This is a repository copy of Corporate Reorganisation of China's Listed Companies: Winners and Losers.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102858/

Version: Accepted Version

**Article:**

https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2015.1090141

(c) 2015, Taylor & Francis. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Corporate Law Studies on Jan 2015, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2015.1090141

**Reuse**
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item.

**Takedown**
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.
CORPORATE REORGANISATION OF CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES: WINNERS AND LOSERS

ZINIAN ZHANG*

This article is the first empirical study investigating the corporate reorganisation of Chinese domestically-listed companies. Through examining these cases, it challenges the assertion made by most of these corporate reorganisation plans and by Chinese state-run media reports that creditors and general public shareholders were the major beneficiaries. Through an analysis of the data generated from all forth-three such cases, this article reveals that: First, unsecured creditors could have, on average, received 61.37% more of their claims if the fundamental value distribution principle, the absolute priority norm, could have been complied with in these reorganisations; Second, if the general-public-shareholder-protection scheme issued by the China Supreme People’s Court could be rigorously implemented, 85.37% of the shares relinquished by general public shareholders could have been avoided. These two groups were not the winners. Instead, this article argues that it was local governments and controlling shareholders who were the real winners.

A: INTRODUCTION

China’s listed companies are probably the most widely studied in China and abroad, largely because of these companies’ importance in China’s economy, the world’s second largest only after the USA at present.¹ Evidently, most existing studies focus on these companies’ corporate governance² and

* Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia (CEBCLA), School of Law, Singapore Management University. The author wishes to thank Professor Roman Tomasic for his helpful comments and the anonymous referees whose valuable suggestions have immensely improved this article. This article was presented at the Australian Corporate Law Teachers Association 2015 Annual Conference held by Melbourne University School of Law on 1-3 February 2015; the author wishes to thank the Conference participants for their valuable comments. All mistakes remain the author’s responsibilities.

securities regulation issues. But one area of the research seems to remain untouched: the corporate reorganisations of China’s listed companies, which are conducted under China’s version of Chapter 11 enshrined in the newly-enacted P.R.C. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006). This article attempts to address this gap by investigating how the Chinese publicly-traded companies use the new corporate reorganisation law to restructure.

This article brings together data on all forty-three China’s domestically-listed company reorganisations which occurred between 1 June 2006 (the time when the China’s new reorganisation law came into force) and 31 December 2013 (the date of the most recent cases). In general, the data relied upon here were generated from company annual reports and general announcements, mostly obtained from the official websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, China’s only two domestic stock exchanges. In some cases, in the absence of Stock Exchange data, materials for this study had to be obtained from a commercial database, the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), which has an archive collection on China’s stock markets and the financial statements of China’s listed companies. Furthermore, this article also draws upon facts derived from media reports, since most of these cases drew huge press attention because of their impacts on investors, nationwide and beyond.

Through investigating the main characteristics of China’s listed company reorganisations, this article seeks to challenge the assertion made in most of these company reorganisation plans as well as

“Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms” (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 330-357, etc.


4 Although Chapter 11 is widely quoted, some readers outside the bankruptcy law research might be confused of this definition. In fact, it means Chapter 11 of the USA Bankruptcy Code 1978, which is for bankruptcy reorganizations and has been borrowed by many other jurisdictions. See generally at E Warren and J L Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 6th edn, 2009) Chapter 8 on “Chapter 11 Reorganization” especially.

5 There are journal articles emerging in the past several years shedding light on China’s listed company reorganisations. There are: E Lee, “The Reorganization Process Under China’s Corporate Bankruptcy System” (2011) 45 International Lawyer 939, Y Ren, “The “Control Model” in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice” (2011) 85 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 177, and Y Ren, “Wealth Distribution in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice” (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 91. Undoubtedly, Lee and Ren’s studies have considerably contributed to China’s corporate reorganization law research. But, two immediate key weaknesses can be spotted. First, their arguments or analysis are based on the incomplete data. For various reasons, only some high-profile cases hitting the media’s headlines are collected in these articles, and a comprehensive data collection has not been carried out. Second and more importantly, these articles attempt to understand China’s corporate reorganization law and practice through only examining some of China’s listed company reorganisations. The second weakness can be very acute, since, in spite of being bound by the same statute, the corporate reorganizations of China’s listed companies are, as previously examined by the author, operated in a quite different way from those of non-listed, or ordinary, Chinese companies. Given that the majority of China’s corporate reorganization cases are for ordinary companies, their conclusions can be very contentious.
in many Chinese state-run news agency reports that unsecured creditors and general public shareholders were the main beneficiaries of these reorganisations. On the contrary, this article uses the data to argue that the real winners in these cases were the Chinese local governments and controlling shareholders. This article also seeks to quantify the losses incurred by unsecured creditors and general public shareholders. More importantly, this article analyses the unique character of the Chinese political economy in which the governments at both local and central levels tend to pursue short-term economic and political gains at the expense of the rule of law.

This article proceeds in six parts. Part 1 provides a brief overview of China’s domestic stock exchanges on which the companies discussed here are listed; this Part also seeks to cast light on how China’s stock exchange regulators monitor financially-troubled listed companies. Part 2 describes China’s new corporate reorganisation procedure, which is at the heart of the EBL 2006 and has borrowed heavily from Chapter 11 of the U.S.A Bankruptcy Code 1978. Part 3 discusses the operation of China’s listed company reorganisations, and analyses the main features of these cases. Part 4 illustrates why unsecured creditors and general public shareholders are losers and seeks to quantify these losses. Part 5 seeks to explain why local governments and controlling shareholders end up being the real beneficiaries. Finally, Part 6 offers a conclusion and suggests some policy reforms.

B. CHINA’S STOCK EXCHANGES AND DOMESTIC LISTED COMPANIES

China once had well-functioning stock exchanges before. But after the China Communist Party took power in 1949, all stock exchanges were closed down because of the communist ideology. In the 1980s, however, China started its unprecedented economic reform, and one of major reforms was to rebuild its stock exchanges.

1. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and China’s Listed Companies

China’s current two stock exchanges, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In October 1992, a ministry-level regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, was created to regulate the stock markets.


The Chinese stock markets have developed rapidly in recent three decades. As shown in Figure 1, the number of listed companies increased from 14 in 1990 to 2,489 by the end of 2013, and, according to the World Bank, the market value of China’s domestic listed companies amounted to US$3.7 trillion in the year 2012, the second largest after the USA.

![Figure 1: Number of Listed Companies in China (1991-2013)](source: World Bank)

It is noteworthy that one of the Chinese government’s main objectives of opening these two stock exchanges is to use them to finance its state owned enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, not surprisingly, the majority of listed companies in China are former SOEs. Though there is a lack of official statistics on the exact proportion, the following figures can give a glimpse on the weight of SOEs on China’s stock exchanges.

In 2003, for example, the available data show that 1,265 out of the then 1,300 listed companies (97%) were SOEs. During the recent decade, a growing number of private companies were allowed to be listed, but in 2013 there were still about eighty per cent of China’s listed companies transformed from the old SOEs. And, according to a senior Chinese national official in charge of SOEs, by the

---


11 See Cheng, supra n 6, 631.

12 Chen, supra n 6, 597.


end of 2012, the state still remained as the controlling shareholder in almost half of China’s listed companies.16

Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that China’s two domestic stock exchanges are flooded with SOEs, which may cast a shadow to the corporate reorganisation of these companies, due to their connection with governments at various levels.

2. Special Treatment of Troubled Listed Companies

Under the listing rules of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,17 a listed company will be placed under Special Treatment (ST) if it reports, among other things, losses over a consecutive two-year period, which is to alert investors that the company may be delisted if it cannot make profits in the following fiscal year. Such a company is classified – and labelled – as a ST company, but the most substantial impact is that the company’s daily share price fluctuation is limited to five per cent.18

In theory, a ST company will be delisted if its financial performance cannot be improved as required afterwards. But as has been well documented,19 it is very rare for the delisting to be carried out in China. In most cases, these ST companies are brought out of trouble and will continue to float after shaking off the ST status.

Generally, two sources of financing help these ST companies to survive distress. First, given that the majority of China’s listed companies have parent SOEs,20 many ST companies are rescued by their parents who can access cheap loans from China’s state-run banks.21 Second, Chinese governments can also subsidise and revive troubled ST companies for political and economic purposes. For instance, one research reveals that between 1993 and 2003, a ten-year period, the Chinese government subsidies amounted to fourteen per cent of the profits made by all China’s listed

18 See Williams and Taylor, supra n 14, 30.
20 Williams and Taylor, supra n 14, 30.
companies as a whole. More strikingly, a recent newspaper article reported that in 2012, one financial year, there were ninety-four per cent of China’s listed companies receiving RMB107 billion of government subsidies (approximately US$17.2 billion) in total, on average each of them given some US$7.48 million.

All companies discussed in this article were once ST labelled at some point. Before 2007, some of the ST companies might have resorted to the aforementioned two means to survive, but after China’s new corporate reorganisation law came into effect in 2007, some began to use the new law to seek a formal corporate reorganisation solution.

C. CHINA’S NEW CORPORATE REORGANISATION LAW

Before 2006, China had fragmented legislations on corporate bankruptcy, and there was no formal bankruptcy reorganisation law. In 1986, China enacted its first bankruptcy law, China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) (the EBL 1986), which only applied for SOEs. For non-SOE enterprises, their bankruptcy had to resort to a bankruptcy chapter in China’s Civil Procedure Law 1996. In reality, both laws were inadequately implemented, since there were a meagre number of bankruptcy cases every year. In the absence of a vigorous bankruptcy system, most failed enterprises in China exited the market by simply walking away. It is equally fair to say that without a rescue-oriented bankruptcy law some enterprises that only suffered from a sudden illiquidity crisis might have missed the chance to be rehabilitated, as a result of which the going-concern value of these companies was unnecessarily lost.

In 2006, as part of the effort of reforming its commercial law, China promulgated the rescue-friendly Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006) with the aim of establishing an effective corporate bankruptcy system and of helping push forward China’s market economy reforms.

---

22 Chen, supra n 13, 163 (calculating the subsidies to China’s listed companies from governments between 1993 and 2003).
The EBL 2006 has three main procedures to deal with companies in trouble – Chapters 8 on reorganisation, 9 on compromise and 10 on liquidation. Many have argued that the EBL 2006 is rescue-oriented; indeed, a number of its pro-rescue mechanisms can be easily identified.

1. Encouraging the Use of the Corporate Reorganisation Procedure

First, the EBL 2006 Article 2 allows all companies in distress to file for reorganisation, whatever a small or large company. This is different from neighbouring jurisdictions like Japan and Taiwan where only public companies are eligible for a formal reorganisation procedure.

Second, under the EBL 2006 Article 7, both the debtor and its creditors can directly file for reorganisation before a court. And even in the case of an ongoing liquidation procedure filed by a creditor, under the EBL 2006 Article 70, the debtor or its shareholders could apply to convert it into a reorganisation procedure.

