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BARRY GOLDWATER: INSURGENT CONSERVATISM AS CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC

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Introduction

Conservatives are biased in favour of the status quo. Change is problematic because its consequences are unforeseeable, so encouraging skepticism, but conservatives are not, however, implacably opposed to change. Moreover, there are instances of conservatives being so hostile to a status quo they advocate its transformation. This is insurgent conservatism. Insurgent conservatives such as Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and the subject of this paper, Barry Goldwater, were not motivated by a status quo bias and were not skeptical about change or pursuing their objectives. A notable aspect of insurgent conservatism is its advocates adoption of constitutive rhetoric. Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Barry Goldwater were convinced that the status quo was deeply dangerous, rejecting the ‘common-sense’ view there was no alternative, they urged radical change.

Their common task was to articulate an alternative for an inchoate opposition and provide an identity that could support a drive for political change. Goldwater, Reagan, and Thatcher articulated an insurgent conservatism but only the last two translated this into electoral victory. The difficulty is that constitutive rhetoric must be both polarising (critical of the status quo) and synthesising (creating a new electoral coalition); Goldwater achieved the former.

Studies of Goldwater concentrate on the machinations that led to his 1964 nomination as Republican presidential candidate (Shadegg 1965, Hess 1967, White 1992, Perlstein 2001, Middendorf 2006) but Hammerback considers that his ‘rhetorical creation of a conservative audience has been the most valuable part of his rhetorical legacy’ (1999: 329). Goldwater’s impact can be estimated from the fact that ‘a surprising number’ of Tea Party activists ‘dated their first political experience to the Goldwater campaign’ (Skocpol and Williamson 2012: 41) whilst Crotty sees in Goldwater’s discourse ideas that ‘are common currency in today’s politics’ (2015: 17). To
guage Goldwater’s significance we must note his effort was directed not so much at *persuasion*, the classic concern of rhetoric, but at *identification*. This paper argues Goldwater pursued constitutive rhetoric, involving ‘the making of the kind of community that enables people to say “we” about what they do and to claim consistent meaning for it …’ (Boyd-White 1985: 38). In so doing Goldwater laid the foundations of Reagan’s victory in 1980.

This paper has three parts. The first discusses constitutive rhetoric. Goldwater’s speaking and writing was designed to create a specific type of conservative identity, and shows how and why post-war Republican politics was open to a constitutive appeal and conservative insurgency. The second section examines a selection of Goldwater’s speeches and writings to identify the ideas and themes that defined his conservatism and energised his insurgency. The third section assesses the utility of constitutive rhetoric for understanding insurgent conservatism. The paper concludes that insurgent conservatism requires constitutive rhetoric but insurgent conservatism operates in two separate but interconnected areas – the activist and voter – and mobilising these requires different strategies (this paper ignores the campaign rhetoric of 1964). Constituting a new conservative identity necessitates polarising rhetoric in order to create a movement, which may limit conservatism’s appeal to the wider electorate. Constitutive rhetoric is concerned with identity, which is prior to electoral persuasion; Goldwater failed at the latter but succeeded in the former.

**What is constitutive rhetoric?**

Constitutive rhetoric is ‘the art of constituting character, community, and culture in language’ and is ‘the central art by which culture and community are established, maintained and transformed’ (Boyd-White 1985: x and 28). Goldwater’s commitment to constituting a different conservatism can be seen in the foreword to *The Conscience of a Conservative*,

> I have crossed the length and breadth of this great land hundreds of times and talked with tens of thousands of people, with Democrats and Republicans, with farmers, laborers and
businessmen. I find that America is fundamentally a Conservative nation. The preponderant judgement of the American people, especially of the young people, is that the radical, or Liberal, approach has not worked and is not working. They yearn for a return to Conservative principles (2013/1960: 3).

Goldwater believed the political tectonic plates were shifting, arguing that ‘The people of America are more disturbed today than I have ever seen them in my political life’ (Goldwater 1961d: 17642) and this opened the way for a conservative insurgency to capture the Republican party. Goldwater declared this objective in his ‘Grow up, conservatives’ speech at the 1960 Republican convention where in a free choice delegates would have made him Vice Presidential, and possibly Presidential, nominee (Goldwater 1960b. See also Brennan 1992: 81-3). After 1960 Goldwater’s strategy shifted from influencing the Republican platform to capturing the party for conservatism and three years later in a speech at Dodger Stadium, LA, Goldwater declared victory (Goldwater 1963: 18134-35). In 1963 Bill Middendorf, a member of the draft Goldwater movement and his campaign treasurer, noted Goldwater’s ‘wish that our movement be not expressly to make him President, but to expand and foster the conservative movement in the US through the Republican Party’ (2006: 30). His rhetoric’s purpose was not solely, or even primarily, electoral.

Derived from the study of legal language, constitutive rhetoric argues texts create a collective identity; their purpose is to change, or influence, behaviour by manipulating language. For rhetoric to be constitutive it must, first, use the language of the audience; second, it must be creative (‘this is the problem to be addressed, and this is how to do so’); and third, it must have a distinct ethical identity that binds the community (Boyd White 1985: 33-34). In constitutive rhetoric the speaker imagines a community (in this case conservative Republicans) by articulating a narrative with the express aim of influencing behaviour: ‘it is a way of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming meaning for it by writing an ending for it’ (Boyd-White 1985: 36). Goldwater’s speeches and writings advocated a particular conservative identity that expressed a distinctive
terministic screen through which the speaker and audience are connected by ideology (‘the network of interconnected convictions that function ... epistemically and shapes ... identity by determining how [the individual] views the world.’ Burke 1970: 112). The terministic screen provides the vocabulary, symbols and ideas which posit a specific understanding of the world, an understanding that embraces audience and speaker.

