The failure of the statebuilding project, the insurgency and to use the famous phrase Britain's 'scuttle', or ignominious withdrawal, from South Arabia have long been the subject of study, receiving attention from many angles and new perspectives. One aspect which has received less attention is the role of policing in the statebuilding project of the Federation of South Arabia (FSA). This article sets out to explore this lacuna by contextualising the role of policing in statebuilding and examining the impact of its absence in the case of South Arabia. It is clear that Britain left it very late to attempt the construction of a Federal State in the face of mounting pressures and challenges, and even later to establish a proper Federal Police Service, the article thus examines the argument that the lack of developed policing structures was the missing link in the statebuilding process, before asking if Britain simply left the construction of effective and unified policing structures too late, or whether this was simply an impossible task.

It is seemingly now widely recognised that the success of statebuilding is closely tied to the state’s coercive capabilities and it is increasingly clear that the role of the police in this process is vital. One need only look at the exponential increase in the numbers of police attached to UN Peacekeeping and Reconstruction Missions which rose from 1,677 in 1994 to 17,500 in 2010 to see the increased emphasis placed on the police.¹ This is also mirrored in developments in Afghanistan where, as of late 2013, the Afghan National Army’s 185,000 troops are complemented by an Afghan National Police force of 148,500 - based on numbers alone at least it seems police matter.²

In the case of the formation of the Federation of South Arabia however, there was little emphasis placed upon the role and utility of the police. This is perhaps natural given the nature of the threats facing the Federation both internally and externally.
but this poses significant questions. Across the protectorate states of South Arabia and in Aden Colony there were a multiplicity of policing structures, most of which were small, ineffective and under resourced, having developed in an *ad hoc* fashion, and feeling very much like an afterthought in policy terms. The extent to which this mosaic of policing structures hindered rather than helped the process of state creation in the Federation of South Arabia is an important and neglected issue both for South Arabia and for more recent attempts at statebuilding. Understanding whether the fragmented policing that emerged across South Arabia was the usual benign neglect in which the police inevitably come a distant second to the army, or a deliberate policy, driven, in whole or in part, by the demands of local tribal politics, primarily because the Federal rulers remained suspicious of centralised authority exercised from Aden, is, in turn, crucial to understanding how a lack of credible internal security in the FSA led to its downfall. Exploring the politics of policymaking in the area of policing in South Arabia can, in itself, act as a mirror to the continuing necessity of effective policing for both state legitimacy and a sense of national identity. Thus this article engages with the role of policing in statebuilding and explores why it was so neglected in the case of the FSA, with the aim of examining the question of what a Federation-wide police force could have offered to the new state both before and after the merging of the Federal National Guard and the Federal Regular Army in mid-1967, on the eve of South Yemen’s rushed independence.

In this sense, the article has a clear element of the counterfactual about it. However, rather than simply taking a traditional counterfactual approach, imagining how a well-established, nationwide police force might have come about if policymaking had been handled differently, and what difference this might have made to the survival of the newly unified state, the article instead uses a mix of historical and security studies methods to explore the role and importance of the police in statebuilding processes, in order to assess the state of policing in Aden and the protectorates from the 1950s, and explore the reasons for Britain’s neglect of these functions and their impact upon the longevity of the newly constituted state. It is interesting to note here that after the collapse of the Federation upon its independence in November 1967 and the brief but bloody civil war between the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF), the new Marxist state which emerged was able to ruthlessly suppress dissent and had police which
were very much in place to protect the state and the system of government, perhaps
benefitting from the new regime’s links with the population and its recognition of how
information and infiltration led to NLF success meant it was more assiduous in
maintaining these advantages and readily recognised the importance of policing.³

In order to engage with these issues the article begins by taking a closer look at how
best to conceptualise the security environment and the government (and police’s)
role within this sphere. By applying the concept of the security arena it is easier to
see the challenge facing a weak government. Next the role of police in statebuilding
more generally is discussed, in order to develop some key principles which can then
be compared to the particular case of the FSA; here a brief overview of the obstacles
facing the statebuilding process in South Arabia are introduced. With this theoretical
and historical background in place the article then turns to an examination of the
evolution of policing structures in the FSA and British policymaking and thinking
about policing during the 1950s and 1960s. While there were a range of civil police
and armed constabularies across South Arabia, as well as the Aden Police itself, the
half-hearted and last minute attempt at creating a coherent unified police force with a
clear remit in June 1967 left the new force with no time to establish itself.⁴ This looks
very much like a policy failure with concomitant questions arising of why this
happened and what the chances were for the establishment of an efficient and
effective nationwide policing structure, which in turn enable conclusions to be drawn
and the article’s key question to be engaged. Thus, through an exploration of why
policing was sidelined for so long in South Arabia and an examination of what a
police force offers to the process of state formation we can engage with the question:
was the absence of a national police force the missing link in the process of state
creation in South Arabia?