Third, and more importantly, to promote early rescues, the EBL 2006 Article 2 allows a company which is not bankrupt but is likely to be bankrupt to enter into the reorganisation procedure. This suggests that a Chinese company filing for reorganisation does not need to demonstrate the existence of insolvency, which in turn may considerably encourage early rescue filings.

2. China’s Debtor-in-Possession

Unlike in a liquidation or compromise procedure where it is always a court-appointed administrator in charge of the company’s businesses and assets, under the EBL 2006 Article 73, the debtor in a reorganisation procedure can request for debtor-in-possession, and if approved by the court, the debtor

---

29 Z Jia, “Issues of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Bill” (2006) 7 The China People’s Congress Gazette 575, 577 (noting that the new reorganization law is open to businesses having the independent legal status).
31 H Zou, “China’s Corporate Rehabilitation System – Theories and Application” (2007) 25 Journal of China University of Political Science and Law 48. 53 (noting that a company which is likely to be bankrupt can file for reorganization under the EBL 2006), S Li, “Drafting of New Bankruptcy Law and Credit Culture and Credit System of China” (2005) 1 The Jurist 12, 15 (arguing that a company likely to be bankrupt can file for reorganization under the new bankruptcy law), and G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (Glos, Edward Elgar, 2008), 123 (noting that a company filing for reorganization in the USA is not required to be insolvent).
itself can manage the company and reorganisation affairs afterwards. But China’s debtor-in-possession is somewhat different from its counterpart under the US Chapter 11 at least on two aspects. First, China’s debtor-in-possession is not automatic or straightforward, since it must be requested by the debtor and approved by the court after a reorganisation procedure has already been commenced. Therefore, literally, if there is no request, or the request is rejected, it is still the court-appointed administrator who stays in control. It is a conditional debtor-in-possession. Second, China’s debtor-in-possession, if granted, should be supervised by the previously-court-appointed administrator. Interestingly, such a structure is similar to what appears in the German corporate reorganisation law. Inspired by the German bankruptcy law, China’s lawmakers expect to use the supervision of the administrator to curb the potential abuse of debtor-in-possession.

3. Creditor Protection in Reorganisation Plans

Under the EBL 2006 Article 79, a reorganisation plan must be proposed within six months, and a three-month extension can be granted by court. To vote on a reorganisation plan, creditors are mandatorily divided into four classes: the secured, employee, tax and unsecured creditor class. The plan is accepted if it has been voted for by both a simple majority in number of creditors and a two-third majority in claims in each class.

To a secured creditor, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, its debt will be fully honoured within the value of encumbered assets. Employee claims are given the priority over tax ones after which the residual value will go to unsecured creditors.

To make sure that creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are protected, the EBL 2006 Article 87 requires that the creditor-best-interest test, according to which creditors must be paid not less than in a hypothetical liquidation, must be passed if a non-consensual reorganisation plan seeks the court approval. At the same time, the absolute priority principle, which allows creditors to be paid before

---

34 See a comprehensive discussion of the US Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession at Warren and Lawrence, supra n 4, Chapter 8 especially.
37 W Wang, “The Draft of the New Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Corporate Governance” (2005) 2 The Jurists 5, 7 (noting that why China’s debtor-in-possession is designed to be supervised by an administrator).
38 The EBL 2006 Article 82.
39 The EBL 2006 Article 84.
40 X Wang, “Improving the Corporate Reorganization Regime” (2010) 10 Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology 28, 33 (noting that the creditor-best-interest test must be passed when a non-
shareholders, must be applied for if a non-consensual reorganisation plan is submitted for court approval.\textsuperscript{41}

It can be argued that there are too many similarities between China’s new corporate reorganisation law and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978, since China heavily borrowed Chapter 11 when making its own corporate rescue law.\textsuperscript{42} But the great challenge to China is how to implement the new law in practice.

\textbf{D. CORPORATE REORGANISATION OF CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES}

Shortly after the EBL 2006 came into force on 1 June 2007, some listed companies in China began to use this law for restructuring. Before reporting the main characters of these cases, two basic criteria used to selecting them should be clarified.

First, this article only focuses on the reorganisation of China’s companies listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which means the reorganisation of China’s companies listed abroad, like Hong Kong, Singapore and the USA, are not included,\textsuperscript{43} since the latter is somewhat processed in a different way. By this benchmark, for instance, the reorganisation of Zhejiang Glass Limited,\textsuperscript{44} a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is not included in this study.

Second, this article investigates the reorganisation of companies which are still listed at the time of reorganisation. This means that the reorganisation of companies which have been delisted before the commencement of the reorganisation procedure is excluded. Take one case for example: the reorganisation of Shenyang Tehuan Limited, which took place in 2011, is excluded, since the company had been long delisted from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 2004. In fact, up until now, there are only two such cases after the EBL 2006 came into force.\textsuperscript{45}

By these two criteria, this article identifies the reorganisations of forty-three China’s domestically listed companies, which were accepted by the Chinese courts between June 1\textsuperscript{st} 2007 and December 31\textsuperscript{st} 2013, as demonstrated in Table 1 below.

\textsuperscript{41} Lee, supra n 5, 969 (noting that the absolute priority principle must be conformed to in a non-consensual reorganization plan under the EBL2006 Article 87).
\textsuperscript{42} See Parry and Zhang, supra n 28, 113.
\textsuperscript{45} One is the Shenyang Tehuan Limited, and the second is Liaoning Zhongliaoh International Limited.
Table 1: China’s Listed Company Reorganisations
(Accepted between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2013)
Source: The Author’s Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Accepted on</th>
<th>Listed at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaohua</td>
<td>The 2nd Intermediate Court, Chongqing</td>
<td>16 November 2007</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingmei</td>
<td>The 3rd Intermediate Court, Chongqing</td>
<td>11 March 2008</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaxing</td>
<td>Xiamen Intermediate Court, Fujian</td>
<td>15 September 2009</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taibai</td>
<td>Jiayuguan Intermediate Court, Gansu</td>
<td>30 November 2011</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua</td>
<td>Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>12 October 2012</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuangzhi</td>
<td>Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>12 August 2010</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualong</td>
<td>Yangjiang Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>10 March 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejian</td>
<td>Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>8 October 2011</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taifeng</td>
<td>Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>10 November 2009</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenrun</td>
<td>Shenzhen Intermediate Court, Guangdong</td>
<td>14 April 2010</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingtai</td>
<td>Panyu Lower Court, Guangzhou, Guangdong</td>
<td>11 March 2009</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beishen</td>
<td>Beihai Intermediate Court, Guangxi</td>
<td>27 November 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baoshuo</td>
<td>Baoding Intermediate Court, Hebei</td>
<td>3 January 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuanghua</td>
<td>Chuangzhou Intermediate Court, Hebei</td>
<td>16 November 2007</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixian</td>
<td>Chende Intermediate Court, Hebei</td>
<td>10 November 2008</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiya</td>
<td>Ha’erbin Intermediate Court, Heilongjiang</td>
<td>28 January 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangming</td>
<td>Yichun Intermediate Court, Heilongjiang</td>
<td>9 November 2009</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xin’an</td>
<td>Jiaozuo Intermediate Court, Henan</td>
<td>7 November 2008</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianfa</td>
<td>Jinzhou Intermediate Court, Hubei</td>
<td>13 August 2007</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianyi</td>
<td>Jinzhou Intermediate Court, Hubei</td>
<td>12 August 2007</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deheng</td>
<td>Liaoysuan Intermediate Court, Jilin</td>
<td>13 April 2010</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanbao</td>
<td>Changchun Intermediate Court, Jilin</td>
<td>16 November 2007</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shijian</td>
<td>Yunbian Intermediate Court, Jilin</td>
<td>30 December 2011</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danhua</td>
<td>Dandong Intermediate Court, Liaoning</td>
<td>13 May 2009</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingchen</td>
<td>Jinchao Intermediate Court, Liaoning</td>
<td>22 May 2012</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Accepted on</th>
<th>Listed at</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jinhua</td>
<td>Huludao Intermediate Court, Liaoning</td>
<td>19 March 2010</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxia</td>
<td>Yinchuan Intermediate Court, Ningxia</td>
<td>16 September 2010</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changling</td>
<td>Baoji Intermediate Court, Shaanxi</td>
<td>14 May 2008</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pianzhuan</td>
<td>Xianyan Intermediate Court, Shaanxi</td>
<td>25 November 2009</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingling</td>
<td>Tongchuan Intermediate Court, Shaanxi</td>
<td>23 August 2009</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiufa</td>
<td>Yantai Intermediate Court, Shaanxi</td>
<td>28 September 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailong</td>
<td>Weifang Intermediate Court, Shandong</td>
<td>18 May 2012</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongshen</td>
<td>Xi’an Intermediate Court, Shaanxi</td>
<td>27 October 2011</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huayuan</td>
<td>The Second Intermediate Court, Shanghai</td>
<td>27 September 2008</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanfa</td>
<td>The second intermediate court, Shanghai</td>
<td>30 August 2010</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fangxiang</td>
<td>Neijiang Intermediate Court, Sichuan</td>
<td>7 December 2010</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingding</td>
<td>Leshan Intermediate Court, Sichuan</td>
<td>23 September 2011</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haina</td>
<td>Hangzhou Intermediate Court, Zhejiang</td>
<td>14 September 2007</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changhang</td>
<td>Wuhan Intermediate Court, Hubei</td>
<td>26 November 2013</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongda</td>
<td>Wuxi Intermediate Court, Jiangsu</td>
<td>26 April 2013</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingye</td>
<td>Huludao Intermediate Court, Liaoning</td>
<td>31 January 2013</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianchen</td>
<td>Xining Intermediate Court, Qinghai</td>
<td>18 June 2013</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongji</td>
<td>The 6th Intermediate Court, Xinjiang Army</td>
<td>19 October 2012</td>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Twenty-five of these companies are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and eighteen on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below. Their main characters can be summarised as follows.
1. Bureaucracy in Commencing a Listed Company Reorganisation Procedure in China

Under the EBL 2006 Article 2, in theory, it is quite simple and straightforward to commence a reorganisation procedure: both the company and its creditors can file for reorganisation before a court if the company is bankrupt or is likely to be bankrupt, as noted before, and the court is liable to accept or reject the filing within fifteen days; in the event of rejection, under the EBL 2006 Article 12, an appeal can be made to a higher court. But in reality meeting these terms is not enough to commence a listed company reorganisation procedure, and the following extra requirements must be met.

First, a local court must get the permission of the China Supreme People’s Court before accepting a listed company reorganisation filing. Such a restriction only applies for listed companies. Literally, this restriction cannot be found in the EBL 2006.

To identify the origin of this restriction, this article managed to find a conference speech made on 30 May 2007 by the then deputy president of the China Supreme People’s Court, Mr Xi Xiaoming. Mr Xi stated that local courts must obtain the Supreme Court’s permission before accepting a listed company reorganisation filing.  