The terministic screen encourages individuals to label some aspects of experience as positive (‘conservative’) and reject others (‘liberal’), responses that encapsulate different philosophies, attitudes, and prescriptions. The terministic screen’s political importance is as the filter through which the world is understood and where a narrative is accepted as a truthful description and prescription for organisation and activity. Classic rhetoric gives little weight to the social, cultural and political context, nor does it give sufficient recognition to the interchange between speaker and audience other than as an aspect of technique. It does, however, place great emphasis on the appropriateness, or propriety, of the speaker. The speaker’s success rests on an ability to convince the audience of both the appropriateness of the message and the speaker’s suitability as the message’s vehicle (the first persona). Speaker and audience interact through the ideas and concepts that explain the world and constitute an identity but which are themselves simplifications that can mean different things to those who subscribe to the identity of conservative. This introduces the second persona.

Texts contain a world-view expressed as identity and ideology; to explore this Black (1970: 109-119) developed the idea of the second persona. Goldwater was shaping a moral critique, identifying for conservatives a usable past in which moral significance was central to his selection of concepts and ideas. The relationship between a text, its author(s), and the audience depends on the author’s presentation of character (first persona) and the audience’s reading of it. Goldwater’s persona (or ethos) is frequently described as ‘rugged individualism’, something that appealed strongly to his audiences and which encapsulated an ideology. These qualities – ‘self-reliance, dynamism, courage,
and perseverance’ – were those the audience saw in themselves and which were projected by ‘the delivery, style, and content of his discourses’ (Hammerback 1972: 181). By 1960, Bozell argues, a distinct Goldater ‘image’ composed of plain-speaking, clear principles, and personal courage had emerged and was proving attractive (Bozell 1960: 74). The attractiveness of this ethos can be seen in Hilary Clinton’s memoir, Living History. An active Young Republican and ‘Goldwater Girl’, Hilary Clinton ‘liked Senator Goldwater because he was a rugged individualist who swam against the tide’ (2004: 21).

The second persona, largely ignored in classic rhetoric (because of its focus on technique), acts through the text/speech’s ideology and that of the audience and shapes identity by determining how the world is understood (Black 1970: 111). The appellation ‘rugged individualist’, therefore, was shorthand for a more complex concept; similarly, ‘freedom’ constituted a broad spectrum of attitudes and beliefs, or a ‘vector of influence’ (Black 1970: 113), expressing a distinct world-view. ‘States rights’ encapsulated and expressed attitudes about civil rights; ‘communism’ becomes a metaphor for degeneration and an existential threat; and ‘individualism’ is about defending property rights. Vectors of influence, or ‘dog whistle politics’ (Haney-Lopéz 2014: 17-22 for Goldwater’s contribution to the genre) bind the speaker (first persona) and audience (second persona) in a common ethos, thereby constituting a community. This echoes Althusser’s (1971) concept of interpellation or ‘hailing’. Interpellation is the process whereby ideology is embodied in speech and text constituting the subject; it occurs when the hailed hear and respond accordingly and is thereby transformed into a subject, aware of both who is hailing and of others responding in a similar way. Through interaction an identity is produced. The conservative search for identity was essential for the success of Goldwater’s rhetoric that helped forge that identity and that identity informed Goldwater’s discourse. Why were Goldwater’s auditors receptive?

Despite Eisenhowever’s victory in 1952, making the him the first Republican president since Hoover, Taft’s death in 1953, Eisenhowers espousal of the vapid but nonetheless infuriating (to
conservatives) ‘Modern Republicanism’, losses in 1956 and especially in the 1958 mid-terms (which eliminated an entire generation of conservatives in Congress) and the liberal-Republican stranglehold on the party’s nominating process created space for a new articulation of what it meant to be a conservative that was emerging from the mid-West, California, and the South. Fundamental to Goldwater’s conservatism was the Republican failure to offer Americans a distinct choice, this conviction and his election in 1952 on a conservative platform in a Democratic state made Goldwater the rising conservative star. Goldwater’s dislike of the Administration’s direction was tempered initially by his party loyalty. The insurgency was launched on 8 April 1957 when Goldwater delivered a stinging critique of the Eisenhower Administration’s budget in the Senate, damning the constitutionally and morally subversive effects of high taxation and budget deficits. The Republican and Democrat parties were peddlers of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that States rights are void, and that the only hope for the future of these United States is for our people to be federally born, federally housed, federally clothed, federally educated, federally supported in their occupations, and to die a Federal death, thereafter to be buried in a Federal box in a Federal cemetery (Goldwater 1958: 5260).

Republicans were equally culpable,

we have been so thoroughly saturated with the New Deal doctrine of big, squanderbust government, that, as a party, we Republicans have on more than one occasion shown tendencies to bow to the siren song of socialism and, instead of hurling a challenge against the ravages of the pseudo-liberals amongst us, have accepted their doctrines, lock, stock, and barrel, saying only “we can do it better” (Goldwater 1957: 5261).

Modern Republicanism meant which ever party was in office, the Democrats were in power.

