Good International Citizenship and Special Responsibilities to Protect Refugees

Abstract

Good international citizenship is generally seen, either implicitly or explicitly, as being a matter of fulfilling general duties in the realm of foreign policy. In this article, I challenge this prevailing view, by arguing that good international citizenship frequently involves discharging special responsibilities to protect, which in turn involves grants of asylum to refugees. While arguing that asylum should be seen as an important element of good international citizenship as a matter of course, it assumes an even more central role in this citizenship in two scenarios. The first is where humanitarian intervention is either imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international society. The second is when intervention – whether pursued for humanitarian or other reasons – creates refugees, and intervening states may thereby acquire special responsibilities to protect those refugees.

Introduction

In recent decades, the notion of good international citizenship has developed within political and academic discourse in liberal-democratic states as a framework with which to assess the ethics of states’ foreign policies. Originating in Canadian politics during the 1960s (Pert 2014, 4), and championed by the former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (Evans 1989), it has since been elaborated by international relations theorists in the English School tradition, who posit the existence of an international society of states (e.g. Dunne 2008; Linklater 1992; Linklater 2000; Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7; Wheeler and Dunne...
There now exists a consensus that the basic content of good international citizenship involves a strong commitment to human rights, multilateralism, and international law, including the responsibility to protect (R2P). In short, good international citizens are committed to the common rules and values governing the international society of which they are members.

Despite this basic consensus, a residual indeterminacy within the concept persists. Indeed, the simple vagueness of the term ‘good’ means that any understanding of what good international citizenship is and entails will, in the abstract, be contingent on whatever one considers ‘good’ state conduct in the international sphere to be (Williams 2002, 42-43). Although there is no expectation that states be perfect in order to qualify as good international citizens, it remains unclear how demanding good international citizenship should be taken to be, as well as how states should seek to balance and prioritise their often competing responsibilities towards their own citizens, other states, and non-citizens. Although scholars have not addressed these issues and ambiguities in as much depth as they might have done – tending as they have done to raise them rather than systematically attempting to resolve them – some have sought to convert this impression of slight slipperiness around the concept into a virtue. Jonathan Gilmore, for instance, has recently argued that, while the concept cannot offer any ‘objective determination’ of when a balance between a states’ various responsibilities has been achieved, it may nevertheless act as a ‘discursive framework’ through which the ‘continuities and tensions’ between these responsibilities can be explored (Gilmore 2015, 107-108). While this indeterminacy is, in common with all moral concepts, not entirely eliminable, leaving it unaddressed opens the door to under-demanding interpretations of what good international citizenship entails, which may well have the effect of justifying states’ existing policies that are in fact highly problematic.ii
This residual indeterminacy is also partly due to the relatively narrow framing of the concept to date, and to the fact that scholars have not analysed the notion in light of the full range of moral and legal obligations that states can bear both towards each other and to individuals within international society. What is striking in most discussions of good international citizenship is the extent to which principles of good international citizenship are largely framed, at least implicitly, in terms of general duties – that is, as duties that arise by virtue of each state’s membership in an international society of states – and as pertaining solely or mostly to states’ foreign policies. In this article, I suggest that one way of sharpening the concept is to recognise explicitly the role of special responsibilities and domestic practices such as asylum policy in the practice of good international citizenship. Whereas scholars who have theorised good international citizenship have contributed to recent important work on special responsibilities in world politics (Bukovansky et al. 2012; Dunne 2013), they have not made explicit connections between the two concepts. Although good international citizenship and asylum policy have been related to one other, mostly in the context of Australian politics – where claims to Australia’s good international citizen credentials have sat uneasily with its draconian asylum policies in recent years – detailed general principles of good international citizenship in the domain of asylum have yet to be elaborated. Given that special responsibilities are standardly seen as being more demanding than general duties, showing the relevance of special responsibilities for good international citizenship can help to ensure that the concept acts as a critical yardstick, where necessary, with which to judge states’ existing policies.

In order to make this case, this article is structured in three parts. In the first part, I outline the notion of good international citizenship and the role it has played in normative debates in international relations theory to date. In the second part, I make a general case for linking good international citizenship and special responsibilities, arguing that practices of
special responsibilities are not confined to great powers, but rather that the assignment and
shouldering of such responsibilities should be seen as part of the proactivity expected of all
good international citizens. Just as citizens who enjoy formal equality within a state can
acquire differentiated obligations as a result of their actions, so too can states, especially
where the harmful effects of their actions will be borne by other states or individuals if left
unrectified. I also suggest that recognising the role of special responsibilities within good
international citizenship can help to guard against an overly static view of what this
citizenship is and entails, for it brings into view the ways in which states may gain, lose and
re-gain their status as good international citizens by causing and rectifying the harms they
cause.