The State–Based Security Arena

A useful framework with which to begin thinking about the nature of policing for
statebuilding can be developed through an understanding of the way in which
security is constructed and maintained. This also necessitates recognition that the
role of the police in this process is different, but complementary to, the role of the
armed forces more generally. In recent decades much effort has gone into trying to
understand the nature of what has come to be called the security sector and the
reforms needed to make it more cohesive, efficient and representative. One of the biggest issues with this approach is that it is based on an ideal type of political structure in which the nation-state maintains a centralised control of the security structures which are tasked with delivering security both for the state (from its internal and external foes) but also for the state's citizens (from crime, disorder and other threats to their rights, property and families). This vision of the state holding the Weberian monopoly of the use of violence through control of centralised security structures was of course the natural model that Western colonial powers would generally wish to export as the ideal type but this ignores two key factors: firstly that this approach was ever really fully applied by Britain in South Arabia outside of the Crown Colony of Aden until the very last years of its presence there, and secondly that the image of a unified, coherent security sector is a useful prism through which to view the provision of security in South Arabia anyway.

The recognition of these facts is useful because it enables us to search for other prisms through which to view the security situation in South Arabia as Britain commenced the process of creating the Federation of South Arabia in earnest from the 1950s onwards. The section below gives an overview of the contours of this process, here it is important to introduce an alternative conceptualisation of the security field which can be used to view Britain's attempts to create the basic elements of a unified state from a disparate mass of feudal rulers, which might (hopefully) have the coercive capacity needed to give it the opportunity to build itself up into something more closely resembling the Weberian ideal type in the longer run, for this in reality was probably the best that could be hoped for in the circumstances.

The important thing to realise is that despite the British presence in Aden and its attempts to engage in 'aerial policing' of restive tribes further away from the strategic port, Britain's presence in these areas was always sparse and fleeting. Each ruler was long responsible for maintaining order within his domains and it was not until the 1950s that more centralised forms were really instituted. Even those security forces which were developed to enable the rulers some semblance of control of their fiefs tended to be small in number and capacity, and in addition there were often numerous security forces operating under the control of each ruler, often alongside other informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and the maintenance of order in isolated communities. This meant that while the British often appeared to consider
the project of creating security structures for the new state more in the vein of modern-day security sector reform, what they really faced was a situation in which security was a product provided by multiple suppliers and the field in which this provision took place was therefore not a definable sector of the state but instead an arena of competition and co-operation which was constantly shifting and changing, and importantly was one in which, when the suppliers of security were identified, the state itself may or may not have primacy in the field. This security arena in which sub-state security is played out 'alludes to the personalized or neopatrimonial relationships and inter-agency rivalries conducted amongst and between political elites and security actors such as police, militaries, intelligence agencies, special units, warlords, militia and commercial security companies'. What Britain faced from the 1950s was a patchwork quilt even of different formal security bodies with different aims and objectives, controlled by different rulers; in addition to locally privatised forms of security, soft security functions which were largely hidden from its view and frequently even from the rulers themselves - often exercised by cultural and spiritual leaders - and a society suffused with weapons in which the exercise of authority was often more of a negotiation than a right. Added to this were inter and intra tribal squabbles, insurgent movements with both Nasserite and Communist leanings (and concomitant external support) and a lack of time and resources with which to address these issues.

The utility of the concept of the security arena is that it explicitly forces us to confront the absence of many of the conditions in which, we take for granted, a security sector will be operating. Realising that the state's security structures are not dominant and may not even be considered primus inter pares is an important step and enables us to explore how best to develop the state's coercive capacities to enable it to at least reach the latter position and develop from there. This may also be an important clue in explaining why the Federal Army received so much attention while policing received so little when the time came for Britain to try to put the security forces of the FSA on a more sustainable footing. Having a robust army which can dominate all other contestants within the security arena gives the state a dominant position in negotiations over issues of security and offers it protection from forces which wish to either take over the state or to see its collapse because it is a challenge to existing power structures. At this juncture one may well ask what utility can be ascribed to policing if a strong and capable federal armed forces can give the
state a predominant position in the security arena with which to engage with other security providers and societal actors.

**Policing**

Policing is often the Cinderella service when it comes to more recent post-conflict reconstruction efforts, security sector reform and even when upholding colonial power. Time and time again policing appears to be an afterthought rather than being seen as critical to stability and order in any Weberian-style nation-building project. Instead, it is the military which receives the lion's share of attention and resources. In the absence or weakness of policing structures, it is the military which is, in turn, forced into supporting an inadequate police service or ends up becoming a repressive instrument used for police work but without the training or temperament to perform these duties adequately, often with disastrous political and humanitarian results. An added problem when it comes to police forces in much of the developing world is the question of policing priorities, protecting the state or protecting the population, far too often the police themselves are used as a repressive instrument of the state. Rather than a complement to the role of the military in the Weberian ideal, they are merely an adjunct force. It is of course important to bear in mind that methods of policing differ and may not always match with the aims and expectations of various audiences both within, and without, the state. Despite this, a clear ‘ideal type’ has emerged that has attracted an international consensus and this type is rooted in a British approach which was gradually moving from the British mainland into the colonies from the 1950s onwards.⁷

