distinction is able to differentiate, for example, between someone with a concern for gender inequality in certain minority cultures and someone who only uses feminism selectively in order to exclude immigrants.10

In sum, the first part of locating a sense of belonging in institutions requires of them to be perceived as fair and effective. The onus of generating trust and solidarity therefore falls on the democratic welfare state itself, rather than on citizens. The second part consists of the institutions also yielding a commitment to shared, yet universal, values. This theme was found primarily amongst the Swedish respondents. Others have observed the attachment to institutions in Swedish society. For example, a qualitative comparison between Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden found that institutions are the target of discontent with the perceived impact of immigration in Sweden, rather than immigrants themselves: ‘…politicians [in Sweden] take the large reliance of immigrants on welfare as a sign that the Swedish state has not served immigrants well enough, not a sign that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats who should be pushed off their benefits’ (Koning 2013, p. 246). Karin Borevi (forthcoming; see also Borevi 2012) has recently argued that the Swedish idea of national belonging is what she calls ‘state-centred’, as it relies on the capacity of institutions to create social cohesion. This idea of how national identity, and ideas of solidarity and diversity, is constructed in Sweden is also found in this study amongst ordinary citizens, and not just at the elite level, and may be an important explanation for why, comparatively, Swedes are less negative to immigration (European Commission 2015, p. 36). Similarly, Markus Crepaz (2008) has argued that the high levels of commitment to the welfare state in Sweden, and the concomitant high levels of trust, can help explain the relatively low levels of prejudice and welfare chauvinism in

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10 There is another way to distinguish between the invocation of liberal values, suggested by Gina Gustavsson (2013) when discussing the controversies of the Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. This did not emerge from the interviews, but may certainly be an interesting distinction to explore in future empirical work on people’s experiences of identity and values. Gustavsson argues that the editor that commissioned the cartoons subscribed to a distinctly Romantic liberalism, as opposed to Enlightenment and Reformation liberalism. Typically, Romantic liberalism is about authentic self-expression rather than critical reflection, and it therefore values specific ways of how freedom of speech should be used to further a specific conception of the good; the good of authentic self-expression. This may be a good way of distinguishing between the kind of liberal values that would construct inclusive shared identities and a sense of belonging in diverse societies from those promoting a more exclusive idea of identity and belonging based on liberal values directed to a particular conception of the good.
Sweden. The latest International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) for National Identity (2015) also shows that Swedes are more proud of their social system than the British are (72 percent and 61 percent respectively) and of how their democracy works (81 percent and 76 percent respectively). This study has shown that it is not just allegiance to institutions that matter, but also a commitment to the formative function of institutions in shaping those who belong to the political community, and how this commitment attaches to ideas of identity, belonging and exclusion.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The purpose of this study has been to investigate empirically the nature of the potential conflict between a shared (national) identity and immigration as described by instrumental nationalism. It found that in the two cases Sweden and Britain, people understand shared identity, ideas of belonging and exclusion in the democratic welfare state differently, with different consequences for the proposed conflict. When identity and belonging is tied to contributions or to institutions, the conflict between a shared identity and immigration was cushioned.

One of the most notable differences amongst the respondents was the prevalence of the institutionalism theme in Sweden compared to the prevalence of the contribution theme amongst British respondents. While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a systematic comparative analysis of the institutional and political contexts that construct national identity, previous research suggests that this difference may be partly due to the differences in welfare regimes. While regrettably there is little knowledge about how welfare regime types construct shared identities and ideas of belonging, though the present study gives an indication to how this may take place, we do have some knowledge about the relation between welfare regimes and welfare chauvinism. Even though the evidence is far from conclusive (Nagayoshi and

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11 Crepaz (2008, p. 71) also points out that despite lower levels of anti-immigration attitudes, Swedes are concerned that immigrants do not contribute at sustainable levels to the welfare state. A few Swedish respondents did express a view of ‘reciprocity’, where the welfare state relies on everyone doing their fair share and paying taxes. This was often expressed at the general level, rather than in relation to immigration. Survey data also present a mixed picture, since Swedes, compared to the British, have a less negative view on the effect of immigration the economy. In ISSP data from 2013, only 18 percent of Swedes disagree that immigration is good for the economy, compared to 33 percent of the British. 49 percent of Swedes agree, compared to 31 percent of the British. Yet the recent large influx of refugees to Sweden has resulted in intense public debate about the sustainability of the welfare state in the face of large refugee migration, with particular worries expressed about the lower levels of employment amongst refugees, who often have lower levels of education as well. The reason why Crepaz did not find that the cost of refugee migration to Sweden and the issues of immigrants’ employment levels had resulted in negative attitudes to immigration may be attributed not only to the welfare state, but also to the fact that immigration was much less politicised in Sweden a decade ago.