In the third part, I suggest that, while asylum should be seen as a key element of good
international citizenship as a matter of course, it becomes an even more central aspect of this
citizenship in two scenarios where humanitarian intervention is unable to deliver effective
protection to those at risk from atrocities. The first is where humanitarian intervention is
imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international
society. In such a scenario, I suggest, good international citizens bear a duty to reshape norms
such as R2P. The second is where intervention (whether pursued for humanitarian or other
reasons) creates refugees, and intervening states may thereby acquire special responsibilities to
protect those refugees through asylum. In this kind of case, I suggest, leaving third-party states
to take up the slack and offer asylum to those refugees constitutes an inter-state injustice that is
incompatible with such citizenship. While discussions of good international citizenship,
especially from those writing from a solidarist perspective, have emphasised the role of
humanitarian intervention in upholding human rights, I argue that the practical limitations of
such intervention require recognition of the role of asylum in this citizenship. In so doing, I
aim to pave the way towards an account of good international citizenship that is more sensitive
to the harmful consequences that often flow from humanitarian intervention. I also show how attending to the currently skewed distribution of responsibilities to protect refugees across international society challenges the close association between good international citizenship and Western liberal-democratic states, given that the majority of the world’s refugees are hosted by states within the global South.

**The Good International Citizen Revisited**

The notion of good international citizenship has often been considered to be a critical tool – whether by providing ‘some basic moral criteria’ (Linklater 1992, 39); a ‘conceptual rationale’ (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 848); a ‘litmus test’ (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 168); a ‘benchmark’ (Buller and Harrison 2000, 79); a ‘discursive framework’ (Gilmore 2015, 108); or a ‘standard of behaviour’ (Pert 2014, 207) – for evaluating states’ foreign policies. The concept sits among a cluster of cognate terms, including internationalism (Dunne and McDonald 2013) and the ‘good state’ (Lawler 2005; 2013), and has largely been developed within, and applied to, liberal-democratic middle powers (Lightfoot 2006, 457). Although the concept has assumed its most prominent role in political discourse in Australia, scholars have used the term to assess the UK’s foreign policy during the Blair years (see Buller and Harrison 2000; Gilmore 2015; Vickers 2000; Wheeler and Dunne 1998), as well as that of South Africa (Graham 2008) and the Nordic states (Lawler 2005). However, there appears to be weaker consensus over whether the application of the term should be confined to such liberal middle powers. While some have viewed good international citizenship as flowing from the self-image of liberal states (Evans and Grant 1991, 34-35), others have left open the possibility that any state may act as good international citizen (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 231), including great powers such as the United States (Ralph 2009), as well as regional bodies such as the European Union (Dunne 2008; Siniver and Cabrera 2015).
Nevertheless, there appears to be a broad consensus that the principal characteristics of good international citizens include a strong commitment to human rights, multilateralism and international law. In Linklater’s classic introduction of the concept to international relations theory, he argued that each good international citizen is ‘prepared to put the welfare of international society ahead of the relentless pursuit of its own national interests’ (Linklater 1992, 28), which Wheeler and Dunne (1998, 868) later articulated as a willingness to ‘[sacrifice] the pursuit of narrow economic and political advantages in the cause of promoting international standards of human rights’. In recent decades, good international citizenship has, thanks to the advocacy of Gareth Evans, become closely associated with the doctrines of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and R2P. Indeed, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001, 8) – which, co-chaired by Evans, first articulated R2P – viewed a willingness to uphold R2P as ‘the minimum content of good international citizenship’. In its commitment to multilateralism, moreover, each good international citizen is expected to ‘punch its weight’ (Siniver and Cabrera 2015, 210) or ‘pitch in’ (Pert 2014, 7) in international affairs.

Moreover, a distinction can be drawn between domain-specific and overall good international citizenship. Scholars have applied the framework of good international citizenship to a variety of policy domains and issue areas – such as humanitarian intervention (Linklater 2000), R2P (Youde and Slagter 2013), environmental policy (Lightfoot 2006), arms sales (Wheeler and Dunne 1998), the Middle East peace process (Siniver and Cabrera 2015), the International Criminal Court (Ralph 2007), and universal jurisdiction (Ralph 2009) – although not to asylum and refugee protection in any depth. In discussions of internationalism and good international citizenship, capitalism remains, in Burke’s words, ‘a vast and deeply problematic silence’ (Burke 2013, 62).

The relationship of good international citizenship to the different principles that can underpin international society perhaps remains to some extent unclear. Normative English
School theory has been characterised by a debate between pluralism and solidarism. Perhaps at the risk of over-simplification, pluralist norms prioritise international order and focus on principles of state sovereignty, self-determination, non-interference and co-existence among states, while solidarist norms prioritise matters of justice and are principally concerned with the rights of individuals within international society. Whereas good international citizenship has been characterised as lying between the poles of pluralism and solidarism (Gilmore 2015, 109), it is possible to tailor principles of good international citizenship to fit international societies in which either pluralist or solidarist norms are dominant (see Dunne 2008, 21-25; Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7). In a pluralist international society, good international citizenship would largely consist of contributing to what Molly Cochran (2008, 286) has described as ‘responsible international society management’, by prioritising order between states, whereas in a solidarist international society good international citizenship would go well beyond this to include at least some degree of cosmopolitan concern for the human rights of the world’s population, whether that is formulated in terms of respect for the ‘harm principle’ or ‘cosmopolitan harm conventions’ (Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7). While pluralism implicitly offers a relatively thin understanding of what citizenship in international society involves – given that, in Dunne’s words, pluralism ‘maintains that cultural diversity is a practical and moral barrier to the pursuit of collective moral purposes other than maintaining order’ (Dunne 2008, 21) – solidarism sets out a thicker conception of what it means to be a good international citizen.