Constitutive rhetoric is appropriate in understanding insurgent conservatism, which sees itself as
opposed to both the status quo but also the ‘conservative’ party, which buttressed the status quo (‘the socialistic Republicanats’, ‘dime-store New Dealers’, ‘me-tooism’, ‘country club Republicans’). In 1958 Goldwater complained,

We are putting a Federal crutch under the arms of the people. We are taking away the bootstraps which Americans once grasped firmly and pulled on to make something out of themselves. We are instilling in the American people the desire to rely upon the Federal Government for everything they need and do (1958: 17294).

Goldwater complained of America’s infantilisation, of Uncle Sam’s transformation into ‘a national wet nurse – dispensing a cockeyed kind of patent medicine labeled “Something for Nothing”, passing out soothing syrup and pacifiers in return for grateful votes on election day’ (Goldwater 1960a: 6).

Contemplating the 1960 presidential election Goldwater wrote in his journal that ‘Republicans, beginning in 1940, have had nothing but “me-tooism” on the part of our candidates’ and feared ‘another seizure of “me-tooism”, another product of the years 1940, 1944, and 1948. To me this is a certainty ... what we have offered the people and what the Vice President [Richard Nixon] apparently wants to take as his stock in trade is a dime-store new deal’ (Dean and Goldwater 2008: 204, 210. Emphasis added). The erosion of the nation’s moral fibre was, therefore, not just the Democrats’ fault but also because Republicans ‘offered candidates and policies which were little more than hollow echoes of the siren songs of the welfare staters’ and were punished electorally for so doing (Goldwater 1960a: 6). ‘Me-tooism’ was nothing less than a crisis of the Republic.

These assaults, coupled with his 1958 victory in Arizona, his anti-communism and hostility towards the USSR, and his well publicised feud with the UAW’s Walter Reuther (“I would rather have Jimmy Hoffa stealing my money than Walter Reuther stealing my Freedom.” Goldwater 1958a: 2888) on the McLellan Committee, transformed him into the national advocate of a new conservative vision (Shermer 2008). This vision resonated powerfully, particularly so in new areas of Republican strength and Goldwater, as the chair of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee, travelled the country
outlining his vision to enraptured audiences. In 1959, for example, he travelled some 10,000 miles per month (Perlstein 2009: 46. See also Donaldson 2003: 59-60). After his 1958 victory Goldwater was approached by a coterie of Midwestern conservatives about a presidential run in 1960; believing Nixon had the nomination sown up, he refused, preferring to concentrate on spreading the word. Goldwater also took to print. From January 1960 Stephen Shadegg ghosted Goldwater’s thrice weekly column, ‘How Do You Stand, Sir?’, in The Los Angeles Times. This became the fastest growing feature in the history of the Time-Mirror Syndicate, eventually appearing in over 150 newspapers across America. Clarence Manion, the former dean of Notre Dame law school and an uber-conservative activist, suggested that Goldwater publish a concise statement of his views. The Conscience of a Conservative (2013/1960) although drafted by Brent R. Bozell, a founder and editor of the National Review with W.F. Buckey (Bozell was also Buckley’s brother-in-law) and Goldwater’s speech writer, was composed with Goldwater’s collaboration and accurately reflected his views though there is some doubt as to whether Goldwater read the whole book. Whether he did or did not is irrelevant, The Conscience of a Conservative achieved huge sales and massive distribution thanks to wealthy conservative donors. Before Goldwater ‘there was no conservative forum, no conservative leadership to unite them, no organization to bring them together to explore whatever common ground these various philosophies and the beliefs they shared’ (Donaldson 2003: 25).

The foundation of Goldwater’s constitutive rhetoric was straightforward,

More and more Americans are beginning to understand that all forms government other than the governments of free men, require central control to become effective. This is a common and an absolutely necessary ingredient of government collectivism. I don’t care whether we call it communism, socialism, Fabianism, the welfare state, the planned economy, the New Deal, Fair Deal or the New Frontier (Goldwater 1961d: 17643).

At Notre Dame university he stressed the absolute centrality of choice, the essence of freedom,
I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to be poor and free than to be snug and a slave.

I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to live in peril, but with justice, than to live on a summit of material power, but unjustly.

I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to stand up as a suffering man than to lie down as a satisfied animal (Goldwater 1962a: 2059).

During his speaking tours ‘Goldwater discovered that Midwest audiences responded when he declared his devotion to the Constitution. They applauded his criticism of the expanding federal bureaucracy, the increased federal indebtedness, and the foreign aid program which was giving American dollars to support nations within the Communist orbit’ (Shadegg 1965: 17). Republicans, Goldwater insisted, would win only if they expounded conservative principles and offered ‘a clear-cut choice’ between ‘the paternalistic super-state with its ever increasing spending and its ever-increasing taxation and its ever-increasing interference in the life of the individual’ and a Republican party acting ‘as a vehicle through which the people can assert their sovereignty over government’ (Goldwater 1960b: 7; Annunziata 1980: 254-265). After the publication of Conscience Goldwater became the undisputed leader and embodiment of the insurgency; he was not ‘Mr Republican’ (Taft’s old moniker) but ‘Mr Conservative’ (Bell 1964). In 1959 around 1 percent of Republicans favoured Goldwater for president; in 1964 he won the nomination on the first ballot. Why, were so many Republicans ‘nuts about Barry Goldwater without being nutty in the process’? (Time, 24 July, 1964: 18).