The ideal type of policing for much of the liberal-democratic world is clearly one in which the dichotomy between these two roles, of protecting the state and the public, is bridged through good relationships, trust and responsiveness. Even many less-democratic regimes have learnt that the use of the police as a repressive tool of state power is no guarantee of regime survival. Instead, the police must be used as more than just a blunt instrument and it is perhaps in this manner that they are best able to complement the power of the regular armed forces. As David Bayley points out, 'capturing, killing or imprisoning people who commit violent acts does not mitigate insecurity in the long term unless the identification of perpetrators or targets is guided by precise intelligence.'⁸ This is down to the need to be seen to be
proportionate and to give the impression of omnipotence. It is clear that the police can only be of a limited efficacy acting on their own, because 'the great effectiveness multiplier in the use of state power against violence is the allegiance and support of the public'\textsuperscript{9} and in order to gain this support 'responsibility for security should be entrusted as far as possible to police deployed among the population who minimise the use of force and who act in accordance with local norms'.\textsuperscript{10} Whether the implementation of this ideal type was ever entirely possible in South Arabia is a moot point since it is clear that there was a desire to aim for this kind of policing among policymakers, as plans for a single union-wide police force, the South Arabian Police, were developed during the 1960s. More importantly for us, is to recognise the importance that is placed on the police in the academic literature on the statebuilding process and that the skills they offer to the state are an essential counterpart to those of the armed forces within the security arena. In the end, the brute power of the armed forces can deter and contain, while giving the state time to use its position of power preponderance in the security arena to reach political compromises with other actors in this arena wherever possible. The police on the other hand are more day-to-day security actors, since in Britain’s vision of how the world should be, the military is a last resort when the situation has escalated and a direct threat to the state’s security has emerged and cannot be handled in any other way. The police act as a buffer between the armed forces and the population; they are designed to build networks, prevent escalation, communicate information between the population and the state (and vice versa), and, as importantly, to serve and protect the public. In this sense then, they are the public face of the state and have a vital role to play in upholding order and providing security, which as the foundational benefit of having a state for the population, goes a long way to securing the legitimacy of the state itself, whilst also assisting in the creation of a common national identity.

It is perhaps natural to see what happened in South Arabia, with the effective collapse of policing and the failure to create a nationwide police force in the form of the South Arabian Police until the very last moment of British rule, and dismiss the chances of the police making any difference at all. Yet clearly Britain was successful in creating police forces elsewhere in the colonies which played a significant role in the statebuilding process. Closer to Aden there is also the example of the efficacy of Policing in South Arabia in the form of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion (HBL)\textsuperscript{11} in the Eastern Protectorates, granted there are differences between the two areas but it is
clear that the HBL had a significant role in bringing order to the region and enabled it to remain stable for longer. Established in 1938 after the 'Ingrams' Peace' was secured, 'the British-officered Hadhrami Bedouin Legion was formed along the lines of Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion in Transjordan and given the task of providing security in the Protectorate. With modifications this security system was still in place when the National Liberation Front took over from the British in 1967.' What is especially interesting about this force is that it behaved more like a police force than an army. Its job was to build relationships, trust and legitimacy; importantly beginning its work in 1938, this gave it the time to embed itself. As Doreen Ingrams puts it when talking of the region's development: 'none of this could have happened if there had not been peace, and peace would not have been maintained without the formation of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion'. The force, established by Harold Ingrams, brought together tribesmen 'from different tribes to serve in policing the country, in spreading education, in giving medical help, arbitrating, and developing a sense of trust between the various sections of the community...[there was a process of] learning to accept erstwhile enemies as friends and appreciating the benefits of order and justice'. Not only was the force able to end tribal warfare and raiding, thus enabling trade and development but its multifaceted role and the respect it earned led to the tribes' increasing trust of the government and appreciation of the benefits it brought. In this sense then it was a classic example of the role that unified, well directed policing can play in statebuilding projects - in stark contrast to the example in the Western Protectorates.

**Statebuilding in South Arabia**

It is important to bear in mind something of the context in which Britain was attempting to make the new Federation of South Arabia cohere and create the structures of a new state from the 1950s onwards, and especially in the run-up to withdrawal in 1967. The four key obstacles can be classified roughly as internal politics, regional politics, internal dissent and economic and political constraints. There is, naturally enough, a degree of interconnectivity between these factors and together they have consistently been used in the literature on South Yemen and the Federation to explain why London's statebuilding attempts appeared to fall on such barren ground.
The literature on Britain's policy in South Arabia and the collapse of the Federation is well established with clear dividing lines on the most important factors, from Nasserite subversion, to squabbling local rulers and Britain's loss of will. It is not necessary to review this literature extensively here. Instead, it is important to highlight the general lack of attention that the role of the police has received in these academic debates and to highlight how the lack of attention paid by Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) itself to policing is mirrored by the focus placed on the new Federal Army on the one hand and on the wider political difficulties in the statebuilding project on the other. It is evident that the piecemeal nature of the process of forming the Federation was a significant factor but there is a further issue in that the literature divides over either particular focus on the insurgency, or particular focus on the wider politics. It is evident from the literature that common factors are often highlighted and it is merely the degree of emphasis which is given that is the key factor. Clearly, poor co-ordination of intelligence activities was a key problem and is something in which policing plays a real role but it is also possible to point to the piecemeal nature of the creation of the Federation with different rulers showing varying levels of interest, the lack of any internal hegemon (as with Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) to drive the process and impose itself, the lack of any sense of national unity and the lack of effective bureaucratic structures at Federal level can all further be pointed to, in addition to the four themes highlighted above, all of which also hindered the role of the police.