Five years later, in 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated this requirement in a judicial notice. But, up until now, there has not been any justification publicly disclosed by the Court.

Little is known about the real intention of the Supreme Court to setting up such a restriction. It is a very high barrier, which may deter reorganisation filings, thereby against the pro-rescue spirits of

---

**Figure 2: Reorganisations of Chinese Listed Companies (2007-2013)**

Source: the Author's Data Collection

- 42% Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (18)
- 58% Companies Listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (25)

---


the EBL 2006. In fact, under the EBL 2006 Article 10, whether to accept a reorganisation petition is fully at the discretion of a local court, and the law clearly authorises the local court to assess the merits of petitions and to decide whether the reorganisation procedure can be commenced, regardless of a petition for a listed or a private company.

But in reality, China’s local courts are unable – or unwilling – to cite the EBL 2006 Article 10 to defend their statutory discretion, thereby have to seek the permission from the Supreme Court. One of the negative consequences is that it takes too long for these filings to go through the acceptance procedure.

Second, supporting statements in writing from both a local government and the China Securities Regulatory Commission should be presented to the court before the filing can be accepted. Again, this requirement also seems to be unlawful, since its legal basis could not be found on any statutes or official documents. But this unwritten and court-imposed rule matters in reality.

Courts may need support from local governments for a number of reasons. At first, the court needs the local government to tackle potential social stability troubles. More bluntly, this is because the local government is able to deploy police forces, in case of protests caused by disgruntled creditors, employees or individual shareholders in large numbers whose interests may be significantly affected in the reorganisation procedure. In nearly all reorganisation cases in China, there is always heavy riot police presence during the creditors meetings. This reflects the anxiety of China’s authorities over the vulnerability of the Chinese society internally.

Also, for the court, a written supporting statement from the local government can serve as a kind of political guarantee, which could shield the court and especially the judges from being negatively assessed by the Communist Party local committee, in the event of a protest launched by affected parties. Social stability appears to be the top worry of China’s courts. Judges will be disciplined or at least negatively assessed if a case-related protest happens. This is also why China’s courts hesitate to

---

50 See Howson, supra n 3, 955 (arguing that some government agencies in China tend to use internal notices to replace statutes when regulatory actions are taken).
51 The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, “The Survey on China’s Listed Company Reorganizations” the People’s Court Daily, 3 March 2011, 8.
53 See generally S L Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2008).
54 See C F Minzner, “Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in China” (2009-2010) 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 53 (noting that judges in China are assessed by local governments and the results will determine the former’s promotion).
handle cases which involve individuals in large number. Without the special support of the local
government, the court would be too nervous to accept a listed company reorganisation filing, which is
always involved by a large number of individuals who are employees, shareholders or creditors.\textsuperscript{55}

Moreover, for the court, the local government’s involvement can make the reorganisation
procedure run more efficiently. In particular, the local government can persuade or pressure banks,
most of them state-owned and large creditors, to make concession and to vote in favour of the
government-backed reorganisation plan, thereby the reorganisation procedure can be concluded more
quickly.

In many cases, it was quite common for the local government to use the China Banking
Regulatory Commission local office to establish an interim bank committee comprising bank creditors.
This committee will lead all banks involved to take a coordinated action especially in voting on the
reorganisation plan. Securing the local government support largely means having secured the support
from large creditors. This can make the court more comfortable in conducting the reorganisation
procedure.\textsuperscript{56}

Turning to the support of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, because this
Commission has, through the two Stock Exchanges, a final say as to whether a listed company
reorganisation proposal or plan meets the listing requirements,\textsuperscript{57} the courts will have intense
communications with the Commission to make sure that the approved reorganisation plans meet the
regulatory requirements as well as to avoid embarrassment in case that the court-approved
reorganisation plans are not recognised by the Commission.

Soliciting the support from these three major public authorities can be quite time-consuming. It
should be noted that all the permissions must be substantially requested by the applicant who files for
reorganisation rather than by the court. This begs the question which party could afford to do so.

2. Applicants of China’s Listed Company Reorganisations

Under the EBL 2006 Articles 7 and 70, as noted before, a reorganisation procedure can be entered
into through two different routes. Out of all forty-three cases, it is found that there were six cases
(14\%) converted from existing liquidation procedures, three of them requested by the debtor and the
other three by the shareholder. The remaining thirty-seven reorganisations (86\%) were directly-filed.

\textsuperscript{55} See N C Howson, “Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts”, in R
Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China (Cambridge University Press 2010) (noting that “even in the
context of corporate law application, Chinese courts may be seen acting in the service of state or party policy
and in contravention of the law”).

\textsuperscript{56} Zhang and Booth, supra n 24, 11-2 (noting that judges need extra government support in handling
corporate bankruptcy cases in China).

\textsuperscript{57} See generally G Chen and others, “Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger?
Evidence from Enforcement Actions” (2005) 24 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 451 (describing the
relation between China’s two stock exchanges and the China Securities Regulatory Commission).
Out of these thirty-seven directly-filed, thirty-six of them (97%) were filed by the creditors. Bearing in mind that the six conversion cases were also originally filed by the creditors, hence, in total, as illustrated in Figure 3, forty-two out of these forty-three reorganisation cases (98%) were initiated by the creditors.

![Figure 3: Applicants of China's Listed Company Reorganisations (2007-2013)](source: The Author's Data Collection)

2% Filed by Creditor (42 Cases)
98% Filed by Debtor (1 Case)

Is this a sign that creditors in China had the initiative in using the new corporate reorganisation law for a rescue outcome? If so, it can be a strong indicator that creditors would be well protected in the subsequent reorganisation procedures. Since this question is firmly related with one of this article’s arguments on creditor protection, a closer inspection is needed. Who were these filing creditors?

In spite of the difficulties in unveiling the status of these creditor applicants, this article managed to find that most of them were the related or inside parties. By delving in the debtors’ annual reports and the relevant newspaper coverage, this article identifies that at the very least twenty-two of these thirty-seven filing creditors (61%) were the debtors’ subsidiaries, shareholders or connected parties. They were not ordinary creditors. For instance, in the reorganisation case of Xiaxing Electronics Limited, according to the company’s disclosed reorganisation materials, it seems that there was no connection between the company and the filing creditor, Xiamen Huoju Group Limited. However, after trawling through the archive of the company’s annual reports, it soon transpired that Huoju was in fact one of the company’s main shareholders.

To the rest of the filing creditors, their status remains missing. But in view of the barriers in commencing a listed company reorganisation procedure, this article ventures to speculate that most of them were likely to be insiders or connected parties; namely, to ordinary creditors, it appears to be

---

insurmountable to pushing a defaulting listed company into reorganisation in China. This may cast a shadow on creditor protection.

Why did these reorganisations prefer to use the creditors’ name to file? There are a number of reasons.

At first, filing under the name of a creditor can avoid convening an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders. Under China’s Company Law 2005 Article 38, a special resolution must be passed by an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders if the debtor company voluntarily files for reorganisation. Given that a listed company usually has tens of thousands of general public shareholders, convening a meeting at such a scale takes time and incurs extra costs (though in practice a small number of them will attend such a meeting). More importantly, the company must face the uncertainties regarding the voting outcome if the meeting is held.

In the face of this burden, if the debtor can find an alternative to circumvent this, and if there is a creditor that the company can influence or control, undoubtedly the company will choose the creditor to file. The alternative is an easier way to avoid costs as well as uncertainties.

Meanwhile, using a creditor to file for reorganisation can also avoid one of the filing hurdles exclusively imposed on debtors. Under the EBL 2006 Article 8, if reorganisation is filed for by the debtor, the debtor is liable to prepare and present a plan explaining how to deal with employee layoffs, potential or real. The court assesses whether the layoff plan is appropriate and will then decide whether to accept or reject the filing. But such an employment protection plan is not required if the reorganisation petition is lodged by a creditor. Hence, for both costs and convenience considerations, the debtor will do whatever it can to find a friendly creditor to give a hand.

Moreover, and more subtly, filing for reorganisation under the name of a creditor can also alleviate the accusation of bankruptcy abuse. This could only be understood in the context of China’s bankruptcy system. Although corporate bankruptcy in China has a very short history, it has long been accused of being abused by debtors, especially former SOEs backed by China’s local governments. If a bankruptcy procedure is initiated by the debtor, creditors tend to be more sceptical about the potential abuse. In other words, a voluntary bankruptcy filing by the debtor is likely to invite accusation. In response, the debtor will try to use a creditor to file, since this can create an impression that the debtor is forced to enter into a bankruptcy procedure rather than proactively seeks to use bankruptcy. Clearly, to this end, the availability of a creditor who the debtor can control would be fit for purpose.

---


61 See Q Bao, “Shanghai Has No Bankruptcy Abuse Case” People’s Daily, 22 January 2002, 1 (noting the widespread bankruptcy abuses in China, especially the bankruptcy of SOEs backed by conniving local governments).
Thus, using a creditor to file for reorganisation does bring the procedural convenience for the debtor, but it may do little to the effectiveness or achievability of reorganisations.

3. Local Governments in Control of Most Listed Company Reorganisations

Under the EBL 2006 Article 13, if a reorganisation filing is accepted, an administrator will be simultaneously appointed by the court to replace the debtor and to take control of the company’s businesses and assets. As to administrator candidacy, under Article 24, there are two options: a local-government-organized liquidation committee or a licensed insolvency professional agency, including law or accounting firms.

Regarding the administrator appointments in these forty-three cases, as shown in Figure 4 below, it is found that thirty-six of them (84%) saw the appointment made from the local-government-organized liquidation committee, and the remaining seven appointments (16%) from the licensed professional agencies. This suggests that the local governments dominated most of these administrator appointments.

As for the composition of the local-government-organized committees, first, without doubt, most individual members were officials from different local government departments. A typical case is the reorganisation of Guangxi Beisheng Pharmaceutical Limited in which eleven out of the thirteen committee members were the officials from the nine local government departments, including the legal, auditing, labour, economy, infrastructure, land, business and banking authority.62

Second, all these committees were chaired by a local senior official, such as a deputy mayor of the city. For example, in the aforementioned Beisheng case, it was the deputy mayor, Mr Wen Zhen, of the local Baihai City Government, Guangxi Province who headed the liquidation committee. In the

---

case where there was state equity, usually the director or deputy-director of the local state-assets-management authority would chair the committee. In the reorganisation of Xianyan Pianzhuan Limited, for example, it was Mr Wu Lishen, the director of the local Xianyan City State-Assets-Management Authority, who presided at the committee.63

Third, given that reorganisation always involves legal issues, most of these committees hired lawyers as committee members for advice.64 For example, in the reorganisation of Jin Hua Group Chloro-Alkali Limited, Mr Yanling Liu, a lawyer from the Beijing-based law firm King&Wood was hired as one of the committee members.65

In the rest of these committees where lawyers were not given the membership, it could be easily identified that lawyers were instead hired as legal counsels rather than as committee members in aid of reorganisation affairs. For example, in the reorganisation of Xinjiang Chalkis Limited, the lawyers from a Guangzhou-based law firm were contracted by the liquidation committee to advise the case, although they were not formally appointed as the liquidation committee members.66 Lawyer service was always needed, though they participated in different ways.

