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Foucault, Social Movements and Heterotopic Horizons: rupturing the order of things.

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Abstract
In this article we explore and develop the utility for social movement studies of Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of heterotopia. Informed by Foucault’s theorizing, we propose a heuristic typology of social movement heterotopias. Five heterotopia ‘types’ are considered: ‘contained’, ‘mobile’, ‘cloud’, ‘encounter’ and ‘rhizomic’. Each has particular attributes, but all challenge normal, routine politics. They do so by being, from the perspective of state and capital, either in the ‘wrong’ place, moving in the ‘wrong’ way, or involving the ‘wrong’, connections, affinities or organization. These are ‘constructed-types’, proposed for the purpose of description, comparison and prediction. These social movement heterotopias are different types of space that facilitate practices of resistance and transgression. We situate Foucault’s writing on heterotopia at a pivotal moment in his intellectual career, when he became increasingly concerned with how particular mechanisms for modulating the creative force of resistance/power are invented, the types of bodies they craft and the politics they make possible. We propose an interpretation of heterotopia that relates it to his later work on power, resistance and freedom, and the interplay of his ideas with those of Gilles Deleuze.

Key words: Social Movements; Protest; Resistance; Foucault; Heterotopia.

Introduction
In this article, we explore and develop Foucault’s concept of heterotopia - understood as ‘counter-sites’ in which the order of things is challenged - for use within Social Movement Studies (SMS). Our starting point is the critique of Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), which suggests that it conflates normative and non-normative forms of protest by classifying both as ‘normal politics’ (Piven and Cloward, 1992). For these critics, RMT normalises what the deviancy approach would call ‘disorder’ by downplaying the rule-breaking or norm-refusing aspects of much social
movement activity. In contrast we argue that Foucault’s concept of heterotopia provides an analytically fruitful way of opening up the analysis of social movement practices which are norm-breaking (i.e. that are both outside and against normal, routine politics), whilst simultaneously avoiding a return to equally problematic perspectives which consider non-normative political action to be ‘pathological’. We locate our reading of Foucault’s concept of heterotopia within his wider theorisation of power and resistance and the relationship between his work and that of Deleuze. Outlining a heuristic typology of different forms of social movement heterotopia, we conceptualise these as ‘contained’, ‘mobile’, ‘cloud’, ‘encounter’ and ‘rhizomic’ heterotopias. Further, we propose that the concept of heterotopia may prove helpful in addressing some of the limitations associated with actor-centric models, allowing for the analysis of ‘specific practices and rationalities of protest, which themselves work to constitute particular identities and subjectivities through the performance of dissent’ (Death 2010, 236). We do not suggest that such a Foucauldian approach might replace other existing approaches to the study of social movements, but rather that it provides an alternative and complementary method for analysis.

We are not the first to recognise the potential of Foucault’s concept of heterotopia for the social sciences and humanities (see Johnson 2006, 2008, 2013), or for SMS in particular (Hetherington 1997, 1998). Notably, Hetherington (1997, 1998) has employed the concept in his writing on modernity, identity politics and alternative lifestyles. We do not embrace all of Hetherington’s theorizing around identity politics, but concur with his reading of heterotopias as being spaces of alternative ordering. It is this understanding of heterotopias, as spaces where a portion of the social becomes alternatively ordered, that we believe makes the concept potentially useful for social movement analysis.

Here we develop an expanded and differentiated conception of social movement heterotopias that enable, organize and coordinate practices that are rule-breaking, seeking and affecting, in different ways, to rupture the order of things. This new conceptualisation can be employed empirically as part of a typological methodology (Winch 1947) to compare and comprehend ‘real world’ examples of social movements and protest. This can allow for new understandings of how social movements challenge normal, routine politics by being - from the perspective of the state and capital - in the ‘wrong’ place, moving in the ‘wrong’ way, or involving the ‘wrong’ type of connection, affinity and/or organization. We argue that this reconceptualization of heterotopia can be employed in the analysis of social movements involving: sites of physical co-presence, relatively enduring in particular strategic locations, for example protest camps (‘Contained Heterotopias’); physically mobile social aggregations, for example long-distance marches (‘Mobile Heterotopias’);
entanglements of people, technology and communication, for example web-based or web-enabled protests and struggles (‘Cloud Heterotopias’); anonymous interactions between people of like minds or other commonalities, for example flash mobs and smart mobs (‘Encounter Heterotopias’); and non-hierarchical, centreless, submerged forms of resistance, for example politics at the intersection/s of everyday life (‘Rhizomic Heterotopias’). These forms of social movement heterotopia are ‘constructed types’ (McKinney, 1966, 11), which are developed for the purpose of description, comparison and analysis.