Usually, mention of the police in the academic literature is made only in connection to the difficulties faced by the Aden Police or in mentioning the mutiny of the South Arabian Police in 1967. The police are already seen in the literature as a dead letter. Thus as Ian Beckett puts it:

Aden was a failure for the British but largely as a result of the premature announcement by the Labour government in 1966 of its intention to leave South Arabia, undermining at a stroke the authorities of the Federation of South Arabia and the whole counterinsurgency effort. Increasingly, indeed, federal officials and even local governments in the emirates, sultanates, and sheikhdoms either left the country altogether or threw in their lot with the insurgent movements. In any case, intelligence had never been forthcoming freely from the population, and there was now little incentive to cooperate. Arab members of the Special Branch already had been targeted by the insurgents, and the local police forces were thoroughly infiltrated, both the South Arabian Police and Aden Armed Police.
This quote highlights a number of key themes which crop up repeatedly in the literature, namely lack of British staying power, unreliability of allies and the successful decapitation of intelligence and policing by the insurgents. In this sense, the police are given a reverse importance in that by being targeted and infiltrated they become useless, thus contributing to defeat but they are not discussed in terms of what led to their being targeted or what contributed to the infiltration which rendered them ineffective in the first place. No emphasis is placed on Britain's failures to build up the police over a longer period and to give them the support needed to be able to become an effective tool of the state.

There is a strong suggestion in much of the literature that the insurgency was irresistible and that it was inevitable that the armed forces and police would be compromised. This is put forward especially by R.J. Gavin. On the other side the counterinsurgency (COIN) scholar Thomas Mockaitis believes that Britain was unable to defeat the insurgents because of their own actions (and as importantly inaction). This is the starting point of this article. Jacob Abadi agrees, stating that, 'local resistance to British rule in South Arabia was not sufficient to bring an end to British rule'; he instead ascribes the failure of the new state to 'Britain's failure to create a new collaborative local elite which could have replaced the old one', increasing costs of occupation exacerbated by foreign intervention in South Arabia and the wider moves to rearrange defence 'East of Suez'. Here the broader changes contributing to problems with the statebuilding project in terms of funding and local political direction come to the fore and were only exacerbated by the insurgency.

**Policing During a Counterinsurgency**

While during the 1950s the problems faced by Britain in South Arabia were centred around trade union militancy, low level sabotage and subversive acts, alongside political intransigence amongst the rulers, by the 1960s the situation was rapidly spiralling into a full-blown insurgency. The absence of strong and coherent policing in this phase is arguably of critical importance because it provides opportunities to disrupt and deter escalation, thus it is in these early stages when the police rather than the army can be most effective in preventing a descent into greater, more sustained and threatening forms of violence. Granted, for Britain, many of these
issues were centred on Aden which did have a police force but beyond the colony there were no policing structures under British control, thus, as the situation got out of hand there was little choice but to escalate rapidly into full-scale military counterinsurgency operations.

Even after the outbreak of significant levels of organised political violence in the early 1960s the continuing absence of an organised nationwide police force continued to be a major handicap since, as Bayley and Perito put it, 'the comparative advantage of the police vis-à-vis the military is not to become "little soldiers", doing proactive counter-insurgency. Instead, their comparative advantage is to respond to the security needs of individuals, thus contributing to the legitimacy of struggling local governments'; this connection with the population is crucial for good counterinsurgency and provides much needed intelligence. In Aden and the protectorates it was this absence of legitimacy and intelligence which was to prove fatal to the health of the newly inaugurated federation. The seeming absence of the idea of police primacy which was supposedly a hallmark of British counterinsurgency was perhaps more a recognition of the inability of the police forces to play this role given their size, capabilities and Balkanisation.