Good international citizenship also reflects the broader English School theory in which it is embedded, by representing a ‘middle-ground ethics’ (Cochran 2009), or a ‘third way’ (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 856) that sits between the poles of realism and cosmopolitanism, and pragmatism and idealism. As Andrew Linklater has put it, good international citizenship ‘promises to overcome that conflict between citizenship and
humanity which has been such a recurrent feature of the theory and practice of international relations’ (Linklater 1992, 22). Rather than either asserting that ethics is inapplicable to international politics at one extreme, or calling for the dismantling of the states system at the other, the framework of good international citizenship sees states as faced with distinct sets of responsibilities, namely ‘national responsibility’ to their own citizens, ‘international responsibility’ towards other states, and ‘humanitarian responsibility’ towards individuals, wherever they may reside (Jackson 2000, 170; Ralph 2007, 78-79). Some discussions of the concept suggest that the potential tensions between these distinct responsibilities can be reconciled, and that, as Tony Blair (1999) famously put it, ‘values and interests merge’. Gareth Evans, for instance, has contended that ‘being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen’ is part of the ‘national interest’ (Evans 1989, 9).

To be sure, the role of good international citizenship as an ethical middle-ground sets limits on its ability to play a strong role in any truly radical political project, and various scholars have observed its ‘modest’ character (Lawler 2013, 24) or relative ‘conservatism’ (Williams 2002, 46), given its ultimately state-centric approach (Burke 2013; Cabrera 2010, 23). Indeed, it may be the ‘international’ in good international citizenship that limits its radical potential, such that states would need to ‘go beyond’ the demands of good international citizenship in order to become full-blooded cosmopolitan states (Shapcott 2013, 139; see also Cabrera 2010, 22). In contrast, a “good world citizen” would be able to act in more thoroughly cosmopolitan ways. Nevertheless, the concept retains significant progressive potential (Cabrera 2010, 5), especially in its solidarist renderings, whether one believes that good international citizenship is ‘but a way station on the road to the realisation of an authentically cosmopolitan morality within a universal community of humankind’ or is ‘a perennial form’ (Lawler 2013, 21), given the propensity of actual states to only selectively adhere to the norms of good international citizenship. However, this progressive potential depends in part on
addressing the concept’s residual indeterminacy noted above, thereby ensuring that it can act as a critical yardstick against which to judge states’ actions.

**Good International Citizenship and Special Responsibilities**

In political philosophy, a standard distinction is made between general duties and special responsibilities. While general duties are those ‘we have to people as such’, special responsibilities are those that ‘we have only toward particular people with whom we have had certain significant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in certain significant sorts of relations’ (Scheffler 2001, 49). Special responsibilities are often thought of as being stronger than general duties, at least in cases where the two conflict (Kagan 1988, 293; Pogge 2002, 207; Scheffler 2001, 87). In the context of international society, states may bear special responsibilities on a number of distinct grounds. In addition to their special responsibilities towards their own citizens, states may bear special responsibilities to non-citizens on the basis of transnational ties such as historical association (Ypi, Goodin and Barry 2009); any particular roles they may have assumed within international society, such as permanent membership of the UN Security Council (Clark and Reus-Smit 2013); the fact that they have harmed outsiders and owe them reparation (Butt 2009); or by virtue of their simple capability (Bukovansky et al. 2012).

Despite recognition of the special ‘managerial responsibilities’ of great powers within English School thinking (Bull 1977, 194), the literature specifically on good international citizenship to date makes only brief and sporadic reference to the concept of special responsibilities, and has limited its focus to states’ special responsibilities or ‘fiduciary duties’ towards their own citizens (Siniver and Cabrera 2015, 214), or those flowing from their capabilities (Linklater 1992, 29; Linklater and Suganami 2006: 238). It might, however, be argued that this neglect of special responsibilities within specific discussions of good
international citizenship is for good reason: good international citizenship should be solely or largely defined by general duties. The concept’s foundation in English School theory might be thought to make clear why this is so. If good international citizenship specifies the principles of ethical state conduct in international relations that arise from each state’s membership of international society of states then, it could be argued, there is a close conceptual link between good international citizenship and general duties. The challenges facing international society at any given time are to be shared among its members and, in this way, good international citizenship is fundamentally about ‘doing one’s bit’ to address these problems and to maintain order within the international system. As Vickers (2000, 42) has commented, ‘a focus on good international citizenship and the international community suggests some notion of equality between citizens’. Whereas good international citizenship has, as I observed earlier, largely been applied to middle powers, the language of special responsibilities may seem more at home in the context of great power politics, where special responsibilities seem to flow from the maxim that ‘with great power, comes great responsibility’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 246). Viewed in this light, the assignment of special responsibilities to states within international society is to go beyond the requirements of good international citizenship. Good international citizenship and special responsibilities are, on this view, both highly significant within international affairs, but the two are analytically distinct.