For courts, however, appointing a local-government-organized liquidation committee as the listed company reorganisation administrator remains very controversial in China.

On the one hand, admittedly, the EBL 2006 Article 24 does allow the court to appoint such a committee as the administrator. But, as argued by two prominent Chinese bankruptcy scholars, Professors Li Shuguang67 and Wang Xinxin,68 who were also the draftsmen of the EBL 2006, the real intention of Article 24 is to reserve such committees only for the bankruptcy of state owned enterprises (SOEs); in other words, for the reorganisation case of a non-SOE company, the court must appoint a licensed professional agency as the administrator. Although most listed companies in China are former SOEs, strictly speaking, they are no longer SOEs after being listed on the stock exchanges. They have become public companies. Therefore, it seems to be against the legislative intention of Article 24 for the court to make such appointments.

---

64 See Booth, supra n 27, 293-3 (noting that it was rare for lawyers to be included as government-organized liquidation committee members which dealt with the bankruptcy of SOEs in the past under the EBL 1986 in China)
68 X Wang, “Problems of Enhancing China’s Insolvency Practitioner System” (2010) 9 Legal Research (Fa Zhi Yan Ju) 14. See also Parry and Zhang, supra n 28, 130 (arguing that appointing a local-government-organized liquidation committee was retained for the bankruptcy of SOEs in the EBL 2006).
On the other hand, in most cases, appointing these committees may also lead to a conflict of interest and allegedly violates the EBL 2006 Article 24. To ensure the neutrality of an administrator, Article 24 stipulates that any party who has a direct interest in the reorganisation is proscribed from being appointed. However, as noted, most Chinese listed companies have state shares and even half of them are directly equity controlled by the state. In these circumstances, appointing a local-government-organized liquidation committee as the administrator largely means appointing one shareholder to do the job. Clearly, these appointments seem to be unlawful.

Interestingly, although in China it still remains a taboo to specifically criticize authorities in public, the above rampant breaches were immediately pointed out by China’s shareholder activists, who accused, on internet blogs, that it is a breach of the EBL 2006 Article 24 for courts to make such appointments. Unfortunately, the key weakness of China’s legal system is that many institutions, including government-controlled law courts, do not treat laws seriously, as a result of which these alleged breaches remain widespread in listed company reorganisations.

Despite most cases using a local-government-organized liquidation committee as the administrator, it is not the end of the story, since the debtor-in-possession may, as mentioned previously, in theory, be requested and granted by the court, which means the local government would cede control to the debtor, and this may somewhat alleviate the state dominance. But, in practice, it is another story.

This article finds that, as indicated in Figure 5, out of these forty-three reorganisations were there only nine cases (21%) where debtor-in-possession was requested and granted; accordingly, in the majority of the cases (79%), the administrator remained in control. In other words, the landscape of the local government dominance in China’s listed company reorganisations has not been substantially changed by the theoretical prospect of debtor-in-possession.

---

69 J Sanhu, “The Seven-Day Ordeal of Lodging a Petition in Harbin” http://lzbb600705.blog.163.com/blog/static/102776088200982071750660/ accessed on 2 November 2014 (describing the insurmountable difficulty of a retail shareholder activist lodging a petition in an effort to revoke the court’s appointment of the administrator from the local-government-organized liquidation committee in the reorganization of Beiya Limited, in which the state was the controlling shareholder).

70 See Y Li, “Misunderstanding and Misuse of China’s Corporate Reorganization Regime, A Case of Beiwen in Zhengzhou” (2001) 3 Financial Law Forum 11, 17 (arguing that laws are not always treated seriously by many state institutions in China). See also the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2014 (the World Justice Project 2014) 14-5 (ranking China as low as the 92nd of 99 countries in the world as to constraints on government powers). The weakness of China’s legal system can also be understood by reading an excellent article at S Lubman, “Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years” (2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 383.

71 See Ren, “The Control Model in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice” supra n 5, 180 (describing the likelihood of the DIP under China’s EBL 2006).
In many cases, the administrator- rather than debtor-in-possession seems to be the only one realistic option, since at least sixteen out of all cases (37%) saw the company’s business operation having ceased before the commencement of reorganisation. This suggests that many formal rescues were launched too late, and that it was impractical to rely on the debtor itself to conduct the rescue by granting debtor-in-possession. Terminating the business operation was largely accompanied with the departure of the key members of the debtor’s managing team.

Moreover, bearing in mind that the governments are the major shareholders of most China’s listed companies, for debtor companies, there might be no difference between requesting debtor-in-possession and not. Before the reorganisation procedure, the government controls the listed company as the controlling shareholder, and after the formal rescue procedure commences, the government maintains its control under the name of the administrator. Therefore, to the debtor, it may not be fit for purpose to apply for debtor-in-possession: most of them are continuously controlled by the governments, no matter of being in or out of reorganisation.

Although there were nine cases using debtor-in-possession, they largely existed in name only. That is to say: The debtor-in-possession was granted, but the key decisions were still made by the administrator. For example, in the case of Shaanxi Pianzhuan Limited, it was the administrator, the government-organised liquidation committee let by the local Xianyang State-Assets-Management Authority, rather than the debtor who made the key decision of the reorganisation issues, including choosing the company buyer, although the debtor-in-possession was artificially sanctioned. In most cases, with debtor-in-possession granted, instead of being allowed to fully control the company, the

---


debtor was mainly retained to maintain the day-to-day business operation. The control has been lost to the administrator, and it has never really returned.\textsuperscript{74}

To sum up, it was overwhelmingly the local government that controlled the listed company reorganisation in China. This may pose considerable threat to the protection of creditors and minority shareholders and affect how the value of these companies is equitably distributed.

4. Value Distribution in China’s Listed Company Reorganisations

With respect to value distribution, at the policy level, China might have the most liberal legal framework on this. Under the EBL 2006 Articles 81 and 87, the two fundamental value distribution norms, the pari passu and absolute priority principles, which are compulsory in liquidation, are only treated as the default rules in reorganisation.\textsuperscript{75} That is to say that affected parties in reorganisation can contract out of these two norms; the other side of the same coin is that if a consensus cannot be reached, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, these two norms must be conformed with.

Before reporting how these two value distribution norms were applied, it seems necessary to look at going-concern value preservation at first. The corporate reorganisation regime would be a total failure if going concern value cannot be preserved.\textsuperscript{76}

This article measures going concern value preservation by calculating the debt recovery rate for creditors. Out of all these forty-three cases, secured debts were fully honoured within the value of encumbered assets, and two classes of priority creditors – employee and tax authority – were also paid in full. This is a huge success by the Chinese standard, since even secured debt could not be fully paid in an ordinary company liquidation or dissolution case in China, according to the World Bank.\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, the recovery rate here is only a matter of unsecured creditors.

Reorganisation is designed to prevent piecemeal liquidation, hence, there was always going-concern value preserved, since liquidation was avoided in all these cases. In particular, zero returns to unsecured creditors have never happened. It is a positive sign of the strength of China’s new corporate reorganisation law.


\textsuperscript{75} See Ren, “Wealth Distribution in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganization Law and Practice” supra n 5, 97 (arguing value distribution in China’s corporate reorganizations)


\textsuperscript{77} According to the World Bank data, in an ordinary liquidation case in China, secured creditors on average recoup thirty-six per cent of their claims. This also means that it is the norm for unsecured creditors to recoup zero in China. See World Bank Group, Doing Business Resolving Insolvency http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency accessed on 14 January 2015.
By compiling the unsecured creditors’ recovery rate of each case, this article finds that the average recovery rate for unsecured creditors was 25.14 per cent, which means on average unsecured creditors recovered 25.14 per cent of their claims in China’s listed company reorganisations. It does reflect a kind of achievement. Specifically, this figure would be more encouraging if compared with the recovery rate for unsecured creditors in China’s company liquidations as a whole.

According to the existing literature, the average recovery rate for creditors, including secured and unsecured creditors, in China’s corporate liquidations is always lower than ten per cent. It is also widely observed that unsecured creditors get zero returns in most corporate liquidation cases in China. Thus, compared with less than ten per cent, the 25.14 per cent found here is something which should be celebrated. Such a figure is also somewhat encouraging even if an international comparison is made.

In the UK, according to an article contributed by Professor Armour and others published in 2012, unsecured creditors on average recovered less than 20.20 per cent in randomly selected administrations (reorganisations), in the USA, one study, which examines Chapter 11s conducted in New York and Arizona from 1995 and 2001, finds that American unsecured creditors on average realised 52 per cent of their claims. The comparison between these three jurisdictions is demonstrated in Figure 6 below, though it should be addressed that such comparison is considerably simplified, since many background factors have not been taken into account.

78 Zhang and Booth, supra n 24, 10 (reporting that at least in Shenzhen the return to creditors in bankruptcy is always less than 10%), Li, supra n 25, 1 (reporting that “the banks recovered only 10.1% of their loans” in Chinese company liquidations, and in view of the fact that some of bank loans were secured, the recovery rate for unsecured debts would be definitely lower than 10%), X Wang, “A Character of Market Economy” (1999) 4 International Trade 37, 38 (reporting that the average recovery rate for creditors, including secured and unsecured, in China’s company liquidations nationwide in 1997 is 6.63%), and T Zhou, China’s Financial Sector Problems: Risks Control and Prevention (Beijing, China Party School Publishing House, 2002) 78 (reporting that in the surveyed bankruptcy cases the banks only recovered 9.30% of their loans in China).
79 See J Yan, “An Analysis of the Low Recovery Rate for Creditors in China’s Corporate Liquidations” People’s Court Daily, 14 August 2014), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/08/id/1364746.shtml accessed on 6 November 2014 (reporting that in the Zaozhuang prefecture of Shandong Province it was the norm for creditors (except employees) to get zero returns in company liquidations from 2002 to 2014).
For example, the UK has a bank-centre corporate financing system, as a result of which many UK companies rely on bank lending secured under various forms of securities including floating charges for financing; in the event of insolvency, the majority of company value goes to meet the claims of secured creditors, most of them banks, at first, which means that little could be left for unsecured creditors. However, the USA has a well-developed equity market, which translates into the fact that many companies use equity markets rather than banks to raise funds, and in the case of bankruptcy because of the application of the absolute priority norm, creditors, especially unsecured ones, are better-positioned. This may explain why unsecured creditors recover higher in US Chapter 11s than in UK administrations.