The Evolution of Policing Structures in the FSA

During Britain’s long association with South Arabia responsibility for policing duties was largely left to local Sheikhs, while in Aden a police force was not properly formed until the 1920s. As plans were made to gradually bring together the British protected Sheikhdoms of South Arabia into more cohesive administrative units the pattern of benign neglect of the police seemingly continued, with attention falling on the armed forces rather than formal policing structures right up to the formation of the Federation of South Arabia and independence in 1967. The Geraghty and Penfold-Young reports of the mid-1960s both recommended the creation of a Federal Police Force, the reinforcement of existing policing structures and better coordination between existing police-like units and the Aden Police. However in comparison to other security priorities, and particularly the Federal Regular Army there was little real emphasis placed upon the role and utility of the police, and even less resource available. This was perhaps natural given the nature of the threats facing the Federation both internally and externally but poses two significant
questions: firstly, what was the role and capability of police forces in South Arabia and secondly, what was Britain’s policy towards policing in Aden and the protectorates and how and why did it evolve over time? The answers to these questions are somewhat depressing in that the role gradually blurred with that of the armed forces, capabilities remained inadequate\textsuperscript{24} and evolution was glacial and then far too rapid from the end of 1965.

Perhaps one of the greatest problems in terms of the policing of South Arabia was the multiplicity of police forces which existed across the nation. Since the focus of the article is on the role of police in statebuilding in South Arabia and Britain’s inability to create a union-wide police force which had the necessary capacity to fulfil its remit, it is only necessary here to give a flavour of the diversity of police and internal security forces across the territory. As Jill Crystal states in the context of the development of policing structures in Kuwait, a state which had a single unified force from the outset, ‘to maintain continuous order requires the energy of the whole state’.\textsuperscript{25} In South Arabia the diversity of police and the lack of a nationwide force mitigated against even the energy of the whole of the police being directed at maintaining order; this was further exacerbated by the increasing disconnect between the police’s job of promoting and maintaining ‘general order’, and policing dissent against the state, as well as the fact that general order itself needs to be created and structured through consistent effort in the statebuilding process, which in this instance appeared to be more set on undermining order than in nurturing it. Thus to give some idea of the numbers of different police and security units, there were: the Aden Armed Police, Aden Civil Police, Federal National Guard (FNG), Government Guards, Tribal Guards, Lahej Police, Mahra Tribal Guard; and just in one Sultanate, the Qu’aiti Armed Constabulary (plus Civil Police, the Prison Guards, the Customs Police, and the irregular non-uniformed Desert Guards).\textsuperscript{26}

The quality of these units naturally varied wildly to begin with and gradually grew worse as events ran their course, thus as D.J. McCarthy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) who was working for the High Commissioner in Aden noted in 1965, ‘the British machine as distinct from Arabised British, is ramshackle and running down and lacks most elements of normal infrastructure (i.e. career subordinate staff, automatic distributions, coherent command structure etc.). The successor Arab administrative machine barely exists yet.’\textsuperscript{27} To make things worse
police loyalties were also 'deeply divided'\(^{28}\) and this further complicated their role in providing reliable intelligence. It was in this environment that the creation of a Federal Police Force was finally begun.

**The Creation of the South Arabian Police**

The need for a Federal Police Service was not really widely recognised amongst officials until the early 1960s but perhaps more important than the absence of this force was the weakness of policing structures in general and the unwillingness to build up police capacity and resources more generally.\(^{29}\) This can be seen in the archival documents in the early and mid 1950s where discussions were taking place about the expansion of Aden's two police forces; expansion that was only envisaged in the low dozens of officers.\(^{30}\) Even as the insurgency was growing rapidly in the early 1960s there was much ink spilled over the addition of a further four Special Branch Officers for Aden.\(^{31}\) More ambitious expansion plans outlined in the Morris Report submitted to London in December 1961 rapidly got bogged down in Treasury objections to the cost.\(^{32}\) The report envisaged a rolling programme of police expansion between 1963 and 1966. Police housing had long been an issue and the colonial divides between the quality of housing for the local and expatriate officers were stark, Morris recommended the construction of some 500 new police houses. In fact, the whole plan was eventually rejected as being too ambitious and costly. It was also overambitious in terms of capacity - ‘The Director of Federal Works made it quite clear that even if he had the money, there was no capacity to build houses on the scale recommended by Morris’.\(^{33}\)

As the situation deteriorated in South Arabia during the 1960s HMG commissioned in-depth reports examining various aspects of the Federation, the two most significant of which are the Geraghty Report and the Penfold-Young Report. The latter dealing with ‘the situation' proposed the re-equipment and expansion of the Federal Force and expansion of the Hadrami Bedouin Legion and of other Eastern protectorate police. The expansions\(^{34}\) agreed by HMG in the wake of the report consisted of a tiered level of priorities and included in level one, expansion of forces and new weapons for the army and an additional platoon for the HBL, in level two further support for the army and on the police side an additional company for the HBL, a riot squad for Mukalla Police, and an expansion of the Kathiri Armed
Constabulary. The letter outlining these modest police expansions stated: ‘We should explain that compelling need to limit Government expenditure in present financial difficulties of U.K, obliges us to restrict consideration to proposals that are absolutely vital to maintain the security of the Federation and other States.’  

The report meanwhile stated that the role of the Federal Regular Army (FRA) should be ‘the maintenance of internal security and tribal law and order in support of the Federal Guard’; it also recommended the eventual formation of ‘c. A Federal Mobile Armed Police [and] d. A static Federal Police Force’. 

