Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations

Bauso, D. orcid.org/0000-0001-9713-677X and Başar, T. (2016) Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations. European Journal of Control, 32. pp. 1-15. ISSN 0947-3580

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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of European Control Association. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in European Journal of Control. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Keywords: Mean-field games; Coalitional game theory; Differential games; Optimal control
Dates:
  • Accepted: 20 April 2016
  • Published (online): 27 April 2016
  • Published: November 2016
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 08 Jul 2016 08:14
Last Modified: 01 Jul 2017 19:51
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejcon.2016.04.006
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejcon.2016.04.006

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