China’s slightly higher recovery rate for unsecured debt than the UK’s counterpart might be because that the Chinese companies studied here are all listed companies, which can be financially stronger, whereas the UK companies covered by the aforementioned study are ordinary businesses, most of which are small and medium enterprises and might have no substantial assets at the time of insolvency. Overall, this comparison is only aimed to give a glimpse over unsecured debt recovery rates at the international level, rather than to indicate the superiority of any jurisdictions in using corporate reorganization law.

Hence, generally speaking, it can be tentatively concluded that China’s corporate reorganisation law has functioned well in preserving going concern value at least in these listed company reorganisation cases. But preserving value is one thing; distributing it is another. Now, attention turns back to how the value was allocated.

First, as for the application of the pari passu principle, except three reorganisations (Tianfa, Tianyi and Lanbao) which did not publicly disclose the relevant information, as shown in Figure 7, it is found that pari passu was applied in seventeen out of the remaining forty cases (42.5%), and in the rest of cases (57.5%) it was relaxed. It is worth repeating that pari passu was only a concern of unsecured creditors, since all other creditors – secured, employee and revenue – were fully paid, as noted.
In general, the pari passu principle was relaxed in two forms. First, each unsecured claim was broken into several parts, and a variety of recovery rates applied to each of them. It is complex. An example is given to illustrate this. In the case of Xiaxing Electronics Limited, for instance, each unsecured claim was divided into three parts: the first RMB 10,000, the second between RMB 10,000 and RMB 100,000, and the third over RMB 100,000. The full repayment applied for the first RMB 10,000 of each unsecured claim, the second part got a fifty per cent return, and the third part was 6.15 per cent repaid. Under this plan, if an unsecured creditor only had a claim of less than RMB 10,000, it means that this creditor got a full recovery. But for an unsecured creditor having a claim of RMB 1 million, the 100 per cent recovery rate for the first RMB 10,000 was substantially negligible, since the majority of its debt was covered by the lower repayment rate of 6.15 per cent. Under this form, obviously, small unsecured creditors benefited; large ones did not.

Unlike the first form, the second was made exclusively in favour of small unsecured creditors. In this situation, unsecured creditors were regrouped according to the amount of their claims, and different recovery rates were made for different groups. The main point was that small creditors got more. For instance, in the case of Hua Yuan Titanium Dioxide Limited, unsecured creditors were separated into two groups: the first group each of them having the claim of less than RMB 6 million, and the second group each having more than RMB 6 million. The first group was seventy per cent repaid, and the second was 41.69 per cent repaid. Unsecured creditors with relatively smaller claims were particularly favoured.

Whatever the forms of departure, pari passu was relaxed in favour of small unsecured creditors. This begs the question why the administrator, who formulated the plan but was not appointed by small unsecured creditors, tried to please this group of creditors. Two factors may offer a partial explanation.

---

At first, the administrator needed the votes of the small unsecured creditors to pass the reorganisation plan. The number of these small creditors matters. As mentioned, the reorganisation plan is not passed unless it is voted for by a majority of affected parties in number of each class. With the favourable recovery rate and even the full repayment provided, it seems unlikely for the small unsecured creditors to vote down the reorganisation plan. This is what the administrator expected to see. Arguably, these creditors were bribed to vote for the administrator-proposed reorganisation plan.

Second, paying small unsecured creditors more was also aimed to prevent protests or at least to make protests less likely. Again, this could only be understood in the context of China. Chinese creditors may protest in the court house or directly march to the government if they feel badly treated. This scenario is precisely what the local government and the court are afraid of and will do their best to avoid. Protests are treated seriously as political threats to the one-party regime. Paying some creditors in full or more favourably is clearly a divide-and-conquer strategy, since the creditors who are paid in full will leave, which can in turn reduce the number of potential trouble-makers. The administrator, behind whom are the local government and the court, decided to pay some creditors more to buy peace.

This strategy worked very well in some cases. For example, in the reorganisation of Guangxi Beishen Pharmacy Limited, under its proposed reorganisation plan, the first RMB50,000 of each unsecured claim was fully repaid, and this meant that 122 out of all 226 unsecured creditors (54%) got the full recovery. So, with over half of unsecured creditors financially satisfied entirely, even if there was a protest, at least its scale could be more manageable or containable for both the court and the local government.

But the real concern here is that the local government under the name of the administrator was using the money of large unsecured creditors to pursue its own agenda. And the same tactic was also used in dealing with the absolute priority principle.

Turning to the absolute priority principle, compared with the departure from pari passu, which happened in some half of all cases, the departure from absolute priority was the norm rather than the exception in all these cases. Precisely, in all forty-three listed company reorganisations, shareholders

---

83 See J R Franks, K G Nyborg and W N Torous, “A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency Codes” (1996) 25 Financial Management 86, 94-5 (noting that in Germany occasionally small unsecured creditors are paid in full to secure the approval of the reorganization plan).
84 C F Minzner, “China’s Turn Against Law” (2011) 59 The American Journal of Comparative Law 935, 946 (noting that in China land seizures and corporate reorganizations of failed enterprises may generate mass citizen discontent or social unrest).
retained part or whole of their equity in the reorganized company, although creditors, especially unsecured creditors, were not paid in full.

By and large, the departure was operated in two ways. First, the equity of shareholders remained intact, whereas unsecured creditors had to fully shoulder reorganisation costs. This occurred in nine out of all forty-three cases (21%). For example, in the case of Guangdong Hualong Groups Limited, the equity of all shareholders was untouched, while the unsecured creditors only recovered thirteen per cent of claims each.87 It should be noted that most of such deviations happened in the years of 2007 and 2008, when the EBL 2006 was first implemented. As time went on, presumably, it was increasingly realised that this way was excessively unfair to creditors; then the second way emerged later.

In the second way (taking place in the remaining 79% of cases), instead of being shielded from bearing any costs, shareholders were required to concede part of their equity to increase the unsecured debt recovery rate. For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, two controlling shareholders surrendered ten per cent of their shares, and the rest of shareholders, including the general public shareholders, conceded eight per cent each; as a result, the returns to the unsecured creditors were increased by 6.31 per cent to 30.67 per cent.88

Unlike the departure from absolute priority in US Chapter 11s, China’s version of the departure seems to have gone too far. In US listed company Chapter 11s, the departure from absolute priority did happen in many cases, but usually only a less than five per cent of the company’s value goes to old equity holders in order to reach a desirable consent.89 In this circumstance, however, the majority of the old equity will be cancelled. On the contrary, in China’s listed company reorganisations, the majority of old equity will be retained. This is the key difference between these two jurisdictions.

One may ask the question why the absolute priority principle seemed to be ignored in all these cases. Again, this is because of China’s social stability concerns. As early as April 2006, two months before the EBL 2006 took effect, one senior judge of the China Supreme People’s Court, Mr Song Xiaoming, gave a presentation in a high-level international conference, the 5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), stating that in a listed company reorganisation case “a certain proportion of stock equities should be reserved for medium and small investors (shareholders),” whether the company is solvent or insolvent, and that this is to “perform the function to maintain social stability”.90 In other words, the Supreme Court is of view that in listed company reorganisations the

---

90 X Song, “The Courts Role in Enterprise Bankruptcy Proceedings and Restructuring in China” (5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), Beijing, China, 27-28 April 2006).
absolute priority principle must be relaxed in the interest of medium and small shareholders. Presumably, Song’s speech has been circulated to all Chinese courts, since except this document, there is no legally-binding bylaw which could be identified to justify the widespread departure from absolute priority in China’s listed company reorganisations.  

But this policy gives rise to two immediate problems. First, it contradicts the EBL 2006 Article 87. Under Article 87, as mentioned before, absolute priority is a default rule. In all reorganisation cases, it can be relaxed subject to consent between creditors and shareholders. But the Supreme Court says that in listed company reorganisations it must be relaxed regardless of consent reached or not. This policy is controversial, since it is against the EBL 2006 Article 87.

Second, this policy has been expansively used and even abused by controlling shareholders at the expense of both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders. According to this policy, it is medium and small investors that are given special protection for the sake of preventing social unrest. In the context of China’s securities markets, these investors are the general public who register as investors in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and become shareholders of certain of listed companies. It seems clear that controlling and institutional shareholders are not on this special protection list. But the reality is that all shareholders used this policy to retain their equity.

To sum up, China’s new reorganisation law did show its strength in preserving going concern value in the listed company reorganisations, since at least it doubled the returns to unsecured creditors by avoiding piecemeal liquidations. But concerns are raised in distributing value, as the two fundamental value distributional norms were often relaxed for political considerations. In some cases, the company’s value was distributed quite unfairly. In the event of unfairness, the court is empowered to correct this when approving the reorganisation plan at the last stage.

5. Court Approval of Reorganisation Plans

As noted, there are two different procedures made to approve consensual and non-consensual reorganisation plans respectively. For a consensual one that has been accepted by all classes of affected parties through a vote, under the EBL 2006 Article 86, the court will approve it if it generally complies with the EBL 2006. Article 86 does not specify what criteria the reorganisation plan must

---

91 See Howson, supra n 3, 971 (noting some law enforcement guidelines issued by China’s administrative authorities are directly contrary to the statute).

By contrast, where there is a non-consensual reorganisation plan that has been voted down by one or more than one class of affected parties, the EBL 2006 Article 87 provides a list of conditions for the plan to meet. If the plan fails to meet one of them, the court will reject the plan and force the company into liquidation. This article summarizes these conditions as the four tests, which are very similar to those in the US Chapter 11s.\(^{94}\)

The first is the creditor-best-interest test, which requires that creditors be paid not less than in a hypothetical liquidation; the second is the pari passu test, which stipulates that creditors within the same class (mainly unsecured creditor class) must be paid pro rata; the third is the absolute priority test, which indicates that absolute priority must be complied with;\(^{95}\) the final is the feasibility test, which, as demonstrated by its name, means that the plan must be feasible.\(^{96}\) If all of these four tests are passed, the court may approve – and force dissenting parties to accept – the reorganisation plan. In the language of the corporate reorganisation law, it is called a cram-down approval.

In these forty-three cases, all reorganisation plans were approved by the courts; no rejection has been found. In other words, the court confirmation of reorganisation plans seemed to be guaranteed in China. In particular, the normal approval was used in thirty-one cases (72%), and the cram-down approval was seen in the remaining twelve cases (28%).