The article proceeds as follows: first, we introduce Foucault’s writings on heterotopia. Foucault’s accounts of this concept are, as Johnson (2006, 75) states, ‘briefly sketched and somewhat confusing’. Consequently the notion has prompted various interpretations and applications across disciplines. Proposing a reading of heterotopia that relates it to Foucault’s wider work, particularly his theorising on power, resistance and freedom, and to the interplay of his ideas with those of Gilles Deleuze, we argue that this new reading of ‘heterotopia’ enhances the concept’s analytical utility for SMS. In the final section of the article we then consider the five forms of social movement heterotopia.

Heterotopia: understanding and developing the concept

Heterotopia is a minor concept within Foucault’s work, but one that has caught the imagination of writers across a number of disciplines, particularly within Fine Art and Geography. The concept appears three times within Foucault’s oeuvre: in the preface to The Order of Things ([1966] 2002); in Different Spaces ([1967] 1998); and in a radio recording Le Corps Utopique, Les Hétérotopies ([1966] 2009). According to Topinka (2010, 55) the ‘conceptions of heterotopias that these works provide do not reduce to one succinct, unproblematic definition of the term, making scholarly attention to the topic difficult’. We do not see this as a difficulty, however, but as an opportunity to adopt and adapt the most useful aspects of the concept and to extend Foucault’s theorizing where appropriate.

At the beginning of The Order of Things Foucault explains how this book arose from his encounter with Borges’s fiction. He cites a passage from Borges in which the latter claims to quote from a ‘certain Chinese Encyclopaedia’ (Foucault 2002, xvi). This passage, Foucault states, ‘shattered…the familiar landmarks of my thought’ (ibid). It appears to have prompted his thinking about heterotopias as spaces where the ‘normal ordering of things’ (for example the ‘normal’ arrangement of words and categorization of things within an encyclopedia) are juxtaposed with a ‘different ordering of things’ (for example Borges’s comic categorization/taxonomy of animals
supposedly found within the ‘Chinese Encyclopedia’ he references). This juxtaposition has the startling effect of revealing the usual ‘order of things’. According to Foucault, heterotopias are spaces that operate to make existing orders legible. By so doing they unsettle received knowledge – i.e. common sense – both revealing and destabilizing the foundations of knowledge. This destabilization renders knowledge open to critique, introducing contingency into the present and demonstrating that if the order of things is socially produced, then it can be made differently.

Borges’s fantasy/fictional encyclopedia is, however, an example of a heterotopia. This reference does not explain how or why Foucault chose to employ the term heterotopia, which he did not invent so much as redefine. Johnson (n.d., 1) suggests that Foucault may or may not have been aware that ‘heterotopia’ is a medical term for tissue that (whilst not diseased) is not where it is usually expected to be. It is dislocated. We suggest that it is highly likely that Foucault knew of this definition and adopted it from evolutionary science and medicine. In medicine, as previously mentioned, heterotopia describes tissue ‘out of place’, but importantly it is also understood as tissue co-existing with the same tissue-type in its ‘normal’ physiological position. It is therefore matter out of place, co-existing with matter in its place. That this dislocated tissue is not necessarily diseased, or the sign of disease, is important because it means that it is not pathological. Foucault’s definition of heterotopia encapsulates all aspects of this medical understanding of the term, including the latter. As Mead (1995/6, 13 our emphasis) states, Foucault’s concept of heterotopia is distinct from utopia and dystopia, in that ‘Utopia is a place where everything is good; dystopia is a place where everything is bad; heterotopia is where things are different’. As mentioned previously, this is why Foucault’s concept of heterotopia is potentially useful for SMS because it helps us to explore the non-normative aspects of social movements - how they often involve spaces where things are ‘different’ in some way - without construing them as pathological.

We also hypothesize that Foucault may have been influenced in his adoption and adaption of the concept of heterotopia by Haeckel’s (1905) Evolution of Man, or similar source/s. Foucault was perhaps more influenced by the history of science than the history of philosophy. His immersion in the history of biology is well known, and is particularly pronounced during the writing of The Order of Things (Blencowe, 2012). There are certainly striking similarities between aspects of Haeckel’s (1905) work on evolution and Foucault’s discussion of heterotopia. Haeckel followed Darwin in distinguishing between two forms of evolution: inherited (heredity) and vitiated (adaptation). Inherited evolution describes a process of ‘complete’ unchanging reproduction over time. Vitiated evolution involves adaptation; the gradual displacement of phenomena. This displacement according to Haeckel (1905, 12), ‘may affect either the place or the time of the
phenomena. If the former, it is called Heterotopy; if the latter, Heterochrony’. Heterotopy refers to the gradual displacement of organs or tissue from their original position. Heterochrony refers to a displacement in time, in the sequence in which organs appear, such that there is acceleration or slowing in their appearance. Whether Foucault was familiar with the work of Haeckel we shall perhaps never know. What can be said is that Foucault (1998) blends these two concepts (heterotopy and heterochrony) in his discussion of heterotopia to describe spaces that are connected to the rest of space, and yet are somehow at variance with it. They are outside of known space, and disruptive of conventional time.