There is, however, an important counterargument to this line of thought, which demonstrates that special responsibilities should be seen as forming an integral part of good international citizenship. When states act within the context of international society, engaging as they do in a range of actions of different sorts, this clearly affects not only other states, but also the individuals within those states. If harmful, the costs of these actions will often fall on other states or individuals, unless that is compensated for through further remedial action by the
state that caused the harm. To fail to redress these harms would be to allow the costs of these actions to fall on individuals whose basic interests may be set back as a result, or on other states that step in and take up the slack for other states, while those states responsible for the harm effectively free-ride on these others’ efforts. This inequitable distribution of the costs of states’ actions is clearly a matter of ethics within the international society of states. Just as, on the domestic level, the equality of citizens does not prevent the state from demanding that individual citizens pay compensation and offer redress for foreseeable harms they have caused – even, under doctrines of strict liability within tort law, when acting justifiably (Honoré 1999, ch. 2) – states may also be required within international society to do the same. I illustrate this point in the final section with the example of how the distribution of the costs of international refugee protection has tracked states’ special responsibilities towards refugees only to a very limited extent in recent years.

Moreover, recognition of the formal sovereign equality of states within international society should not lead us to conclude that good international citizenship must be viewed as a matter of discharging general duties. As Bukovansky and colleagues have persuasively argued, ‘ideas and practices of special responsibilities come to the fore, and assume particular importance, in international orders where either sovereign equality or material power politics, each on their own, provides an inadequate basis on which to address challenges of coexistence and cooperation’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 7). Part of what it means to be a good international citizen should be to take an active part in the assignment of special responsibilities in order to tackle such challenges effectively, and to assume some of those special responsibilities where necessary, which fits readily with the notion that each good international citizen should ‘punch its weight’ (Siniver and Cabrera 2015, 210). Although Vickers (2000, 42) has characterised the good international citizen’s respect for international law as ‘a rather passive stance to foreign affairs’, the values of ‘leadership’ and ‘proactivity’ (Pert 2014, 12) that are to be found within
assertions of good international citizenship by politicians, such as Evans, means that a willingness to assign and accept special responsibilities among members of international society can readily be seen as a part of good international citizenship.

The incorporation of special responsibilities into a conception of good international citizenship can also help to guard against a rather static view of what it means to be such a citizen. If the ‘harm principle’ is, as Linklater and Suganami (2006, ch. 7) have suggested, an important element of good international citizenship, then states that cause harm beyond their borders unjustifiably, and then fail to redress those harms, cannot properly be classed as good international citizens. A focus on special responsibilities that flow from the principle of reparation can bring to light the ways in which states may gain, lose and regain their status as good international citizens, by causing harm and injustice and redressing it (or not, as the case may be). This focus on special responsibilities allows us to appreciate the means through which states that have deviated from the norms of good international citizenship – which is to say all states at one point or another – can make amends and thereby re-enter the fold of good international citizens once more, or even perhaps enter it for the first time.

It might be claimed that, while special responsibilities based on considerations such as capability or a state’s position within international society can be readily incorporated into the framework of good international citizenship – given that capability will at least partly be determined by whether a state is able to pursue cosmopolitan ends once it has also fulfilled its duties towards its own nationals and to other states – reparative duties may pose a tougher challenge for the concept. Some reparative duties can be discharged by states without jeopardising their ‘vital interests’, provided the harm they caused to non-citizens was limited. However, if historical injustices, such as large-scale practices of colonialism and slavery, are taken into consideration then, it could be argued, the framework of good international
citizenship might collapse under their weight, so to speak, as the need for reparation demands sacrifices that are incompatible with the good international citizen’s maintenance of a balance between cosmopolitan duties and the national interest.\textsuperscript{vii} Whereas states may be entitled to prioritise the welfare of their citizens over the assistance of vulnerable strangers where those states are not implicated in this vulnerability, reparative duties are less sensitive to considerations of cost (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 219-220). While a full discussion of how extensive duties to redress historical injustices are goes beyond the scope of this article, it may be that the viability of good international citizenship as an ethical framework ultimately depends on the elision of such injustices. Nevertheless, discharging special responsibilities towards refugees generated by states’ recent military interventions, which form the focus of this article, may well impose significant costs, but are less likely to be so onerous as to threaten the responsible states’ ‘vital interests’, and so are more easily incorporated into the good international citizen frame.