Goldwater’s vision for conservatism and his determination be a new kind of politician was captured in the often quoted credo in The Conscience of a Conservative,

I have little interest in streamlining government or in making it more efficient, for I mean to reduce its size. I do not undertake to promote welfare, for I propose to extend freedom.
My aim is not to pass laws but to repeal them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to cancel old ones that do violence to the Constitution, or that have failed in their purpose, or that impose on the people an unwarranted financial burden. I will not attempt to discover whether legislation is ‘needed’ before I have first determined it is constitutionally permissible. And if I should later be attacked for neglecting my constituents’ ‘interests,’ I shall reply that I was informed their main interest is liberty and that in that cause I am doing the very best I can (Goldwater 2013/1960: 13).

The problem confronting Goldwater was three-fold: first, was conservatism a social movement, a party, an ideology, a philosophical disposition or all at the same?; second, its internal contradictions (such as the tension between the traditionalist’s emphasis on social order and the dynamism sought by economic liberalism) posed problems of definition; and third, issues of inclusion (did it include the John Birch Society?). These organisational, definitional, and inclusion problems meant the delineation of conservatism was critical to mobilising conservatives. Goldwater approached these difficulties through a philosophy of human nature, then deriving a critique around which conservatives could coalesce, even though different components might emphasise different elements and meanings.

Goldwater’s conception of ‘the whole man’ [sic] conceived of individuals as ‘in part, an economic, an animal creature, but that he is also a spiritual creature with spiritual needs and spiritual desires [that] reflect the superior side of man’s nature, and thus take precedence over his economic wants’ (2013: 7). This moral critique with its emphasis on the spiritual rested on individual freedom, which was not antithetical to material abundance. Government the threat to freedom and materialism, government’s ‘only proper role’ was protecting the Republic’s ‘traditions and principles, its institutions of religious liberty, of educational and economic opportunity, of Constitutional rights, of the integrity of the law, [which] are the most precious possession of the human race’ (Goldwater 1961c: 9925). The American ideal was not ‘to become bigger, fatter, and more luxurious ... Are we
really nothing better than materialists?’ Answering his own question, Goldwater declared, ‘I do not believe that any mere standard of living, in itself, is worth dying for’; America, he continued, ‘has for its moral object the high dignity of man; and for its political aim, ordered freedom – liberty under God and under the law – with justice for all.’ He concluded, ‘If it comes to the test we ought to die rather than to submit to a collectivist anthill, no matter how glistening or filled with up-to-date comforts’ (Goldwater 1962a: 2059).

From this three conclusions followed: first, humans are unique individuals; second, the economic and spiritual cannot be separated; and third, human development cannot be externally directed. Human development rests on the widest possible freedom of choice and so humanity’s greatest enemy was any form of collectivism. The greatest bulwark against tyranny in the United States was the Constitution but this had been under attack for decades and freedom was now seriously circumscribed and liberty jeopardised. Goldwater described freedom to Bozell as ‘the one hope and desire of all the people’ (Dean and Goldwater 2008: 111; See also Goldwater 1962b: 17540). Freedom’s foundational significance can be seen in Goldwater’s first Senate speech opposing military aid to the French in Indo-China, because of the French refusal ‘to grant independence and the right of freedom to these people, who have fought so long for their independence and freedom’ (Goldwater 1953: 7780).

From this foundation – the absolute centrality of freedom and the Constitution as the expression and defence of freedom – Goldwater derived his critique of contemporary politics. This critique condemned the New Deal, its successors and its imitators, the decline of laisser-faire, high taxation, federal spending and budget deficits, the erosion of states’ rights and burgeoning Federal power, the growth of special interests (especially union power), the growth of welfarism, and the domestic and international communist threat. Significant sections of public opinion already dissented from the New Deal-consensus and so Goldwater was both a symptom and cause of ‘the growing strength of the conservative mobilization in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s’ (Phillips-Fein 2011: 126).
Defining conservatism helped locate conservatives. The ‘Nash thesis’ sees postwar American conservatism as blending three frequently contradictory elements: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anticommunism (Nash 1976) and of these traditionalism was the least significant. This was, in part, the product of the shifting geographical and social bases of the ‘new’ conservatism. This included the prosperous, upwardly mobile, white, Democrats who had moved to the suburbs in, for example, Orange County in California and Phoenix, Arizona, and the Southwest generally (McGirr 2001, Shuppara 1992 and 1998, for example); the ex-Democratic voting, white ethnic group backlash (for example, Self 2003, Durr 2003, and Nicholaides 2002); and the South, moving Republican since 1952, where conservatism was increasingly about the defence of property rights and individual freedom (for example, Crespino 2007, Kruse 2008, and Laister 2008). Stewart Alsop concluded that ‘Wherever there is a lot of new money ... the West and Southwest, in Texas, in the newly industrialized South – there is fanatical Goldwater support’ (Alsop 1964: 23; see also Crespi 1965: 530). Goldwaterism’s social and geographic base offered the prospect of a conservative winning in 1964 without the ground-zero of liberal Republicanism, the North-East (Rusher 1963: 109-112).

