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Article:
Crawford, TAM orcid.org/0000-0001-5792-5977 and Hutchinson, S (2016) The Future(s) of Security Studies. British Journal of Criminology, 56 (6). pp. 1049-1067. ISSN 0007-0955

https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azw070

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The Future(s) of Security Studies
Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson

Introduction

Little more than a decade and a half into the twenty-first century, security has undoubtedly become one of, if not, the key problematic of our time. Paradoxically, as historians remind us, we live in what are possibly the most secure, orderly and civil times in recorded history, particularly in Europe. The dangers threatening our lives and our person are fewer and further between than in much of our past. On the whole, we live longer and are generally more prosperous than in previous times. Moreover, as criminologists know well, there has been an historic turn around in the steady rise of criminality across western countries, as rates for homicide, burglary, auto theft and other property crimes - as well as rates for non-lethal violent crimes - have continued to fall since the early to mid-1990s. Yet, it is here (in Western democracies) and at this time,

...that the addiction to fear and the securitarian obsession have made the most spectacular careers in the recent years. Contrary to the objective evidence, it is the people who live in the greatest comfort on record, more cosseted and pampered than any other people in history, who feel more threatened, insecure and frightened, more inclined to panic, and more passionate about everything related to security and safety than people in most other societies, past and present. (Bauman 2006: 130)

Despite our relative safety and well-being, risk, fear and security have all now become prominent and recurrent features of contemporary social life (Beck 1992; Furedi 2005; Mythen and Walklate 2006).

While some prescient criminologists were alert to its ascendance quite early on (Zedner 2000; Valverde 2001), the exponential growth in the scholarly literature on security in particular, over the past 15 or 20 years or so, reflects dramatic changes in the priorities not only of criminology, but of a number of other social science disciplines. Yet these shifts in disciplinary foci themselves only mirror (and in turn help generate) fundamental changes in public and political discourse, government interests and objectives, and research funder priorities, all of which increasingly oscillate around the problem of security, broadly defined. The massive growth of the private security market – now valued at upwards of $350 billion in the United States alone (ASIS 2014) - a development well known to criminologists, has thus gone hand in hand with the emergence of an academic marketplace in ideas and theories about security, which seek to make sense of, advance, and/or resist an incredibly rapid, complex and far reaching set of developments.

For example, the term ‘security’ – and indeed, some often loosely-defined concept of security - has assumed an increasingly central place in local, national, and international politics, and in everyday constructions of law and social order. ‘The once dominant association of the concept of security with military threats, and with the protection of the state – or ‘national security’… - is no longer unquestioned’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 2), and even matters as seemingly mundane as fly-posting and dog fouling – to the extent that these are considered anti-social behaviours – are now increasingly characterised as matters of security. This proliferation of security discourse and allied practices is said to
be linked to its escape from the shackles which bound it to the nation-state; to the notion that security was a matter for state’s and their institutions, and to traditional ideas about nationhood, citizenship and identity. A related convergence of the public and private in the realm of security provision has led not only to massive growth in the global private security industry, but also to the rapid development of new forms of private and hybrid law and regulation. Further, discourses, logics and technologies of security have become ever more visible features of our basic and fundamental social institutions, and have in turn given rise to new opportunities and new approaches to governing everyday life. As challenges to public safety and social order are increasingly seen as more complex and more interconnected than ever before, the concept and practice of security has also been crafted in such a way that is no longer static but fluid, influenced and effected by a range of networked actors, techniques and forces, encompassing the public, private and voluntary sectors.

At the local level, cities across Europe have seen changes to municipal law and order arrangements, as new forms of public-private partnerships have given rise to new methods for promoting and ensuring public safety. In recent years, newly identified ‘threats to security’ have also dramatically reconfigured diverse areas of criminal justice and social policy, given rise to new institutions and cross-sector relationships, and significantly impacted upon our traditional frameworks of national, transnational and international law. Indeed the concept of security now informs the way in which we think and talk about matters as diverse as food and water, energy and the environment, and health and human well-being. From humanitarian crises, economic stability and global conflict, to peace-building, constitutional order and environmental resources, security talk has become more prevalent, more encompassing and more consequential. At the more local, ‘everyday’ level, concerns about security also now influence the way we understand and act upon ourselves, our families and our communities, as we are increasingly encouraged to become responsible for our own and others’ safety.

Echoing these developments, a growing number of scholars from very different backgrounds and with very different philosophical and theoretical orientations have begun to try to make sense of the diverse changes brought about by the rise and proliferation of security thinking and practice. While questions of ‘national’ and ‘international security’ have long been on the agenda in political science (Wolfers 1952), and sociologists have been concerned with ‘social security’ since mid-century (Marshall 1950), it is only over the past couple of decades that researchers from disciplines across the social sciences - including criminology, law and socio-legal studies, anthropology, geography and urban studies - have begun to direct significant attention toward various dimensions of security-related developments. This has included analyses of how it is defined and understood by various actors and agencies, how issues – like poverty and malnutrition – come to be ‘securitized’ (or governed through security) and what effects this has, the processes through which security is produced and managed, and the consequences of managing social and political life through apparatuses of security. If there is one consistency in this vast and varied literature, it is that there is yet little if any agreement about what security actually is. That is, security has been described as a highly contested, polysemic, ambiguous, plural and even ‘promiscuous’ concept (Crawford 2013). As Mythen and Walklate (this Issue) argue, it is a ‘multilayered and multifaceted concept’ that defies rigid, static definition. To complicate things further, security is regularly analysed in the academic literature from very different vantage points, as political,
discursive and/or experiential. These differing analytical frames shape what security comes to mean, its patterning and practices, as well as its social and spatial implications. Put another way, security not only engenders contestation and disagreement, it changes meaning (sometimes rapidly), and can come to mean different things for different people, groups, and institutions. In one sense, security is whatever people say it is. Like Monet’s impressions of Rouen Cathedral, security has many moods that frequently come to be defined through the eye of the beholder.