Foucault elaborates the concept of heterotopia in Different Spaces, suggesting that, amongst other characteristics, a single heterotopia may juxtapose several incompatible emplacements in a single real location; entail temporal discontinuity; be simultaneously closed and isolated, yet open and penetrable. They can be locations for individuals ‘whose behaviour is deviant with respect to the mean or required norm’ (Foucault 1998, 180). They are spaces that can result in novel forms/ formations and developments:

‘Real places, actual places, places that are designed into the very institution of society, which are sorts of actually realized utopias in which the real emplacements, all the other real emplacements that can be found within the culture are, at the same time, represented, contested, and reversed, sorts of places that are outside all places, although they are actually localizable’ (Foucault 1998, 178).

For Foucault, then, a further distinction between heterotopias and utopias is that the latter resides only in a spatial and temporal ‘no-place’ (or fictional somewhere), whereas the former are situated in reality. Foucault was of course critical of utopias, insisting that we would be better to replace utopian dreaming with real experiments lived in the present. It seems likely that his conceptualization of heterotopia reflects this line of critique. His definition also makes clear that heterotopias are ‘designed into the very institution of society’ (Foucault 1998, 178). This implies an agency of design and intentionality. Heterotopias have an intended purpose. What Foucault appears to be arguing is that heterotopias are counter-sites: actually existing sites where other sites are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. In other words, they are spaces that simultaneously reflect and unsettle other spaces (Johnson 2006). As previously stated, Hetherington (1997) has interpreted Foucault’s concept of heterotopias as ‘counter-hegemonic’ sites. We prefer to describe them as sites of counter-rationalitiesii. Heterotopias can be viewed as intermediary spaces between that which is, and that which is not - or at least is not yet, but could be.
We suggest that to understand Foucault’s concept of heterotopia fully, however, it is important to read The Order of Things and Different Spaces in particular, from the vantage point of Foucault’s work of the 1970s (Discipline and Punish [1975] 1995 and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 [1976] 1990). In this later work Foucault describes the disciplinary elements of the processes of subjectivation. ‘Disciplines’ such as penology, criminology (see Discipline and Punish), sexology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis (see The History of Sexuality) provide a discursive regularity - an ordering of things - that allows for the process of subjectivation that we all undergo to be animated by particular ‘normalizing’ rationalities of government. These disciplines are an essential part of the machinery of government that makes subjects into objects of knowledge. In the light of these later writings, we suggest that when thinking about heterotopia Foucault was seeking to understand how a tear, or a rupture in this order of things emerges, how resistance towards the normalizing rationales of government can occur. Heterotopias make possible alternative discursive formations and the establishment of alternative regimes of truth, providing escape routes from the norm. Whilst other analysts interpret his writing on heterotopia differently, as emphasizing the spatial location or patterning of heterotopias, we suggest that for Foucault the defining characteristic of a heterotopia is that it is a space in which a certain type of resistance-practice becomes possible or takes place. Heterotopias are spaces where norms are transgressed. Those norms may, or may not be spatial and are certainly not limited to the spatial.

At this point, a note of caution is required regarding this association between heterotopias, resistance and transgression. It is important not to assume that because these are spaces where norms are transgressed, they are always to be celebrated. As Johnson (2006) has commented, there is a tendency to view heterotopias as spaces of hope. There are authors who embrace Foucault’s concept of heterotopia in such a manner (for example, see Baillie et al 2012). Whilst some of this literature (Baillie et al 2012 included) is thought-provoking, not all of it engages in-depth with Foucault’s writings. Further, there is a risk of the concept becoming some sort of modish ‘hurrah’ word (Cranston 1967). Heterotopias, as Johnson (2006) states, are simply unsettling spaces. Nevertheless, having cautioned thus, he argues that heterotopias do offer an ‘escape route from power’ (ibid, 86); they offer ‘lines of flight’ (ibid, 87). He suggests that rather than viewing heterotopias as sites of liberation, or reservoirs of freedom, emancipation or resistance, they are best considered as sites with liberatory characteristics, as playful, experimental spaces (ibid).