The Geraghty Report had a narrower remit, exploring ‘The Administrative Problems of the F.R.A and the Federal Guard’. This report also ended up recommending reorganisation and commented on the need for police. At this stage J.P. Morton noted that on his reading of the report his proposals were threefold and he hoped Sir Ivor Stourton would champion them. The first was ‘[t]here should be a Federal Police Force... The components of the Federal Police would be the local or State Police forces... these forces would retain certain local responsibilities to their Rulers or Governments for the maintenance of law and order; but in regard to certain central subjects they would be liable to central direction and control’. Second, he believed that, ‘there should be a Federal Special Branch built into the Federal Police’, and third, that this should come under the direction of the Federal Intelligence Committee. These ideas then had to work their way through the system. What eventually emerged was the decision to establish the South Arabian Police from a merger of part of the FNG 2 (units which operated within the borders of individual states), the Aden Civil Police and the Aden Armed Police, the latter consisting of just 350 men. Worse still, in April 1967, 40 per cent of the rank and file of the FNG had no uniform, and unlike the new army reorganisation ‘the police amalgamation never really materialised [meaning] the combined South Arabian Police force existed in name only’.

**The Police, The Army and the 1967 Dual Mutiny**

The new force lacked manpower, facilities, and presence across all the states, as well as clear command structures. In addition to the confusion of police forces, with different make-ups, responsibilities, duties and lines of command, there were also tensions between the army and the police. Indeed, both forces were disrupted by the
process of attempting to absorb the disparate security forces of the protectorates
and Aden. It is regrettable to have difficulties with the police but to have the army
interrupted at the same time spells suicide for any state attempting to secure its place
in the security arena just as the colonial power is heading for the exit. In this case
the new South Arabian Army (SAA) which had received the lion’s share of British
attention and limited resources was also destabilised by its merger with elements of
the Federal National Guard, all of which was further exacerbated by personality
clashes.

The political situation at the time, the penetration of the army and the new South
Arabian Police by the opposition and declining British power combined to bring about
the mutiny of both the army and the newly constituted South Arabian Police, along
with the Aden Armed Police. On the morning of 20 June 1967 units mutinied over a
complex mixture of rumour, suspicion and frustration connected with hostility towards
Britain over its suspected support of Israel in the six-day war, as well as the
controversial suspension of three Arab Colonels. The disturbances led to the deaths
of 22 British troops in a series of engagements throughout that day, which quickly
turned into inter-tribal and politically inspired violence between supporters of FLOSY
and the NLF in which the Crater District of Aden was completely taken over by
insurgents and not recaptured until 3 July.

The mutiny is seen by many as the ultimate failure of the statebuilding project in
South Arabia. It is perhaps ironic that the police were so well represented in the
symbolic end of the Federation, given the lack of attention given to the importance of
policing for so long. It is not just that the police were an afterthought, receiving little
attention and resources when compared to the army but that by the time policing
began to be recognised it was simply too late for it to be a successful measure in
shoring up the Federation and advancing the statebuilding process. Events had
moved on too quickly and it was both the lack of a nationwide police, the hollowing
out of the effectiveness of the existing police forces and the wider decline in the
prospects of the statebuilding project which combined to mean that the new South
Arabian Police would face an impossible task and were already a dead letter before
they were officially formed.
Fragmentation, Entrepreneurialism, Self Interest and the Role of the Rulers

As part of the wider statebuilding project clearly responsibilities had to be gradually transferred to the new structures of the state and in this sense to the new ministers who were of course the rulers of the various states which made up the Federation. This in itself brought about a series of problems of co-ordination. On a practical level the removal of the rulers to the new capital at al-ittihad brought with it two consequences for policing. Firstly, having to split their time between federal and local administration meant that neither role received the attention it deserved, and there are frequent complaints from British personnel of being unable to get approval from ministers. Secondly, the distance created, both physically and mentally, between the rulers and the ruled increased. Rulers were spending less time in their territories and were less able to direct local police forces, deal personally with disputes and to gather intelligence. The new union capital also created a new power base in which the rulers were further distracted from events as they squabbled over roles, precedence, responsibilities and jurisdictions. Where the limits of federal authority lay in relation to the states which made up the union was always a pressing problem, which in turn posed problems for policing. This political problem in turn played into Britain’s problems with the establishment of a nationwide police force.