For some critical scholars, those who study security have thus far been unable to adequately distance themselves from its steady colonisation of the social, political and economic world, as both an organising concept and governing framework. At best, from this perspective, security studies have become inadvertently caught in a trap in that they are themselves contributing to the refinement and perfection of yet more security measures and techniques. At worst, such researchers ought to be seen as complicit in the securitisation of contemporary social life (and indeed, of the scientific disciplines). In their anti-security ‘declaration’, Rigakos and Neocleous (2011: 8) put it thus:

...security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion. Less simply... security is a dangerous illusion. Why ‘dangerous’? Because it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers.

As scholarship on security reaches what seems to be a crucial juncture, vital questions must be raised about whether there is value in retaining, re-developing and re-invigorating critical approaches to understanding and researching security. More specifically, what value is there in retaining security as an analytical concept if its meaning is at once capacious and capricious? What future is there for critical security studies that, according to some, can now be bracketed within ‘fairly narrow pathways’ (Rigakos and Neocleous 2011)? And what future role might there be for criminology in shaping this now decidedly interdisciplinary field?

**Disciplining Security**

While analyses of national (state) security date to the founding of the concept in the post-Second World War environment - when it replaced other concepts like the ‘national interest’, to encompass the myriad struggles endemic to overcoming internal and external threats to the state (Romm 1993) - in the 1980s and 1990s a concerted effort in political science and international relations sought to re-define security as it had been conventionally understood (Baldwin 1997). This movement, which took its biggest strides in the international relations literature, attempted both to re-define or ‘broaden’ the priorities of nation-states (Brown 1977) and to re-think or ‘widen’ the concept of security itself (Booth 1991; Shaw 1993). A burgeoning ‘critical security studies’ literature quickly evolved from this effort, and while it certainly included contributions from some few sociologists, legal scholars, and others (Matthews 1989), such issues remained primarily of interest in politics and international relations (Bigo this Issue). It is precisely this questioning of the disciplining of security as a matter for (predominantly realist) political science that gave rise to the now
vast and varied ‘critical security studies’ literature in international relations. Moreover, it is in this emergent literature that the traditional assumptions about (national/state) security and conventional approaches to its study were first called into question.

In a recent article, Browning and McDonald (2013) have suggested that the field of critical security studies in international relations largely revolves around three central themes (see also CASE Collective 2006; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). The first of these is an essential critique of traditional ‘realist’ approaches to security, whereby the referent object of security is the nation state, which exists in a system of competing self-interested state actors that live in an environment of anarchy - the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’.

Whereas traditional approaches to (national) security therefore focus upon the study of threat and the use of force by and between states, critical security studies are instead primarily concerned with understanding the socially constructed and contested nature of security. To this end, critical approaches prompt and seek to interrogate a number of fundamental questions, including: ‘Whose threats’, ‘Whose fears’, and ‘Whose security’ is (or should be) prioritised, enhanced or inhibited?; ‘What are the key threats to security?’; ‘How are these defined, identified and articulated?’; ‘Where do security discourses come from?’; ‘What are their impacts?’; and ‘Whose interests do they serve?’ Critical scholarship of this sort thus seeks to expose and challenge the nature of the political choices that inform the answers to such questions, as well as the normative preferences that they assume.

The second overarching theme within critical security studies in international relations is a concern with the politics of security — ‘the question of what security does politically’ (Browning and McDonald 2013: 236 – emphasis in original). Here, much of the focus has been on the impacts and ramifications of ‘securitising moves’, understood as the processes through which a problem or risk is constructed as a ‘security threat’ and the very real consequences of conceiving issues through the lens of security (Buzan et al. 1998; Balzacq 2008; McDonald 2008). What has therefore been termed the study of ‘securitisation’ has drawn critical scholars into analysing the processes through which the deployment and utterance of the word ‘security’ constitutes an illocutionary speech act that prompts real action and creates new realities (Searle 1965). As Wæver (2004: 13) notes: ‘It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.’ By voicing security, such scholars have noted, things that might ordinarily be politically untenable become not only thinkable but acceptable, including the introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new legislative powers or special measures. Security, thus viewed, is the result of a move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames some particular issue as above ‘normal politics’. The issue or problem – be it water scarcity or malnutrition for example - is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. This implied mode of extraordinary politics, by necessity, both institutionalises fast-track decision-making processes and produces certain outcomes. In this regard, for those like Claudia Aradau (2004), security is necessarily a negative concept with an exclusionary and violent logic, as it is predicated on the production of categories of enemy ‘others’ in that it implies a friend/enemy dichotomy and delineates bodies of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Hence, critical security studies have tended to focus on the discourses of security that legitimise particular policies or practices, prioritise certain issues or concerns, define group identity, and shape political communities. This has in turn brought to the fore questions about what is at stake in our engagements with security as a concept that has
political effects. This reflects ‘an abiding suspicion of security’ (Browning and McDonald 2013: 240) or in some versions an outright perniciousness that is found in much critical security scholarship. Consequently, however, this approach tends to operate within an overly deterministic and singular understanding of security which accords insufficient attention to its contested, multiple meanings and its variegated practices (Crawford 2014). Missing from many such critical accounts are the diverse alternative security logics that are evoked and practiced, as well as the manner in which securitisation is challenged and transformed (Trombetta 2008). The association of security with a dominant universal logic, all-too-often fails to acknowledge the temporal and spatial specificity of security discourses and practices, as Crawford and Hutchinson argue in this volume. As Browning and McDonald (2013: 242) note: ‘In short, missing is recognition that security does different things at different times and different places’ (emphasis in original).