We agree with much of Johnson’s understanding of Foucault’s concept of heterotopia. They cannot be reservoirs of freedom, because this suggests that freedom is a ‘thing’. For Foucault (1997),
freedom is not a thing, but a practice. Viewing heterotopias as repositories of freedom is therefore incompatible with Foucault’s wider theorizing on the nature of freedom, which is of course connected to his theorizing of power and resistance. We query, however, Johnson’s conclusion that heterotopias are not sites of liberation. We suggest that they can be understood in this manner. Johnson’s argument appears to rest on a particular reading of Foucault’s theorization of power, resistance and freedom, which we contest. In a well-known engagement with Foucault’s ideas, Taylor (1984) argued that Foucault does away with freedom. This has subsequently become a familiar critique. Many authors have claimed that Foucault’s ‘denial of an autonomous subject leads to the denial of any meaningful concept of freedom’ (Oksala 2005, 1), and implies that emancipatory politics is impossible. For many feminist authors, for example, whilst Foucault provides a useful description of the role of biopower’s normalizing strategies in the production and regulation of docile bodies, his work implies that resistance to these strategies is somehow impossible (Sveinung and Sandberg 2006 in Death, 2010, 237). If resistance is impossible, then so, the argument goes, is ‘freedom’. The idea that Foucault denies our capacity to resist, or under-theorizes resistance, is erroneous, however, and is the result of an incomplete reading of his work. It may account, in part, for the general reluctance of SMS to engage with Foucault’s work (albeit this is something that is starting to be addressed, see for example Death [2010] and Luchies [2015] in this journal). Foucault not only illuminates the effects of disciplinary practices, allowing for an understanding of the ways in which the body becomes a docile target of power, but his ontology of power also allows us to understand how such disciplinary practices are resisted, and how power not only produces docile bodies, but also resistant bodies (Beckett and Campbell, 2015; Campbell, 2013). As he states, we are not always trapped. There is always the possibility of changing (Foucault, 1989). Certainly, Foucault does not believe complete ‘liberation’ is possible, since it is not possible to be ‘outside’ of power relations. Yet resistance most definitely remains possible, and points of resistance can be subversive (Foucault, 1990). As Butler (1997, 100) puts it, we can ‘work the power relations by which we are worked’.

If SMS is to take up Foucault’s conceptualization of heterotopia, and indeed utilize his theorizing more extensively than at present, then it will need to begin with a subtle analysis and understanding of his concept of resistance. It will need to recognize that, for Foucault, resistance is prior to power (Deleuze, 1999; Revel, 2008). To understand this statement, it is necessary to explore the interplay of ideas between Foucault and Deleuze. As stated earlier, there was an important pivot in Foucault’s work around the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is when he moved beyond his structuralist phase
and began, for example, talking about discursive formations rather than discourse. This shift in Foucault’s thinking is evident within his 1970 review (Theatrum Philosophicum) of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (2001) and The Logic of Sense (2004). The glowing terms in which he describes these books suggest that they had a profound effect upon him, likely influencing his thinking and the future character of his writing. It is of course also important to note that Deleuze was much influenced by the work of Foucault, as is evident within Difference and Repetition and his later books. Whilst their theorising remained distinct, there is a complementarity to their ideas from the late 1960s through the 1970s.

For our purposes, it is important to consider how Deleuze’s conception of ‘difference’ can deepen our understanding of Foucault’s theory of power and resistance, which we argue is key to understanding and elaborating his concept of heterotopia. In advancing a concept of difference based upon affirmation rather than negation, Deleuze was working against Hegel and specifically the dialectic. This is something that Foucault was also seeking to do in relation to history. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze contends that in the majority of conceptions of difference in Western philosophy, difference comes after identity (Widder 2008). In other words, difference rests upon ‘identity’, with identity being defined through opposition (we are not-this) (Williams 2013). Deleuze engineers an alternative concept of difference that does not subjugate difference to identity, or view it as negation, but instead views it as the object of affirmation itself (this-becoming) (ibid). Foucault’s understanding of the relationship between power and resistance suggests a similar underlying ontology. Indeed, his review, Theatrum Philosophicum, suggests that his understanding of the relationship between resistance and power might well have been influenced by Deleuze’s understanding of difference. After his reading of these texts, Foucault adopted an altered version of Deleuze’s metaphysics for his own purposes.