This situation was made worse by the decision to have both a Minister of the Interior, Sharif Husain, and a Minister of Internal Security, Sultan Salih, who both attempted to control policing as part of their remit. As Aden was merged with the Federation, the already pressing problems facing the Aden Police in terms of understaffing and the number of incidents needing police response transmuted themselves into issues of command and control, and federal high politics. The Commissioner of Police in Aden, Arthur Wiltshire, told John Harding, the Chief Minister’s advisor, ‘Before merger, both the Civil and Armed Police were my operational responsibility, and I was directly answerable to the Governor. After merger the Armed Police became a Federal Force under Sharif Husain. They’re still based in Crater, and are supposed to be Aden’s first line of defence. However, neither Sharif Husain nor his Civil Servants ever come near the place, and I have to go through every sort of bureaucratic hoop before I can use them’. In addition, since the bulk of the force was already recruited from tribes in the Western protectorates, as soon as they came under federal control, since ‘their strongest affinities are with individual Federal...
Ministers, many Adenis now regard them as a quasi-military Federal force with a mandate to control Aden at their rulers' whim.\textsuperscript{44} Thus the transition had both reduced the legitimacy of the Aden Armed Police in the eyes of their public while at exactly the same time reducing the ability of the Commissioner to use them in a timely and effective manner. These issues further emphasise the rushed nature of these processes, showing that even in the absence of any Federal Police Force existing pieces of the policing mosaic were already degrading in both legitimacy and effectiveness.

What made things worse over time was that these tensions between rulers, different police forces and the Federal Regular Army continued to further complicate the wider problem of where the legitimacy of security ultimately lay. As the legitimacy of the rulers diminished, this was further exacerbated by the capricious nature of many policy decisions and compounded by Britain's increasing inability to arbitrate between the rulers and the different security forces on the ground. London and Aden's earlier inability to rationalise the security forces while they still had sufficient power and influence had led directly to a situation in which security seemed to be no-one's responsibility and security forces focused more on internal squabbles than on the threats to the state, while also neglecting to provide for the security of the population. A classic example of this can be seen in the early 1960s with the position of Brigadier James Lunt, Commander of the Federal Regular Army. Having deployed troops to reinforce the position at Beihan, command of the operation became problematic since 'the Federal National Guard (FNG) units permanently stationed at Beihan were controlled by the Emir [and] a keen rivalry existed between the two forces that made co-ordinating the two forces difficult'. To make matters worse 'Lunt was subordinate to the Arab federal Minister of Defence as commander of the FRA, but, as a seconded British officer, he was ultimately answerable to the Commander, Middle East Land Forces based in Aden. He received orders from both, which were often "contradictory or at least divergent".\textsuperscript{45} The situation was clearly worse than this in issues of jurisdiction, command and control when it came to the police, given the lack of a Federal Force, the continuing patchwork quilt of forces under different commands, and the added rivalry with the army.

Fragmentation of policing responsibilities between the British and the Rulers, and between state and federal levels led to extreme opacity and a lack of co-ordination,
direction and sense of responsibility, made worse by the replacement of British Officers with locals in the run-up to independence. This period was followed by rapid consecutive integrations of police forces (and militias with a more martial role) leading to numerous power struggles between rulers, officers and tensions within newly merged units. This contributed to the general environment of chaos prevalent at the time, which in turn created further distance between the police and society. As policing rapidly moved towards the creation of the South Arabian Police in 1966, nepotism, corruption and abuse of power became ever more prevalent due to the wider environment and the lack of control from above. This led to breakdowns in discipline, caused in part by people thinking about their own roles, fortunes and security post-independence, certain in the knowledge that the police would not be able to operate effectively.

While all of this was ongoing, the insurgency itself had gained increased strength and the police (of all kinds) increasingly found themselves taking on state security functions. In other words they had rapidly become just another army within the security arena, unable to bring much in the way of distinctiveness of skills. In short, they isolated themselves from the population and were reduced in influence accordingly. This of course was a process made much worse by the public's plummeting lack of trust and confidence in the Federation, which further fuelled their lack of trust in the police. When one also factors in the considerable social change which had swept the Arab World, not least Aden and the Protectorates in the preceding decades, the job facing the police by the mid-1960s seemed insurmountable. With increased urbanisation, growing populations, new ideas, increased information flows and internal migration it is unsurprising that rapid and complex social change was severely disrupting existing social orders. This was clearly, in large part, what undermined the authority of the rulers themselves - hence why Abadi highlighted Britain's failure to cultivate a new elite as being an important factor in the problems it faced. But beyond this, and perhaps more importantly, these changes fractured existing social orders based on deference, seniority and social values, thereby also undermining systems of self policing so crucial in enabling the police to support the maintenance of order.
Conclusion - Just Too Late or Just Not Possible?

The story of multiple failures in the realm of policing in South Arabia outlined above is a complex mix of unintended consequences, good intentions and changing circumstances which made the task of statebuilding even more difficult than usual. It is however possible to highlight some of the key factors which severely hampered the development of the kind of policing structures needed in South Arabia to give the new state a chance of survival. These factors are a mix of those directly associated with policing policy, alongside wider factors which mitigated against the chances of a successful experiment in statebuilding.

Without doubt for the majority of the period in question, the Aden Police were the leading policing body in the whole of South Arabia having been much longer established and run along the lines of a relatively modern and efficient force. In this sense then they represented the embryo from which a nationwide force may have been built, yet at the same time the policing challenges of Aden were vastly different to those of the hinterland. The Aden Police were expanded only at a piecemeal rate despite the many challenges they faced. It also did not help that the Police in Aden were divided between the Aden Civil Police and the Aden Armed Police. With low numbers of officers, organisational and bureaucratic problems, and too many pressures in the face of strikes, civil unrest and terrorism, they were in no position to help build a nation-wide force. The very fact that they were compromised and targeted so directly by FLOSY and the NLF demonstrates both of these groups' understanding of the importance of police. Clearly, by the time Britain realised the need for improved policing it was far too late.