Kennedy’s assassination and Johnson’s accession meant the prospect of an electoral challenge faded; Republican divisions at the San Francisco convention and Goldwater’s statements gave Democrats all the ammunition they needed. Karl Hess, then one of Goldwater’s speechwriters, argued Goldwater’s strategic aim in 1964 was to re-establish two-party politics and an ideological choice thereby laying the foundations for conservative growth. Goldwater had long deprecated the decline of party competition because ‘When are we ... going to learn that we cannot longer [sic] win elections ... by playing the role of a political Santa Claus? ... The attempt to be all things to all man is a frail admission that, each in our own philosophies of government, has not sufficient substance or competence to serve the Nation well and in accordance with constitutional standards’ (Goldwater 1957: 5261). As party competition declined, choice narrowed and politics degenerated; Goldwater sought to re-establish a clear choice between parties and ideologies (Hess 1967: 39-42). Party politics were now built around an unstable and moving ‘centre’ that ineluctably led to abandoning
principle. Southern voters were the vanguard of political change: ‘realizing that they cannot live under a single-party system; that they have to have a two-party system; that there has to be competition between the parties all over this country’ they were moving away from the Democrats. Without party and ideological competition government would not be restrained (Goldwater 1961d: 17645). Differentiation was absolutely fundamental because ‘If the “out” party cannot or will not grit its teeth and dig in for the long hard fight ... then it will become a non-party. ... Politics, then, ceases to be partisan ... Nothing changes but the players’ (Hess 1967: 152). The lack of an ideological choice threatened individual freedom because it institutionalised one-party rule and ensured the Republican Party became ‘an annex of the Democratic Party ... dedicated to the same programs under different personalities’ (Hess 1967: 158). By the late-1950s/early-1960s disaffection with the New Deal consensus, social and geographical change and Goldwater’s proselytising meant a conservative insurgency was verging on political take-off (Andrew 1997, Gifford 2009, Schneider 1999, Schoenwald 2001, for example).

Constitutive Rhetoric: Content

Goldwater deployed a limited number of themes that were repeated in countless speeches (and writings) to Republican audiences. This is not to belittle his efforts. The essence of constitutive rhetoric is the repetition of themes and arguments to establish a clear message around which identity can form, so a restricted sample of texts can encapsulate his main themes. Of the many speeches delivered by Goldwater this paper analyses the Senate speech attacking budget deficits (1957), the ‘No Time for Timid Souls’ speech (1958b), a speech opposing federal education funding (1958c), the Air War College speech (1961b) and the speech opposing the civil rights act (1964a). Of Goldwater’s writings I have omitted Why Not Victory?, a foreign policy study that repeats at greater length statements and sentiments found elsewhere in profusion but I have included The Forgotten Americans (1960a). Conceived of as ‘A Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, Programs and Objectives’ (1961a) it was intended as a ‘stem-to-stern Republican legislative agenda for the 1960s’
but Goldwater quickly dropped it (Perlstein 2009: 138). It represents, however, an extended statement of a putative Goldwaterite conservative governing project that supplements *The Conscience of a Conservative* (2013/1960), itself a distillation of his years on the Republican rubber chicken circuit and which is of lasting significance (Regnery 2014). The final source is Goldwater’s speech to the 1964 convention accepting the Republican presidential nomination, the summation of Goldwater’s rhetorical effort (1964a).

Figure 1 gives the tag cloud for the texts and Table 1 the number and percentage of word usage that constitutes Goldwater’s terministic screen. The tag cloud is a visual representation of usage of the ideas and concepts characteristic of Goldwater’s speaking and writing; given the enthusiastic response of his audiences these ideas clearly resonated. From this data we can discern the outline and content of Goldwater’s message, the words used with the greatest frequency are the ‘terministic screen’ and the selection of ideas that underpinned his conception of the conservative identity. This is Goldwater’s Althusserian ‘hail’. What matters, however, is not the words and concepts *per se* but their combination and meaning within the message’s structure and objective. Thus, ‘federal’ and ‘government’ could be presented as a negative by a conservative and a positive by a liberal; everyone favours ‘freedom’ but (*pace* Isaiah Berlin) freedom can be defined as negative or positive.

<Figure 1 here>

<Table 1 here>

In the frequency count ‘government’ and ‘federal’ are the most numerous and are the antithesis of ‘people’ and ‘freedom’; similarly, ‘american’ and ‘states’ signal the importance of both unity and diversity in Goldwater’s thinking and their antithesis is, of course, ‘communism’ that represents the regimented other, which required Americans be ‘united’ if communism was to be resisted successfully at home and abroad. ‘Federal’, ‘freedom’ and ‘states’ is a significant combination in
Goldwater’s discourse as it is a proxy for states rights, which was itself a proxy for Southern (and after Wallace’s primary run, Northern) hostility to civil rights. An appeal to the South was central to Goldwater’s strategy in 1964 (‘hunting where the ducks are’) and whatever Goldwater’s personal convictions about segregation this was an appeal addressed to those fearful of civil rights and African-American advancement. A visible and significant word is ‘should’. ‘Should’ is a modal verb expressing duty, identifying (or suggesting) the best or correct thing to do and is related to ‘ought’, with its strong imputation of moral duty (should = ‘do the right thing’). ‘Should’ suggests that a situation exists, or could come into existence, and therefore indicates both purpose and response. It is an extremely significant word as it indicates a moral imperative, the reason for a conservative insurgency and the urgent need for change, connoting a duty to destroy the status quo.