The third theme is the ‘ethics of security’ — ‘the question of what progressive practices look like regarding security’ (Browning and McDonald 2013: 235). This moves consideration beyond critique to how security might be reformulated, and into normative questions regarding the ‘good’ in security (see Virta and Brands this Issue). For some, this has been largely about ‘desecuritisation’ as an ethical stance that seeks to shift ‘issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’ (Buzan, et al. 1998: 4; see also Wæver 1995; Floyd 2011). Others have gone further in linking security to broader ethical positions such as an ‘ethic of care’ (Robinson 2011) or to advancing conceptions of ‘human security’ as an ethical commitment (Newman this Issue; Kaldor 2007). From this perspective security encompasses a wide-range of interconnected facets of human development and fundamental rights that enhance and protect the ‘vital core’ of individual freedom and fulfilment. Security, here, is ‘protective’, in the sense that it seeks to safeguard the rights and freedoms that pertain to survival, livelihood and basic dignity (Alkire 2003). As well as encompassing a diverse range of threats and harms, beyond those normally associated with (state) security, this approach revolves around people not states. It places individuals centre stage, reinforcing the break from assumptions about the state as the primary referent for security, and ushering in an engagement with universal discourses of human rights.

From an ethical standpoint, this highlights the manner in which security may constitute a necessary precondition for sociability, as well as a constraint upon it (given the securitising potential). Hence, security can be seen as both protection from harms, threats and risks - ‘security from’ – reflecting its negative shield-like quality, and it may foster the conditions that empower people to engage in certain pursuits - ‘security to’ – reflecting its enabling, foundational quality (Hoogensen et al. 2009: 3). Yet, there are evident dangers implicit in the quest for such ‘positive’ notions of security (Schuilenburg et al. 2014), including the construction of unhelpful, determinisitic and overly-static binaries of negative/positive, bad/good, constraining/enabling, violent/non-violent, state/individual, securitising/emancipatory, and so forth (Hoogensen 2012). Whilst such approaches successfully move analyses away from universalistic and linear interpretations of (security, in the end they may be too polarising to reflect or capture adequately the multiple logics, experiences, impacts and ethics of security practices. Indeed, some critical scholars have suggested that in a post-Cold War age of growing complexity, the traditional, apparently fixed, moral certainties of good/evil and universal solutions to security governance through international relations and the proliferation of (‘universal’) human rights, are less relevant.
Some suggest that instead these must give way to non-linear, local problem-solving and self-policing strategies, in ways that suggest a ‘more immanent perspective of emergent causality, eliciting a reflexive ethics of continual work on “good” public modes of being’ (Chandler 2014: 441).

For some security scholars, normative dispositions should be eschewed in contemporary analyses of security (for example, Valderde 2011). For others, while normative preferences and assumptions are evident, they are often insufficiently nuanced or well-articulated to inform ‘bottom up’ security strategies in particular places at given times (Chandler 2016). For instance, the normative tendency to promote deliberation and ‘normal politics’ – evident in much of the discussion around ‘desecuritisation’ (Wæver 1995) – is all-too-often insufficiently sensitive to the very different dynamics operating in differing social and cultural contexts, as well as the distinctive ways in which deliberation and politics are conducted at different scales from local, regional, and national to global levels. By implication, analysis frequently falls back on liberal assumptions about the ways in which national politics in Western democracies should operate. Hence, one of the contemporary challenges for critical security studies, as Browning and McDonald (2013: 248) assert, is to move ‘beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in nuanced, reflective and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security’. By implication this ‘blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international forms of security governance and expands the conception of policing as a process of self-management and self-regulation’ (Chandler 2016: 13).

Given the substantial breadth and depth of this critical security studies literature, there is a danger that in engaging with such ideas, criminologists will fall prey to similar pitfalls and limitations. For example, much of the more recent literature (and policy debate) has tended – whether intentionally or not - to give priority to the international arena. Yet there are clear risks in seeing threats to security as always and already inherently global. Such a perspective reinforces a particularistic and universal logic that both conceives and constitutes security at a global scale. In the process, threats, risks and fears are globalised. This is perhaps most evidently so in recent debates about terrorism, but it can also be seen in the context of matters such as (im)migration and cyber-crime. The result has been a burgeoning literature on ‘globalised fears’, ‘global threats’ and the ways in which these ‘new’ threats engender a wider ‘culture of fear’ and anxious citizenry (Bauman 2006; Furedi 2007). One consequence of this has been a ‘scaling up’ of security as always being omnipresent, global and interconnected, such that it is articulated in ways that suffer from a lack of grounding (Morgan et al. 2010). This tends to disconnect security and fear from the ways in which these are experienced, felt, patterned and practiced in everyday life. Drawing upon insights from human geography, Pain (2009: 467) has argued forcefully against such ‘artificial scaling’. Instead, she points to ‘a more insightful and empowering framework for understanding fear [and security] in the twenty-first century that is far more attentive to what is happening on “the ground” in the places and lives people inhabit’. In a similar vein, Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson (this Issue) develop just such an approach, averring that novel insights into the practices and experiences of security can be found by shifting the focus from the formal, public, political sphere, to the pluralised, differentiated, informal, and often private or personal sphere of everyday life. This is not an argument against the analysis of global trends and international relations – for as Gearty (this Issue) astutely highlights, there are powerful global ideological and structural forces at play – but rather
one which underlines the need for attentiveness to questions of scale, to which geographers are particularly attuned. As Chris Philo (2011: 1) has noted,