**Bringing Good International Citizenship Home**

The second feature of existing discussions of good international citizenship that I seek to challenge in this article is the view that this citizenship is solely or mainly a matter of foreign affairs. Linklater (1992, 39) is typical in this regard, and set the trend of subsequent discussion, in his view that the concept of good international citizenship ‘sets out some basic criteria which can be used to judge and criticise the state’s conduct of foreign policy’ (emphasis added). This is not to say that there has been no recognition of links between good international citizenship and domestic policy in issue areas such as asylum, however. Given the apparent contradiction between Australia’s claims to good international citizenship and its draconian policy of detaining asylum seekers in off-shore processing centres, some scholars and commentators have pointed out in passing that this asylum policy at the very least calls
into question Australia’s status as a good international citizen (Devetak 2004, 107; McDonald 2013, 108; McGaughey and Kenny 2015; Shapcott 2013, 146). Evans himself seemed to see domestic policy such as asylum as relevant to good international citizenship only insofar as a state’s credibility as a good international citizen depends partly on keeping its ‘domestic house absolutely in order’, which can involve a just refugee and immigration policy (Evans 1989, 15-16). Beyond this link, which is an artefact of Australian politics of recent decades, recent academic work has explored how practices of good international citizenship abroad have domestic pre-requisites, with Shapcott (2013) exploring the ways in which states may take ‘a constitutional path’ to good international citizenship. However, these links made between good international citizenship and domestic policy stop short of fully viewing such policy as part of this citizenship, instead viewing domestic policy only as a pre-requisite for it. 

However, the basic claim that asylum should be seen as forming part of good international citizenship is hardly controversial, for it flows directly from the good international citizen’s commitment to human rights and to international law, which includes the 1951 Refugee Convention and other instruments which provide for the protection of refugees. The good international citizen’s commitment to multilateralism might also be thought to entail some willingness to share the collective responsibility to protect refugees through physical resettlement schemes and financial ‘burden-sharing’. There is, however, much more than this to say here, and the neglect of domestic policies such as asylum in discussions of good international citizenship has persisted despite the existence of sophisticated work from an English School perspective on the role of asylum in international society (Haddad 2008; Hurrell 2011). Without drawing on the notion of good international citizenship explicitly, Emma Haddad, for instance, has explored asylum’s relationship with pluralist and solidarist norms underpinning international society. While the institution of
asylum flows more naturally from solidarist principles of good international citizenship which stress the importance of human rights, Haddad’s work demonstrates that a rationale for asylum can be found within pluralist norms. Asylum is a means of maintaining the stability of international society and reinforcing its statist logic, in that it seeks to reabsorb refugees – who, by fleeing, have disrupted the initial distribution of responsibility for their rights to their states of origin – into international society through a process of ‘reterritorialisation’ (Haddad 2008: 90). Moreover, asylum may function as a ‘corrective mechanism’ for the workings of international society that foreseeably creates refugees (Haddad 2008, 88; see also Clark 2013, ch. 4; Carens 2013, 195). In other words, asylum can be an important element of the practice of good international citizens, whether pluralist or solidarist norms are dominant within that society.

It might be asked why the focus here is on asylum, rather than other forms of refugee protection and assistance that can be delivered within refugees’ regions of origin, such as humanitarian aid packages or the creation of safe havens, which may be more efficient (see Price 2009, 12-13). Without discounting the role of these forms of in situ protection and assistance entirely, and recognising that good international citizenship may involve taking these measures, it is important to recognise that they are often an inadequate substitute for asylum. Aid, which is often delivered in refugees camps, can be an important short-term palliative by offering shelter and subsistence but, unlike asylum, it cannot secure the full range of human rights within a state to which refugees should have access.

While the basic case that asylum should be seen as forming part of the code of good international citizenship should be easy to make out, recognition of the role of asylum in this citizenship is especially important given the frequent practical limitations of humanitarian intervention as a means of upholding states’ R2P. As I now argue, the fact that intervention
can be imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international society, and can create its own refugees, renders asylum an especially crucial element of good international citizenship.

Asylum and Humanitarian Intervention

Discussions of good international citizenship, and especially those informed by a strongly solidarist ethos, have tended to focus on humanitarian intervention as the principal means of upholding human rights (e.g. Dunne 2008; Linklater 2000). Some have sought to incorporate a demanding duty of intervention within the framework of good international citizenship, with Wheeler and Dunne (2001, 184) arguing that in ‘killing to defend human rights, the good international citizen must be prepared to ask its soldiers to risk and, if necessary, lose their lives to stop crimes against humanity’. This link is partly due to the fact that the frameworks of good international citizenship and R2P have been part of the same broad normative and political trajectory. In addition to the fact that they both stem from the human rights culture that has developed since the end of World War Two, Gareth Evans has been a firm advocate of both. As co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose report presented the concept of R2P in 2001, his vision of both R2P and good international citizenship stressed intervention as a principal means of tackling mass atrocity crimes.