Typically, resistance is understood quite differently, as coming after power. Foucault, however, argues that resistance is chronologically and ontologically prior to power and fundamental to the constitution of power relations (Revel, 2008). Power and resistance are terms in Foucault’s theorizing that describe different elements of the endless differentiation of difference from itself, the proliferation of creative force. Resistance, for Foucault, is a force proliferating from our bodies; whilst power is a force proliferating onto our bodies. From the perspective of the experience of the subject, resistance is thus chronologically and ontologically prior. Foucault’s books from the late 1960s through the 1970s become about how particular mechanisms for modulating the creative force of resistance/power are invented, the types of bodies they craft, and the politics they make possible.
A helpful way to understand his theorizing on this point is provided by Patton (1989) who relates Foucault’s ideas to classic debates about positive and negative freedom. Patton disputes Taylor’s critique that Foucault somehow denies freedom, arguing that Taylor reaches this conclusion because he views freedom only in the sense of freedom from (negative freedom). Foucault’s concept of ‘resistance’ is closer to the concept of positive freedom (Berlin 1958). According to Berlin’s classic articulation of the distinction between these two forms of ‘liberty’ (his preferred term), negative freedom is defined in terms of absence of constraint, whereas positive freedom is understood as the capacity for self-determination or self-realization. Patton argues that Foucault positions freedom at the heart of human action, using the term to indicate a way of being that can include a certain practice of philosophy, an ongoing attempt to problematize dimensions of the present ways of being, thinking, and acting, and thus open up the possibility of new approaches. We concur. Resistance, in Foucault’s (1989, 1997) work, is a transgenerational creative force, arising from the collective character of human existence, allowing for the enlargement of the possibilities of self-determination and new economies of power. In effect it involves subjects themselves harnessing similar mechanisms of power that are employed against them by the state or other forms of governance, to engage in the production of new subjectivities (Proust, 2000).

For Foucault (1990, 94), resistance, like power, is exercised from many points. Resistance practices are ‘spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way’ (ibid, 96). Sometimes revolution happens, but more often what occurs are moving and temporary points of resistance that ‘swarm’ (ibid, 96). Heterotopias are such points of resistance. They are transformative spaces that are ‘about’ the production of new subjectivities. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari (1987) distinguish between striated and smooth spaces. Striated spaces are defined by general rules acting to capture and direct energy towards an instrumental end. They are partitioned fields of movement preventing free motion. Smooth spaces, on the other hand, are environments/landscapes in which a subject operates. These are spaces where State ‘striation’ might be resisted. Such spaces are conducive to nomadism, characterized by movement and growth that is unconstrained by systems of organization. They are conducive to rhizomatic growth, which is characterized by having no beginning or end, simply a middle from which it grows. Such spaces are like a map that is always modifiable, with multiple entry and exit points (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). They allow difference to be related in new and creative ways (ibid). We perceive this smooth, or nomad space, to be very close to what Foucault had in mind in his description of heterotopic space. Further, elaborating Foucault’s concept of heterotopia to encompass this concept of smooth space is helpful. Heterotopias are just such transgressive spaces
where it is possible to think differently, be differently, and thus engage in the work of freedom. These spaces are threatening to the order of things, whilst simultaneously necessary for the establishment of a new order.

In our reading of Foucault, his concept of heterotopia has potential for SMS, but only if it is interpreted from the perspective of his later work on power, resistance and freedom, and elaborated with reference to certain key concepts arising in the work of Deleuze (with and without Guattari). Heterotopias can be understood as real experiments in thinking and being differently, lived in the present. They provide escape routes from the norm, enlarging the possibilities for self-determination. They are spaces that facilitate and organize resistance practices. In enabling practices that are rule-breaking they have the potential to effect a rupture in the current order of things. In the next section of this article, we consider how this concept of heterotopia can be operationalized within SMS via a reconceptualization and typology of social movement heterotopias. Whilst all of the social movement heterotopias discussed below represent transformative spaces, each has its distinct attributes.

Towards a reconceptualization of social movement heterotopias
In what follows we propose a series of five ‘constructed-type’ social movement heterotopias. We propose that each might be understood as counter-normative, when viewed from the perspective of the state and capital, but in different ways. Table 1 summarises their key attributes:

Table 1 here

‘Contained’ heterotopias can be understood as receptacles of physical co-presence that are relatively enduring in particular strategic locations. Classic examples would be protest camps (Feigenbaum et. al., 2013). Such heterotopias are normatively ‘in the wrong place’, both figuratively and literally. It is this form of transgression that characterizes their challenge to power relations, and this is why they are often subject to repression. Events in Tahrir Square, Cairo, and the wave of ‘Occupy’ protests, have attracted much attention (ibid), but there are earlier examples such as student occupations, squats, occupations of road construction-sites, and the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp (e.g. Roseneil, 1995). Whilst many see the protest camp as a tactic used by movements, conceptualizing it as a form of heterotopia reveals more of its social character as a space that challenges the usual order of things. In this case, the protest camp challenges spatial norms. Seeing the protest camp as a tactic risks equating it to a short-term protest event of limited duration, rather than acknowledging it as an ongoing and evolving sequence of interactions and
resistance practices. The anti-roads protests in the UK during the 1990s saw a sequence of camps that were part of a wider environmental movement (McNeish, 1999), and Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp was part of wider peace and feminist movements (Roseneil, 1995). Whereas the lunch-counter ‘sit-ins’ of the civil rights movement are perhaps best viewed as a tactic, other occupations, such as student occupations, take control of spaces and make alternative uses of them in such a way that disrupts the spatial norms of the university.