In his speech attacking the Eisenhower administration’s budget Goldwater condemned the administration’s aping of the Democrats. This was ‘a betrayal of the people’s trust’ and the institution of ‘government by bribe’ that ensured a loss of freedom: ‘our people do need to be inspired – inspired in the way of helping themselves unimpeded by Government … inspired by the conviction that the Federal Government gives to the people nothing which it does not first take from them.’ High taxation and budget deficits meant ‘the United States can spend itself out of existence as a free and sovereign nation.’ The erosion of economic strength meant the erosion of all defences in the face of centralised government whose rise heralded the end of the American constitutional order. The Eisenhower administration ‘instead of following its original campaign pledges, simply parrot the antics of its predecessor against which it labored so loud and justly in 1952’ (Goldwater 1957: 5259 and 5260). Along this path lay the death of the Republican Party and American democracy.

The speech delivered in Prescott, Arizona (3 May 1958) to the Republican Women’s Convention entitled ‘No Time for Timid Souls’ argued the Depression brought to power individuals hostile to the American way. The solutions to all America’s problems would come from ‘the small towns ... from
the men and women who look up from the toil of their day to day labors toward a better world…’ but ‘you and I are caught like a shuttlecock in a badminton game between the power plays of ambitious men’ (Goldwater 1958b: 8355). Freedom was under threat because government had ‘ subscribed to that ancient fallacy that a powerful central government could do more man than man could for himself.’ He continued,

after 25 years of meddling and tinkering with the basic concepts of the Constitution with our ancient understandings of the position of a free man in a free society, and with our constant increasing dependence upon a central authority, in business and in labor and in government, the face of America’s main street has changed (Goldwater 1958b: 8355).

Americans now confronted a ‘paternalisitic and collective administrative dictatorship’ offering voters the ‘pie-in-the-sky of collectivist paternalism in return for a surrender of our individual freedoms and responsibilities’ (Goldwater 1958b: 8354-56). At Flint, Michigan, Goldwater warned of ‘the constant interference of professional politicians’ that ‘dulled and demoralized’; these ‘demagogos and their Communist allies … still mouthing the cliches of the thirties’ represented the most significant threat to the United States. The conservatives’ task was to ‘drag them kicking and screaming into the second half of the 20th Century’ (Goldwater 1961a: 7593-94).

Goldwater resolutely opposed Federal education funding. Commenting on a Senate debate on Federal funding Goldwater declared ‘I did not hear anything then, I have not heard anything since, to convince me that the Federal Government should put another one of its meddling fingers into the affairs of the States by sticking it into the educational system, a responsibility of the States’ (Goldwater 1958c: 17291-92). For it to do so was unconstitutional, further confirming the contempt in which the Constitution was now held:

Federal aid for schools, for any purpose, is morally and legally wrong because it will lead to Federal control … Public education is a matter that should be controlled by the States and
localities ... Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given permission to tax and spend for the Nation’s schools ... If Federal aid to education is imposed, it eventually will ... a make collectivized captives of our children (Goldwater 1958c: 17293).

‘I am not’, Goldwater lamented, ‘very proud of the Republican Party tonight’ and concluded that the best thing ‘I can do for my community, my State, my country ... is to see to it that Federal aid to education receives a decided setback ...’ (Goldwater 1958c: 17294, 17295).

Goldwater was convinced that the USA should not shrink from confrontation with the USSR and communism even at the risk of war. As a result ‘our national existence is once again threatened as it was in the early days of the Republic’ from ‘alien forces’ and this had reached such a pitch that American leaders, both political and intellectual, are searching desperately for means of “appeasing” or “accommodating” the Soviet Union as the price of national survival. The American people are being told that, however valuable their freedom may be, it is even more important to live. A croven fear of death is entering the American consciousness...

(Goldwater 1960c: 5571. My emphasis).

The USSR was determined to win whilst the United States was not; America was at war with the Soviet Union so victory should be the goal of government policy. Accordingly, ‘We must – as the first step toward saving American freedom – affirm the contrary view and make it the cornerstone of our foreign policy: that we would rather die than lose our freedom’ (Goldwater 1960c: 5572. Emphasis added).

In 1961 Goldwater argued America’s ‘ultimate objective’ was to ‘establish a world in which there is the largest possible measure of freedom and justice and peace and material prosperity’ but this was unattainable ‘without the prior defeat of world communism’ so ‘It follows that victory over communism is the dominant, proximate goal of American policy’ (Goldwater 1961b: 582). America’s ability and willingness to do this had declined precipitately over the previous decade and would
continue to decline until the point was reached where the country was ‘isolated and besieged by an entirely hostile world.’ The remedy? ‘We will have to shed the attitudes of and techniques of the Salvation Army and start behaving like a great power’ because ‘This sluggish sentimentality, this obsession for pleasing people, has become a matter of grand strategy; has become no less than the guiding principle of American policy’ (Goldwater 1961b: 583). One way to do this was to ‘encourage the captive peoples to revolt against their Communist rulers. This policy must be pursued with caution and prudence as well as courage’ but ‘we would invite the Communist leaders to choose between the total destruction of the Soviet Union, and accepting a local defeat’ (Goldwater 1961b: 585).