To the thirty-one normal approvals, at first glance, the court seemed to have done the right things, since all classes of affected parties had voted for the proposed plan. But great unfairness might be hidden, and this is mainly because of the oversimplified, deeply-flawed EBL 2006 Article 82 on how to form the class of unsecured creditors.\(^{97}\)

Under Article 82, creditors are divided into four classes – secured, employee, tax and unsecured – to vote on a reorganisation plan. But the key problem of this Article is that it is silent on whether an unsecured creditor who is an insider should abstain from voting as an ordinary unsecured creditor, or

---

93 X Wang, “Theories and Practices of Corporate Reorganization” (2012) 11 Journal of Law Application (Fa Lv Shi Yun) 10, 15 (noting that the EBL 2006 is silent on the criteria which a court can use to approve a consensual reorganization plan).
94 Warren and Westbrook, supra n 4, Chapter 8 especially.
95 Wang, supra n 93, 18 (noting that absolute priority must be complied with in the case of a cram-down approval under the EBL 2006 Article 87).
96 These tests are probably directly borrowed from the Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978. See 11 USC Sec. 1129, and see a detailed discussion on this at K N Klee, “All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code” (1979) 53 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 133, 136-7 (describing the similar tests used by American bankruptcy courts to assess reorganization plans).
97 See Falke, supra n 33, 74 (noting that many gaps are left in the EBL 2006 and may lead to difficulties in the implementation of this law).
whether a new class should be formed to accommodate these insider parties. Without categorizing unsecured creditors further, the majority rule is artificially followed, but in substance, the voting outcome might be manipulated by the insiders under the guise of the ordinary unsecured creditors. The China Supreme People’s Court knows this, but no any policy action has been made until now. 

Realistically, although China has no formal claim-subordination rules, courts can use the general principle of equity embedded in China’s Civil Law 1986 Article 4 to restrict insiders from voting as ordinary unsecured creditors.

A typical case can demonstrate the potential inequity caused by not excluding insiders from the class of unsecured creditors. In the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, the largest unsecured creditor, Shenzhen Guoshen Energy Limit, holding the RMB 0.46 billion debt representing twenty-six per cent of the unsecured claims, was included in the class of unsecured creditors to vote, but Guoshen was also the company’s controlling shareholder. With debtor-in-possession granted in this case, it means that the reorganisation plan was made by Guoshen and then was substantially approved by itself but under a different name as an ordinary unsecured creditor. Inevitably, the voting result had been considerably affected, if not manipulated, by Guoshen. For the purpose of equity, ideally, Guoshen should be barred from voting as an ordinary unsecured creditor at least.

Turning to the twelve cram-down approvals, unfortunately, they are the real negative examples of China’s version of the rule of law. As mentioned before, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, a cram-down approval cannot be sanctioned if the absolute priority test is not passed. But, given the automatic departure from absolute priority in all China’s listed company reorganisations, clearly, all cram-downs here violated the EBL 2006, because they failed in passing the absolute priority test. The most serious concern is that some cram-downs were in fact supported and agreed with by the

---


99 M Liu and H Chi, “Cram-downs in Chinese Company Reorganization” (2011) 10 Journal of Law Application 81, 85 (the author Min Liu is a judge in China’s Supreme Court, and he noticed the widespread abuses made by insiders as unsecured creditors when voting on the reorganization plan).


China Supreme People’s Court, according to Professor Li Shuguang, a leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar.  

Moreover, in these twelve cram-downs, at least there were six cases where the pari passu principle was also relaxed; again, it was a violation of the EBL2006 Article 87, since they failed in passing the pari passu test noted above.

With respect of the creditor-best-interest test, it seems that this test was passed in all cram-down cases. In all reorganisations, there was a routine assets valuation procedure. Licensed auditors were hired to evaluate the liquidation value of the companies. At least from reading these reorganisation plans, unsecured creditors were always paid more than in liquidation. For example, the unsecured creditors of Hebei Baoshuo Limited recovered thirteen per cent of their claims each, whereas according to the assets evaluation report, they could only recover 10.12 per cent if the company was liquidated.

As for the feasibility test, sine it is considerably subjective in nature, most courts seemed to be unable to make a real judgement. In reality, it was more a kind of formality for judges to insert a brief statement in the reorganisation approval document that “the court is of view that the plan is feasible.” In fact, no substantial assessment was made. Professor Zou Hailin, another leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar, argued that assessing the feasibility of a reorganisation plan involves business judgement and is beyond what judges as legal professionals can do. Very few judges are business-minded, which means the feasibility test is largely not used in practice.

After approving the reorganisation plan, the court will close the judicial reorganisation procedure, and the debtor is liable to execute the reorganisation plan. Under the EBL 2006 Article 90, the administrator supervises the plan’s execution.

To summarise, several main characters of the implementation of China’s listed company reorganisations can be learnt. First, most of these cases were politically driven, since local governments played the key role in supporting the commencement of these cases and in controlling these companies in the reorganisation process under the name of bankruptcy administrators. Second, these cases reflected the less-developed rule of law in China, since many statutory rules were not respected by public authorities including law courts. Third, the corporate reorganisation law itself did show its strength in preserving going concern value by preventing piece-meal liquidations, since the debt recovery rate was considerably increased compared with in liquidations. But great unfairness lied

---

107 The EBL 2006 Article 89.
in distributing the preserved value. The following parts turn to the questions who are winners and losers.

E. ARE UNSECURED CREDITORS AND GENERAL PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS WINNERS?

The answer looks to be affirmative. To unsecured creditors, on the one hand, bearing in mind the creditor-best-interest test, all of them were paid more than in liquidation, as reported above. On the other hand, on average, they recovered 25.14 per cent of their claims, whereas their counterparts in liquidations could only recoup less than ten per cent. To general public shareholders, the majority of their equity was retained, and they were only in some cases required to sacrifice a small portion of their equity to pacify unsecured creditors, but they would have lost everything if these companies had had been liquidated. Thus, on the face of it, both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders seemed to be the winners or beneficiaries, but this article points to the contrary.

1. Unsecured Creditors Were Losers

An early study shows that the average unsecured creditors’ recovery rate in Chinese corporate reorganisations as a whole, including both listed and private company reorganizations, amounts to 33.67 per cent. In view of the two different recovery rates, one question arises: Why the unsecured creditors in listed company reorganizations recover 25.14 per cent, but the national average for both listed and private company reorganizations is 33.67 per cent? Listed companies are supposed to financially stronger, because in China only the very healthy companies are selected to be listed, and because the performance of these companies is constantly monitored by the regulators to ensure adequate protection of investors. In turn the unsecured creditors’ recovery rate is supposed to be higher instead?

One of the causes is soon spotted: Unsecured creditors in these cases were served with a low recovery rate partly because the absolute priority principle was routinely circumvented.

As noted, for political considerations, the China Supreme People’s Court does not acknowledge absolute priority as a default rule in listed company reorganizations. Instead, the Court makes clear that the absolute priority principle must give way to maintaining social stability, thereby this

110 See generally Fan, Wong and Zhang, supra n 2, 330.
111 The EBL 2006 Article 87.
fundamental value distribution norm is put upside down. Inevitably, unsecured creditors bear the brunt of the Court’s decision.

This article finds that if the absolute priority principle could have had been complied with, the average unsecured debt recovery rate could be increased from the current 25.14 per cent to 86.51 per cent, and in twenty-five out of all forty-three cases (61%) the unsecured creditors could get the full recovery. How are these figures generated?

To count how much more the unsecured creditors could get, it is vital to determine the share price when the company is in the process of reorganisation. This article mainly refers to the price-measuring methods used in the existing reorganisation cases.

Following this approach, if the share price is set in the reorganisation plan, this article simply uses it to calculate the equity value of the company. In the case where the share price is not shown in the reorganisation plan, this article uses either the closing price at the date when trading was suspended by the Exchange or the opening price at the date when the company resumed trading, depending on which price is publicly available. In addition, in some cases, the share price was generated from the average price traded during the period of twenty market days prior to its suspension. Choosing these methods is also because they were used and preferred by many administrators in calculating share prices in other reorganization plans; in general, there is not a uniform method to do so.

In addition, using the above share prices is also intended to make this article’s argument more conservative and robust, since in most cases the share prices soared after the conclusion of the reorganization procedure; if the post-reorganization share price, which is always far higher than the aforementioned depressed prices, is selected to calculate how much should go to creditors, the vast majority of these cases may see the full repayment to all unsecured creditors; but this cannot be quite reliable due to the volatility of share prices in the equity market. For the sake of being conservative, this article uses the above methods to count what unsecure creditors are entitled, which are obviously less controversial. The counting methods are very complex, and they are listed in detail in Appendix 1.

By such methods, for example, in the case of Beishen Pharmacy Limited, the share price was fixed at RMB3.00 per share in the reorganisation plan. Each shareholder was required to surrender twenty-three per cent of the shares to increase the recoveries for unsecured creditors. As a result, unsecured creditors got a 50.44 per cent recovery. But the real problem is that if the absolute priority principle could be conformed to, the equity value of RMB 911 million retained in the hands of the old shareholders could be enough to pay the cancelled unsecured debt of RMB 515 million. In other words, in the Beishen case, the unsecured debt recovery rate should be 100 per cent rather than the current 50.44 per cent if the absolute priority principle was complied with.
After obtaining all assumed recovery rates in these cases, this article reaches the estimated figure that the average unsecured recovery rate should be at 86.51 per cent rather than the present 25.14 per cent. Unsecured creditors were not winners; instead they might be the largest losers.

Some may ask a firmly-related question why the company’s equity was still valuable after the company had been financially bankrupt. At this point, equity is presumed to be worth nothing. It is strange indeed. Such a phenomenon does, however, exist in China; or it reflects the Chinese characters of its socialist market economy. In substance, the company’s equity value is mainly because of its license to float on the stock exchange, which is called the shell value. Being allowed to float on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchange is more like a permanent membership. With delistings rarely taking place, the equity of these companies were still highly valuable.

The second question is why unsecured creditors were so disadvantaged. A number of reasons can explain. At first, as mentioned before, all these cases were substantially initiated by the debtors themselves. Creditors, especially unsecured creditors, were quite passive as to whether or when the reorganisation procedure could be launched. In other words, it was the intention and the initiative of the debtor to use the reorganisation procedure, thus naturally it was unlikely for the debtor-initiated reorganisation procedure to be pursued in favour of creditors.

Second, the reorganisation process was largely out of the creditors’ control, which made them quite vulnerable. As noted, in most of the existing cases it was the local-government-organized liquidation committee staying in charge as the administrator. Creditors, including unsecured ones, did not have a say on the appointment. Even the Chinese courts were unable to refuse to appoint such committees, since courts are also somewhat controlled by the governments. Some Chinese judges also complain about this. Admittedly, in theory creditors could request the court to replace the incumbent administrator, but this has never happened in reality. The situation would be worsened by

---


114 The EBL 2006 Article 22.

115 X Jiang, “The Role of Administrators in Corporate Reorganization” in X Wang and Z Yi (eds), The 2nd National Bankruptcy Conference Collection (Beijing, Law Press, 2010) (the judge author argues that sometimes courts are pressured by governments to appoint the latter as administrators). See also Shenzhen People’s Intermediate Court, Report on Handling Corporate Bankruptcy Cases http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/shenwu/view.aspx?id=4207 accessed on 22 September 2012 (the court is of view that courts must resist the pressure from local governments by not appointing the government-organised liquidation committees as administrators in bankruptcy).
the connection between local government and debtor, since in most cases the local government was exactly the controlling shareholder. Arguably, it was a game played by and for the debtor.