‘Mobile’ heterotopias can be understood as physically mobile social aggregations, for example, long distance marches, hunger marches, the CND marches from Aldermaston to London (Byrne, 1988). Their mobility, or their ‘nomadism’, is partly what makes them heterotopic. Again, they are challenging of ‘spatial norms’. Nomadism is incompatible with the settlement of modernity. These heterotopias are mobile aggregations of physically co-present bodies. Although particular individuals may come and go, the mobile heterotopia endures and flows across the landscape as a physically symbolic challenge to the power relations that seek to control it. These heterotopias travel from one symbolically significant location to another. This entails the presence of people not only ‘out of place’, but also moving in the ‘wrong’ way, unconstrained by systems of ‘normal’ organization. It is because they pose such a threat to the usual order of things that they are often repressively policed. The Hunger Marches in the UK in the 1930s were so repressively policed that the National Council for Civil Liberties was formed as a result (Bagguley, 1991). The famous initial Selma to Montgomery march was broken up by police. It is their very mobility that is often subject to policing, preventing or seeking to control or govern their movement. These examples also illustrate another dimension of the challenge of mobile heterotopias: the question of who is mobile where. Marginalised social groups such as the unemployed or racialized minorities produce a threat to power relations when they become self-organized mobile aggregates. They become the ‘wrong’ people, moving in the ‘wrong’ way, in the ‘wrong’ place. This provokes fear on the part of governments, and often generates repression. As aggregations of individuals that may endure for days and weeks, they begin to take on some characteristics of the protest camp or more ‘contained’ heterotopias, and can thus generate intense experiences of emancipation from normative routines amongst participants.

‘Cloud’ heterotopias can be understood as those characterized by networks of weak ties without co-presence, multiple encounters with physically, and often temporally absent strangers who may be of a like mind. These are technologically dependent upon the corporate infrastructure of the Internet, Twitter, Facebook, etc. In cloud heterotopias people log in and log out, whilst the heterotopia continues. This type of heterotopia involves ‘connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013).
Hence, we do not perceive cloud heterotopias as entailing simply networks of individuals, where the emphasis is on ‘individualized communication’ (Rainie and Wellman, 2012). Instead, the non-normative challenge emerges through the form of the many communicating with the many. It is the ‘wrong’ type of connection. This challenges hierarchical forms of organization within social movements, which effectively become leaderless, with processes of interaction that have the character of a complex, fluid, ever changing dance (Gerbaudo, 2012). Cloud heterotopias are distinctive in that they enable the formation of social relations, communications and meanings that are lifted out of space and time and that would not otherwise be possible. We might find this type of ‘connection’ within movements such as Occupy, or within the Arab Spring. This type of connection has also been seen in Far Right movements, however, and may give rise to both individualized and collective forms of violence. As discussed earlier, heterotopias need not be challenging of norms in ways that we might all celebrate. There is a tendency in the literature to treat these forms of protest as characteristic of, or the sole preserve of, the ‘libertarian-left’, often of a decidedly intellectualist nature. In contrast, we suggest that cloud heterotopias of connective action may increasingly characterize a variety of contemporary social movements.

We should emphasise that in proposing this heterotopia ‘type’, we are not endorsing a digital evangelist (Comunello and Anzera, 2012) view of social media as totally transforming social movement action. Rather, we draw attention to how online and offline social relations and communications are mutually constitutive and mutually transforming. For example, the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring had, as a crucial component, an Arab ‘cloud heterotopia’ of a transnational kind. Elements of this pre-exist and continue outside social media, yet social media facilitated the transformation of what was previously an Arab public sphere. Thus, it does not make sense to speak of social media as an ‘organizing tool’ or as having an ‘impact’ upon social movements. Cloud heterotopic practices flow between the ‘virtual’ and the ‘real’ or ‘actual’, rendering the dichotomy meaningless. The technology has become integrated into the everyday life of the people and the movements that have access to the technology. Cloud heterotopic practices might thus be thought of as a ‘cyborg’ form (Haraway, 1991); new environments of action-and meaning-formation that enable people to relate to each other in innovative ways. Lifted out of specific spaces and times, cloud heterotopic practices endure before, during and after protest. Thus they function not just to mobilise people, but also to comment on things as they are actually happening, whether or not people are present, and offer the opportunity for longer term reflection (Sajuria et al 2015). Cloud heterotopias are thus assemblages not of bodies, but of communications, with images, texts and links. These are what people can ‘dip into’, ignore, respond to, or pass on, as they desire. Consequently, people are reacting to essentialized and reified communications rather
than people they necessarily know. These heterotopias are entanglements of people, technologies, software and communications (Haraway, 1991; Mol, 2002).