...the insecurities faced by many of the world’s peoples – and hence, the measures that might improve their senses of security – may well not be the same as those recognized by, to use a simplistic shorthand, the more powerful elites of societies based in the Global North. The underlying sources of insecurity might possess something in common... but precisely how their implications work out for differing peoples in differing places spread across the globe is likely to be far from the same. Moreover, the practices installed by certain peoples in certain places when striving to enhance their own senses of security, may end up exacerbating the insecurities felt by others in other places. In short, there are highly uneven and entangled geographies of security and insecurity to be located at a range of spatial scales and/or traced across a host of different networks spread far and near across the globe.

Given these and other latent issues in the security studies literature, criminologists who wish to engage with this broad and varied scholarship must first understand them well so that such pitfalls can be avoided or addressed. For some, it may be that alternative fields - rather than security studies per se - represent better focal point or meeting places for criminologists, political scientists, legal scholars, and international relations experts interested in such trans-disciplinary matters. As Didier Bigo (this Issue) argues, International Political Sociology might in the end be a more fruitful point of convergence. Either way, whilst there is much that criminology has to gain by engaging with politics and international relations regarding the analysis and study of security, so too is there much that security scholars in international relations and political science might learn from criminologists.

Criminology’s Engagement with Security

Despite early forays by a few sociologists and legal scholars, it has been only recently - perhaps the last 15 years or so - that security has become of real interest in geography and urban studies, criminology, and law and socio-legal studies. During this time, the analysis of different security logics and rationalities, laws and regulatory mechanisms, and allied practices and procedures, has become increasingly enmeshed within the debates that comprise these disciplines and fields. And yet, sustained interest in more conventional topics have thus far tempered any broad-scale shift toward understanding and analysing security, such that in reflecting upon this state of the affairs in 2009, Lucia Zedner noted that security as yet had ‘little claim to criminological attention’ (Zedner 2009: 1). However, it is becoming ever harder to ignore the growing pervasiveness of ‘security talk’, the increasing articulation of ‘crime’ and ‘security’, and the shifting priorities of government departments, criminal justice policy makers and research funding bodies. As security has become an increasingly important strategic concept through which diverse areas of economic and social life have come to be thought about and governed - not least of which, crime and criminal justice - more and more criminologists are beginning to attend to this important problematic. While the concept of security has steadily colonised domestic social policy realms – including housing, healthcare, crime, education and employment – it has also extended further afield, from food, water and human well-being, to global conflict, environmental survival and natural resources. Put another way, discourses, technologies and metaphors of security have become increasingly eminent features of contemporary institutions and governing bodies at all scales of analysis, across the public and the private.
What little engagement there has been in criminology with security studies more broadly has, at least in part, been prompted by the dissolving of erstwhile conceptual certainties that have hitherto informed our disciplinary knowledges, notably the long held and taken for granted distinctions between ‘war’ and ‘crime’, ‘army’ and ‘police’, the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’, the ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the ‘local’ and the ‘global’. Borders and boundaries seem to have become increasingly permeable, as the salience of cross-disciplinary problems and thetics - including for example, ‘risk’, ‘resilience’, ‘pre-emption’, ‘globalisation’, and ‘governance’ - have opened up the study of crime and social disorder to a wider set of influences and approaches. In this context, criminology’s more traditional interest in criminal acts and criminal justice responses to them seems rather parochial. Anticipating this criminological dilemma – a world where risk and security are more central than crime per se – some perceptive criminologists ‘have been reconceptualising their field in ways that undermine the “crime” focus, either by shifting attention to forms of social regulation that are outside the criminal law or by burying crime in a much broader category (risk; regulation; security)’ (Valverde and O’Malley 2015: 5).

With this Special Issue, whilst we do not seek to redefine or reconceptualise criminology in any broad sense - and we take the view that criminology is better understood as a field or topic area rather than a ‘discipline’ - we hope to encourage further research and analysis of security-related developments by criminologists, particularly those working at the edges of what have traditionally been regarded as disciplinary boundaries. It can no longer be doubted that security has come to constitute a potent meeting place for criminologists, sociologists, political scientists, legal scholars, and international relations experts, among others. Nor can it be doubted that security has now transformed the field of crime, crime control and criminal justice, as much as it has the law and regulatory system. Perhaps one of the strengths of a field that David Downes once described as a ‘rendez-vous’ discipline – one defined principally by its focus upon an empirical area rather than by any allegiance to a particular theory or set of theories - is that many of the diverse and rich social, psychological and (socio-)legal perspectives that have been applied to the problems of crime and disorder can be suitably refined and re-deployed in the context of security.