Third, as a consequence of being unable to control the reorganisation procedure, information for creditors was scarce; even when certain of the company’s information was available eventually, but it usually reached creditors too late. Without having information of the company, creditors were easy to be manipulated. Under the EBL 2006 Article 61, the administrator is liable to provide an audited report of the company’s assets to the meeting of creditors, but usually such a report was too skeletal for creditors to know how many assets the company really had. For example, in the case of Hebei Dixian Limited, the company had 3,000 hectares of land but only admitted 324 hectares in its assets report; it seemed to be impossible for ordinary creditors to verify such information, thanks to the whistle blower, one of the company’s senior managers, who reported to the China Securities Regulation Commission years later after the reorganisation procedure, otherwise such a fact may be hidden for ever.

The audited reports might lack details, but another problem is that they always reached creditors too late. In practice, creditors were given a bundle of reports only at the time when the meeting of creditors commenced. Without having sufficient time to digest these reports, usually one or two hours later, they were required to vote on the reorganisation plan. Creditors were angry, but they were, in extreme cases, revenged with violence when they voted down a local-government supported reorganisation plan. Arguably, they were threatened to vote yes.

In addition, the disadvantaged position of the unsecured creditors could also be attributed to the weakness of the Chinese courts. Courts are supposed to be the ultimate defenders of law. However, as argued by Professor Howson “Chinese courts may be seen acting in the service of state or party policy and in contravention of the law”. As reported earlier, at the very least, all cram-down approvals issued by the courts were illegal, since these reorganisation plans failed to pass the absolute priority test under the EBL 2006. Unfortunately, the Chinese courts, including the Supreme Court, are unable, or unwilling, to act as the defender of law. The vulnerability of the courts in turn makes the creditors more vulnerable.

---

119 Howson, supra n 55, 138.
2. General Public Shareholders Were Not Winners Either

Like unsecured creditors, general public shareholders were not well protected also because of the lack of representation.

To a large extent, most of the losses of general public shareholders are made by controlling shareholders before reorganisation. As has been complained repeatedly by shareholder activists,120 if the company was not abused by the controlling shareholders, the company would not go bankrupt and did not need to resort to bankruptcy reorganisation for survival. For example, in the case of Shandong Jiufa Food Limited, the company’s financial illiquidity was mainly because its controlling shareholder, Jiufa Group Limited, took away the company’s RMB 0.79 billion cash illegally (tunnelling), as a result of which the company collapsed eventually in 2008.121 Although the Chinese securities regulator has started to crackdown such abuses from years ago, but it seems that it has not gone far enough.122

Turning to the general public shareholders, as mentioned, the company’s equity was entirely kept intact in eleven cases. Thus, it seems at least in these cases, shareholders, especially general public shareholders, were not victimized by reorganisation. But, in the remaining thirty-two cases, which is the focus of this section, the general public shareholders surrendered part of their equity to support the rescue efforts, and this article finds that most of these surrendered shares should not be conceded if the policy intention of the China Supreme People’s Court could be faithfully materialised.

As analysed, the Supreme Court requires that the absolute priority principle should be relaxed in favour of general public shareholders, not for controlling and institutional ones. Again as reported above, this controversial policy was expansively used, since both controlling and institutional shareholders took advantage of this policy at the expense of both unsecured creditors and general public shareholders.

This article finds that in twenty cases the general public shareholders did not need to concede a single share if the absolute priority principle could have applied to the controlling and institutional shareholders (see Appendix 2). In these cases, if all of the controlling and institutional shares were surrendered, these shares would be enough to pay unsecured creditors at the same level, without forcing general public shareholders to concede anything.


For example, in the case of Shenzhen China Bicycle Limited, the general public shareholders were asked to give up 35 million shares to pay the unsecured creditors, and the controlling and institutional shareholders relinquished 11 million shares but retained 98 million shares. It seems clear: If the 98 million shares still possessed by the latter could be conceded according to the absolute priority principle, as a result, the general public shareholders in this case did not need to concede anything.

By this method, with the current unsecured creditor recovery rate remaining unchanged, this article concludes that, in these thirty-two cases where general public shareholders were required to conceded shares, 85.37 per cent of these conceded shares could be prevented if the Supreme Court’s aforementioned policy intention could be fully implemented. Put it in a different way, general public shareholders paid 85.37 per cent more than they were required. They were not winners either.

Why general public shareholders were disadvantaged? They encountered the similar situations faced by unsecured creditors, as analysed before. Even worse, unlike unsecured creditors, general public shareholders have another more acute problem: the collective action dilemma, since they are considerably dispersed. It is quite difficult to coordinate the vast number of these individuals, as it is quite common for a Chinese listed company to have over 40,000 general public shareholders. Coordinating these shareholders is not easy. For example, in the case of Heilongjiang Beiya Limited, only the shareholders representing 426 million shares voted on the reorganisation plan, and the remaining shareholders holding 538 million shares, the vast majority of whom were general public shareholders, were absent at the meeting, notwithstanding the online voting system was also available.

In a nutshell, the unsecured creditors and general public shareholders were not winners in China’s listed company reorganisations.

F. WHO WERE WINNERS?

To a large extent, local governments and controlling shareholders were the main beneficiaries of these reorganisations. Unlike controlling shareholders, local governments benefited from these cases in a subtle and indirect way.

---

124 For example, the reorganized company, Xiamen Xiaxin Electronic Limited, had 54,192 shareholders, most of them general public. See H An and B Ye, “Rehabilitation of Xiaxin through the Reorganization Procedure” People’s Court Daily, 30 August 2011, 3.
125 Heilongjiang Beiya Limited, General Announcement on the Meeting of the Shareholders (Harbin Heilongjiang China, 22 April 2008).
1. Local Governments as Winners

Local governments were likely to be the main winners, since reorganizing these companies served them with both political and economic interests.

This should be understood against the background of China’s political economy. China has thirty-two provincial governments, 333 prefecture governments and 2,861 county governments in the hierarchy. The most active local governments in these cases are at the prefecture level. With only 2,489 domestically listed companies in China, as noted before, this means in theory each prefecture can only have less than eight listed companies. But given the imbalanced economy of China, in fact, some prefectures have fewer. For example, by the end of 2013, the Shenzhen prefecture in the well-developed Guangdong province had 260 listed companies, the Luoyan prefecture in the less-developed Henan province had 10, and the Lu’an prefecture in another less-developed Anhui province had only one. Thus, in practice, there is fierce competition between regions in China to fight for more IPOs and for having more listed companies.

First, on the top of the gains the local government sought was the political image. Under China’s current political climate, the local government, especially its senior political leaders, will lose face if a local company is delisted. To save face, the local government will do whatever it can to maintain the listing of a local company. This may partially explain why the delisting is a very rare phenomenon on China’s stock exchanges. Rescuing a local listed company is a serious political mission. For example, when Guangming Furniture Limited was ready to enter reorganisation in 2010, an official in the Yichun Prefecture Government explicitly told a newspaper “since Guangming is the only one listed company in Yichun, our major government leaders are very serious to rescuing it and will ensure its success by whatever means”. This is also echoed by a recent research, which finds that

---

130 See S Li and Z Wang, “An Empirical Study on Implementing China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law during the First Three Years” (2011) 22 The Journal of China University of Political Science and Law 58 (noting that a local listed company reflects the political image of the local government).
local senior politicians are more likely to be promoted if there are more listed companies in the region. In all these cases, for the local government, its political goal was achieved, since all companies remained the listing status after going through reorganisation.

Second, by rescuing these companies, the local governments were to maintain their own tax bases. In China, taxes are charged and shared between the central and local governments. The central government may pay little attention on where a listed company is located, but local governments do. To this end, this is why the local government will rescue the local listed company at any costs. This is also why in many cases the local government help the listed company to remain balance-sheet healthy through generous subsidies. In all these forty-three cases, it is found that only four companies (Shenrun, Deheng, Danhua and Yuanfa) removed the registered headquarter to where its main business operation took place. It means that the vast majority of them (91%) stayed and continued to contribute taxes to the local governments. As for these four dislocation cases, it remains unknown what kind of deals have been reached between two local governments behind closed doors.

By contrast to these four dislocation cases, there are twelve cases in which the company’s main business operation was in fact removed to the different province, which means that in principle their registered headquarters should follow, but it was not the case. This further convinces this article’s assertion that the local governments were winners, since these companies must pay taxes to the authorities where their registered offices are.

Third, in many cases, local governments were the controlling shareholders. This may also explain why the local courts remained silent when the aforementioned Supreme Court’s general-public-shareholder protection policy was misused by the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholder was the local governments, thus keeping a blind eye seemed to be the best strategy for the courts.

In addition, the local governments’ gains were also reflected at maintaining social stability by using unsecured creditors’ money to bribe the general public shareholders as well as the small unsecured creditors, as mentioned before. And in the existing cases, inevitably, there were still some protests occurring. For example, on 12 December 2011, some general public shareholders of Yinchuan Guangxi Limited travelled to Beijing and protested before the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the protestors even blocked the main gate of the Commission’s building. According to the present political practise in China, it is the local government which is responsible to

---

135 These companies are Chaohua, Hualong, Kejian, Beiya, Guangming, Xing’an, Tianfa, Tianyi, Lanbao, Pianzhuang, Jiu fa and Huayuan.
136 Wang, supra n 132 (reporting that one of the local government’s aims in reorganization is to make the company’s registered office remained unchanged for tax purposes).
bring, either by force or by persuasion, these protestors back to their hometown. This involves costs. Such costs are usually passed to the company ultimately. Though it seems impossible to unfold the size of these costs in each case, this article does find a staggering figure which may give a glimpse.

According to its 2012 annual report, Sichuan Jinding Limited had to pay the local government RMB26,210,000 for the latter’s social stability expenditure during the company’s reorganisation process; presumably, the local Leshan City government used this money to cover all costs incurred from its social stability activities.

2. Controlling Shareholders as Winners

The controlling shareholders were the winners, mainly because they exploited the Supreme Court’s policy by circumventing the absolute priority principle.

First, most of the controlling shareholders’ gains were exactly the losses of unsecured creditors. In other words, the former sought to retain the bulk of their equity at the expense of the latter. In principle, according to the absolute priority principle, shareholders should be at the first line to bear the consequences of the company’s bankruptcy; they are not allowed to receive anything unless creditors, especially unsecured creditors, are fully paid. This principle is also upheld by both China’s bankruptcy and company law, but controlling shareholders backed by local governments misused the controversial policy of the China Supreme People’s Court and transferred almost all costs of reorganisations to unsecured creditors.

As has been calculated, the unsecured debt recovery rate could have been increased from the present 25.14 per cent to 86.51 per cent if the absolute priority principle could be faithfully complied with. Unsecured creditors’ losses were mainly because what they were legally entitled had been grabbed by controlling shareholders. Admittedly, all shareholders, including general public and controlling shareholders, joined the feast, but controlling shareholders took the lion share.