At this juncture, advocates of good international citizenship have faced a strong tension between respect for procedural norms in international society, and recognition of the need to deliver the substantively just outcome of protection for those vulnerable to atrocity crimes. Indeed, in the wake of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Linklater regarded the question of whether to intervene in cases of grave humanitarian emergency without UN Security Council
authorisation as ‘the fundamental dilemma for the good international citizen at the present time’ (Linklater 2000, 493). Here the good international citizen’s values of human rights and multilateralism seem to enter into direct conflict. The problem is even more acute where unauthorised intervention risks generating competition among great powers and undermines international order. Intervening without authorisation might avert atrocities in the short-term, but in the longer-term it may lead to the emergence of what Ralph and Gallagher (2015) have dubbed ‘legitimacy faultlines’ in international society, or prompt a ‘pluralist backlash’ (Ralph 2007, 56), as states which are strongly committed to pluralist norms of non-interference may become highly wary of future interventions. Arguably, NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, which exceeded the Security Council’s mandate to protect civilians by pursuing regime change, has to some extent contributed to this kind of backlash when it has come to the prospect of intervention in response to the subsequent crisis in Syria. As well as being politically unfeasible without acting outside the established procedures of international society, intervention may often simply be imprudent or, in the language of just war theory, not stand a reasonable chance of success. Intervention risks further inflaming already highly volatile situations, claiming civilian lives and precipitating or accelerating further refugee crises. As Dunne (2008, 22) has put it, ‘[a] key dimension of good international citizenship is confronting moral limits as well as possibilities’ such that, ‘[i]n many cases’ of humanitarian disaster, ‘it may be prudent not to act’ (emphasis in original).

One upshot of the focus on humanitarian intervention in discussions of good international citizenship has been that domestic policies, such as asylum policy, that can help to navigate the tensions and controversies inherent in such intervention have been overlooked. While, as I have shown, a willingness to offer asylum to refugees is entailed by the good international citizen’s commitment to human rights as a matter of course, it becomes an even more important tool in the toolkit of good international citizens in this kind of
scenario, alongside other ‘soft’ measures, such as diplomacy, that also fall within the good international citizen’s commitment to multilateralism. Bringing good international citizenship home, so to speak, through a strong asylum policy is one way of making good on good international citizens’ commitment to human rights and R2P where military measures are unfeasible. As solidarist good international citizens seek to mitigate or even eliminate the tension between proceduralism and substantive justice by engaging in the incremental task of, in Linklater’s words, ‘persuading the rest of the international community to adopt a new legality concerning humanitarian wars’ (Linklater 2000, 493), asylum becomes even more important as an interim measure.ix

This way of understanding the relationship between asylum and intervention is distinct from how scholars who focus on asylum and refugee protection have approached the two. For instance, while Dowty and Loescher (1996) have seen refugee crises as potential grounds for military intervention, Matthew Price (2009, 70) has argued that asylum and intervention bear a ‘family relationship’ with each other and are part of a spectrum of policy responses that seek to reform persecutory or otherwise illegitimate states. Price (2009, 77) suggests that, where human rights abuses are severe and flagrant and the numbers of refugees rise greatly, ‘military intervention becomes a viable substitute for asylum’. However, in cases where such intervention is imprudent or politically off the table, the order is reversed, so to speak, and it is asylum that becomes an important substitute for intervention. This is not to imply that intervention and asylum can exactly achieve the same goals, for while asylum can only protect individuals at risk from abuses committed elsewhere rather than tackle them at source, at best intervention will be able to avert them (although, whereas asylum can offer immediate protection, intervention may exacerbate conflict before it has any positive impact, if indeed it has any at all). It is to recognise that, where intervention would be counterproductive, asylum assumes an even greater importance in the repertoire of good international citizens.
This has important implications for the framing of the R2P norm in international society. In common with good international citizenship, R2P has also been understood as being solely or mainly a foreign policy issue for liberal states (Welsh 2014, 3), and has developed independently of the tradition of international refugee law that has been established in modern international society. This separation of R2P and asylum is quite artificial, given the obvious ability of asylum to fulfil R2P by offering protection from atrocity crimes within the territory of other states (Barbour and Gorlick 2008; Bulley 2010; Gilgan 2015; Straehler 2012; Ralph and Souter 2015). More generally, Ian Clark (2013, 154) has observed the process within international society of

macro-categorization into...individual issue areas – violence, climate, movement, and health – as if each is separate and discrete...The powerful additional impact it has had is to present each as if it were self-contained, and to design it in virtual detachment from the self-evident mutual interdependencies that exist among those various regimes. This is, of course, wholly artificial and the source of yet another layer of problems for the people who have to negotiate their way through them.

Although Clark does not draw an explicit moral conclusion from this, it is no great leap from this observation to argue that states should seek to overcome these artificial compartmentalizations, in order to minimise and correct the vulnerabilities that the operation of international society foreseeably creates. In the context of R2P, this means recognising that declarations of R2P’s failure or untimely death (e.g. Rieff 2011), given the failures of intervention, are premature, and enjoins good international citizens to take the lead in recasting and reiterating R2P so as to include asylum. Indeed, this potential role for good international citizens in tailoring the R2P framework to political developments fits well with the picture of middle-power good international citizens engaging in ‘niche diplomacy’ (Youde and Slagter 2013, 124) and acting as norm entrepreneurs.