‘Encounter’ heterotopias (or heterotopias of ‘encounter’) can be understood as those characterized by protest events where there is physical co-presence, but entail typically brief encounters with strangers who may be of like-mind. This might be traditional demonstrations and marches in strategic locations for a day or an afternoon, but as these have in the West at least become increasingly ‘civilized’ by police management practices (della Porta and Reiter, 1998), some movements have resisted this by not collaborating with the police in order to create more disruptive events. For example, in the 1990s the UK saw a wave of ‘Reclaim the Streets’ protests. Parties were organized in major urban centres, or on motorways, without police cooperation, producing much disruption. Flash mobs and smart mobs might also be examples of this type of heterotopia. Again, as with cloud heterotopias, in an increasingly mediatized society, this type of protest is both more possible and more likely. Media are extending interactions in time and space, restructuring (reordering) interpersonal and public time. Increasingly, technological intermediaries intervene in ways that transcend the limits of time and space. Social and technological developments are changing both mass and interpersonal communication and the result is a diversification and hybridization of mediated communication. The results can be startling. Linking this back to Foucault’s theorizing, as explained earlier, he blends the concepts of heterotopy and heterochrony in his definition of heterotopia. These social and technological developments are allowing for social movement activity which is at variance with, or outside of, known space (heterotopic) and disruptive of conventional time (heterochronic).

Immediately following the U.S. presidential election of 2000, online activist Zack Exley anonymously created a website allowing people to propose locations for gatherings at which people called for a full re-count of the votes in Florida (Stewart et al, 2012). More than 100 significant protests took place, many with thousands of participants, without any traditional approach to organizing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_mob). This temporary and ‘anonymous’ interaction is the ‘wrong’ type of affinity. Whilst participants may share a certain kinship of spirit, shared interests or other interpersonal commonalities, their engagement with each other does not involve the high levels of intimacy or permanency usually associated with affinity groups. The norm-challenging nature of this type of heterotopia is its suddenness – its appearance in unexpected places at unexpected times. It cannot be easily managed and corralled by the authorities using their normalizing protest control tactics.
Finally, ‘rhizomic’ heterotopias can be understood as those that are counter-normative because they involve the ‘wrong’ type of organization. They are characterized by latitude, cul-de-sacs, dead-ends, and creativity. This might, for example, be seen in social movement activity submerged within everyday life, involving everyday, autonomous activities. Such heterotopias are random and discontinuous in their spreading (Chesters and Welsh, 2005), spreading horizontally, upwards, downwards, and discontinuously, as parts break off and reform elsewhere. In fact, the capacity for elements/parts/sections of such heterotopias to break off, but regenerate from such fragments is a key characteristic. According to the principle of ‘asignifying rupture’, this ‘holds that a rhizome may be broken in any part by still has the power to continue growing in previous or new directions’ (Roos and Oikonomakis, 2014, 119). Although not employing the concept of heterotopia, this is how Karatzogianni and Robinson (2010) understand ‘rhizomatic politics’. It is the norm-challenging nature of this social movement activity that makes it heterotopic. As a form of organization, it throws light upon, and simultaneously challenges, the hierarchical (‘arboreal’) and serialized character of modernist, capitalist, social relations.