12 Negative attitudes also differ, with 39 percent of the British not being proud in the social system, compared to 28 percent of the Swedish respondents. For pride in how democracy works, 24 per cent of the British are not proud compared to 19 percent of the Swedish (ISSP, 2015).
Hjerm 2015), research to date suggests that welfare chauvinism tends to be at least mediated by welfare regime type and that it is in general lower in universal welfare regimes compared to liberal, means-tested ones (Oorschot 2006; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Crepaz 2008, p. 156-60). Markus Crepaz (2008, p. 237) also argues that by including immigrants in the universal welfare state, Sweden has ‘doused the fires of racism’. However, one of the key findings of this study is indeed that people do indeed understand their shared political identity very much in nationalist, and thus more exclusionary, terms, even in the universal welfare state of Sweden. The contribution and institutionalism category should be seen as possible alternatives to the prevailing nationalist narrative of identity, belonging and exclusion. Multiple understandings of identity, belonging and exclusion are at play simultaneously, and future research ought to investigate under what political, social and institutional conditions one becomes dominant rather than another. This study suggest that welfare institution may be one such condition. Moreover, the study suggests that stressing institutional, rather than cultural, factors as explanations for difference amongst immigrants and natives may encourage less exclusionary attitudes. This is partly a role of political rhetoric, but it may also only be possible if citizens generally trust and are proud of their social and political institutions; sentiments that are certainly desirable to achieve in their own right anyway. However, ‘institutional patriotism’ also includes an acknowledgment of the formative power of institutions. This suggests that civic integration measures and similar attempts to introduce immigrants to the institutions of the new society may be good ways of instilling an institutional shared identity. Moreover, emphasising contributions by immigrants may also be a way of lessening the conflict between immigration and the welfare state.

Importantly, this study shows that research on the effects of immigrant-driven diversity on trust and solidarity must investigate what narratives of identity, belonging and exclusion that give rise to such effects in the first place. That is, race, ethnicity and nationality may all be factors that impact trust and solidarity, yet these are categories of identity, belonging and exclusion that are constantly changing. Research on the tension between diversity and the social conditions for the welfare state is insufficient unless it can also explain why some types of diversity become experienced as diversity at all. This study has contributed with alternative identity constructions based on people’s own interpretations, which point to different ways in which identity, belonging and exclusion can be conceptualised to mitigate the tension between immigration and the democratic welfare state.
Notably, the contribution category of identity has never, to my knowledge, featured as a distinct category of shared identity and sense of belonging in a study on attitudes to immigration, as most rely on variations of the civic/ethnic dichotomy (e.g. Wright, Citrin and Ward 2012; Heath and Tilley 2005). Some studies have shown that notions of contribution can make people more favourable towards immigration (Jolley 2013, p. 28; Ford, Morreland and Heath 2012, p. 36). This study has demonstrated the need to incorporate these notions in wider understandings of identity and belonging in the political community and to expand the mechanisms and symbolic boundaries that we use to understand ‘the other’. Thus studies looking specifically at how symbolic boundaries in the political community construct ‘the other’ ought to expand the notion of what such boundaries may consists of, to include the idea of contributions. Moreover, the institutionalism theme is not equivalent to many representations of a civic identity in the quantitative literature, as it involves a formative element by institutions that is not normally recognised. There is also an important distinction to be made between the institutionalist and nationalist identity in terms of shared values. Shared values are often seen as a feature of a nationalist and a patriotic identity alike. This study has highlighted an important distinction of how these are conceptualised in terms of belonging and exclusion. For the nationalists, certain values are cherished because they are British or Swedish, whereas for the institutionalists being British or Swedish is cherished because such identity embodies certain values. The latter understanding is less exclusive.¹³

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¹³ Naturally, these three categories of identity, belonging and exclusion are not exhaustive and the theoretical literature contains more suggestions of ‘the ties that bind’. Some of these, like Rawls’s (1999) ‘overlapping consensus’ are similar to the institutionalism category found in this study. Others may be even thinner forms of shared identity, such as Andrew Mason’s (2000) account of ‘belonging to a polity’. Whilst it is certainly possible to imagine even more alternatives, we do not know in what sort of political and social circumstances they are relevant and whether people actually imagine the ‘ties that bind’ in their democratic welfare state in such ways. The strength of the present study has been to move beyond the theoretical models to the experiences of ordinary people in order to investigate what sort of conflict between immigration and the democratic welfare state that people actually imagine there to be.
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