Special Responsibilities and Asylum

In this article so far, I have argued that good international citizenship should be explicitly seen as entailing special as well as general responsibilities, and that an inclusive
asylum policy should flow from the good international citizen’s commitment to human rights, especially where intervention is unfeasible or would be counterproductive. In the final part of this article, I aim to bring these contentions together, suggesting that asylum becomes an even more important element of good international citizenship where intervention produces refugees, which may lead states to acquire special responsibilities to protect those refugees. Good international citizenship, I also suggest, involves rectifying the inequitable distribution of special responsibilities to protect refugees that currently exists in international society.

International society arguably already contains its own regime of special responsibilities in the domain of asylum and refugee protection. For instance, the principle of non-refoulement within the 1951 Refugee Convention – which bars states from returning refugees to situations where their life or freedom would be endangered – effectively distributes among states a special responsibility to protect refugees when they have reached their territory. This renders refugees’ proximity to another state a powerful criterion for distributing responsibilities to refugees (Gibney 2000). Moreover, through voluntary repatriation – which is pursued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a ‘durable solution’ to displacement – the refugee regime seeks to uphold the initial distribution of responsibility for the world’s population, by affirming the continuing responsibilities of refugees’ states-of-origin towards their estranged citizens.

There is, however, a strong case for arguing that, in order to be full good international citizens, states need to go beyond these existing and imperfect allocations of special responsibilities for refugees. For one thing, this regime of special responsibilities contains strong protection norms for certain displaced persons, namely the persecuted, while containing only weak obligations to those displaced by other factors such as war, severe socio-economic deprivation, and environmental change (Betts 2013). The non-refoulement principle effectively
incentivises the array of non-arrival measures that Western states have erected in recent decades to prevent the arrival of refugees on their territory where the principle would kick in, which ensure that two thirds of the global refugee population remains in the global South, within states that are far less able to offer effective protection to refugees (Gibney 2015, 2). The strength of the non-refoulement principle stands in contrast to the weakness of any ‘burden-sharing’ norm which would oblige states to participate in resettlement schemes (Betts 2009, 3), in which states offer permanent residence to refugees who are residing in a state of first asylum that is unable to offer adequate protection to them.

The currently skewed distribution of special responsibilities to protect refugees across international society should lead us to call the close association in the scholarly literature between good international citizenship and Western liberal democracies into question. This is because some states within the global South act, judged by the numbers of refugees they protect, more in accordance with the principles of good international citizenship and R2P than many liberal-democratic states, and thereby arguably practice a domain-specific form of this citizenship. Indeed, certain states neighbouring Syria have been described as ‘heroically’ fulfilling their R2P by accepting millions of Syrian refugees in recent years (Welsh 2013), while European states have received only around ten per cent of those refugees (UNHCR 2016).

This has important implications for our understanding of the principal actors involved in upholding R2P. Although some non-Western states are closely aligned to pluralist norms (Newman 2013, 241) and have tended to be wary of a Western-driven interventionist agenda that they perceive within R2P, recognition not only of the role of asylum in R2P, but also of the burdens of refugee protection borne by certain non-Western states, demonstrates that R2P need not be seen as the sole preserve of Western liberal democracies.
Nevertheless, it is important not to exaggerate the good international citizen credentials of refugee-hosting states within the global South, for several reasons. First, many of these states fulfil their R2P by accepting refugees only in effect rather than as a result of a clear intention, given that R2P and asylum have been seldom linked by such states and, in the case of states hosting large numbers of Syrian and Iraqi refugees, may be motivated more by cultural and religious affinity (Chatty 2013). Second, their welcoming of refugees may say more about their limited capacity to control their borders than the commitment to R2P and international refugee law that is strongly associated with good international citizenship, as some of these states have not signed or ratified the Refugee Convention.

In addition to working towards an improved assignment of special responsibilities to protect refugees and to rectify the currently inequitable distribution of refugees across international society, the status of any state as a good international citizen will depend on its readiness to discharge any reparative special responsibilities it may bear towards refugees. After all, liberal-democratic states have, in recent decades, caused, contributed to, accelerated or created the conditions for various refugee crises in areas such as Kosovo, Iraq and Libya through their military interventions. According to the widely held principle of reparation, states bear an obligation to offer refugees they have created the most fitting form of reparation that is available to them, which may often be in the form of asylum (Souter 2014). For instance, in the case of Iraq, the invasion of 2003 by several purported good international citizens led to the collapse of the Iraqi state and set the stage for mass displacement, both during the civil war that engulfed Iraq from 2006 until 2007, and as a result of the rise of Islamic State in 2014. Moreover, the removal of Colonel Gaddafi from power in Libya in 2011, made possible by NATO airstrikes, has left a power vacuum and created the conditions for civil war and displacement.