Despite seemingly common ground however - and the way in which security problems and their solutions are increasing seen as being ‘interconnected’ - the space for cross-disciplinary dialogue and for the development of shared conceptual understandings between different approaches remains rather narrow and constrained. For example, while legal scholars have begun to explore the implications of ‘securitising’ the law and legal procedure more widely, there has been relatively little engagement with the important work on such issues that has being carried out in international relations and criminology. New legal scholarship has also been attending to critical developments in domestic, transnational and international criminal law - including new substantive laws and offences, and changes to criminal procedures, courts and jurisdictional spaces – and the ways in which these are linked with shifting concepts and discourses of security. Yet this work has been largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical debates taking place in other increasingly security-focused disciplines. Analyses of the rapid changes to the scope of criminal law and criminal responsibility, and of broader shifts toward ‘preventative law’ (Borgers and van Sliedregt 2009; Ashworth and Zedner 2014) – which seeks not to punish past transgressions but rather to control future behaviour – would seem to have much in
common with criminological and (socio-)legal scholarship on crime prevention, precautionary forms of policing, and other nascent logics of ‘anticipation’.

On the other hand, human rights scholars have drawn attention to the implications of security for civil liberties, privacy and citizenship. Indeed, this is a longstanding set of concerns (Lasswell, 1950). Yet, the notion of ensuring some sort of ‘balance’ between liberty and security - a problematic which defines much of the current thinking in the area – would have much to gain from alternative ways of thinking about security and (human) rights, which do not rely upon the rather constraining notion of a zero-sum relationship; a perspective which assumes that we can have either extensive security or human rights protections, but never both at once. Similarly, while traditional legal theory has been primarily organised in terms of nation-states - which do the majority of law-making - the fusing of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security that has been identified by international relations scholars raises new questions and new problems for students of the law. Indeed, the law now often plays a central role in measures taken not only by states, but by regional, transnational and international organisations – both public and private - ‘in the name of security’. Thus, assertions about a ‘right to security’ have often presaged greater powers of surveillance, enhanced police authority, novel forms of control, wider use of pre-trial detention, and other pre-emptive and preventive measures aimed at risk mitigation. At the same time and somewhat paradoxically, human rights are also frequently evoked in arguments which seek to limit the excesses of security and the scope of legal reforms. Human rights, however, do not always serve either as a limit on the coercive reach of the criminal law (and state institutions more broadly) or as an inevitable counterweight to ‘criminalisation’ or ‘securitisation’. Indeed, such developments have led to new challenges for constitutional order, both at sub-state, state, and supranational levels, and the ways in which the politics of security increasingly interact with the development of law and legal order is of growing importance.

What all of this suggests is a manifest need for cross-disciplinary engagement in endeavours to understand and analyse the broader problematic of security. As significant and wide-reaching as contemporary security-related developments are, they have only infrequently been addressed through structured interdisciplinary dialogue (Loader and Percy 2012).¹ There is a clear need, therefore, to explore potential interaction and engagement between scholarship from different backgrounds and traditions which now share this common problematic, including in particular criminology, sociology, law and socio-legal studies, and politics and international relations. Indeed, as ‘[d]istinctions among all fields of scholarship are increasingly fluid and contested’ (Bigo and Walker 2007: 2), claims about the global or international scope and character of contemporary security problems have led to a broader reshaping of contemporary scholarship and a reconsideration of conventional disciplinary boundaries. Drawing together a number of progressive approaches to security, each of which seeks to move extant scholarship forward in some way, and each of which is located between different disciplines at the cutting-edges of thinking about security, this Special Issue sets out to explore security by engaging with its parameters, its analysis, its social

¹ But see the Special Issue of Global Crime (2012, Volume 13, Number 4) guest edited by Ian Loader and Sarah Percy, which sought to bridge the divide between criminology and international relations in particular.
purpose, its consequences, and its intellectual futures. ² We do not begin with some assumed definition or conceptualisation of security, and no particular method, theoretical approach or disciplinary orientation binds the contributions together. Rather, we seek here to advance the cross-disciplinary exchange of ideas about security, to move interdisciplinary (or perhaps, non-disciplinary) scholarship forward, and further shared understandings of both the problems and opportunities endemic to security thinking and security processes.

**Thinking Forward: Some Promising Futures for Security Scholarship**

To a certain degree, the division of core social and human sciences is a somewhat arbitrary and contingent product of nineteenth century European history. Whether one accepts this or not, what has become increasingly apparent over time has been the degree of introspective conceptual and methodological development within the complex disciplinary division of labour. Simply put, academic disciplines have developed their own methods, practices, preoccupations and knowledge claims. As a result, the ongoing contest between different rationalities, methodologies and theoretical approaches within a particular discipline tends to keep our gaze fixed upon largely ‘internal’ debates, problems and questions. This tendency can in turn place limits on the very possibility for cross-disciplinary dialogue and engagement, as scholars continue to wrestle with one another primarily within their own discipline. Within a particular field, like criminology, there might be several of these disciplinary traditions at work, each co-existing and vying with one another for dominance. Indeed, this is one of the benefits that criminology can bring to the study of security, which is best regarded, we would argue, as another - and not unrelated - field of study. The challenges of security and insecurity that contemporary societies face do not sit neatly within our conventional disciplinary enclaves. As we have seen, while political science may once have held sway over questions about security, such dominance no longer makes much sense. Disciplinary boundary crossing - perhaps better thought of as theoretical, methodological and/or conceptual boundary crossing - is both an essential and dynamic element of problem-solving which prompts a continual reassessment of our conventions, and critical self-reflection on questions of terminology and values. This in turn affords considerable possibilities for challenging introspective, insular and taken-for-granted assumptions rooted in particular disciplinary traditions. In an important sense, seeing security studies as a field – much like criminology in many ways – then requires precisely this sort of cross-disciplinary engagement, including setting out the parameters of the disciplines in the context of this particular problematic. For to know how to cross-boundaries we must first know where they are and what they constitute. The ambition is that with this in mind, the opportunities presented by boundary identification and boundary crossing in a wider field of multi-disciplinary security studies will stimulate new lines of