Whilst personally opposed to discrimination and segregation, Goldwater saw the Civil Rights Act (1964) through the lens of burgeoning Federal power and regulation. Despite conceding a role for Federal legislation in promoting legal equality he believed that Title II (public accommodation) and Title VII (fair employment practices) clashed with the even more fundamental individual right to possess, and liberty to enjoy and dispose of, private property. This liberty was the foundation of freedom and so Titles II and VII posed ‘a grave threat to the very essence of our basic system of government’ (Goldwater 1964a: 14312). So radical were Titles II and VII, their objectives ought only to be realised by a constitutional amendment for to do otherwise ‘is to act in a manner which could ultimately destroy the freedom of all American citizens, including the freedom of the very persons whose feelings and whose liberties are the major subject of this legislation’. Regulating private property rights to the degree sought by the bill would ‘require the creation of a Federal police force of mammoth proportions’ relying on an “informer” psychology’ creating a police state (Goldwater 1964a: 14312). This cure was, in Goldwater’s view, worse than the malady.

From these examples we can see clearly the terministic screen that provided the link between the first and second personas and which fuelled Goldwater’s insurgency. The next section widens the discussion and considers the relationship between constitutive rhetoric and conservative insurgency.
Constitutive rhetoric and conservative insurgency

Two factors make insurgent conservatism conservative and both flow from the situational nature of conservatism. First, conservatism’s inherent risk aversion and skepticism are neutralised by an extreme fear of the status quo’s consequences. The dangers of change are far outweighed by the dangers of acquiescing in the status quo. Second, status quo bias and uncertainty about change are mitigated by reference to a past experience or a conception of the foundation that supplants informational uncertainty about the consequences of radical change. This calculation depends on the value a conservative invests with most significance and in Goldwater’s case this was individual freedom.

Constitutive rhetoric is especially relevant to, and significant in, contexts where a substantial number of individuals and groups perceive not just defects (the result of incorrect policies) but when this policy dimension intersects with a moral critique of the status quo. Combined these constitute an existential threat addressing which requires a movement pledged to a political transformation. Establishing this diagnosis was Goldwater’s legacy: ‘Goldwater showed subsequent Republican candidates how conservative ideology could electrify a sizable group of listeners and readers, and how conservative discourse could build and animate a core of supporters who would give legitimacy to their candidate’ (Hammerback 1999: 329).

The centrality of critique to constitutive rhetoric appears to make it a more appropriate strategy for radical left-of-centre parties, which are necessarily critical of the status quo. This is why constitutive rhetoric poses serious difficulties for conservatives. Conservatives seek to conserve but if the status quo is perceived to be an existential threat then their goal cannot be conservation but destruction. Goldwater’s immediate concern was to mobilise conservatives through, and around, a critique of the New Deal consensus to serve as a platform for its transformation. This was obscured by Goldwater’s crushing defeat in 1964 but as the previous section demonstrated his determination to constitute insurgent conservatism is clear. From this we can identify insurgent conservatism’s characteristics.
These are: first, a comprehensive assault upon, and critique of, the status quo and of those (including ‘conservatives’) who uphold it; second, a reassertion of traditional values and beliefs that have been pushed aside by the status quo’s advocates; third, rejection of centrist, or consensus, politics; fourth, a strident moral critique of contemporary policy and politics and a call for a return to a tried and tested moral code; fifth, the categorisation of opponents as being in thrall to alien doctrines; opponents were not simply well-meaning but wrong-headed, but profoundly wrong and deeply dangerous; and finally, the critique must be accompanied by a positive alternative vision sanctified by the past, offering not just hope but the certainty of a bright future. Combined these characteristics place tremendous emphasis on the speaker’s ability to articulate and mobilise individual and group sentiment around this conservative vision, and then evolve a persuasive electoral appeal. It is hard to achieve because the speaker must develop and project an ethos that conveys the truth of their critique and the validity of their vision. Both the critique and the vision must necessarily present the speaker’s message as an ‘outsider’ in contemporary politics and therefore subversive of the status quo.

Reagan and Thatcher translated constitutive rhetoric and insurgent conservatism into a electoral appeal. For a conservative committed to transforming the status quo constitutive rhetoric must combine critique and vision with an appeal capable of extending outward beyond the faithful to the less ideologically committed. In doing so, context and contingency are critical. During the 1964 election Ronald Reagan delivered ‘A Time For Choosing’, better known as ‘The Speech’, which Goldwater’s advisers urged he veto. Having read it he asked, ‘What the hell’s wrong with that?’ (Perlstein 2009: 500-501; Middendorf 2006: 207-209). The Speech demonstrated Goldwater’s ideas unencumbered by Goldwater’s liabilities could appeal to voters other than Republican activists but this depended both on Reagan’s sunnier disposition and on events that ‘confirmed’ Goldwater’s prior analysis. A similar trajectory can be identified in Mrs Thatcher’s rhetoric between 1975-79 (Dorey 2015: 103-120). Their personas and events enabled Reagan and Thatcher to employ
constitutive rhetoric to not only reorient their parties but also reorient American and British politics around their vision.

Did Goldwater create the conservative movement? Obviously not. It was growing before Goldwater and this, coupled with some deft politicking, made him the Republican candidate in 1964.