In keeping with the abstract argument concerning the role of special responsibilities in
good international citizenship outlined in the second part of this article, the failure of the intervening states to discharge their reparative special responsibilities to the refugees for whose flight they bear responsibility has not only constituted an injustice to those refugees themselves, but also an inter-state injustice (see also Gibney 2015).xi This is because, if states that create refugees choose not to discharge their special responsibilities towards them, the costs of protecting them of course do not simply vanish, but instead are inevitably borne by other states that often do not bear reparative responsibilities to them. An example of this was the reception of the majority of Iraqi refugees in the years following the US-led invasion by neighbouring states (Sassoon 2009). However, such inter-state injustices also emerged among liberal-democratic states. For instance, in 2006 and 2007 the Swedish town of Södertälje accepted nearly twice the number of Iraqi refugees taken by the US (Sassoon 2009, 102). While the willingness of other states to offer asylum to refugees created by the actions of other third-party states varies, the issue of fairness has been cited by various states as a reason for eventually limiting their contributions to international refugee protection. For instance, a Syrian official – speaking before Syria’s civil war, during which period the country was a haven for large numbers of Iraqis – is quoted as saying that ‘[w]e keep reminding the U.S. that without this war there would be no refugees. The U.S. is not meeting its responsibilities’ (International Crisis Group 2008, 23), while Sweden’s Migration Minister pointed out that Sweden’s intake of Iraqi refugees was ‘equivalent of [sic] the US taking in about 500,000 refugees’ (quoted in Banta 2008, 262). Similarly, the Mayor of Södertälje stated that ‘We are a small town in a small country. We didn’t start the war. It was the United States and Great Britain. They must now take responsibility for the refugees’ (quoted in Jordan 2008). In Jackson’s terms, this represents not only a failure to discharge ‘humanitarian responsibilities’ to refugees, but also a matter of ‘international responsibility’ towards other states (Jackson 2000, 173).
Conclusion

In this article, I have sought to advance debates over the content of good international citizenship and to address a residual indeterminacy within the concept by demonstrating that good international citizenship is not restricted to general duties in the realm of foreign policy, but involves discharging special responsibilities to protect, which in turn involves grants of asylum to refugees. Seeking to fill this gap in theorising on the good international citizen, I called attention to the clear links between good international citizenship and asylum, and argued that recognising and sustaining these links is especially important given the practical limitations of humanitarian intervention. Good international citizenship involves thinking creatively to reshape global norms such as R2P in order to ensure the protection of the vulnerable, and entails a willingness to bear the costs of one’s actions where they create refugees. In this way, I hope to have shown that, although good international citizenship remains a relatively conservative framework, and can only take us so far towards the achievement of a world order reconstituted along cosmopolitan lines, it demands action that – if taken – would result in a significant reduction of injustice and unnecessary suffering within, and partly stemming from, international society.

Bibliography


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For instance, Buller and Harrison (2000, 82) have argued that ‘conceptual ambiguity’ within discussions of good international citizenship, such as the notion of the ‘vital national interest’, ‘runs the risk of giving policy-makers a licence to override ethical considerations when it is convenient for them’ (emphasis in original).

In similar vein, Dunne and McDonald (2013, 5) point to candidate states – such as Qatar, Singapore and China – for the title of ‘illiberal internationalists’.

For an overview of the pluralist/solidarist debate, see Buzan 2014, Part III.

In Buzan’s terminology, good international citizenship may be unable to stretch much beyond a ‘state-centric solidarism’ (Buzan 2014, 115).

However, Andrew Linklater’s work, which views states’ adherence to what he dubs the ‘harm principle’ as a core part of good international citizenship, can be seen as paving the way towards greater recognition of the role of special responsibilities within good international citizenship. Linklater views the harm principle as primarily being a duty of non-maleficence; that is, to ‘do no harm’ (Linklater 2006; Linklater 2011, ch. 2; Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7). Although Linklater sees the harm principle as involving positive duties of assistance as well as negative duties of ‘forbearance’ (Linklater 2006, 343), and occasionally mentions reparation and compensation in his work on harm in world politics (Linklater 2011, 76), he does not appear to see reparative obligations as a core part of the harm principle. It is, however, not difficult to see how a violation of the harm principle could, in common moral thought, give rise to a special responsibility to redress that harm.

I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

In fact, asylum and the figure of the refugee challenges any simple distinction between domestic and foreign policy. As Emma Haddad (2008, 62, 2) has convincingly argued, given that ‘[t]he refugee is at the threshold between inside and outside’, asylum lies ‘between domestic and international politics and brings to the fore the interdependence between the two’.

Dan Bulley (2010) has powerfully shown the potential consequences of viewing intervention and hospitality as mutually exclusive, demonstrating the ways in which the possibilities of action in response to the crisis in Kosovo in the late 1990s were narrowly constructed in Britain, resulting in very few Kosovans being granted asylum in the UK.

I am also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting this point.

Incorporating recognition of reparative obligations towards refugees into the framework of good international citizenship throws up epistemic questions concerning causality, for establishing a state’s special responsibility towards a group of refugees will require the demonstration of causal links between that state’s actions and those refugees’ flight. While a full discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this article, although such causal links can be highly direct in cases of military intervention, even in this kind of case there are potential complexities, given that intervention may enable refugee-producing behaviour of internal actors rather than produce refugees directly.

If those refugees preferred asylum in a state with no reparative duties to them, then responsible states may alternatively offer asylum through financial compensation.