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² The contributions to this Special Issue were first presented at a two day colloquium - entitled ‘The Laws of Security: Re-Conceptualising Security at the Intersections of Law, Criminology and International Relations’ - intended as a cross-disciplinary dialogue about the futures of critical security studies. It was hosted by the School of Law at the University of Leeds on 12-13 June, 2014. The event was attended by scholars from different disciplines who contributed to the lively debates that informed the finished articles collected. We would like to acknowledge the valuable comments, input and contributions provided not only by the authors but by the other delegates, including Graeme Davies, Rita Floyd, Lene Hansen, Saskia Hufnagel, Susanne Karstedt, Adam White, Noel Whitty and Henry Yeomans, amongst others.
conceptual development, new questions for investigation and analysis, and new forms of enquiry.

In an innovative attempt to do something of this nature, those who have been working in the area of International Political Sociology have been seeking to establish a space wherein the traditional boundaries and distinctions between international relations, sociology and politics – whose interactions had, until recently, been rather sporadic – might be overcome in productive and fruitful ways. The delineation of this new field of work (a great deal of which can be found in the dedicated academic journal *International Political Sociology*), was a response to several contemporary developments that called into question the established and taken for granted boundaries between these disciplines. Firstly, scholars working on problems seen as international in scale and character were increasingly reaching beyond the established conventional tools in international relations, while those working in other, more parochial disciplines were continually seeking to engage with more international and global problems. Secondly, sociology and social theory, as broad areas of scholarship, were seen to have much to offer international relations scholarship, despite very little engagement between the two disciplines historically. And finally, it was no longer possible to sustain the ethnocentrism and hegemony that had been derived from the dominant American (and to a lesser extent British) traditions of analysis in political science, which had also bled into international relations (Bigo and Walker 2007; Huysmans and Nogueira 2012).

In exploring the role that might be played by sociology and social theory in understanding security processes in particular, proponents of International Political Sociology have placed renewed emphasis upon the study of ‘practices’, or rather, what social actors do (including their discourses). *Contra* the Copenhagen School’s view that securitisation is the outcome of a successful ‘speech act’ (Buzan and Waever 2003), Bigo has argued that securitisation is more accurately described as a product of mundane bureaucratic routines, decisions and practices, including the use of technology (Bigo 2008). In his contribution to this Special Issue, Bigo picks up on these themes. After analysing the development of security as an intellectual field within international relations, draws out the implications for criminology of the ways in which dominant ideas and perspectives within IR have shaped and constrained the study of security. His explicit intention is to ‘decolonise’ security as a problem, or subject, from what he sees as the stranglehold of conventional politics and international relations. In its place he proposes International Political Sociology as a more inclusive and less rigid meeting place for those interested in security, and explores the many questions, insights and resources that such an approach provides. This, he suggests, is a far more productive *rendez-vous* partner for criminology, which has much to offer the study of security, but whose contributions have in many ways been limited by the traditions of conventional international relations.

For the last few decades, one of the major threads of analysis across a number of social science disciplines has been the emergence, proliferation and effects of neoliberalism. Indeed there are now fairly well-established bodies of literature on neoliberalism within criminology (see O’Malley 1999; Lacey 2013), sociology (see Dawson 2013; Gane 2014), international relations (see Schmidt 2016), and geography (see Cox 2005; Springer 2010), among others. Despite some fairly different takes on what exactly neoliberalism is and what precise changes it entails - even within the same disciplines (O’Malley 2016) - most tend to associate it with the resurgence of some nineteenth century ideas linked to *laissez-faire* economic liberalism, including the centrality of the private marketplace in governing
contemporary life, and small, regulatory states. Of course the impacts of the broad changes associated with neoliberalism are complex and diverse, and numerous scholars have taken great pains to diagnose these effects in particular areas and fields. And yet, so popular have been accounts of neoliberalism - and so urgent the rush to confirm ever more instances of its force and reach - that for some, it has become a 'conceptual trash heap capable of accommodating multiple distasteful phenomena' with little argument about whether some component or another actually belongs (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 39).

Thus while some have called for a move away from neoliberalism as an explanatory concept or framework altogether, others have sought to build upon existing work by mapping the interactions between neoliberalism and other political formations for instance - like 'neo-conservatism' (O'Malley 1999) - or by incorporating neoliberalism into some broader formation or development, such as the 'risk society' (Beck 1992) or 'culture of control' (Garland 2001). In another such manoeuvre, Conor Gearty (2013) has recently explored the complex and fluid relationship between liberty and security, how these two notions have been understood historically, and the role that neoliberalism has come to play in their present character and form. In his contribution to this Issue, Gearty de-centres neoliberalism while outlining a broad canvas of ideological change since the end of the Cold War (circa 1989) that has unfolded hand in hand yet in the shadow of the steady advance of neoliberal politics. That is, just as, or even more important than neoliberalism is what Gearty refers to as ‘neo-democracy’; a term which describes polities that wear democratic clothes and manufacture complex and well-designed democratic veneers that work to mask the significant political, ethical and legal changes that stem from the steady advance of neoliberalism. The catalyst for the development, and indeed the possibility of neo-democracies, for Gearty, is located in the rapid rise of the language and practice of security. For him, the important question is not what security and liberty entail, but rather who actually gets to enjoy them; the question of security is one of reach not remit. As the rapid advance of neoliberalism puts market exchange at the heart of human experience and sees governance as embedded in competitiveness and self-interest, consideration of ‘justice’, ‘morality’, democracy and/or universality in resource allocation are effectively side-lined. Taking the United Kingdom and the United States as examples, Gearty contends that the dramatic shift that neo-liberalism represents is best seen as an abandonment of many erstwhile social democratic assumptions and principles of the 20th century. Crucially, this transformation also shapes the interplay and interaction between human rights, civil liberties and security, as they play out both domestically and internationally. ‘Neo-democracy’ - as counterfoil and cloak to the new neoliberal states – therefore serves to shroud the great inequalities, injustices and insecurities generated by this important political-economic shift. Perhaps most importantly, as Gearty demonstrates, it is precisely the language and practice of security which has made possible this state of affairs.