In thinking about this type of heterotopia we draw on the work of Deleuze and Guattari and their discussion of the rhizome. Their work is, as previously discussed, in many ways complementary to that of Foucault, and we suggest can be employed to elaborate Foucault’s concept of heterotopia. Rhizomatic heterotopias, following Deleuze and Guattari (1998) are a ‘body without organs’, a body without hierarchical organization. They have no precise centre, no unique point from which all subsequent development occurs. They can be ‘entered’ at any point, because all points are connected (Karatzogianni and Robinson 2010). Such protest does not spread in a linear fashion but instead by ‘convoluted, unpredictable dispersion…involve[ing] rhizomic, non-linear, vibrating patterns of dispersion’ (Gordillo, 2011, no page). Holloway (2005) in Roos and Oikonomakis 2014, 119) has usefully described this phenomenon in his analysis of the influence of Mexico’s Zapatistas on the Global Justice Movement: ‘It is not the spread of an organization that we are speaking of…It is rather a question of resonance’.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) employ the term ‘rhizome’ to describe living entities (e.g. rats) and geographical entities (e.g. burrows). The latter is a particularly interesting metaphor for SMS. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 7) burrows have operations: ‘shelter, supply, movement, evasion and breakout’. Sutton and Martin-Jones (2008) have used this understanding of the rhizome as ‘burrow’ to explore the guerilla war of attrition fought by the Vietnamese Vietcong, against the seemingly overwhelming technology of the US military. This, they argue was both literally and figuratively an example of the rhizome as ‘burrow’, since this underground political movement was, at times,
literally underground. In their struggle, the Vietcong ‘utilised an elaborate tunnel system which enabled them to evade the US military’s land and air forces, store and move arms and supplies, build up numbers for ambushes and surprise attacks, and quickly disappear again once overwhelmed’ (ibid, 5). This metaphor of the burrow and its operations is also helpful when seeking to understand movements that are involved in non-violent struggle. For example, Monteagudo (2011, vi) provides a fascinating account of Argentina’s social movements, in which she draws upon the concept of the rhizome to understand how these social movements have organized according to a ‘politics by other means’ in the face of the ‘dispossessing nature of the global power they confronted’. She employs the metaphor of the rhizome to understand submerged networks of resistance (Melucci 1989), and how networks constituted at the intersection/s of everyday life have challenged governmentality.

Having outlined this reconceptualization and typology of social movement heterotopias, it is important to address the question of whether or not we are proposing that individual social movements might be characterized as one of these ‘types’. Our answer is that we are not proposing this. It is likely that many social movements, especially contemporary movements, will involve several overlapping forms of heterotopia. For example, it is more likely today that a contained heterotopia will have a corresponding cloud heterotopia, as in the case of the Tahrir Square protests. We are not, therefore, proposing that this reconceptualization and typology be used to categorise social movements. Instead, we are suggesting that working with our proposed forms/types of heterotopia as a guide within future empirical work will prove fruitful for SMS, providing a new way to analyze how the resistance-practices of those engaged in protests and/or social movements incur transformative effects, transforming the individuals involved, making alternative values visible, changing spaces, or illustrating that other spaces could exist. It allows us to gain analytic purchase when it comes to explaining how social movements unsettle norms which have gone unquestioned, and problematize that which was previously considered unproblematic (Foucault, 2001). It also provides analytic purchase upon the resistance practices deployed by members of movements against various types of disciplinary practices.

**Conclusion**

In this article we have explored the potential of Foucault’s concept of heterotopia for social movement analysis. We have proposed a new reading of this concept informed by an understanding of his wider work, particularly his later theorising on power, resistance and freedom, and the interplay of his ideas with those of Gilles Deleuze (with and without Guattari). We have argued that
heterotopias should be understood as transgressive spaces where it is possible to think differently, be differently, and engage in the practice/s of freedom.

We have developed/expanded Foucault’s discussion of heterotopia to propose five forms (types) of social movement heterotopia: ‘Contained Heterotopias’ that are in the ‘wrong’ place (such as protest camps); ‘Mobile Heterotopias’ which move in the ‘wrong’ way (such as long distance marches); ‘Cloud Heterotopias’ that involve the ‘wrong’ type of connection, without physical co-presence (such as social media mobilisations); ‘Encounter Heterotopias’ where there is brief physical co-presence of participants, but the ‘wrong’ type of affinity (such as flash or smart mobs); and ‘Rhizomic Heterotopias’ where there is the ‘wrong’ type of organization (such as submerged networks of resistance). All are transformative spaces that are ‘about’ the production of new subjectivities. They expand the possibilities for self-determination on the part of participants, and the emergence of new economies of power, but they do so in different ways. This re-thinking of heterotopia allows us to consider how movements ‘develop action, thought and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction’ and how they seek to connect desire to reality (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: xiii). It allows for a consideration of the varied techniques, discursive, ethical practices, and practices of freedom of social movements. Our proposed social movement heterotopias are presented as a heuristic typology, deduced from theory with the aim of enhancing the perception of the researcher. We believe that they will prove helpful to researchers in SMS, allowing them to derive initial hypotheses for testing, aiding them to structure their observations of contemporary social movements and protest, and to comprehend and compare the attributes of different movements and/or elements of movements.

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1 Peter Johnson’s website provides valuable appraisal of the various interpretations and applications of the concept of heterotopia [http://www.heterotopiastudies.com](http://www.heterotopiastudies.com) (12.03.16)

2 For us, the term ‘counter-hegemonic’ carries Gramscian connotations of social relations forming a historic bloc that in turn relates to congruence between classes and moral values. ‘Rationalities’ instead refers to logics deriving their legitimacy from particular sites of localized expertise.