This belated recognition led to a last-minute flurry of activity which, although well intentioned, further disrupted the ability of the police to function. There was a shift from absolute fragmentation to too much centralisation, and the need for stability and continuity in policing was not properly considered.\textsuperscript{47} Even this final push to establish the South Arabian Police lacked the resources needed to make any real difference. Ultimately, Britain failed to fully appreciate the importance of policing in general, and a national police force in particular, it was unable to shape order effectively and did not understand the nature of the security arena in South Arabia. When this interacted
with the wider failures in the statebuilding process the chances of the successful establishment of a nationwide police force were reduced to nil.

In this sense then, it becomes clear that, in addition to the many obstacles: cultural, political and societal, Britain simply left it far too late to focus on policing in South Arabia. The mosaic of forces were left underdeveloped for far too long and the move towards a nationwide force came far too late in the day to have any impact against the tide of the insurgency, and was unable to win round the population to the new state when they could already clearly see which way the wind was blowing and had nothing to gain and everything to lose from supporting the police. Policing is a complex mix of factors and relies on the creation of relationships. These relations were often simply not there or were undermined by the rapid changes in direction, structure and policy regarding policing, especially during the 1960s. Clearly, we can never know what difference a nation-wide police force which benefitted from consistent policy, and sufficient material and political support might have achieved in shoring up the position of the new Federal State, but what is clear is that the police never stood a chance of achieving much because they simply were not given the time or the support to establish themselves in the communities of South Arabia.

The sidelining of policing policy as part of the British policymaking and statebuilding processes in South Arabia can therefore be seen as an important factor in the failure of the FSA, made only more toxic by the other challenges facing the new state and British policymakers. This article has sought to supplement the archival record by integrating ideas from the literature on policing and security which emphasise the reasons for the importance of policing more generally for the health and development of the state. In doing so, it has added greater depth to the story of the failure of Britain's statebuilding project in South Arabia, demonstrating that the extent to which the collapse of the Federation and British withdrawal in 1967 was in fact as much dependent on the failure to establish the legitimacy and efficiency of the organs of state policing, as it was down to the challenges posed by the Aden Trades Union Congress, Insurgency and Egyptian intrigue.
Notes

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4 This is succinctly put in a larger context by Stephen Campbell who stated that: ‘The army and police were gradually drawn into an asymmetric conflict amongst the people that they lacked the precision, persistence, flexibility and size to overcome’, Stephen Campbell, An Exit Strategy not a Winning Strategy? Intelligence Lessons From the British ‘Emergency’ in South Arabia, 1963-67 (2012), p.41, available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a569736.pdf].
7 Naturally this movement happened at different speeds in different places but it is clear from the sweep of the policy documents that it had some influence in decisions over the approach policing in South Arabia and added to the feeling that the army was more important than the police. For more on the development of colonial policing and changes in attitudes towards the colonial model during the End of Empire see: Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
13 Robert D. Burrowes, Historical Dictionary of Yemen (Plymouth, Scarecrow Press, 2010), p.17
15 In most academic debates on South Arabia the police are almost totally ignored, if indeed they are mentioned at all.
21 A small police force, a branch of the Bombay Police, was formed in 1857 but with only 16 officers: two European Inspectors and the remainder Indian recruits, a scant force for what would become one of the Empire’s premier ports and strategically vital colony. See also: Cliff Lord and David Birtles, The Armed Forces of Aden and the Protectorate 1839-1967 (Solihull: Helion & Co., 2011), pp.14-16.
This list does not even pretend to be exhaustive and only mentions official forces. It would be virtually impossible to capture the true nature of the numbers, power and role of unofficial actors within the security arena of South Arabia in this era. For more information on the diversity of official forces see: Cliff Lord and David Birtles, *The Armed Forces of Aden and the Protectorate 1839-1967* (Solihull: Helion & Co., 2011).

In addition to these recommendations there were separate proposals for an all British police unit for Aden consisting of 24 officers, as well as a further six supernumerary officers in the rank of Senior Superintendent. CO 1037/226, Aden: Creation of British Police Unit, J.V. Mullin To Ivor Roberts, 27 September 1965.

Britain held an in-depth post mortem into the disorders as they were euphemistically termed which pointed to a wide range of failings, unsurprisingly across two files containing this post mortem, very little concrete is mentioned about the failings of policing. See: FCO 8/436, Disorders in South Arabian Armed Forces, 1967 and FCO 8/437, Disorders in South Arabian Armed Forces, 1967.

One positive outcome of the failures in South Arabia was a keen desire to avoid a repetition. For the post mortem see: FCO 8/253, Lessons from South Arabia, 1967.