Just as neoliberalism – and its cloak, neo-democracy - is said to have reconfigured the political, economic and social terrain of twenty-first century societies, the ever increasing securitisation of everyday life is said to have led to dramatic changes in how we govern day-to-day social problems. This is perhaps most glaring in the context of crime, which has historically been addressed through primarily reactive measures intended to detect, investigate, prosecute and sentence offenders for having (already) committed a certain criminal offence proscribed by law. As issues of crime and disorder are increasingly redefined as security problems however, many of the tools, techniques and knowledges
traditionally associated with (state) security have become available beyond their traditional purview. One dimension to this ‘securitisation of crime and criminal justice’ has been an increasing role for local police in governing what would previously have been considered problems of national (state) security, including terrorism and organized crime. In the third contribution to this Special Issue, Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate address some of the impacts of devolving counter-terrorism work to local police, critically reflecting upon some of the most dangerous effects of counter-terrorism informed changes to policing practices over the last decade. In so doing, they draw upon their own substantial body of original empirical research to explore the effects and implications of counter-terrorism policing on ‘suspect populations’. Their lens on these developments is an analysis of the impacts of pre-emptive counter-terrorism policing policies and approaches, which are now set forth in the context of a shift from ‘universal’ to ‘partial’ pledges of security by the state. In considering the ramifications of this shift for those marginalised groups and individuals who fall outside the boundaries of those considered ‘deserving of safety’, Mythen and Walklate’s analysis is framed in terms of ‘divisions’, ‘dualisms’ and ‘duplicities’, through which they seek to develop an array of conceptual tools to foster criminological critique of security related practices. In so doing, they highlight the ways in which divisive security policies reproduce further and deepen social cleavages. In the end, they lay down a challenge to criminology to embrace inter-disciplinary insights in a way that assists in the ‘quest to understand security in all its guises’ and enables ‘deeper appreciation of the textured, layered and ambivalent nature of security in the modern world’.

As many criminologists and legal scholars now recognize, in the search for security many of the changes ushered in by counter-terrorism policies and programmes have eroded many traditional principles of criminal justice, including due process and human rights (Fitzpatrick 2003; Gearty 2005). Changes to counter-terrorism laws are certainly not the only challenge to such tenets, and initiatives such as those associated with the Anti-Social Behaviour Agenda engender their own assault on well-established values and norms (Crawford 2009). Given the incredible pace and breadth of the changes ushered in by the hyper-concern with terrorism and political forms of violence, the fairly dramatic modifications to the laws governing terrorism represent an important case study in how far we have gone in our attempts to govern this most dreaded security threat, and what impacts this has had on traditional criminal justice principles and approaches. Focusing upon one of the key areas of change over the past decade and a half, Karen Cooper and Clive Walker present in this Issue their analysis of what they see as two different models which depict how we have addressed terrorism financing. Sidestepping the familiar and widely contested notion of a zero-sum balance between security and rights, and drawing upon original empirical research, they contrast and assess the impact and implications of a ‘criminal justice model’ and a ‘regulatory risks’ model to countering terrorist financing. Operating upon the conviction that terrorism is indeed a palpable threat that must be addressed, and that counter-terrorism is often ‘fought out in the halls of our financial institutions’, they explore questions concerning the delivery of justice within each of the two models, as well as the ability of each to produce tangible results. Their particular focus is on the capacity to impact on informal value transfer systems, such as ‘hawala’, which have been under sustained suspicion since 2001 and which are seen as being particularly problematic as they lie outside the formal, global financial regulatory system. As much of the regulatory framework has taken the form of public-private partnerships, ‘soft laws’ and multi-tiered governance approaches, they suggest that the ‘regulatory risks’ model has largely come to predominate
over the ‘criminal justice model’, both in terms of its pervasiveness and its impact. And yet, as they conclude, the extent to which it delivers effective financial security and conforms with a broader framework of justice remains decidedly questionable.