Goldwater’s incessant propagandising defined the contours of conservatism and forged a unity between the first and second personas. Thus, ‘he had given [conservatism] direction, realigned its voting base, and uncovered its leaders’ (Donaldson 2003: 293). Evidence of Goldwater’s contemporary influence can be found easily (Kazin 2015, for example). Paulson argues Goldwater’s nomination and campaign ‘proved to be the crucial turning point towards ideological polarization between the major parties that Roosevelt and Wilkie could only dream of’ (2015: 73). Karl Rove, the leading Republican strategist of the Bush years, recalled,

I had Goldwater buttons, stickers, and posters, a ragged paperback copy of Goldwater’s *Conscience of a Conservative*, and even a bright gold aluminium can of “AuH2O” [a drink Goldwater described as ‘piss’], a campaign artefact that played on the candidate’s last name ... for budding Republicans like me, there was nobility in Goldwater’s loss. He went down with guns blazing and his ideology on full, unapologetic display. Goldwater was a “conviction politician,” the kind who shaped a movement (2010: 7).

Goldwater’s rhetoric was constitutive rather than persuasive, creating a conservative identity and insurgency antithetical to the consensus. His alternative was simple:

a market economy, a reliance upon individual and voluntary rather than collectivized or coerced talent and energy, laws that are impartially applied to maintain public order and freedom, and government to limited that it cannot tyrannize but still so strong that it can fulfill its essential charges such as defending the country and its laws and its domestic tranquillity (Hess 1967: 158).
The Tea Party, ‘the most recent incarnation of American conservative populism’, is descended in a direct line from Goldwater,

One of the few college-age Tea Partiers we met, a young man in Boston, wore a T-shirt emblazoned with Goldwater’s bumper sticker slogan “AuH₂O”. It was history for him, but of course many of his fellow Tea Partiers remember that campaign firsthand. An extraordinary number dated their first political experiences to the 1964 Goldwater campaign ... The Tea Party is fundamentally the latest iteration of long-standing, hard-core conservatism in American politics (Skocpol and Williamson 2012: 82-82).

As well as giving many Tea Party supporters their first, and heady, political experience Skocpol and Williamson argue it represents a lasting definition of conservatism. The 1964 presidential campaign was for many mobilisational and inspirational: it created experienced cadres and, in Ronald Reagan, found an attractive and articulate advocate.

**Conclusions**

Insurgent conservatism is not a contradiction. ‘The risk of lousing up a lousy status quo’, O’Hara argues, ‘is far less than the risk of lousing up a pleasantly functionning society. This test does not compare two different states of uncertainty, rather than two different qualities of life’ (2014: 19-20). The more serious the threat, the greater the need for radical change.

Goldwater’s rhetoric spurred the coalescing of a conservative identity that was radically different from Dewey-Eisenhower-Rockefeller Liberal/Modern Republicanism and which was necessarily polarising and subversive. Goldwater proved adept at defining conservatism and his success ‘was due in part to what he said, and in part to the way he said it – to a personality and style that had elements of political magic’ (Bozell 1960: 74). So successful was he, Perlestein writes, he ‘would have had to have been revealed as Beelzebub himself for his partisans to abandon him’ (2009: 339). The identity Goldwater promoted was profoundly hostile to the dominant political narrative and was
fuelled by a profound conviction that the status quo was leading to disaster. Goldwater framed his insurgency as a return to an authentic narrative sanctified by history and the American character that was representative of countless numbers of ordinary Americans betrayed by the elites. It was they and their status quo, not conservatives, that were the aberration. This was, at heart, a moral appeal, emphasising ethos but it was not primarily intended as persuasion because the people Goldwater was addressing were already persuaded, they needed to be organised around an identity and mobilised. Once achieved, the focus would shift to the wider electorate. This is where Goldwater failed.

Constitutive rhetoric was an element in Goldwater’s politics from before 1952 when he won his Senate seat in a (then) heavily Democratic Arizona. This was the foundation of his popularity but also acted a limiting factor on his appeal. Goldwater mapped an appeal enshrining rhetoric, ideas and tactics that Reagan developed and expanded. Successful constitutive rhetoric employs the speaker’s ideology (expressed in a terministic screen) to galvanise supporters around their diagnosis. The first persona (the speaker), filtered by context, creates an identity and the second persona can be likened to a mirror held up to the auditors, showing them who they are, what is wrong, and what needs to be done thereby shrinking the gap between the first and second personas by delineating a common identity.

Goldwater’s speeches and writings employed a limited number of claims encapsulated in a compelling narrative intended to trigger an empathetic response, a sense of ‘togetherness’ in a just and righteous cause resting upon transcendental ideas. His constitutive rhetoric was far more than a political campaign. Goldwater’s speeches and writings rendered legible a political landscape many conservatives knew, believed, or sensed, was wrong but who were constantly told ‘there was no alternative’. Goldwater’s purpose was to assemble a narrative and diagnosis about what had gone wrong with America, what was still going wrong, and how it could be reversed, thereby providing a standard around which conservatives could rally, organise and mobilise.
Goldwater’s constitutive rhetoric fuelled a conservative insurgency but was, however, unable to find a response to its polarising effect. Polarisation is integral and inevitable because constitutive rhetoric challenges overtly an entrenched status quo. Whilst it forged a conservative community and identity, polarisation limited its appeal; to succeed the appeal must broaden to the wider electorate. The transition from polarisation to synthesising a broad appeal is difficult and Goldwater failed but this is not to decry his achievement in laying the foundations for the Republican resurgence under Ronald Reagan.
References


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York: Oxford University Press.

Myth in the 1964 California Republican Presidential Primary,’ Southern California


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New York: Oxford University Press.


Figure 1  Goldwater Texts Tag Cloud
Table 1 Goldwater’s Terministic Screen. Top 30 Words

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