Second, on the side of shareholders, controlling shareholders also used their positions to force general public shareholders to unnecessarily bear the costs of reorganisations. As noted before, in many cases, the general public shareholders did not need to concede a single share if the controlling shareholders were subject to the absolute priority principle; as a result, the relinquished shares by general public shareholders in these cases were their losses, which should be instead born by the controlling shareholders.

It should be noted that the losses and gains are inter-conditional between general public shareholders, controlling shareholders and unsecured creditors. If a metaphor of a food chain could be

---

used, at the top are the controlling shareholders, followed by the general public shareholders, with the unsecured creditors at the bottom.

G. COCLUSIONS

This article has provided an in-depth investigation on how China’s listed companies use the new corporate reorganisation law for restructuring and has answered who are the winners and losers.

One point should be particularly addressed: Enacting and implementing a Chapter 11-style corporate reorganisation law in China has been proved to be a step in the right direction, since an enormous amount of going concern value has been preserved, as reflected in the increased unsecured debt recovery rate. This has been achieved mainly through using reorganisation to avoid piecemeal liquidation. But concerns are raised especially on creditor protection.

To better protect creditors, first, to solve short-term problems, it seems urgent for Chinese courts to stop appointing local-government-organized liquidation committees as administrators in listed company reorganisations. As investigated in this article, most of the local governments are the controlling shareholders, thereby it seems natural for them to place their own interests ahead of creditors. The current imbalance between debtor and creditor could be alleviated by not making such appointments. And, as analysed before, appointing these committees is also against the spirits of the EBL 2006. Ideally, the China Supreme People’s Court could issue a judicial notice correcting the current practice. Meanwhile, creditors should be given a strong voice on the administrator appointment, as the current situation of creditors can largely be attributed to the little control of creditors in Chinese listed company reorganisations.

Second, to solve the problems in the long run, China may strengthen its rule of law. Many problems of creditor protection reported in this article are in fact caused by the less-developed rule of law in China. Many creditor protection rules are clearly written in the EBL 2006, but in reality the public authorities, including law courts, violate them without being held accountable. This cannot be easy.  

Overall, China’s listed company reorganisations also reflect the widely-held observation that China’s current commercial law reform is still “in a two-steps forward, one step backward” process.  

---

### Appendix 1: Assumed Payment Increase to the Unsecured Creditors
June 2007 to 31 December 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Share Price Applied</th>
<th>Absolute-Priority-Principle-Bound Increase of the Unsecured Debt Recovery Rate</th>
<th>Final Recovery Rate for Unsecured Debts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaohua</td>
<td>¥2.72 a share (the average price during the 60 days before being suspended)</td>
<td>83.94%</td>
<td>93.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingmei</td>
<td>¥5.00 a share (the price set in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaxing</td>
<td>¥3.71 a share (the price set in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>34.19%</td>
<td>55.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taibai</td>
<td>¥3.3 a share (priced according to a share deal in the reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>58.31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua</td>
<td>¥2.875 a share (generated from averaging the A and B shares priced in the plan)</td>
<td>69.33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuangzhi</td>
<td>¥4.68 a share (the price set in the reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>84.42%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualong</td>
<td>¥3.65 a share (the price referred in a recent share deal)</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejian</td>
<td>¥11.25 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>47.03%</td>
<td>82.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taifeng</td>
<td>¥8.64 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>79.67%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenrun</td>
<td>¥8.535 a share (generated by averaging the A and B shares priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>69.95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingtai</td>
<td>¥6.9 a share (the price generated from an auction, later the market price was speculated to ¥15.58 a share)</td>
<td>78.23%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beishen</td>
<td>¥3.00 a share (set in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>49.56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baoshuo</td>
<td>¥6.00 a share (priced in its 2008 reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>31.46%</td>
<td>44.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuanghua</td>
<td>¥5 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>38.15%</td>
<td>49.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Share Price Applied</th>
<th>Absolute-Priority-Principle-Bound Increase of the Unsecured Debt Recovery Rate</th>
<th>Final Recovery Rate for Unsecured Debts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dixian</td>
<td>¥2.1 a share (the market price shortly after the reorganisation)</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiya</td>
<td>¥3.5 a share (the average price during the three months before being suspended)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangming</td>
<td>¥12.52 a share (generated from a share transaction during the reorganisation)</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xin’an</td>
<td>¥2.92 a publicly circular share, and ¥1.28 a non-circular share</td>
<td>36.78%</td>
<td>53.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianfa</td>
<td>¥4.445 a share (the average price during the twenty days before being suspended)</td>
<td>82.27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianyi</td>
<td>¥4.33 (the average price during the twenty days before being suspended)</td>
<td>70.82%</td>
<td>80.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deheng</td>
<td>¥5.28 a share (the price of the shares sold to the strategic investor)</td>
<td>58.15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanbao</td>
<td>¥0.88 a share (the average price during the twenty days before being suspended)</td>
<td>12.27%</td>
<td>34.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shijian</td>
<td>¥3.03 a share (the concluding price on the day of opening the reorganisation procedure)</td>
<td>83.24%</td>
<td>93.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danhua</td>
<td>¥3.64 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingchen</td>
<td>¥6.16 a share (the closing price on the day of being suspended)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinhua</td>
<td>¥3.9 a share (the starting price set in a subsequent auction by the company)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxia</td>
<td>¥7 a share (the closing price on the day of being suspended)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changling</td>
<td>¥6.34 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pianzhuan</td>
<td>N/A (already fully paid)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingling</td>
<td>¥5.78 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Share Price Applied</th>
<th>Absolute-Priority-Principle-Bound Increase of the Unsecured Debt Recovery Rate</th>
<th>Final Recovery Rate for Unsecured Debts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiufa</td>
<td>¥2.15 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>15.08%</td>
<td>35.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailong</td>
<td>¥2.93 a share (the closing price on the day of entering reorganisation)</td>
<td>36.12%</td>
<td>76.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongshen</td>
<td>¥4.32 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huayuan</td>
<td>¥4.37 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>69.49%</td>
<td>83.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanfa</td>
<td>¥6.92 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan, and also the average price during the twenty days before being suspended)</td>
<td>24.06%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fangxiang</td>
<td>¥3.82 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan, also the closing price on the day of being suspended)</td>
<td>55.49%</td>
<td>75.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingding</td>
<td>¥3.8 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haina</td>
<td>¥7.2 a share (the closing price on the day of being suspended by the stock exchange)</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changhang</td>
<td>¥2.53 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan, also the closing price on the day of being suspended by the stock exchange)</td>
<td>37.32%</td>
<td>48.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongda</td>
<td>¥2.1 a share (priced in its reorganisation plan)</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingye</td>
<td>¥2.41 a share (the closing price on the day of opening the reorganisation)</td>
<td>44.13%</td>
<td>49.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianchen</td>
<td>¥8.00 a share (the price of the shares sold to an investor by the administrator later)</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongji</td>
<td>¥2.5 a share (evaluated by an official evaluating firm)</td>
<td>35.58%</td>
<td>89.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.90%</td>
<td>86.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in 25 out of 41 (61%) cases, unsecured creditors could have been fully paid)
## Appendix 2: Assumed Advantages to the General Public Shareholders

**June 2007 to 31 December 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Shares Conceded by the General Public Shareholders (shares)</th>
<th>The Remaining Shares Possessed by the Control and Non-Circular Shareholders (shares)</th>
<th>The Remaining Shares Possessed by Control and Non-Circular Shareholders out of the Shares Conceded by General Public Shareholders (%) (the preventable loss of the general public shareholders)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaohua</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingmei</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaxing</td>
<td>24,463,037</td>
<td>139,672,203</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taibai</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhonghua</td>
<td>35,370,070</td>
<td>98,299,817</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuangzhi</td>
<td>57,994,320</td>
<td>39,611,130</td>
<td>68.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualong</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejian</td>
<td>26,784,163</td>
<td>38,768,400</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taihang</td>
<td>18,849,303</td>
<td>144,021,257</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenrun</td>
<td>10,945,500</td>
<td>39,685,143</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingtai</td>
<td>4,867,215</td>
<td>115,624,761</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beishen</td>
<td>71,588,733</td>
<td>64,324,528</td>
<td>89.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baoshuo</td>
<td>40,295,784</td>
<td>83,996,769</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuanghua</td>
<td>6,813,915</td>
<td>210,998,483</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiya</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangming</td>
<td>2,008,600</td>
<td>89,318,325</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian'an</td>
<td>7,375,679</td>
<td>26,442,772</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianfa</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianyi</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deheng</td>
<td>29,426,283</td>
<td>11,122,180</td>
<td>37.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanbao</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shijian</td>
<td>60,386,904</td>
<td>70,002,146</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danhua</td>
<td>50,700,000</td>
<td>86,529,867</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingchen</td>
<td>54,891,780</td>
<td>27,755,280</td>
<td>50.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinhua</td>
<td>89,923,200</td>
<td>266,179,200</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxia</td>
<td>82,968,977</td>
<td>7,483,400</td>
<td>9.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changling</td>
<td>24,206,332</td>
<td>41,754,520</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pianzhu</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingling</td>
<td>104,345,643</td>
<td>93,427,425</td>
<td>89.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiufa</td>
<td>43,245,467</td>
<td>31,837,607</td>
<td>73.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailong</td>
<td>126,403,439</td>
<td>176,684,732</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongshen</td>
<td>23,790,543</td>
<td>33,589,968</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huayuan</td>
<td>85,410,900</td>
<td>15,105,870</td>
<td>17.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanfa</td>
<td>97,627,600</td>
<td>151,510,400</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fangxiang</td>
<td>43,980,444</td>
<td>113,109,955</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingding</td>
<td>64,219,577</td>
<td>53,717,587</td>
<td>83.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haina</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changhang</td>
<td>247,218,252</td>
<td>180,285,800</td>
<td>72.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongda</td>
<td>153,989,758</td>
<td>227,466,836</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xingye</td>
<td>274,010,858</td>
<td>332,607,048</td>
<td>More than 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianchen</td>
<td>22,414,589</td>
<td>10,683,725</td>
<td>47.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongji</td>
<td>186,813,818</td>
<td>170,695,084</td>
<td>91.37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Shares Conceded by the General Public Shareholders (shares)</th>
<th>The Remaining Shares Possessed by the Control and Non-Circular Shareholders (shares)</th>
<th>The Remaining Shares Possessed by Control and Non-Circular Shareholders out of the Shares Conceded by General Public Shareholders (%) (the preventable loss of the general public shareholders)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Except the eleven reorganisations where all previous shares remained intact, the general public shareholders had, on average, 85.37 per cent preventable losses in the remaining thirty-two cases if the policy of the China Supreme People’s Court could be adequately implemented. In particular, in twenty out of these thirty-two cases (62.5%), the losses of the general public shareholders could have been one hundred per cent avoided.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>