Part and parcel of contemporary security literatures across a number of social science disciplines has been a fairly diverse set of views about what security actually is, or ought to be. It has been claimed that security is a public good, a private commodity, an end-state or state of being that must be reached, a prerequisite for liberty, a collective endeavour, a moral necessity, a condition, a pursuit, and so on. It goes without saying that claims to what security is can impact heavily upon what is done in its name. Taking up two of the core themes of critical security studies – the politics and the ethics of security - Nordic scholars Sirpa Virta and Mina Branders offer a novel and distinct take on security which attends to the consequences of extant security policy, societal security processes and governing practices as a way of seeking to understand the limitations of democratic security policy-making, citizen participation and deliberation. In place of current approaches they seek to advance a normatively informed account of ‘legitimate security’, by which they intend forms of societal security that are based upon principles of deliberative democracy and citizen participation. In so doing, they respond to the concern raised by Browning and McDonald (2013: 249-50) that in our understanding of security, insufficient attention has been given to elaborating: (i) the relationship between spheres of deliberation and actual material conditions; (ii) the possibilities for and limitations of open dialogue; and (iii) the relationship between dialogue and real world outcomes. In their contribution, Virta and Branders point out the limitations of democratic security policy-making and deliberation, particularly given the contingent nature of both security and deliberation. They argue that the quest for comprehensive security that informs much public policy seeks to tame contingencies rather than to support genuine deliberation. Taking Finland as an example, they explore models of deliberative democracy in action, including the ‘Citizens Jury’, which incorporate everyday security experiences and lay understandings. Yet legitimacy, they contend, resides in the processes of political deliberation and policy formation themselves, not simply in the assertion of the will of the people.

On the vast and varied landscape of security definitions, one of the most influential has undoubtedly been ‘human security’, which directly challenges the concept of ‘national security’ by asserting that the proper referent for security should be individuals rather than states. Over the past decade or more, the concept of human security has greatly influenced not only academic discussions but also the practical work of national governments, Non-Governmental Organisations, and international institutions like the United Nations. In his contribution to this Issue, Edward Newman explores the lessons inherent in ‘human security’ for criminology, and highlights points of engagement that might be derived from a sympathetic assessment of human security, including its promises and pitfalls, its expectations and experiences. As he argues, human security is by its very nature a multi-disciplinary construct that draws upon conceptual debates in political science, human rights and criminology. In critically assessing the rise of human security as a normative reference point for human-centred policy movements and civil society organisations around the world, Newman also highlights the difficulties that have been confronted in quests to operationalise the concept in practice. He explores and engages with the potent criticism that critical security ideas like human security can never be reconciled with political ‘realities’, as their intellectual integrity will always ultimately be undermined. Rather than
giving up on human security as a conceptual frame, Newman argues for greater critical academic engagement that might promote further consideration of the structural dimensions of deprivation and inequality that give rise to insecurity. In conclusion, he calls for the development of an ethical framework through which to judge whether human security interventions are morally justified or end up being compromised. For Newman, a human security intervention is insufficiently ethical if it serves merely to manage or contain human misery or simply serves to perpetuate the broader structures which give rise to inequalities and insecurities.

In the final contribution, Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson build upon a critical reading of security scholarship in criminology, sociology, politics and international relations, to advance a framework of ‘everyday security’. This broader frame of reference, they argue, encompasses both (i) the lived experiences of security processes on a quotidian level, and (ii) the related practices that people engage in to govern their own safety on a daily basis. This includes the more mundane practices and habits that are understood or characterised by people as being ‘about security’, and which are crafted and carried out on a regular basis, but which are not normally considered in analyses of security. People’s everyday security practices, they argue, inform and align with, but also depart from, formal security projects. Everyday experiences and quotidian practices of security are then explored along three key dimensions, which they suggest have been given insufficient attention in critical security studies: namely time and temporality, spatial scale, and dynamics of affect and emotion. The framework they outline largely sets out an empirical agenda rather than a normative one that seeks to prompt new lines of enquiry and novel questions for security research moving forward. Like Mythen and Walklate, their call is for the ‘inclusion of other voices’ in understandings of ‘security from below’ as being partial and contingent, and somewhat in line with Newman and Virta and Branders, they seek to move the analysis of security away from states and public institutions, toward individuals and communities. Here, individual security practices and experiences are themselves evident sites of political struggle and contestation, and the authors conclude by arguing that the study of ‘everyday security’ provides an invaluable critical vantage point from which to reinvigorate the field of security studies and interrogate the differential impacts of (in)security and (in)securitisation.

Both severally and collectively the articles brought together in this Special Issue point both to the benefits of drawing insights and conceptual tools from across disciplinary boundaries and to the future possibilities in pushing forward new lines of enquiry in the study of security And indeed, rather than establishing some new, hegemonic and universalistic knowledge or discipline of ‘security studies’, they seek instead to embrace the notion that the study of security is best understood as a varied field, where difference and discontinuity between possible ways forward is a benefit rather than a disadvantage. Indeed, the authors tend to echo the view articulated by Bigo and Walker (2007: 5), in that they ‘are cautious about any […] search for accumulative and global knowledge, hold no brief to defend territory for one discipline against another, and certainly have no wish to colonize one discipline in order to create some overarching discipline within which others might be incorporated around some presumptively unified knowledge’.

Thus envisaged, the trans-disciplinary field of security studies can become an opportunity not only to expose and interrogate the disciplinary boundaries that have hitherto compartmentalised security scholarship, but also to engage with the wide variety of inequalities, injustices and harms that inform contemporary insecurities and the
experiences of people in diverse cultural and social settings across the globe. The ways forward offered here – by no means the only ones - present new prospects for critical security research whichlabours at the confluence of diverse disciplines, including, *inter alia*, criminology, law, politics, sociology and international relations. Far from security constituting an essentialised ‘blockage on politics’ - as Rigakos and Neocleous (2011: 8) imply – and re-envisioned in this way, cross-disciplinary security studies can become a crucial field across which to analyse politics and power; their operation, articulation and silences. This Special Issue, therefore, endeavours to provoke a reinvigoration of the politics and ethics of security, less as a universal given and more as a variegated condition or logic that has differing implications at different times and in different places.

References


